The works of St. Philip consisted of the fort proper, a structure of

brick and earth mounting in barbette four VIII-inch columbiads and one

24-pounder; and two water batteries on either side of the main work,

the upper mounting sixteen 24-pounders, the lower, one VIII-inch

columbiad, one VII-inch rifle, six 42-pounders, nine 32s, and four

24s. There were here, then, forty-two guns commanding the river below

the bend, up which the ships must come, as well as the course of the

stream in their front. Besides these there were one VIII-inch and one

X-inch mortar in the fort; one XIII-inch mortar, whose position does

not appear; and a battery of four X-inch sea-coast mortars, situated

below and to the northeast of the lower water battery. These last

pieces for vertical shell-firing had no influence upon the ensuing

contest; the XIII-inch mortar became disabled at the thirteenth fire

by its own discharge, and the X-inch, though 142 shell were fired from

them, are not so much as mentioned in the reports of the fleet.

Fort Jackson, on the southern bank of the bend, was a pentagonal

casemated work, built of brick. In the casemates were fourteen

24-pounder smooth-bore guns, and ten flanking howitzers of the same

calibre. Above these, in barbette, were two X-inch and three VIII-inch

columbiads, one VII-inch rifle, six 42-pounders, fifteen 32s, and

eleven 24s; total in the fort, sixty-two. Just outside of and below

the main work, covering the approach to it, was a water battery

carrying one X-inch and two VIII-inch columbiads, and two rifled

32-pounders.[4] Of the guns in Jackson, the flanking howitzers and

half a dozen of the 24- and 32-pounders could, from their position,

have had little or no share in the battle with the fleet.

The number and calibre of the guns have been thus minutely stated

because it can scarcely fail to cause surprise that so many of them

were so small. Of 109 in the two works, 56 were 24-pounders. The truth

is that the Confederacy was very badly off for cannon, and the

authorities in Richmond had their minds firmly made up that the great

and dangerous attack was to come from above. General Lovell,

commanding the department, begged hard for heavy cannon, but to no

avail; not only were all available sent north, but constant drafts

were made upon the supplies he himself had. New Orleans, the central

point which he was called on to defend, was approachable, not only by

the Mississippi, but through a dozen bayous which, from Pearl River

on the east to the Atchafalaya Bayou on the west, gave access to firm

ground above Forts St. Philip and Jackson, and even above the city.

Works already existing to cover these approaches had to be armed, and

new works in some cases erected, constituting, in connection with St.

Philip and Jackson, an exterior line intended to block approach from

the sea. A second, or interior, line of works extended from the river,

about four miles below New Orleans, to the swamps on either hand, and

was carried on the east side round to Lake Ponchartrain in rear of the

city. These were for defence from a land attack by troops that might

have penetrated through any of the water approaches; and a similar

line was constructed above the city. The interior works below the

city, where they touched the river on the right bank, were known as

the McGehee, and on the left bank as the Chalmette line of batteries.

The latter was the scene of Jackson's defeat of the English in 1815.

All these works needed guns. All could not be supplied; but the

necessity of providing as many as possible taxed the general's

resources. In March, 1862, when it was determined to abandon

Pensacola, he asked for some of the X-inch columbiads that were there,

but all that could be spared from the north were sent to Mobile, where

the commanding officer refused to give them up. In addition to other

calls, Lovell had to spare some guns for the vessels purchased for the

navy on Lake Ponchartrain and for the River Defence Fleet.

General Duncan had general charge of all the works of the exterior

line, and was of course present at Plaquemine Bend during the attack.

Colonel Higgins was in command of both the forts, with headquarters at

Jackson, Captain Squires being in immediate command of St. Philip.

Auxiliary to the forts there were four vessels of the Confederate

Navy, two belonging to the State of Louisiana, and six of the River

Defence Fleet. The latter were commanded by a Captain Stephenson, who

entirely refused to obey the orders of Commander Mitchell, the senior

naval officer, while professing a willingness to co-operate. The

constitution of this force has already been described. There were also

above, or near, the forts five unarmed steamers and tugs, only one of

which, the tug Mosher, needs to be named.

The naval vessels were the Louisiana, sixteen guns; McRae, seven guns,

six light 32-pounders and one IX-inch shell-gun; Jackson, two

32-pounders; and the ram Manassas, now carrying one 32-pounder

carronade firing right ahead. Since her exploit at the Head of the

Passes in the previous October, the Manassas had been bought by the

Confederate Government, docked and repaired. She now had no prow, the

iron of the hull only being carried round the stem. Her engines and

speed were as poor as before. Lieutenant Warley was still in command.

The State vessels were the Governor Moore and General Quitman, the

former carrying two rifled 32s, and the latter two smooth-bores of the

same calibre; these were sea-going steamers, whose bows were shod with

iron like those of the River Defence Fleet and their engines protected

with cotton. The Moore was commanded by Beverley Kennon, a trained

naval officer, but not then in the Confederate Navy; the Quitman's

captain, Grant, was of the same class as the commanders of the River

Defence Fleet. The Manassas had some power as a ram, and the Moore, by

her admirable handling, showed how much an able man can do with poor

instruments, but the only one of the above that might really have

endangered the success of the Union fleet was the Louisiana. This was

an iron-clad vessel of type resembling the Benton, with armor strong

enough to resist two XI-inch shells of the fleet that struck her at

short range. Her armament was two VII-inch rifles, three IX-inch and

four VIII-inch shell-guns, and seven VI-inch rifles. With this heavy

battery she might have been very dangerous, but Farragut's movements

had been pushed on with such rapidity that the Confederates had not

been able to finish her. At the last moment she was shoved off from

the city on Sunday afternoon, four days before the fight, with workmen

still on board. When her great centre stern wheel revolved, the water

came in through the seams of the planking, flooding the battery deck,

but her engines were not powerful enough to manage her, and she had to

be towed down by two tugs to a berth just above Fort St. Philip, where

she remained without power of movement till after the fight.

When ready, the fleet began moving slowly up the river, under the

pilotage of members of the Coast Survey, who, already partly familiar

with the ground, were to push their triangulation up to the forts

themselves and establish the position of the mortars with mathematical

precision; a service they performed with courage and accuracy. The

work of the surveyors was carried on under the guns of the forts and

exposed to the fire of riflemen lurking in the bushes, who were not

wholly, though they were mostly, kept in check by the gunboats

patrolling the river. On the 16th the fleet anchored just below the

intended position of the mortar-boats on the west bank of the stream.

The day following was spent in perfecting the arrangements, and by the

morning of the 18th two divisions of mortar-boats were anchored in

line ahead, under cover of the wood on the right bank, each one

dressed up and down her masts with bushes, which blended

indistinguishably with the foliage of the trees. Light lines were run

as springs from the inshore bows and quarters; the exact bearing and

distance of Fort Jackson was furnished to each commander, and at 10

A.M. the bombardment began. The van of the fourteen schooners was at

this moment 2,950 yards, the rear 3,980 yards from Fort Jackson, to

which the mortar attack was confined; an occasional shell only being

sent into St. Philip.

The remaining six schooners, called the second division, from the

seniority of its commanding officer, were anchored on the opposite

side, 3,900 yards below Jackson. Here they were able to see how their

shell were falling, an advantage not possessed by those on the other

shore; but there were no trees to cover them. An attempt to disguise

them was made by covering their hulls with reeds and willows, but was

only partly successful; and as the enemy's fire, which began in reply

as soon as the mortars opened, had become very rapid and accurate, the

gunboats of the main squadron moved up to support those of the

flotilla and draw off part of it. Before noon two of the leading

schooners in this division were struck by heavy shot and were dropped

down 300 yards. The whole flotilla continued firing until 6 P.M., when

they ceased by signal. That night the second division was moved across

the river and took position with the others.

Until five o'clock the firing was sustained and rapid from both forts.

At that time the citadel and out-houses of Jackson were in flames, and

the magazine in great danger; so the enemy's fire ceased.

All the mortars opened again on the morning of the 19th and continued

until noon, after which the firing was maintained by divisions, two

resting while the third worked. Thus, about 168 shell were fired every

four hours, or nearly one a minute. At 10 A.M. of the 19th one

schooner was struck by a shot, which passed out through her bottom,

sinking her. This was the only vessel of the flotilla thus destroyed.

Although Jackson was invisible from the decks of the mortar-boats and

the direction given by sights fixed to the mastheads, the firing was

so accurate and annoying as to attract a constant angry return from

the fort. To draw off and divide this one of the corvettes and two or

three of the gunboats took daily guard duty at the head of the line,

from 9 A.M. one day to the same hour the next. The small vessels

advancing under cover of the trees on the west bank would emerge

suddenly, fire one or two shots drifting in the stream, and then

retire; the constant motion rendering the aim of the fort uncertain.

Nevertheless some ugly hits were received by different ships.

Every night the enemy sent down fire-rafts, but these, though

occasioning annoyance to the fleet, were productive of no serious

damage beyond collisions arising from them. They were generally

awkwardly started, and the special mistake was made of sending only

one at a time, instead of a number, to increase the confusion and

embarrassment of the ships. The crews in their boats towed them

ashore, or the light steamers ran alongside and put them out with

their hose.

Mortar-firing, however good, would not reduce the forts, nor lay New

Orleans at the mercy of the fleet. It was necessary to pass above.

Neither the flag-officer on the one hand, nor the leaders of the enemy

on the other had any serious doubt that the ships could go by if there

were no obstructions; but the obstructions were there. As originally

laid these had been most formidable. Cypress trees, forty feet long

and four to five feet in diameter, were laid longitudinally in the

river, about three feet apart to allow a water-way. Suspended from the

lower side of these logs by heavy iron staples were two 2½-inch iron

cables, stretching from one side of the river to the other. To give

the framework of trunks greater rigidity, large timbers, six by four

inches, were pinned down on the upper sides. The cables were secured

on the left bank to trees; on the right bank, where there were no

trees, to great anchors buried in the ground. Between the two ends the

raft was held up against the current by twenty-five or thirty

3,000-pound anchors, with sixty fathoms of chain on each. This raft,

placed early in the winter, showed signs of giving in February, when

the spring-floods came sweeping enormous masses of drift upon it, and

by the 10th of March the cables had snapped, leaving about a third of

the river open. Colonel Higgins was then directed to restore it. He

found it had broken from both sides, and attempted to replace it by

sections, but the current, then running four knots an hour, made it

impossible to hold so heavy a structure in a depth of one hundred and

thirty feet and in a bottom of shifting sand, which gave no sufficient

holding ground for the anchors. Seven or eight heavily built

schooners, of about two hundred tons, were then seized and placed in a

line across the river in the position of the raft. Each schooner lay

with two anchors down and sixty fathoms of cable on each; the masts

were unstepped and, with the rigging, allowed to drift astern to foul

the screws of vessels attempting to pass. Two or three 1-inch chains

were stretched across from schooner to schooner, and from them to

sections of the old raft remaining near either shore.

Such was the general character of the obstructions before the fleet.

The current, and collisions with their own vessels, had somewhat

disarranged the apparatus, but it was essentially in this condition

when the bombardment began. It was formidable, not on account of its

intrinsic strength, but because of the swift current down and the

slowness of the ships below, which, together, would prevent them from

striking it a blow of sufficient power to break through. If they

failed thus to force their way they would be held under the fire of

the forts, powerless to advance.

It is believed that, in a discussion about removing the obstructions,

Lieutenant Caldwell, commanding the Itasca, volunteered to attempt it

with another vessel, and suggested taking out the masts of the two.

The Itasca and the Pinola, Lieutenant-Commanding Crosby, were assigned

to the duty, and Fleet-Captain Bell given command of both; a rather

unnecessary step, considering the age and character of the commanders

of the vessels. To handle two vessels in such an enterprise,

necessarily undertaken on a dark night, is not easy, and it is a

hardship to a commander to be virtually superseded in his own ship at

such a time. This was also felt in assigning divisional commanders for

the night attack only, when they could not possibly manage more than

one ship and simply overshadowed the captain of the vessel.

On the afternoon of the 20th, the Itasca and Pinola each went

alongside one of the sloops, where their lower masts were taken out,

and, with the rigging, sent ashore. At 10 P.M. Captain Bell went

aboard both and addressed the officers and crews about the importance

of the duty before them. He remained on board the Pinola and the two

vessels then got underway, the Pinola leading. All the mortar-boats

now opened together, having at times nine shells in the air at once,

to keep down the fire of Jackson in case of discovery, although the

two gunboats showed for little, being very deep in the water.

As they drew near the obstructions two rockets were thrown up by the

enemy, whose fire opened briskly; but the masts being out, it was not

easy to distinguish the vessels from the hulks. The Pinola struck the

third from the eastern shore and her men jumped on board. The

intention was to explode two charges of powder with a slow match over

the chains, and a torpedo by electricity under the bows of the hulk,

a petard operator being on board. The charges were placed, and the

Pinola cast off. The operator claims that he asked Bell to drop astern

by a hawser, but that instead of so doing, he let go and backed the

engines. Be this as it may, the ship went rapidly astern, the operator

did not or could not reel off rapidly enough, and the wires broke.

This hulk therefore remained in place, for the timed fuzes did not

act.

The Itasca ran alongside the second hulk from the east shore and threw

a grapnel on board, which caught firmly in the rail; but through the

strength of the current the rail gave way and the Itasca, taking a

sheer to starboard, drifted astern with her head toward the bank. As

quickly as possible she turned round, steamed up again and boarded the

hulk nearest the east shore on its port, or off-shore side, and this

time held on, keeping the engine turning slowly and the helm aport to

ease the strain on the grapnel. Captain Caldwell, Acting-Masters Amos

Johnson and Edmund Jones, with parties of seamen, jumped on board with

powder-cans and fuzes; but, as they were looking for the chains, it

was found that they were secured at the bows, by lashing or otherwise,

to the hulk's anchor chain, the end of the latter being led in through

the hawse-pipe, around the windlass and bitted. When its windings had

been followed up and understood, Captain Caldwell was told that the

chain could be slipped. He then contemplated firing the hulk, but

while the materials for doing so were sought for, the chain was

slipped without orders. The vessels went adrift, and, as the Itasca's

helm was to port and the engines going ahead, they turned inshore and

grounded hard and fast a short distance below, within easy range of

both forts.

A boat was at once sent to the Pinola, which was steaming up to try

again, and she came to her consort's assistance. Two lines were

successfully run to the Itasca, but she had grounded so hard that both

parted, though the second was an 11-inch hawser. The Pinola now

drifted so far down, and was so long in returning, that the Itasca

thought herself deserted; and the executive officer, Lieutenant George

B. Bacon, was despatched to the Hartford for a more powerful vessel.

The hour for the moon to rise was also fast approaching and the fate

of the Itasca seemed very doubtful.

The Pinola, however, came back, having in her absence broken out a

13-inch hawser, the end of which was passed to the grounded vessel.

The third trial was happy and the Pinola dragged the Itasca off, at

the same time swinging her head up the river. Lieutenant Caldwell, who

was on the bridge, when he saw his ship afloat, instead of returning

at once, steadied her head up stream and went ahead fast with the

engines. The Itasca moved on, not indeed swiftly, but firmly toward

and above the line of hulks, hugging the eastern bank. When well above

Caldwell gave the order, "Starboard;" the little vessel whirled

quickly round and steered straight for the chains. Carrying the full

force of the current with her and going at the top of her own speed,

she passed between the third hulk, which the Pinola had grappled, and

the fourth. As her stem met the chain she slid bodily up, rising three

or four feet from the water, and dragging down the anchors of the

hulks on either side; then the chains snapped, the Itasca went

through, and the channel of the river was free.

The following morning the hulks were found to be greatly shifted from

their previous positions. The second from the east shore remained in

place, but the third had dragged down and was now astern of the

second, as though hanging to it. The hulk nearest the west shore was

also unmoved, but the other three had dragged down and were lying

more or less below, apparently in a quartering direction from the

first. A broad open space intervened between the two groups. The value

of Caldwell's work was well summed up by General M.L. Smith, the

Confederate Engineer of the Department: "The forts, in my judgment,

were impregnable so long as they were in free and open communication

with the city. This communication was not endangered while the

obstruction existed. The conclusion, then, is briefly this: While the

obstruction existed the city was safe; when it was swept away, as the

defences then existed, it was in the enemy's power."

The bombardment continued on the 21st, 22d, and 23d with undiminished

vigor, but without noteworthy incident in the fleet. The testimony of

the Confederate officers, alike in the forts and afloat, is unanimous

as to the singular accuracy of the mortar fire. A large proportion of

the shells fell within the walls of Jackson. The damage done to the

masonry was not irreparable, but the quarters and citadel, as already

stated, were burned down and the magazine endangered. The garrison

were compelled to live in the casemates, which were partially flooded

from the high state of the river and the cutting of the levee by

shells. Much of the bedding and clothing were lost by the fire, thus

adding to the privations and discomfort. On the 21st Jackson was in

need of extensive repairs almost everywhere, and the officers in

command hoped that the Louisiana, which had come down the night

before, would be able to keep down the mortar fire, at least in part.

When it was found she had no motive power they asked that she should

take position below the obstructions on the St. Philip side, where she

would be under the guns of the forts, but able to reach the schooners.

If she could not be a ship of war, at least let her be a floating

battery. Mitchell declined for several reasons. If a mortar-shell

fell vertically on the decks of the Louisiana it would go through her

bottom and sink her; the mechanics were still busy on board and could

not work to advantage under fire; the ports were too small to give

elevation to the guns, and so they could not reach the mortars. If

this last were correct no other reason was needed; but as the nearest

schooner was but 3,000 yards from Jackson, it seems likely he deceived

himself, as he certainly did in believing "on credible information"

that a rifled gun on the parapet of Jackson, of the same calibre as

that of the Louisiana, had not been able to reach. Three schooners had

been struck, one at the distance of 4,000 yards, during the first two

days of the bombardment, not only by rifled, but by VIII-and X-inch

spherical projectiles; and the second division had been compelled to

shift its position. Looking only to the Louisiana, the decision of the

naval officers was natural enough; but considering that time pressed,

that after five days' bombardment the fleet must soon attack, that it

was improbable, if New Orleans fell, that the Louisiana's engines

could be made efficient and she herself anything but a movable

battery, the refusal to make the desired effort looks like caring for

a part, at the sacrifice of the whole, of the defence. On the last day

Mitchell had repeated warnings that the attack would soon come off,

and was again asked to take a position to enfilade the schooners, so

that the cannoneers of Jackson might be able to stand to their guns.

Mitchell sent back word that he hoped to move in twenty-four hours,

and received from Higgins, himself an old seaman and naval officer,

the ominous rejoinder: "Tell Captain Mitchell that there will be no

tomorrow for New Orleans, unless he immediately takes up the position

assigned to him with the Louisiana."[5]

That same day, all arrangements of the fleet being completed, the

orders to be ready to attack the following night were issued. Every

preparation that had occurred to the minds of the officers as tending

to increase the chance of passing uninjured had been made. The chain

cables of the sheet anchors had been secured up and down the sides of

the vessels, abreast the engines, to resist the impact of projectiles.

This was general throughout the squadron, though the Mississippi, on

account of her side-wheels, had to place them inside instead of out;

and each commander further protected those vital parts from shots

coming in forward or aft, with hammocks, bags of coal, or sand, or

ashes, or whatever else came to hand. The outside paint was daubed

over with the yellow Mississippi mud, as being less easily seen at

night; while, on the other hand, the gun-carriages and decks were

whitewashed, throwing into plainer view the dark color of their

equipment lying around. On some ships splinter nettings were rigged

inside the bulwarks, and found of advantage in stopping the flight of

larger fragments struck out by shot. Three more of the gunboats,

following the example of the Pinola and Itasca, had their lower masts

removed and moored to the shore. Of the four that kept them in three

had their masts wounded in the fight, proving the advantage of this

precaution. Thus prepared, and stripped of every spare spar, rope, and

boat, in the lightest fighting trim, the ships stood ready for the

night's work.

The flag-officer had at first intended to advance to the attack in two

columns abreast, each engaging the fort on its own side and that only.

On second thought, considering that in the darkness and smoke vessels

in parallel columns would be more likely to foul the hulks on either

side, or else each other, and that the fleet might so be thrown into

confusion, he changed his plan and directed that the starboard column

should advance first, its rear vessel to be followed by the leader of

the port column; thus bringing the whole fleet into single line ahead.

To help this formation, after dark on the 23d, the eight vessels of

the starboard column moved over from the west bank and anchored in

line ahead on the other side, the Cayuga, bearing the divisional flag

of Captain Theodorus Bailey, in advance. Their orders remained to

engage St. Philip on the right hand, and not to use their port

batteries. The signal to weigh was to be two vertical red lights.

Meanwhile, during the days that had gone by since breaking the line of

hulks, some officers of the fleet had thought they could see the water

rippling over a chain between the two groups; and, although the

flag-officer himself could not make it out, the success of the attack

so depended upon having a clear thoroughfare, that he decided to have

a second examination. Lieutenant Caldwell asked to do this in person,

as his work was in question. Toward nightfall of the 23d, the Hartford

sent a fast twelve-oared boat to the Itasca. Caldwell and

Acting-Master Edmund Jones went in the boat, which was manned from the

Itasca's crew, and after holding on by the leading mortar-schooner

till dark, the party started ahead. Fearing that pickets and

sharpshooters on either shore might stop them, they had to pull up in

the middle of the river against the heavy current, without availing

themselves of the inshore eddy. Before they came up with the chain, a

fire was kindled on the eastern bank throwing a broad belt of light

athwart the stream. To pull across this in plain view seemed madness,

so the boat was headed to the opposite side and crawled up to within

a hundred yards of the hulks. Then holding on to the bushes, out of

the glare of the fire, and hearing the voices of the enemy in the

water battery, the party surveyed the situation. Though tangled chains

hung from the bows of the outer and lower hulk it seemed perfectly

plain that none reached across the river, but, after some hesitation

about running the risk merely to clear up a point as to which he had

himself no doubt, the necessity of satisfying others determined

Caldwell; and by his orders the cutter struck boldly out and into the

light. Crossing it unobserved, or else taken for a Confederate boat by

any who may have seen, the party reached the outer hulk on the west

side. Pausing for a moment under its shelter they then pulled up

stream, abreast the inshore hulk, and Jones dropped from the bow a

deep-sea lead with ten fathoms of line. The boat was then allowed to

drift with the current, and the line held in the hand gave no sign of

fouling anything. Then they pulled up a second time and again dropped

down close to the hulk on the east shore with like favorable result;

showing conclusively that, to a depth of sixty feet, nothing existed

to bar the passage of the fleet. The cutter then flew on her return

with a favoring current, signalling all clear at 11 P.M.

At 2 A.M. the flag-ship hoisted the appointed signal and the starboard

column weighed, the heavy vessels taking a long while to purchase

their anchors, owing to the force of the current. At 3.30 the Cayuga,

leading, passed through the booms, the enemy waiting for the ships to

come fairly into his power. In regular order followed the Pensacola,

Mississippi, Oneida, Varuna, Katahdin, Kineo, Wissahickon, the

Confederate fire beginning as the Pensacola passed through the breach.

The Varuna, Cayuga, and Katahdin steamed rapidly on, the one heavy

gun of the gunboats being ill-adapted to cope with those in the works;

but the heavy ships, keeping line inside the gunboats, moved slowly

by, fighting deliberately and stopping from time to time to deliver

their broadsides with greater effect.

[Illustration: Battle of New Orleans.]

The Pensacola, following the Cayuga closely and keeping a little on

her starboard quarter, stopped when near Fort St. Philip, pouring in

her heavy broadside, before which the gunners of its barbette battery

could not stand but fled to cover; then as the big ship moved slowly

on, the enemy returned to their guns and again opened fire. The

Pensacola again stopped, and again drove the cannoneers from their

pieces, the crew of the ship and the gunners in the fort cursing each

other back and forth in the close encounter. As the ship drew away and

turned toward the mid-river, so that her guns no longer bore, the

enemy manned theirs again and riddled her with a quartering fire as

she moved off. At about this time the ram Manassas charged her, but,

by a skilful movement of the helm, Lieutenant Roe, who was conning the

Pensacola, avoided the thrust. The ram received the ship's starboard

broadside and then continued down, running the gauntlet of the Union

fleet, whose shot penetrated her sides as though they were pasteboard.

The Mississippi, following the Pensacola and disdaining to pass behind

her guns, was reduced to a very low rate of speed. As she came up with

and engaged Fort St. Philip, the Manassas charged at her, striking on

the port side a little forward of the mizzen-mast, at the same time

firing her one gun. The effect on the ship at the time was to list her

about one degree and cause a jar like that of taking the ground, but

the blow, glancing, only gave a wound seven feet long and four inches

deep, cutting off the heads of fifty copper bolts as clean as though

done in a machine. Soon after, moving slowly along the face of the

fort, the current of the river caught the Mississippi on her starboard

bow and carried her over to the Fort Jackson side.

The Oneida, having shifted her port guns to the starboard side,

followed the Mississippi. She shared in the delay caused by the

Pensacola's deliberate passage until the Mississippi's sheer gave her

the chance to move ahead. She then steamed quickly up, hugging the

east bank, where the eddy current favored her advance. As she passed

close under the muzzles of St. Philip's guns she fired rapidly

canister and shrapnel, the fire from the fort passing for the most

part harmlessly over the ship and the heads of her crew.

The two rear gunboats, the Kineo and Wissahickon, were both delayed in

passing; the Kineo by a collision with the Brooklyn, the two vessels

meeting between the hulks, and the Wissahickon by fouling the

obstructions. The difficulty of finding the breach was already felt,

and became more and more puzzling as the vessels were nearer the rear.

The Wissahickon was one of the last that succeeded in getting through.

The port column was under way in time to follow close in the wake of

its predecessor; indeed, it seems certain that, in impatience to be

off, or from some other reason, the leading ships of this division

doubled on the rear ships of the van. By the report of the captain of

the Hartford, which led, that ship was engaged only twenty minutes

after the enemy opened on the leading vessels of the starboard column.

She steered in near to Jackson, but a fire raft coming down on her

caused her to sheer across the river, where she took the ground close

under St. Philip; the raft lying on her port quarter, against which it

was pushed by the tug Mosher,[6] a small affair of thirty-five tons,

unarmed, with a crew of half a dozen men commanded by a man named

Sherman. On that eventful night, when so many hundreds of brave men,

each busy in his own sphere, were plying their work of death, surely

no one deed of more desperate courage was done than that of this

little band. The assault threatened the very life of the big ship, and

was made in the bright light of the fire under the muzzles of her

guns. These were turned on the puny foe, which received a shot in her

boilers and sunk. It is believed that the crew lost their lives, but

the Hartford had caught fire and was ablaze, the flames darting up the

rigging and bursting through the ports; but the discipline of her crew

prevailed over the fury of the element, while they were still

receiving and returning the blows of their human antagonists in both

forts; then working herself clear, the Hartford passed from under

their fire.

The Brooklyn and Richmond followed the Hartford, and behind them the

gunboat division Sciota, Iroquois, Pinola, Kennebec, Itasca, and

Winona, Fleet-Captain Bell having his divisional flag flying on board

the Sciota. By this the enemy had better range, and at the same time

the smoke of the battle was settling down upon the face of the river.

The good fortune which carried through all the vessels of the leading

column therefore failed the rear. The Brooklyn lost sight of her next

ahead and, as she was passing through the hulks, using both broadsides

as they would bear, came violently into collision with the Kineo, next

to the last ship of the starboard column--another indication that the

two columns were lapping. The gunboat heeled violently over and nearly

drove ashore; but the two vessels then went clear, the Brooklyn

fouling the booms of the eastern hulks, breaking through them but

losing her way. This caused her to fall off broadside to the stream,

in which position she received a heavy fire from St. Philip. Getting

clear and her head once more up river, the Manassas, which had been

lying unseen close to the east bank, came butting into the starboard

gangway. The blow was delivered with slight momentum against the chain

armor, and appeared at the time to have done little damage; but

subsequent examination showed that the Brooklyn's side was stove in

about six feet below the water-line, the prow having entered between

the frames and crushed both inner and outer planking. A little more

would have sunk her, and, as it was, a covering of heavy plank had to

be bolted over the wound for a length of twenty-five feet before she

was allowed to go outside. At the same time that the Manassas rammed

she fired her single gun, the shot lodging in the sand bags protecting

the steam-drum. Groping on by the flash of the guns and the light of

the burning rafts, the Brooklyn, just clearing a thirteen-foot shoal,

found herself close under St. Philip, from whose exposed barbette guns

the gunners fled at her withering fire, as they had from that of the

Pensacola.

The Richmond, a slow ship at all times, was detained by her boilers

foaming, and was much separated from her leaders. Still she engaged

Fort Jackson and passed through the fire with small loss. The little

Sciota followed with equal good fortune, having but two men wounded.

The Pinola, which had taken her place next to the Iroquois, was not so

fortunate. She engaged first Fort Jackson, from whose fire she

received little injury. Then she passed over to the other side within

one hundred and fifty yards of St. Philip, from which she at first

escaped with equal impunity; but coming then within the light of the

fire-rafts, and the greater part of the squadron having passed, the

enemy were able to play upon her with little to mar their aim. She was

struck fourteen times, and lost three killed and eight wounded, the

heaviest list of casualties among the gunboats.

The Iroquois, which was on picket duty, fell into her station behind

the Sciota as the fleet went by. After passing through the

obstructions, and when already some distance up the stream, as the

current round the bend was throwing her bow off and setting her over

on the east bank, the order "starboard" was given to the wheel. As too

often happens, this was understood as "stop her," and the engines were

stopped while the wheel was not moved. In consequence of this mistake

the Iroquois, then a very fast ship, shot over to the east (at this

point more precisely the north) bank, past the guns of St. Philip, and

brought up against the ironclad steamer Louisiana that was lying

against the levee a short distance above the fort. This powerful,

though immovable, vessel at once opened her ports and gave the

Iroquois every gun that would bear, and at the same time a number of

her people ran on deck as though to repel what seemed to be an attempt

to board. This gave the Iroquois an opportunity of returning the

murderous fire she had received, which she did with effect. Some of

the guns of the Louisiana had been double-shotted, the second shot

being in two cases found sticking in the hole made by the first. This

unfortunate collision made the loss of the Iroquois amount to 8 killed

and 24 wounded, in proportion to her complement the heaviest of the

whole fleet. It was as she slowly drew away that Commander Porter

noted her as "lingering," standing out in full relief against the

light of the burning rafts; then she went her way, the last to pass,

and the fight was won.

The three gunboats at the rear of the second column failed to get by.

The Itasca, on coming abreast of Fort Jackson, was pierced by several

shot, one of them entering the boiler. The steam issuing in a dense

cloud drove every one up from below, and the vessel deprived of her

motive power, drifted helplessly down the stream. The Winona following

her, fouled the obstructions, and before she could get clear the

Itasca backed on board of her. After a half hour's delay she proceeded

under a heavy fire, at first from Jackson. Thinking the burning raft,

in whose light the Pinola suffered, to be on that side of the river,

she tried to pass on the St. Philip side, receiving the fire of the

latter fort at less than point-blank range. Shooting over to the other

side again, so thick was the smoke that the ship got close to shore,

and her head had to be turned down stream to avoid running on it. By

this time day had broken, and the Winona, standing out against the

morning sky, under the fire of both forts, and with no other vessel to

distract their attention, was forced to retire. The Kennebec also

fouled the rafts and was unable to get by before the day dawned.

The steamers of the mortar flotilla, and the sailing sloop Portsmouth,

as soon as the flag-ship had lifted her anchor, moved up into the

station which had been assigned them to cover the passage of the

fleet, about five hundred yards from Jackson, in position to enfilade

the water battery commanding the approach to the fort. The vessels

kept their place, firing shrapnel and shell, until the last of the

fleet was seen to pass the forts. They then retired, the

mortar-schooners at the same time ceasing from the shelling, which had

been carried on throughout the engagement.

An hour and a quarter had elapsed from the time that the Cayuga passed

the obstructions. The fleet, arriving above the forts, fell in with

the Confederate flotilla, but in the absence of the Louisiana the

other Confederate steamers were no match for their antagonists. The

Cayuga indeed, dashing forward at a rate which left her but fifteen

minutes under the fire of the forts, found herself when above them in

hot quarters; and in a not unequal match rendered a good account of

three assailants. The Varuna, passing with yet greater rapidity,

steamed through with her guns trained as far ahead as they could be,

and delivered her fire as opportunity offered. She soon passed beyond

them, unsupported, and continued up the river, coming close upon a

steamer called the Doubloon, in which were General Lovell and some of

his staff, who narrowly escaped being captured. After the Varuna came

the Governor Moore, which had been down among the Union fleet,

receiving there the fire of the Oneida and Pinola. Finding the berth

too hot for him, and catching sight of the Varuna thus separated from

her fleet, Kennon hoisted the same lights as the latter vessel and

followed on up. The lights deceived the Varuna and also the

Confederate steamer Jackson, which had been up the river on duty and

was at quarantine as the two others drew near. Taking them for enemies

the Jackson opened a long-range fire on the two impartially, one of

her shots wounding the fore-mast of the Moore; she then steamed

hastily away to New Orleans, where she was destroyed by her commander.

The only other vessel in sight was the Stonewall Jackson[7] of the

River Defence Fleet, carrying one gun. She was behind the two, trying

to escape unseen to New Orleans. Kennon now opened fire, hoping that

the Jackson, undeceived, would turn back to help him, but she kept on

her upward course; the Varuna, however, was no longer in ignorance.

Finding that the height of the Moore's forecastle out of water and the

position of the bow gun would not let it be depressed enough to fire

with effect, Kennon resorted to the old-time heroic treatment for such

defects; loading the gun with percussion shell he fired it through the

bows of his own ship, and used the hole thus made for a port. The

next shot raked the Varuna's deck, killing three and wounding nine of

the crew. Boggs then put his helm hard aport, bringing his starboard

battery to bear and doubtless expecting that the enemy would follow

his motion to avoid being raked, but Kennon knew too well his own

broadside weakness, and keeping straight on ran into the Varuna before

her head could be gotten off again. The powerful battery of the Union

vessel, sweeping from stem to stem, killed or wounded a large part of

the enemy's crew; but her own fate was sealed, her frame being too

light for such an encounter. The Moore having rammed again then hauled

off, believing the Varuna to be in a sinking condition, and tried to

continue up stream, but with difficulty, having lost her wheel-ropes.

The Stonewall Jackson, now coming up, turned also upon the Varuna and

rammed her on the port side, receiving a broadside in return. The

Union vessel then shoved her bow into the east bank and sank to her

top-gallant forecastle.

The Varuna's advance had been so rapid that there seems to have been

some uncertainty in the minds of Captains Bailey and Lee of the Cayuga

and Oneida as to where she was. It being yet dark they were very

properly inclined to wait for the rest of the fleet to come up. In a

few moments, however, the Oneida moved slowly ahead as far as

quarantine, whence the Varuna and her enemies were made out. The

Oneida then went ahead at full speed. When she came up the Varuna was

already ashore, her two opponents trying to escape, but in vain. The

Stonewall Jackson ran ashore without offering resistance, on the right

bank nearly opposite the Varuna; the Moore on the left bank, some

distance above, where her captain set her on fire, but received the

broadsides of the Oneida and Pensacola with his colors still flying,

and so was taken.

The Cayuga followed the Oneida, but more slowly, and about five miles

above the fort came upon a Confederate camp upon the right bank of the

river. She opened with canister, and in a few moments the troops, a

part of the Chalmette regiment, surrendered.

After ramming the Brooklyn, the Manassas had quietly followed the

Union fleet, but when she came near them the Mississippi turned upon

her. It was impossible to oppose her three hundred and eighty-four

tons to the big enemy coming down upon her, so her commander dodged

the blow and ran her ashore, the crew escaping over the bows, while

the Mississippi poured in two of her broadsides, leaving her a wreck.

Soon after, she slipped off the bank and drifted down past the forts

in flames. At 8 A.M. she passed the mortar-fleet and an effort was

made to secure her, but before it could be done she faintly exploded

and sank.

The Iroquois, steaming up through the mêlee, saw a Confederate gunboat

lying close in to the east bank. Having slowed down as she drew near

the enemy, some one on board the latter shouted, "Don't fire, we

surrender." This was doubtless unauthorized, for as the ship passed

on, the Confederate, which proved to be the McRae, discharged a

broadside of grape-shot and langrage, part of the latter being copper

slugs, which were found on the Iroquois's decks in quantities after

the action. The fire was promptly returned with XI-inch canister and

32-pounder shot. The McRae's loss was very heavy, among the number

being her commander, Thomas B. Huger, who was mortally wounded. This

gentleman had been an officer of reputation in the United States Navy,

his last service having been as first-lieutenant of the very ship with

which he now came into collision. This was but a few months before,

under the same commission, the present being, in fact, her first

cruise; and the other officers and crew were, with few exceptions,

the same as those previously under his orders. There is no other very

particular mention of the McRae, but the Confederate army officers,

who were not much pleased with their navy in general, spoke of her

fighting gallantly among the Union ships.

As for the General Quitman and the River Defence Fleet, there seems to

have been but one opinion among the Confederate officers, both army

and navy, as to their bad behavior before and during the fight.[8]

They did not escape punishment, for their enemies were among them

before they could get away. The Oneida came upon one crossing from the

right to the left bank, and rammed her; but it is not possible to

recover the adventures and incidents that befell each. Certainly none

of them rammed a Union vessel; and it seems not unfair to say that

they gave way in disorder, like any other irregular force before a

determined onslaught, made a feeble effort to get off, and then ran

their boats ashore and fired them. They had but one chance, and that a

desperate one, to bear down with reckless speed on the oncoming ships

and ram them. Failing to do this, and beginning to falter, the ships

came among them like dogs among a flock of sheep, willing enough to

spare, had they understood the weakness of their foes, but thinking

themselves to be in conflict with formidable iron-clad rams, an

impression the Confederates had carefully fostered.

When the day broke, nine of the enemy's vessels were to be seen

destroyed. The Louisiana remained in her berth, while the McRae, and

the Defiance of the River Defence Squadron, had taken refuge under the

guns of the forts. The two first had lost their commanders by the fire

of the fleet. During the three days that followed, their presence was

a cause of anxiety to Commander Porter, who was ignorant of the

Louisiana's disabled condition.

The Union fleet anchored for the day at quarantine, five miles above

the forts. The following morning, leaving the Kineo and Wissahickon to

protect, if necessary, the landing of General Butler's troops, they

got under way again in the original order of two columns, not,

however, very strictly observed, and went on up the river.

As they advanced, burning ships and steamers were passed, evidences of

the panic which had seized the city, whose confidence had been

undisturbed up to the moment of the successful passage of the forts.

Four miles below New Orleans, the Chalmette and McGehee batteries were

encountered, mounting five and nine guns. The Cayuga, still leading

and steaming too rapidly ahead, underwent their fire for some time

unsupported by her consorts, the Hartford approaching at full speed

under a raking fire, to which she could only reply with two bow guns.

When her broadside came to bear, she slowed down, porting her helm;

then having fired, before she could reload, the Brooklyn, compelled to

pass or run into her, sheered inside, between her and the works. The

successive broadsides of these two heavy ships drove the enemy from

their guns. At about the same moment the Pensacola engaged the

batteries on the east bank, and the other vessels coming up in rapid

succession, the works were quickly silenced.

The attack of the fleet upon the forts and its successful passage has

been fitly called the battle of New Orleans, for the fate of the city

was there decided. Enclosed between the swamps and the Mississippi,

its only outlet by land was by a narrow neck, in parts not over

three-quarters of a mile wide, running close by the river, which was

at this time full to the tops of the levees, so that the guns of the

fleet commanded both the narrow exit and the streets of the city. Even

had there been the means of defence, there was not food for more than

a few days.

At noon of the 25th, the fleet anchored before the city, where

everything was in confusion. Up and down the levee coal, cotton,

steamboats, ships, were ablaze, and it was not without trouble that

the fleet avoided sharing the calamity. Among the shipping thus

destroyed was the Mississippi, an ironclad much more powerful than the

Louisiana. She was nearing completion, and had been launched six days,

when Farragut came before the city. His rapid movements and the

neglect of those in charge to provide tow-boats stopped her from being

taken to the Yazoo, where she might yet have been an ugly foe for the

fleet. This and the fate of the Louisiana are striking instances of

the value of promptness in war. Nor was this the only fruit snatched

by Farragut's quickness. There is very strong reason to believe that

the fall of New Orleans nipped the purpose of the French emperor, who

had held out hopes of recognizing the Confederacy and even of

declaring that he would not respect the blockade if the city held out.

Captain Bailey was sent ashore to demand the surrender, and that the

United States flag should be hoisted upon the public buildings. The

rage and mortification of the excitable Creoles was openly manifested

by insult and abuse, and the service was not unattended with danger.

The troops, however, being withdrawn by the military commander, the

mayor, with some natural grandiloquence, announced his submission to

the inevitable, and Captain Bailey hoisted the flag on the mint. The

next day it was hauled down by a party of four citizens; in

consequence of which act, the flag-officer, on the 29th, sent ashore a

battalion of 250 marines, accompanied by a howitzer battery in charge

of two midshipmen, the whole under command of the fleet-captain. By

them the flags were rehoisted and the buildings guarded, until General

Butler arrived on the evening of May 1st, when the city was turned

over to his care.

Meanwhile Commander Porter remained in command below the forts. The

morning after the passage of the fleet he sent a demand for their

surrender, which was refused. Learning that the Louisiana and some

other boats had escaped the general destruction, and not aware of

their real condition, he began to take measures for the safety of his

mortar-schooners. They were sent down the river to Pilot Town, with

the Portsmouth as convoy, and with orders to fit for sea. Six were

sent off at once to the rear of Fort Jackson, to blockade the bayous

that ramify through that low land; while the Miami and Sachem were

sent in the other direction, behind St. Philip, to assist the troops

to land.

On the 27th, Porter, having received official information of the fall

of the city, notified Colonel Higgins of the fact, and again demanded

the surrender, offering favorable conditions. Meanwhile

insubordination was rife in the garrison, which found itself hemmed in

on all sides. At midnight of the 27th, the troops rose, seized the

guard and posterns, reversed the field pieces commanding the gates,

and began to spike the guns. Many of them left the fort with their

arms; and the rest, except one company of planters, firmly refused to

fight any longer. The men were largely foreigners, and with little

interest in the Secession cause; but they also probably saw that

continued resistance and hardship could not result in ultimate

success. The water-way above and below being in the hands of the

hostile navy, all communication was cut off by the nature of the

country and the state of the river; there could therefore be but one

issue to a prolonged contest. The crime of the men was heinous, but it

only hastened the end. To avoid a humiliating disaster, General Duncan

accepted the offered terms on the 28th. The officers were permitted to

retain their side arms, and the troops composing the garrison to

depart, on parole not to serve till exchanged. At 2.30 P.M. the forts

were formally delivered to the navy, and the United States flag once

more hoisted over them.

The Confederate naval officers were not parties to the capitulation,

which was drawn up and signed on board Porter's flag-ship, the Harriet

Lane. While the representatives were seated in her cabin, flags of

truce flying from her masthead and from the forts, the Louisiana was

fired by her commander and came drifting down the river in flames. Her

guns discharged themselves as the heat reached their charges, and when

she came abreast Fort St. Philip she blew up, killing a Confederate

soldier and nearly killing Captain McIntosh, her former commander, who

was lying there mortally wounded. This act caused great indignation at

the time among the United States officers present. Commander Mitchell

afterward gave explanations which were accepted as satisfactory by Mr.

Welles, the Secretary of the Navy. He said that the Louisiana was

secured to the opposite shore from the fleet, three-quarters of a mile

above, and that an attempt had been made to drown the magazine. As

proof of good faith he had sent a lieutenant to notify Porter of the

probable failure of that attempt. It remains, however, a curious want

of foresight in a naval man not to anticipate that the hempen fasts,

which alone secured her, would be destroyed, and that the vessel thus

cast loose would drift down with the stream. Conceding fully the

mutual independence of army and navy, it is yet objectionable that

while one is treating under flag of truce, the other should be sending

down burning vessels, whether carelessly or maliciously, upon an

unsuspecting enemy.

When taken possession of, Fort Jackson was found to have suffered

greatly. The ground inside and out was plowed by the falling shell;

the levee had been cut in many places, letting water into the fort;

the casemates were shattered, guns dismounted and gun-carriages

destroyed; all the buildings within the walls had been burned. Yet it

was far from being reduced to an indefensible condition by six days'

bombardment, could it have continued to receive supplies and

reinforcements. The loss of the garrison had been 14 killed and 39

wounded.

The question of the efficacy of mortar-firing was raised in this as in

other instances. Granting its inability to compel the surrender, it

remains certain that Fort Jackson, though the stronger work, inflicted

much less damage upon the passing fleet than did St. Philip. The

direct testimony of Commander De Camp of the Iroquois, and an

examination of the injuries received by the ships, when clearly

specified, shows this. As both posts had been under one commander, it

may be inferred that the difference in execution was due partly to the

exhaustion of the garrison, and partly to the constant fire of the

mortar flotilla during the time of the passage; both effects of the

bombardment.

The exterior line of the defences of New Orleans being thus pierced in

its central and strongest point, the remaining works--Forts Pike and

Macomb guarding the approaches by way of Lake Pontchartrain,

Livingston at Barrataria Bay, Berwick at Berwick Bay, and others of

less importance--constituting that line were hastily abandoned. Such

guns as could be saved, with others from various quarters, were

hurried away to Vicksburg, which had already been selected as the next

point for defence, and its fortifications begun. The whole delta of

the Mississippi was thus opened to the advance of the Union forces.

This was followed a few days later by the evacuation of Pensacola, for

which the enemy had been preparing since the end of February, when the

disaster at Donelson had made it necessary to strip other points of

troops. The heavy guns had been removed, though not to New Orleans.

The defenceless condition of the place was partly known to the officer

commanding at Fort Pickens, but no one could spare him force enough to

test it. At the time of its final abandonment, Commander Porter, who

after the surrender of the forts had proceeded to Mobile with the

steamers of the mortar flotilla, was lying off that bar. Seeing a

brilliant light in the direction of Pensacola at 2 A.M. on the 10th of

May, he stood for the entrance, arriving at daylight. The army and

navy took possession the same day, and this fine harbor was now again

available as a naval station for the United States.

After New Orleans had been occupied by the army, Farragut sent seven

vessels, under the command of Captain Craven of the Brooklyn, up the

river. Baton Rouge and Natchez surrendered when summoned; but at

Vicksburg, on the 22d of May, Commander S.P. Lee was met with a

refusal. On the 9th of June the gunboats Wissahickon and Itasca, being

sent down to look after some earthworks which the Confederates were

reported to be throwing up at Grand Gulf, found there a battery of

rifle guns completed, and were pretty roughly handled in the encounter

which followed. On the 18th of June the Brooklyn and Richmond anchored

below Vicksburg, and shortly after the flag-officer came in person

with the Hartford, accompanied by Commander Porter with the steamers

and seventeen schooners of the mortar flotilla. The flag-officer did

not think it possible to reduce the place without a land force, but

the orders of the Department were peremptory that the Mississippi

should be cleared. From Vicksburg to Memphis the high land did not

touch the river on the east bank, and Memphis with all above it had

now fallen. Vicksburg at that time stood, the sole seriously defended

point.

The condition of the fleet was at this time a cause of serious concern

to the flag-officer. The hulls had been much injured by the enemy's

fire, and by frequent collisions in the lower river, due to the rapid

current and the alarms of fire-rafts. The engines, hastily built for

the gunboats, and worn in other ships by a cruise now nearing its

usual end, were in need of extensive repairs. The maintenance of the

coal-supply for a large squadron, five hundred miles up a crooked

river in a hostile country, was in itself no small anxiety; involving

as it did carriage of the coal against the current, the provision of

convoys to protect the supply vessels against guerillas, and the

employment of pilots; few of whom were to be found, as they naturally

favored the enemy, and had gone away. The river was drawing near the

time of lowest water, and the flag-ship herself got aground under very

critical circumstances, having had to take out her coal and shot, and

had even begun on her guns, two of which were out when she floated

off. The term of enlistment of many of the crews had ended and they

were clamoring for their discharge, and the unhealthy climate had

already caused much illness. It was evident from the very first that

Vicksburg could only be taken and held by a land force, but the

Government in Washington were urgent and Farragut determined to run

by the batteries. This was the first attempt; but there were

afterward so many similar dashes over the same spot, by fleets or

single vessels, that the scene demands a brief description.

[Illustration: Battle at Vicksburg.]

Vicksburg is four hundred miles above New Orleans, four hundred below

Memphis. The river, after pursuing its irregular course for the latter

distance through the alluvial bottom lands, turns to the northeast

five miles before reaching the Vicksburg bluffs. When it encounters

them it sweeps abruptly round, continuing its course southwest,

parallel to the first reach; leaving between the two a narrow tongue

of low land, from three-quarters to one mile wide. The bluffs at their

greatest elevation, just below the point where the river first touches

them, are two hundred and sixty feet high; not perpendicular, but

sloping down close to the water, their nearness to which continues,

with diminishing elevation, for two miles, where the town of Vicksburg

is reached. They then gradually recede, their height at the same time

decreasing by degrees to one hundred and fifty feet.

The position was by nature the strongest on the river. The height of

the banks, with the narrowness and peculiar winding of the stream,

placed the batteries on the hill-sides above the reach of guns on

shipboard. At the time of Farragut's first attack, though not nearly

so strongly and regularly fortified as afterward, there were in

position twenty six[9] guns, viz.: two X-inch, one IX-inch, four

VIII-inch, five 42- and two 24-pounder smooth-bores, and seven 32-,

two 24-, one 18-, and two 12-pounder rifled guns. Of these, one

IX-inch, three VIII-inch, and the 18-pounder rifle were planted at the

highest point of the bluffs above the town, in the bend, where they

had a raking fire upon the ships before and after they passed their

front. Just above these the four 24-pounders were placed.[10] Half a

mile below the town was a water battery,[11] about fifty feet above

the river, mounting two rifled 32s, and four 42s. The eleven other

guns were placed along the crest of the hills below the town,

scattered over a distance of a mile or more, so that it was hard for

the ships to make out their exact position. The distance from end to

end of the siege batteries was about three miles, and as the current

was running at the rate of three knots, while the speed of the fleet

was not over eight, three-quarters of an hour at least was needed for

each ship to pass by the front of the works. The upper batteries

followed them for at least twenty minutes longer. Besides the siege

guns, field batteries in the town, and moving from place to place,

took part in the action; and a heavy fire was kept up on the vessels

from the rifle-pits near the turn.

On the 26th and 27th of June the schooners were placed in position,

nine on the east and eight on the west bank. Bomb practice began on

the 26th and was continued through the 27th. On the evening of the

latter day Commander Porter notified the admiral that he was ready to

cover the passage of the fleet.

At 2 A.M. of the 28th the signal was made, and at three the fleet was

under way. The vessels advanced in two columns, the Richmond,

Hartford, and Brooklyn in the order named, forming the starboard

column, with intervals between them long enough to allow two gunboats

to fire through. The port column was composed of the Iroquois, the

leading ship, and the Oneida, ahead of the Richmond on her port bow,

the Wissahickon and Sciota between the Richmond and the Hartford, the

Winona and Pinola between the flag-ship and the Brooklyn, and in the

rear, on the port quarter of the Brooklyn, the Kennebec and the

Katahdin. At four o'clock the mortars opened fire, and at the same

moment the enemy, the vessels of the fleet replying as their guns

bore. As the Hartford passed, the steamers of the mortar flotilla,

Octorara, Miami, Jackson, Westfield, Clifton, Harriet Lane, and

Owasco, moved up on her starboard quarter, engaging under way the

water battery, at a distance of twelve hundred to fifteen hundred

yards, and maintaining this position till the fleet had passed. The

leading vessels, as far as and including the Pinola, continued on,

silencing the batteries when fairly exposed to their broadsides, but

suffering more or less severely before and after. The prescribed order

was not accurately observed, the lack of good pilots leading the ships

to hug the bank on the town side, where the shore was known to be

bold, and throwing them into line ahead; the distances also lengthened

out somewhat, which lessened the mutual support.

The flag-ship moved slowly, and even stopped for a time to wait for

the vessels in the rear; seeing which, Captain Palmer, of the

Iroquois, who had reached the turn, also stopped his ship, and let her

drift down close to the Hartford to draw a part of the enemy's fire,

and to reinforce that of the flag-officer. The upper batteries, like

all the others, were silent while the ships lay in front of them; but

as soon as the Hartford and Iroquois moved up they returned to their

guns, and followed the rear of the fleet with a spiteful fire till out

of range.

The cannonade of the enemy could at no time have been said to be

discontinued along the line. The Brooklyn, with the two gunboats

following, stopped when above the mortar-steamers, and engaged the

batteries within range at a great disadvantage; those ahead having a

more or less raking fire upon them. The three remained there for two

hours and then retired, the remainder of the fleet having passed on

beyond and anchored above, at 6 A.M.

Having thus obeyed his orders, the flag-officer reported that the

forts had been passed and could be passed again as often as necessary,

a pledge frequently redeemed afterward; but he added, "it will not be

easy to do more than silence the batteries for a time." The feat had

been performed with the steady gallantry that characterized all the

similar attempts on the river. Notwithstanding the swift adverse

current, the full power of the vessels was not exerted. The loss was

15 killed and 30 wounded, eight of the former being among the crew of

the Clifton, which received a shot in her boiler, scalding all but one

of the forward powder division. The Confederates reported that none of

their guns had been injured, and they mention no casualties.

The action of the three commanders that failed to pass was severely

censured by the flag-officer; nor is it surprising that he should have

felt annoyed at finding his fleet separated, with the enemy's

batteries between them. It seems clear, however, that the smoke was

for a time so thick as to prevent the Brooklyn from seeing that the

flag-ship had kept on, while the language of the flag-officer's

written order governing the engagement was explicit. It read thus:

"When the vessels reach the bend of the river, should the enemy

continue the action, the ships and Iroquois and Oneida will stop their

engines and drop down the river again, keeping up the fire until

directed otherwise." In view of these facts, Captain Craven was

certainly justified in maintaining his position until he saw that the

flag-ship had passed; then it may be doubtful whether the

flag-officer's action had not countermanded his orders. The question

will be differently answered by different persons; probably the

greater number of officers would reply that the next two hours, spent

in a stationary position under the batteries, would have been better

employed in running by and rejoining the fleet. The error of judgment,

if it was one, was bitterly paid for in the mortification caused to a

skilful and gallant officer by the censure of the most distinguished

seaman of the war.

Above Vicksburg the flag-officer communicated with one of the rams

under Lieutenant-Colonel Ellet, who undertook to forward his

communications to Davis and Halleck. The ships were then anchored.

On the 1st of July Davis's fleet arrived. On the 9th an order was

received from Washington for Commander Porter to proceed to Hampton

Roads with twelve mortar-schooners. The next morning he sailed in the

Octorara with the schooners in company. On the way down he not only

had experience of the increasing difficulty of navigation from the

falling of the water, but also his active mind ascertained the extent

of the traffic by way of the Red River, and its worth to the

Confederacy; as also the subsidiary value of the Atchafalaya Bayou,

which, extending through the delta of the Mississippi from the Red

River to the Gulf, was then an open highway for the introduction of

foreign supplies, as well as the transport of native products. The

object and scope of the next year's campaign are plainly indicated in

a letter of his addressed to Farragut during his trip down the river.

It was unfortunate that an attempt was not made to hold at once the

bluffs below the point where those two highways meet, and blockade

them both, instead of wasting time at Vicksburg when there was not

then strength enough to hold on.

FOOTNOTES:

[2] For particulars of batteries, see Appendix.

[3] For detailed account of these batteries, see Appendix.

[4] These threw projectiles weighing from sixty to eighty pounds.

[5] Mitchell's conduct was approved by a Naval Court of Inquiry.

Higgins, who was most emphatic in his condemnation, could not appear as

a witness, the War Department not being willing to spare him from his

duties. The difference was one of judgment and, perhaps, of

temperament. From Higgins's character it is likely that, had he

commanded the naval forces, the Louisiana would either have done more

work or come to a different end. As the old proverb says, "He would

have made a spoon or spoiled the horn."

[6] As this feat has been usually ascribed to the Manassas, it may be

well to say that the statement in the text rests on the testimony of

the commander of the ram, as well as other evidence.

[7] There were two Jacksons, the naval steamer Jackson and the River

Defence boat Stonewall Jackson.

[8] Colonel Lovell of the Confederate army, who was ordnance and

disbursing officer of the River Defence Fleet, and had been twelve

years an officer in the United States Navy, testified there was no

organization, no discipline, and little or no drill of the crews. He

offered to employ a naval officer to drill them, but it does not appear

that the offer was accepted. He also testified that he had examined the

Ellet ram, Queen of the West, and considered most of the River Defence

boats better fitted for their work. The night before the fight, one of

them, with Grant, captain of the Quitman, went on board the Manassas,

and there told Warley that they were under nobody's orders but those of

the Secretary of War, and they were there to show naval officers how to

fight. There is plenty of evidence to the same effect. It was

impossible to do anything with them.

[9] Quarterly Return of the ordnance officer of the post, June 30,

1862.

[10] The writer is inclined to think these were not ready on June 28th,

but were the _new_ battery mentioned in Union and Confederate reports

of July 15th.

[11] This, known to the fleet as the hospital battery, was commanded by

Captain Todd, a brother-in-law of President Lincoln.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RECOIL FROM VICKSBURG.

The position now occupied by the combined fleets of Farragut and Davis

was from three to four miles below the mouth of the Yazoo River, near

the neck of the long tongue of land opposite Vicksburg. The armed

vessels were anchored on the east side, the transports tied up to the

opposite bank. It was known that up the Yazoo was an ironclad ram,

similar to one that had been building at Memphis when the capture of

that city led to its destruction. The one now in the Yazoo, called the

Arkansas, had been taken away barely in time to escape the same fate,

and, being yet unfinished, had been towed to her present position. She

was about 180 feet long by 30 feet beam, of from 800 to 1,000 tons

burden, with a casemate resembling that of other river ironclads,

excepting that the ends only were inclined, the sides being in

continuation of the sides of the vessel. The deck carrying the guns

was about six feet above water. The armor was of railroad iron

dovetailed together, the rails running up and down on the inclined

ends and horizontally along the sides. The iron thus arranged formed

nearly a solid mass, about three inches thick, heavily backed with

timber; and in the casemate between the ports there was a further

backing of compressed cotton bales firmly braced. The cotton was

covered within by a light sheathing of wood, as a guard against fire.

Her battery of ten guns was disposed as follows: in the bow, two

heavy VIII-inch columbiads; in the stern, two 6.4-inch rifles; and in

broadside two 6.4-inch rifles, two 32-pounder smooth-bores and two

IX-inch Dahlgren shell-guns. The hull proper was light and poorly

built. She had twin screws, but the engines were too light, and were

moreover badly constructed, and therefore continually breaking down.

Owing to this defect, she sometimes went on shore, and the commanding

officer could not feel sure of her obeying his will at any moment.

Besides her battery she had a formidable ram under water. She was at

this time commanded by Commander Isaac N. Brown, formerly of the

United States Navy, and had a complement of trained officers.

Notwithstanding the reports of her power, but little apprehension had

been felt in the Union fleet, but still a reconnoissance was ordered

for the 15th of July. The vessels sent were the Carondelet, Commander

Walke, the Tyler, Lieutenant-Commanding Gwin, and the Queen of the West

of the ram fleet; they carried with them a number of sharpshooters

from the army.

The Yazoo having been entered early in the morning, the Arkansas was

met unexpectedly about six miles from the mouth. At this time the ram

and the Tyler were over a mile ahead of the Carondelet, the Tyler

leading. The latter, having no prow and being unarmored, was wholly

unfit to contend with the approaching enemy; she therefore retreated

down stream toward the Carondelet.

The latter also turned and began a running fight down stream. The move

was not judicious, for she thus exposed her weakest part, the

unarmored stern, to the fire of the enemy, and directed her own

weakest battery, two 32-pounders, against him. Besides, when two

vessels are approaching on parallel courses, the one that wishes to

avoid the ram may perhaps do so by a movement of the helm, as the

Pensacola avoided the Manassas at the forts; but when the slower ship,

as the Carondelet was, has presented her stern to the enemy, she has

thrown up the game, barring some fortunate accident. The aggregate

weight of metal discharged by each ironclad from all its guns was

nearly the same,[12] but the Arkansas had a decided advantage in

penetrative power by her four 6.4-inch rifles. Her sides, and probably

her bow, were decidedly stronger than those of her opponent; but

whatever the relative advantages or disadvantages under other

circumstances, the Carondelet had now to fight her fight with two

32-pounders opposed to two VIII-inch shell-guns, throwing shell of 53

pounds and solid shot of 64, and with her unarmored stern opposed to

the armored bow of the ram. The Tyler took and kept her place on the

port bow of the Carondelet; as for the Queen of the West, she had fled

out of sight. "We had an exceedingly good thing," wrote one of the

Arkansas' officers, and for a long time, Walke's report says one hour,

they kept it. During that time, however, a shot entered the

pilot-house, injuring Commander Brown, mortally wounding one pilot and

disabling another. The loss of the latter, who was pilot for the

Yazoo, was seriously felt as the Arkansas came up and the order was

given to ram; for the Carondelet was hugging the left bank, and as

the enemy was drawing thirteen feet, the water was dangerously shoal.

She accordingly abandoned the attempt and sheered off, passing so

close that, from the decks of the Tyler, the two seemed to touch. Both

fired their broadsides in passing.

After this moment the accounts are not to be reconciled. Captain

Walke, of the Carondelet, says that he continued the action broadside

to broadside for some minutes, till the Arkansas drew ahead, and then

followed her with his bow guns until, his wheel-ropes being cut, he

ran into the bank, while the ram continued down the river with her

colors shot away. The colors of the Carondelet, he says, waved

undisturbed throughout the fight. On the other hand, Captain Brown, of

the Arkansas, states explicitly that there were no colors flying on

board the Carondelet, that all opposition to his fire had ceased, and

was not resumed as the ram pursued the other vessels; the Arkansas'

flag-staff was shot away. The loss of the Carondelet was 4 killed and

6 wounded; that of the Arkansas cannot well be separated from her

casualties during the same day, but seems to have been confined to the

pilot and one other man killed.

The ram now followed the Tyler, which had kept up her fire and

remained within range, losing many of her people killed and wounded.

The enemy was seen to be pumping a heavy stream of water both in the

Yazoo and the Mississippi, and her smoke-stack had been so pierced by

shot as to reduce her speed to a little over a knot an hour, at which

rate, aided by a favoring current, she passed through the two fleets.

Having no faith in her coming down, the vessels were found wholly

unprepared to attack; only one, the ram General Bragg, had steam, and

her commander unfortunately waited for orders to act in such an

emergency. "Every man has one chance," Farragut is reported to have

said; "he has had his and lost it." The chance was unique, for a

successful thrust would have spared two admirals the necessity of

admitting a disaster caused by over-security. The retreating Tyler was

sighted first, and gave definite information of what the firing that

had been heard meant, and the Arkansas soon followed. She fought her

way boldly through, passing between the vessels of war and the

transports, firing and receiving the fire of each as she went by, most

of the projectiles bounding harmlessly from her sides; but two XI-inch

shells came through, killing many and setting on fire the cotton

backing. On the other hand, the Lancaster, of the ram fleet, which

made a move toward her, got a shot in the mud-receiver which disabled

her, scalding many of her people; two of them fatally. The whole

affair with the fleets lasted but a few minutes, and the Arkansas,

having passed out of range, found refuge under the Vicksburg

batteries.

The two flag-officers were much mortified at the success of this

daring act, due as it was to the unprepared state of the fleets; and

Farragut instantly determined to follow her down and attempt to

destroy her as he ran by. The execution of the plan was appointed for

late in the afternoon, at which time Davis moved down his squadron and

engaged the upper batteries as a diversion. Owing to difficulties in

taking position, however, it was dark by the time the fleet reached

the town, and the ram, anticipating the move, had shifted her berth as

soon as the waning light enabled her to do so without being seen. She

could not therefore be made out; which was the more unfortunate

because, although only pierced twice in the morning, her plating on

the exposed side had been much loosened by the battering she received.

One XI-inch shot only found her as the fleet went by, and that killed

and wounded several of her people. All Farragut's fleet, accompanied

by the ram Sumter,[13] detached for this service by Flag-Officer

Davis, passed down in safety; the total loss in the action with the

Arkansas and in the second passage of the batteries being but 5 killed

and 16 wounded. None of this fleet ever returned above Vicksburg

again.

The Upper Mississippi flotilla in the same encounter had 13 killed, 34

wounded, and 10 missing. The greater part of this loss fell on the

Carondelet and the Tyler in the running fight; the former having 4

killed and 10 wounded, besides two who, when a shot of the enemy

caused steam to escape, jumped overboard and were drowned. The Tyler

lost 8 killed and 16 wounded. The commanding officer of the Arkansas

reported his loss as 10 killed and 15 badly wounded.

The ram now lay at the bend of the river between two forts. On the 22d

of July, Flag-Officer Davis sent down to attack her the ironclad

Essex, Commander W.D. Porter, with the ram Queen of the West,

Lieutenant-Colonel Ellet. They started shortly after dawn, the Benton,

Cincinnati, and Louisville covering them by an attack upon the upper

batteries. As the Essex neared the Arkansas the bow fasts of the

latter were slacked and the starboard screw turned, so that her head

swung off, presenting her sharp stem and beak to the broad square bow

of the assailant. The latter could not afford to take such an offer,

and, being very clumsy, could not recover herself after being foiled

in her first aim. She accordingly ran by, grazing the enemy's side,

and was carried ashore astern of him, in which critical position she

remained for ten minutes under a heavy fire; then, backing and

swinging clear, she ran down the river under fire of all the

batteries, but was not struck. When Porter saw that he would be unable

to ram, he fired into the Arkansas' bows, at fifty yards distance,

three solid IX-inch shot, one of which penetrated and raked her decks,

killing 7 and wounding 6 of her small crew, which then numbered only

41; the rest having been taken away as she was not fit for immediate

service. The Queen of the West rammed, doing some injury, but not of a

vital kind. She then turned her head up stream and rejoined the upper

fleet, receiving much damage from the batteries as she went back.

Two days later, Farragut's fleet and the troops on the point opposite

Vicksburg, under the command of General Williams, went down the river;

Farragut going to New Orleans and Williams to Baton Rouge. This move

was made necessary by the falling of the river and the increasing

sickliness of the climate. Porter, on his passage down a fortnight

before, had expressed the opinion, from his experience, that if the

heavy ships did not come down soon they would have to remain till next

season. But the health of the men, who had now been three months up

the river, was the most powerful cause for the change. On the 25th of

July forty per cent. of the crews of the upper flotilla were on the

sick list. The troops, who being ashore were more exposed, had but 800

fit for duty out of a total of 3,200. Two weeks before the Brooklyn

had 68 down out of 300. These were almost all sick with climatic

diseases, and the cases were increasing in number and intensity. The

Confederates now having possession of the point opposite Vicksburg,

Davis moved his fleet to the mouth of the Yazoo, and finally to

Helena. The growing boldness of the enemy along the banks of the

Mississippi made the river very unsafe, and supply and transport

vessels, unless convoyed by an armed steamer, were often attacked. One

had been sunk, and the enemy was reported to be establishing batteries

along the shores. These could be easily silenced, but to keep them

under required a number of gunboats, so that the communications were

seriously threatened. The fleet was also very short-handed, needing

five hundred men to fill the existing vacancies. Under these

circumstances Flag-Officer Davis decided to withdraw to Helena,

between which point and Vicksburg there was no high land on which the

enemy could permanently establish himself and give trouble. By these

various movements the ironclad Essex and the ram Sumter, now

permanently separated from the up-river fleet, remained charged with

the care of the river below Vicksburg; their nearest support being the

Katahdin and Kineo at Baton Rouge.

On the 5th of August the Confederates under the command of

Breckenridge made an attack upon General Williams's forces at Baton

Rouge. The Arkansas, with two small gunboats, had left Vicksburg on

the 3d to co-operate with the movement. The Union naval force present

consisted of the Essex, Sumter, Cayuga, Kineo, and Katahdin. The

attack was in superior force, but was gallantly met, the Union forces

gradually contracting their lines, while the gunboats Katahdin and

Kineo opened fire as soon as General Williams signalled to them that

they could do so without injuring their own troops. No Confederate

gunboats came, and the attack was repelled; Williams, however, falling

at the head of his men.

The Arkansas had been prevented from arriving in time by the failure

of her machinery, which kept breaking down. After her last stop, when

the order to go ahead was given, one engine obeyed while the other

refused. This threw her head into the bank and her stern swung down

stream. While in this position the Essex came in sight below.

Powerless to move, resistance was useless; and her commander,

Lieutenant Stevens, set her on fire as soon as the Essex opened, the

crew escaping unhurt to the shore. Shortly afterward she blew up.

Though destroyed by her own officers the act was due to the presence

of the vessel that had gallantly attacked her under the guns of

Vicksburg, and lain in wait for her ever since. Thus perished the most

formidable Confederate ironclad that had yet been equipped on the

Mississippi.

By the withdrawal of the upper and lower squadrons, with the troops

under General Williams, the Mississippi River, from Vicksburg to Port

Hudson, was left in the undisputed control of the Confederates. The

latter were not idle during the ensuing months, but by strengthening

their works at the two ends of the line, endeavored to assure their

control of this section of the river, thus separating the Union forces

at either end, maintaining their communication with the Western

States, and enjoying the resources of the rich country drained by the

Red River, which empties into the Mississippi in this portion of its

course. On the 16th of August, ten days after the gallant repulse of

the Confederate attack, the garrison was withdrawn from Baton Rouge to

New Orleans, thus abandoning the last of the bluffs above the city;

the Confederates, however, did not attempt to occupy in force lower

than Port Hudson. Above Vicksburg, Helena on the west side was in

Union hands, and the lower division of the Mississippi flotilla

patrolled the river; but Memphis continued to be the lowest point held

on the east bank. The intercourse between the Confederates on the two

sides, from Memphis to Vicksburg, though much impaired, could not be

looked upon as broken up. Bands of guerillas infested the banks,

firing upon unarmed vessels, compelling them to stop and then

plundering them. There was cause for suspecting that in some cases the

attack was only a pretext for stopping, and that the vessels had been

despatched by parties in sympathy with the Confederates, intending

that the freight should fall into their hands. Severe retaliatory

measures upon guerilla warfare were instituted by the naval vessels.

Flag-Officer Davis and General Curtis also arranged that combined

naval and military expeditions should scour the banks of the

Mississippi from Helena to Vicksburg, until a healthier season

permitted the resumption of more active hostilities. One such left

Helena on the 14th of August, composed of the Benton, Mound City, and

General Bragg, with the Ellett rams Monarch, Samson, and Lioness, and

a land force under Colonel Woods. Lieutenant-Commanding Phelps

commanded the naval force. The expedition landed at several points,

capturing a steamer with a quantity of ammunition and dispersing

parties of the enemy, and proceeded as far as the Yazoo River.

Entering this, they took a newly erected battery twenty miles from the

mouth, bursting the guns and destroying the work. Going on thirty

miles farther, the rams were sent twenty miles up the Big Sunflower,

one of the principal tributaries of the Yazoo. The expedition returned

after an absence of eleven days, having destroyed property to the

amount of nearly half a million.

The lull during the autumn months was marked by similar activity on

the Tennessee and Cumberland, for which a squadron of light vessels

was specially prepared. During the same period the transfer of the

flotilla from the army to the navy was made, taking effect on the 1st

of October, 1862. From this time the flotilla was officially styled

the Mississippi Squadron.

During the rest of the summer and the autumn months Admiral Farragut's

attention was mainly devoted to the seaboard of his extensive command.

The sickly season, the low stage of the river, and the condition of

his squadron, with the impossibility of obtaining decisive results

without the co-operation of the army, constrained him to this course.

Leaving a small force before New Orleans, he himself went to

Pensacola, while the other vessels of the squadron were dispersed on

blockading duty. Pursuing the general policy of the Government, point

after point was seized, and the blockade maintained by ships lying in

the harbors themselves. On the 15th of October, Farragut reported that

Galveston, Corpus Christi, and Sabine Pass, with the adjacent waters,

were in possession of the fleet, without bloodshed and almost without

firing a shot. Later on, December 4th, he wrote in a private letter

that he now held the whole coast except Mobile; but, as so often

happens in life, the congratulation had scarcely passed his lips when

a reverse followed.

On the 1st of January, 1863, a combined attack was made upon the land

and naval forces in Galveston Bay by the Confederate army and some

cottonclad steamers filled with sharpshooters, resulting in the

capture of the garrison, the destruction of the Westfield by her own

officers, and the surrender of the Harriet Lane after her captain and

executive officer had been killed at their posts. The other vessels

then abandoned the blockade. This affair, which caused great

indignation in the admiral, was followed by the capture of the sailing

vessels Morning Light and Velocity off Sabine Pass, also by cottonclad

steamers which came out on a calm day. Both Sabine Pass and Galveston

thenceforth remained in the enemy's hands. An expedition sent to

attempt the recovery of the latter failed in its object and lost the

Hatteras, an iron side-wheel steamer bought from the merchant service

and carrying a light battery. She was sent at night to speak a strange

sail, which proved to be the Confederate steamer Alabama, and was sunk

in a few moments. The disproportion of force was too great to carry

any discredit with this misfortune, but it, combined with the others

and with yet greater disasters in other theatres of the War, gave a

gloomy coloring to the opening of the year 1863, whose course in the

Gulf and on the Mississippi was to see the great triumphs of the Union

arms.

The military department of the Gulf had passed from General Butler to

General Banks on the 17th of December, shortly before these events

took place. It was by Banks that the troops were sent to Galveston,

and under his orders Baton Rouge also was reoccupied at once. These

movements were followed toward the middle of January by an expedition

up the Bayou Teche, in which the gunboats Calhoun, Estrella, and

Kinsman took part. The enterprise was successful in destroying the

Confederate steamer Cotton, which was preparing for service; but

Lieutenant-Commander Buchanan, senior officer of the gunboats, was

killed.

FOOTNOTES:

[12] The Carondelet, by returns made to the Navy Department in the

following month, August, had four VIII-inch guns, six 32-pounders, and

three rifles--one 30, one 50, and one 70-pound. Assuming her rifles to

have been in the bows, the weight and distribution of battery would

have been--

Carondelet. Arkansas.

Bow 150 106

Broadside 170 165

Stern 64 120

--- ---

384 391

The Arkansas' battery, as given, depends upon independent and agreeing

statements of two of her division officers. A third differs very

slightly.

[13] Commanded by Lieutenant Henry Erben.

CHAPTER V.

THE MISSISSIPPI OPENED.

Flag-Officer Davis had been relieved in command of the Mississippi

flotilla on the 15th of October, by Commander David D. Porter, holding

the local rank of acting rear-admiral. The new commander was detained

in Cairo for two months, organizing and equipping his squadron, which

had been largely increased. A division of vessels was still stationed

at Helena, patrolling the lower river, under the command of Captain

Henry Walke.

During the fall of 1862 and the following winter, two new types of

vessels were added to the squadron. The first, familiarly called

tinclads, but officially light-draughts, were river stern-wheel

steamers purchased for the service after the suggestion of

Flag-Officer Davis, and covered all round to a height of eleven feet

with iron from half to three-quarters of an inch thick, which made

them proof against musketry. The protection around the boilers was

increased to resist the light projectiles of field artillery. They

quartered their crew comfortably, and could on a pinch, for an

expedition, carry 200 men. The usual battery for these vessels was six

or eight 24-pound brass howitzers, four on each side, with sometimes

two light rifled guns in the bows. This armament was of little use

against works of any strength, but with canister or shrapnel could

keep off the riflemen, and meet on equal terms the field artillery

brought against them on the banks of the narrow streams, often

thickly timbered or covered with underbrush, into which they were

called to penetrate and engage in that kind of warfare significantly

called bushwhacking. For this service their light draught, not

exceeding three feet when deep, and diminishing to eighteen or twenty

inches when light, peculiarly fitted them; but they were also useful

in connection with the operations of the larger vessels, and some of

them generally went along as a kind of light force fitted for raids

and skirmishing.

The other vessels, which were not completed till later, were of an

entirely different kind, being intended to supply a class of fighting

ships of superior power, armor, and speed to those which had fought

their way down to Vicksburg from Cairo. The fighting power of the

Confederates had increased, and the successes of the Union arms, by

diminishing the extent of their line to be defended, had enabled them

to concentrate their men and guns. The defences of Vicksburg, both on

the Mississippi and Yazoo, had become greatly stronger. The new

armored vessels that were ready for some part of the coming operations

were the Lafayette, Tuscumbia, Indianola, Choctaw, and Chillicothe. Of

these the Tuscumbia, of 565 tons, the Indianola, of 442, and the

Chillicothe, of 303, were specially built for the Government at

Cincinnati. They were side-wheel, flat-bottomed boats, without keels;

the wheels being carried well aft, three-fourths of the entire length

from the bow, and acting independently of each other to facilitate

turning in close quarters. The Indianola and Tuscumbia had also two

screw propellers. On the forward deck there was a rectangular

casemate, twenty-two feet long in each vessel, but of differing

widths, as the vessels were of different size. Thus that of the

Tuscumbia was sixty-two feet wide, that of the Chillicothe only

forty-two. The sides of the casemate sloped at an angle of thirty

degrees from the perpendicular, and they, as well as the hull before

the wheels, were plated with two-or three-inch iron, according to the

locality; the heaviest plating being on the forward end of the

casemate. In the Tuscumbia this forward plating was six inches thick.

The casemates were pierced with ports for all their guns at the

forward end only; on each beam one port, and two aft. The ports were

closed with two three-inch iron shutters which slid back on tracks on

either side. In these casemates the Tuscumbia carried three XI-inch

guns, the Indianola and Chillicothe each two XI-inch. In the two

larger vessels there was also, between the wheels, a stern casemate

seventeen feet long, built of thick oak, not armored on the forward

end, but having two-inch plating aft and one-inch on each side. In

this stern casemate, pointing aft and capable of being trained four

points (45°) on each quarter, the Tuscumbia carried two 100-pound

rifles, and the Indianola two IX-inch guns. The hulls inside and abaft

the wheels, and the decks, except inside the main casemate, were

plated, but more lightly than the forward parts. In the Tuscumbia and

Indianola, iron bulwarks, half an inch thick and pierced with

loop-holes for musketry, extended all round the boats, except against

the wheelhouses; they were so arranged as to let down on deck when

desired. When ready for service, with guns and stores on board, these

boats drew from five to seven feet of water; but they were so weakly

built as to be dangerous and comparatively inefficient vessels,

quickly "disabled," as is apt to be the case with such preparations

for war as are postponed to the time of its outbreak. The contingency

of civil war on our inland waters was not indeed to be anticipated nor

prepared for; but what was the history of the ocean navy, on whose

hasty creation such harmful boasts and confidence were and are based?

They served their turn, for that enemy had no seamen, no navy, and

few mechanics; but they were then swept from the list, rotten and

broken down before their time. At this day nearly every ship that can

carry the United States flag was built before the war or long after

it.

The Lafayette and Choctaw, of one thousand tons each, were purchased

by the Government and converted into ironclad gunboats with rams.

Built deliberately, they were strong and serviceable vessels, but not

able to carry as much armor as had originally been intended. They were

side-wheel steamers, the wheels acting independently, but had no

screws. The Choctaw had a forward turret with inclined sides and

curved top, armored with two inches of iron on twenty-four inches of

oak, except on the after end and crown, where the iron was only one

inch. Just forward of the wheels was a thwartship casemate containing

two 24-pound howitzers pointing forward and intended to sweep the

decks if boarders should get possession. Over this casemate was the

pilot-house, conical, with two inches of iron on twenty-four of oak.

From turret to wheelhouses the sides were inclined like casemates and

covered with one-inch iron, as was the upper deck. Abaft the wheels

there was another thwartship casemate, sides and ends also sloping, in

which were two 30-pound Parrott rifles training from aft to four

points on the quarter. It had been at first proposed to carry in the

forward casemate two guns on a turn-table; but as this did not work,

four stationary guns were placed, three IX-inch and one 100-pound

rifle, two of which pointed ahead and one on each beam. The Lafayette

had a sloping casemate carried across the deck forward, and as far aft

as the wheels, covered in the lower part with one inch of iron over

one inch of indiarubber; the upper part of the bulwarks had

three-quarter-inch plating, and the deck half-inch. She carried two

XI-inch bow guns, four IX-inch in broadside but well forward, two

24-pound brass howitzers, and two 100-pound stern guns. The draught

of these two boats was about nine feet.

Besides these vessels may be mentioned the Black Hawk, a fine steamer,

unarmored, but with a battery of mixed guns, which had been remodelled

inside and fitted as a schoolship with accommodations for five hundred

officers and men. She carried also syphon-pumps capable of raising any

vessel that might sink. The old ram Sampson had been fitted as a

floating smithery. The two accompanied the fleet, the former taking

her place often in battle and serving as a swift flag-ship on

occasions.

Active operations again began toward the end of November, when the

rivers were rising from the autumnal rains. The great object of the

combined Union forces was the reduction of Vicksburg, upon which the

authorities at Washington preferred to move by way of the river, as it

gave, under the convoy of the navy, an easy line of communication not

liable to serious interruptions. The Confederate line of which

Vicksburg was the centre then faced the river, the right resting on

Haines's Bluff, a strongly fortified position twelve miles away, near

to and commanding the Yazoo; while the left was on the Mississippi at

Grand Gulf, sixty miles below Vicksburg by the stream, though not over

thirty by land. The place, in the end, was reduced much in the same

way as Island No. 10; the troops landing above it on the opposite

bank, and marching down to a point below the works. The naval vessels

then ran by the batteries and protected the crossing of the army to

the east bank. A short, sharp campaign in the rear of the city shut

the Confederates up in their works, and the Union troops were able to

again secure their communications with the river above the town. There

were, however, grave risks in this proceeding from the time that the

army abandoned its water-base, adding to its line of communication

thirty miles of bad roads on the river bank, and then throwing itself

into the enemy's country, leaving the river behind it. It was

therefore preferred first to make every effort to turn the position

from the north, through the Yazoo country.

[Illustration: MISSISSIPPI VALLEY--HELENA TO VICKSBURG.]

The Yazoo Valley is a district of oval form, two hundred miles long by

sixty wide, extending from a short distance below Memphis to

Vicksburg, where the hills which form its eastern boundary again reach

the Mississippi. The land is alluvial and, when not protected by

levees, subject to overflow in ordinary rises of the river, with the

exception of a long narrow strip fifteen miles from and parallel to

the eastern border. It is intersected by numerous bayous and receives

many streams from the hills, all of which, from the conformation of

the ground, find their way first to the Yazoo River, and by it to the

Mississippi. The Yazoo is first called, in the northern portion of the

basin, the Cold Water, then the Tallahatchie, and, after receiving the

Yallabusha from the east, the Yazoo. In the latter part of its course

it is a large stream with an average width of three hundred yards, and

navigable always, for vessels drawing three feet of water, as far as

Greenwood, a distance of two hundred and forty miles. It flows in a

southerly direction along the eastern side of the basin, between the

hills and the narrow strip of dry land before mentioned, receiving the

streams from the former, which it does not touch except at Yazoo City,

eighty miles from its mouth. After passing Yazoo City the river makes

several successive bends to the west, and then begins to receive the

various bayous which have been pursuing their own southerly course on

the other side of the strip of dry land, the principal one of which is

the Big Sunflower. At the present day the Yazoo enters the Mississippi

eight miles above Vicksburg, but formerly did so by another bed, now

a blind lead known as the Old River, which diverges from the existing

channel about six miles above its mouth.

Neither rivers nor bayous are the simple streams thus described.

Separating at times into two or more branches which meet again lower

down, having perhaps undergone further subdivisions in the meanwhile,

connected one with the other by lateral bayous, they form a system of

watercourses, acquaintance with which confers the same advantage as

local knowledge of a wild and desolate country. Opposite Helena, in

the natural state of the ground is a large bayou called Yazoo Pass,

leading from the Mississippi to the Cold Water, by which access was

formerly had to Yazoo City; but before the war it had been closed by

the continuation of the levees across its mouth.

When not under cultivation, the land and the banks of the streams are

covered with a thick growth of timber. Where the troops or gunboats

penetrated, it was found that there was abundance of live stock,

stores of cotton, and rich harvests of grain. The streams carried on

their waters many steamers, the number of which had been increased by

those that fled from New Orleans when the city fell; and at Yazoo City

the Confederates had established a navy yard, where at least three

powerful war vessels were being built for the river service.

The first step by the navy was undertaken early in December, when the

autumn rains had caused the rivers to rise. Admiral Porter issued

orders, dated November 21st, to Captain Walke to enter the Yazoo with

all his gunboats, except the Benton and General Bragg left at Helena,

and to destroy any batteries that he could. The object was to get

possession of as much of the river as possible and keep it clear for

General McClernand, who was to land and make the first attempt on

Vicksburg by that way.

In accordance with his orders, Walke, on arriving off the mouth of the

river, sent two light-draught gunboats, the Signal and Marmora, which

made a reconnoissance twenty miles up, where they fell in with a

number of torpedoes, one of which exploded near them. Having received

their report, Captain Walke determined, as the river was rising, to

send them up again with two of the heavy boats, the Cairo and

Pittsburg, to cover them while they lifted the torpedoes. The ram

Queen of the West also went with them.

These vessels left the main body at 8 A.M., December 12th. When the

torpedoes were reached they began removing them, the two

light-draughts in advance, the ram next, the two heavy boats bringing

up the rear. While thus engaged the Marmora began firing musketry, and

Lieutenant-Commander Selfridge, in the Cairo, pushed ahead to support

her. It was found that she was firing at an object floating in the

water, which turned out to be a torpedo that had already been

exploded. The Marmora was then ordered to proceed slowly again, the

Cairo following; but before the latter had gone her length two sharp

explosions occurred in quick succession, one under the bow and one

under the stern, the former so severe as to lift the guns from the

deck. The ship was at once shoved into the bank, and hawsers run out

to keep her from slipping off into deep water; but all was useless.

She filled and sank in twelve minutes, going down in a depth of six

fathoms, the tops of her chimneys alone remaining visible. The work of

destroying the torpedoes was continued after the accident, in which no

lives were lost. Thus, at the very beginning of operations, the

flotilla was deprived of one of its best vessels, the first to go of

the original seven.

The torpedoes by which the Cairo was sunk were merely demijohns filled

with powder and ignited by a common friction primer rigidly secured

inside. To the primer was fastened a wire passing through a

water-tight cork of gutta percha and plaster of Paris. The first very

primitive idea was to explode them by pulling from the shore, and it

is possible that the first to go off near the light-draughts was thus

fired. The matter was then taken in hand by a Confederate naval

officer, who arranged them in pairs, anchored twenty feet apart, the

wire leading from the primer of one to that of the other. Torpedoes

had hardly yet come to be looked on as a respectable mode of warfare,

especially by seamen, and the officer who laid these, and was looking

on when the Cairo went down, describes himself as feeling much as a

schoolboy might whose practical joke had taken a more serious shape

than he expected.

The work of removing the torpedoes was continued by the boats under

Lieutenant-Commander John G. Walker, of the Baron de Kalb, formerly

the St. Louis. Two landing-places were at the same time secured. After

the arrival of the admiral the work went on still more vigorously from

the 23d to the 26th of December. A bend in the river was then reached,

which brought the vessels under fire of the forts on Drumgoold's

Bluff. Every step of the ground so far gained had been won under a

constant fire of musketry, which the armored portion of the

light-draught gunboats resisted, but their upper works were badly cut

up. The batteries of the enemy being now only twelve hundred yards

off, the flag-ship Benton took position to cover the lighter vessels,

having to tie up to the bank because the wind blowing up stream

checked the current and threw her across it. She remained in this

position for two hours, receiving the enemy's fire and being struck

thirty times, but without serious injury. Unfortunately her captain,

Lieutenant-Commander William Gwin, a valuable officer, who had

distinguished himself at Shiloh and in the fight with the Arkansas,

was mortally wounded; having, in his anxiety to see how effective was

the fire of the vessels, left the armored pilot-house, saying, with a

noble rashness, that the captain's place was on his quarterdeck.

The army, 32,000 strong, under General W.T. Sherman, had arrived on

the 26th, and landed on the low ground above the old mouth of the

Yazoo, the gunboats occupying the sweep of river around them for a

length of eight miles. Heavy rains had set in, making the ground

almost impassable and causing the water to rise. After various

preliminary operations the troops assaulted the works on the hills in

front on the 29th, but the attack failed entirely. Sherman considered

the works too strong to justify its renewal at the same point, but

determined to hold his ground and make a night assault with 10,000 men

higher up the river, upon the right of the Confederate works at

Haines's Bluff, where the navy could get near enough to try and

silence the batteries. Colonel Charles Rivers Ellet,[14] of the ram

fleet, volunteered to go ahead with the ram Lioness and attempt to

blow up a raft which was laid across the stream. Everything was ready

on the night of the 31st, but a dense fog setting in prevented the

movement.

The continued rains now rendered the position of the army dangerous,

and it was re-embarked on the 2d of January. The enemy apparently did

not discover the movement till it was nearly finished, when they sent

down three regiments with field pieces to attack the transports, a

movement quickly checked by the fire of the gunboats.

When Sherman's army was embarked, the transports moved out into the

Mississippi and anchored five miles above Vicksburg, where General

McClernand joined and assumed the chief command. Soon after his

arrival he determined upon a movement against Fort Hindman, on the

Arkansas River, fifty miles from its mouth. This point, better known

as Arkansas Post, commanded the approach to Little Rock, the capital

of Arkansas, but was specially obnoxious to the Union forces at this

time, as being the base from which frequent small expeditions were

sent out to embarrass their communications by the line of the

Mississippi, from which it was but fifteen miles distant in a straight

line. A few days before, the capture of the Blue Wing, a transport

loaded with valuable stores, had emphasized the necessity of

destroying a work that occupied such a menacing position upon the

flank and rear of the projected movement against Vicksburg.