MOBILE, 218
APPENDIX, 251
INDEX, 255
LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS.
PAGE
MISSISSIPPI VALLEY--CAIRO TO MEMPHIS, _to face_ 9
MISSISSIPPI VALLEY--VICKSBURG TO THE GULF, _to face_ 52
BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS, 74
BATTLE AT VICKSBURG, 92
MISSISSIPPI VALLEY--HELENA TO VICKSBURG, _to face_ 115
BATTLE AT GRAND GULF, 159
RED RIVER DAM, 208
BATTLE OF MOBILE BAY, _to face_ 229
THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS.
CHAPTER I.
PRELIMINARY.
The naval operations described in the following pages extended, on the
seaboard, over the Gulf of Mexico from Key West to the mouth of the
Rio Grande; and inland over the course of the Mississippi, and its
affluents, from Cairo, at the southern extremity of the State of
Illinois, to the mouths of the river.
Key West is one of the low coral islands, or keys, which stretch out,
in a southwesterly direction, into the Gulf from the southern
extremity of the Florida peninsula. It has a good harbor, and was used
during, as since, the war as a naval station. From Key West to the
mouth of the Rio Grande, the river forming the boundary between Mexico
and the State of Texas, the distance in a straight line is about eight
hundred and forty miles. The line joining the two points departs but
little from an east and west direction, the mouth of the river, in 25°
26' N., being eighty-three miles north of the island; but the shore
line is over sixteen hundred miles, measuring from the southern
extremity of Florida. Beginning at that point, the west side of the
peninsula runs north-northwest till it reaches the 30th degree of
latitude; turning then, the coast follows that parallel approximately
till it reaches the delta of the Mississippi. That delta, situated
about midway between the east and west ends of the line, projects
southward into the Gulf of Mexico as far as parallel 29° N.,
terminating in a long, narrow arm, through which the river enters the
Gulf by three principal branches, or passes. From the delta the shore
sweeps gently round, inclining first a little to the north of west,
until near the boundary between the States of Louisiana and Texas;
then it curves to the southwest until a point is reached about one
hundred miles north of the mouth of the Rio Grande, whence it turns
abruptly south. Five States, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana,
and Texas, in the order named, touch the waters bounded by this long,
irregular line; but the shore of two of them, Alabama and Mississippi,
taken together, extends over little more than one hundred miles. All
five joined at an early date in the secession movement.
The character of the coast, from one end to the other, varies but
slightly in appearance. It is everywhere low, and either sandy or
marshy. An occasional bluff of moderate height is to be seen. A large
proportion of the line is skirted by low sandy islands, sometimes
joined by narrow necks to the mainland, forming inland sounds of
considerable extent, access to which is generally impracticable for
vessels of much draft of water. They, however, as well as numerous
bays and the mouths of many small rivers, can be entered by light
vessels acquainted with the ground; and during the war small steamers
and schooners frequently escaped through them, carrying cargoes of
cotton, then of great value. There is but little rise and fall of the
tide in the Gulf, from one to two feet, but the height of the water is
much affected by the direction of the wind.
The principal ports on or near the Gulf are New Orleans in Louisiana,
Mobile in Alabama, and Galveston in Texas. Tallahassee and
Apalachicola, in Florida, also carried on a brisk trade in cotton at
the time of the secession. By far the best harbor is Pensacola Bay, in
Florida, near the Alabama line. The town was not at that time a place
of much commerce, on account of defective communication with the
interior; but the depth of water, twenty-two feet, that could be
carried over the bar, and the secure spacious anchorage within made it
of great value as a naval station. It had been so used prior to the
war, and, although falling at first into the hands of the
Confederates, was shortly regained by the Union forces, to whom, from
its nearness to Mobile and the passes of the Mississippi, as well as
from its intrinsic advantages, it was of great importance throughout
the contest.
The aim of the National Government in connection with this large
expanse of water and its communications was two-fold. First, it was
intended to enter the Mississippi River from the sea, and working up
its stream in connection with the land forces, to take possession of
the well-known positions that gave command of the navigation.
Simultaneously with this movement from below, a similar movement
downward, with the like object, was to be undertaken in the upper
waters. If successful, as they proved to be, the result of these
attacks would be to sever the States in rebellion on the east side of
the river from those on the west, which, though not the most populous,
contributed largely in men, and yet more abundantly in food, to the
support of the Confederacy.
The second object of the Government was to enforce a strict blockade
over the entire coast, from the Rio Grande to Florida. There were not
in the Confederate harbors powerful fleets, or even single vessels of
war, which it was necessary to lock up in their own waters. One or two
_quasi_ men-of-war escaped from them, to run short and, in the main,
harmless careers; but the cruise that inflicted the greatest damage on
the commerce of the Union was made by a vessel that never entered a
Southern port. The blockade was not defensive, but offensive; its
purpose was to close every inlet by which the products of the South
could find their way to the markets of the world, and to shut out the
material, not only of war, but essential to the peaceful life of a
people, which the Southern States were ill-qualified by their previous
pursuits to produce. Such a blockade could be made technically
effectual by ships cruising or anchored outside; but there was a great
gain in actual efficiency when the vessels could be placed within the
harbors. The latter plan was therefore followed wherever possible and
safe; and the larger fortified places were reduced and occupied as
rapidly as possible consistent with the attainment of the prime
object--the control of the Mississippi Valley.
Before the war the Atlantic and Gulf waters of the United States, with
those of the West Indies, Mexico, and Central America, were the
cruising ground of one division of vessels, known as the Home
Squadron. At the beginning of hostilities this squadron was under the
command of Flag-Officer G.J. Pendergrast, who rendered essential and
active service during the exciting and confused events which
immediately followed the bombardment of Fort Sumter. The command was
too extensive to be administered by any one man, when it became from
end to end the scene of active war, so it was soon divided into three
parts. The West India Squadron, having in its charge United States
interests in Mexico and Central America as well as in the islands,
remained under the care of Flag-Officer Pendergrast. Flag-Officer
Stringham assumed command of the Atlantic Squadron, extending as far
south as Cape Florida; and the Gulf, from Cape Florida to the Rio
Grande, was assigned to Flag-Officer William Mervine, who reached his
station on the 8th of June, 1861. On the 4th of July the squadron
consisted of twenty-one vessels, carrying two hundred and eighty-two
guns, and manned by three thousand five hundred men.
Flag-Officer Mervine was relieved in the latter part of September. The
blockade was maintained as well as the number and character of the
vessels permitted, but no fighting of any consequence took place. A
dashing cutting-out expedition from the flag-ship Colorado, under
Lieutenant J.H. Russell, assisted by Lieutenants Sproston and Blake,
with subordinate officers and seamen, amounting in all to four boats
and one hundred men, seized and destroyed an armed schooner lying
alongside the wharf of the Pensacola Navy Yard, under the protection
of a battery. The service was gallantly carried out; the schooner's
crew, after a desperate resistance, were driven on shore, whence, with
the guard, they resumed their fire on the assailants. The affair cost
the flag-ship three men killed and nine wounded.
Under Mervine's successor, Flag-Officer W.W. McKean, more of interest
occurred. The first collision was unfortunate, and, to some extent,
humiliating to the service. A squadron consisting of the steam-sloop
Richmond, sailing-sloops Vincennes and Preble, and the small
side-wheel steamer Water Witch had entered the Mississippi early in
the month of October, and were at anchor at the head of the passes. At
3.30 A.M., October 12th, a Confederate ram made its appearance close
aboard the Richmond, which, at the time, had a coal schooner
alongside. The ram charged the Richmond, forcing a small hole in her
side about two feet below the water-line, and tearing the schooner
adrift. She dropped astern, lay quietly for a few moments off the
port-quarter of the Richmond, and then steamed slowly up the river,
receiving broadsides from the Richmond and Preble, and throwing up a
rocket. In a few moments three dim lights were seen up the river near
the eastern shore. They were shortly made out to be fire-rafts. The
squadron slipped their chains, the three larger vessels, by direction
of the senior officer, retreating down the Southwest Pass to the sea;
but in the attempt to cross, the Richmond and Vincennes grounded on
the bar. The fire-rafts drifted harmlessly on to the western bank of
the river, and then burned out. When day broke, the enemy's fleet,
finding the head of the passes abandoned, followed down the river, and
with rifled guns kept up a steady but not very accurate long-range
fire upon the stranded ships, not venturing within reach of the
Richmond's heavy broadside. About 10 A.M., apparently satisfied with
the day's work, they returned up river, and the ships shortly after
got afloat and crossed the bar.
The ram which caused this commotion and hasty retreat was a small
vessel of three hundred and eighty-four tons, originally a Boston
tug-boat called the Enoch Train, which had been sent to New Orleans to
help in improving the channel of the Mississippi. When the war broke
out she was taken by private parties and turned into a ram on
speculation. An arched roof of 5-inch timber was thrown over her deck,
and this covered with a layer of old-fashioned railroad iron, from
three-fourths to one inch thick, laid lengthways. At the time of this
attack she had a cast-iron prow under water, and carried a IX-inch
gun, pointing straight ahead through a slot in the roof forward; but
as this for some reason could not be used, it was lashed in its place.
Her dimensions were: length 128 feet, beam 26 feet, depth 12½ feet.
She had twin screws, and at this time one engine was running at high
pressure and the other at low, both being in bad order, so that she
could only steam six knots; but carrying the current with her she
struck the Richmond with a speed of from nine to ten. Although
afterward bought by the Confederate Government, she at this time still
belonged to private parties; but as her captain, pilot, and most of
the other officers refused to go in her, Lieutenant A.F. Warley, of
the Confederate Navy, was ordered to the command by Commodore Hollins.
In the collision her prow was wrenched off, her smoke-stack carried
away and the condenser of the low-pressure engine gave out, which
accounts for her "remaining under the Richmond's quarter," "dropping
astern," and "lying quietly abeam of the Preble, apparently hesitating
whether to come at her or not." As soon as possible she limped off
under her remaining engine.
Although it was known to the officers of the Union fleet that the
enemy had a ram up the river, it does not appear that any preparation
for defence had been made, or plan of action adopted. Even the
commonplace precaution of sending out a picket-boat had not been
taken. The attack, therefore, was a surprise, not only in the ordinary
sense of the word, but, so far as appears, in finding the officer in
command without any formed ideas as to what he would do if she came
down. "The whole affair came upon me so suddenly that no time was left
for reflection, but called for immediate action." These are his own
words. The natural outcome of not having his resources in hand was a
hasty retreat before an enemy whose force he now exaggerated and with
whom he was not prepared to deal; a move which brought intense
mortification to himself and in a measure to the service.
It is a relief to say that the Water Witch, a small vessel of under
four hundred tons, with three light guns, commanded by Lieutenant
Francis Winslow, held her ground, steaming up beyond the fire-rafts
until daylight showed her the larger vessels in retreat.
During the night of November 7th the U.S. frigate Santee, blockading
off Galveston, sent into the harbor two boats, under the command of
Lieutenant James E. Jouett, with the object of destroying the
man-of-war steamer General Rusk. The armed schooner Royal Yacht
guarding the channel was passed unseen, but the boats shortly after
took the ground and were discovered. Thinking it imprudent to attack
the steamer without the advantage of a surprise, Lieutenant Jouett
turned upon the schooner, which was carried after a sharp conflict.
The loss of the assailants was two killed and seven wounded. The
schooner was burnt.
On November 22d and 23d Flag-Officer McKean, with the Niagara and
Richmond, made an attack upon Fort McRea on the western side of the
entrance to Pensacola Bay; Fort Pickens, on the east side, which
remained in the power of the United States, directing its guns upon
the fort and the Navy Yard, the latter being out of reach of the
ships. The fire of McRea was silenced the first day; but on the second
a northwest wind had so lowered the water that the ships could not get
near enough to reach the fort. The affair was entirely indecisive,
being necessarily conducted at very long range.
From this time on, until the arrival of Flag-Officer David G.
Farragut, a guerilla warfare was maintained along the coast, having
always the object of making the blockade more effective and the
conditions of the war more onerous to the Southern people. Though each
little expedition contributed to this end, singly they offer nothing
that it is necessary to chronicle here. When Farragut came the
squadron was divided. St. Andrew's Bay, sixty miles east of Pensacola,
was left in the East Gulf Squadron; all west of that point was
Farragut's command, under the name of the Western Gulf Blockading
Squadron. Stirring and important events were now at hand, before
relating which the course of the war on the Upper Mississippi demands
attention.
[Illustration: MISSISSIPPI VALLEY--CAIRO TO MEMPHIS.]
CHAPTER II.
FROM CAIRO TO VICKSBURG.
At the 37th parallel of north latitude the Ohio, which drains the
northeast portion of the Valley of the Mississippi, enters that river.
At the point of junction three powerful States meet. Illinois, here
bounded on either side by the great river and its tributary, lies on
the north; on the east it is separated by the Ohio from Kentucky, on
the west by the Mississippi from Missouri. Of the three Illinois was
devoted to the cause of the Union, but the allegiance of the two
others, both slave-holding, was very doubtful at the time of the
outbreak of hostilities.
The general course of the Mississippi here being south, while that of
the Ohio is southwest, the southern part of Illinois projects like a
wedge between the two other States. At the extreme point of the wedge,
where the rivers meet, is a low point of land, subject, in its
unprotected state, to frequent overflows by the rising of the waters.
On this point, protected by dikes or levees, is built the town of
Cairo, which from its position became, during the war, the naval
arsenal and dépôt of the Union flotilla operating in the Mississippi
Valley.
From Cairo to the mouths of the Mississippi is a distance of ten
hundred and ninety-seven miles by the stream. So devious, however, is
the course of the latter that the two points are only four hundred and
eighty miles apart in a due north and south line; for the river,
after having inclined to the westward till it has increased its
longitude by some two degrees and a half, again bends to the east,
reaching the Gulf on the meridian of Cairo. Throughout this long
distance the character of the river-bed is practically unchanged. The
stream flows through an alluvial region, beginning a few miles above
Cairo, which is naturally subject to overflow during floods; but the
surrounding country is protected against such calamities by raised
embankments, or dikes, known throughout that region as levees.
The river and its tributaries are subject to very great variations of
height, which are often sudden and unexpected, but when observed
through a series of years present a certain regularity. They depend
upon the rains and the melting of the snows in their basins. The
greatest average height is attained in the late winter and early
spring months; another rise takes place in the early summer; the
months of August, September, and October give the lowest water, the
rise following them being due to the autumnal rains. It will be seen
at times that these rises and falls, especially when sudden, had their
bearing upon the operations of both army and navy.
At a few points of the banks high land is encountered. On the right,
or western, bank there is but one such, at Helena, in the State of
Arkansas, between three and four hundred miles below Cairo. On the
left bank such points are more numerous. The first is at Columbus,
twenty-one miles down the stream; then follow the bluffs at Hickman,
in Kentucky; a low ridge (which also extends to the right bank) below
New Madrid, rising from one to fifteen feet above overflow; the four
Chickasaw bluffs in Tennessee, on the southernmost of which is the
city of Memphis; and finally a rapid succession of similar bluffs
extending for two hundred and fifty miles, at short intervals, from
Vicksburg, in Mississippi, about six hundred miles below Cairo, to
Baton Rouge, in Louisiana. Of these last Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, and
Port Hudson became the scenes of important events of the war.
It is easy to see that each of these rare and isolated points afforded
a position by the fortification of which the passage of an enemy could
be disputed, and the control of the stream maintained, as long as it
remained in the hands of the defenders. They were all, except Columbus
and Hickman, in territory which, by the act of secession, had become
hostile to the Government of the United States; and they all, not
excepting even the two last-named, were seized and fortified by the
Confederates. It was against this chain of defences that the Union
forces were sent forth from either end of the line; and fighting their
way, step by step, and post by post, those from the north and those
from the south met at length around the defences of Vicksburg. From
the time of that meeting the narratives blend until the fall of the
fortress; but, prior to that time, it is necessary to tell the story
of each separately. The northern expeditions were the first in the
field, and to them this chapter is devoted.
The importance of controlling the Mississippi was felt from the first
by the United States Government. This importance was not only
strategic; it was impossible that the already powerful and
fast-growing Northwestern States should see without grave
dissatisfaction the outlet of their great highway pass into the hands
of a foreign power. Even before the war the necessity to those States
of controlling the river was an argument against the possibility of
disunion, at least on a line crossing it. From the military point of
view, however, not only did the Mississippi divide the Confederacy,
but the numerous streams directly or indirectly tributary to it,
piercing the country in every direction, afforded a ready means of
transport for troops and their supplies in a country of great extent,
but otherwise ill-provided with means of carriage. From this
consideration it was but a step to see the necessity of an inland navy
for operating on and keeping open those waters.
The necessity being recognized, the construction of the required
fleet was at the first entrusted to the War Department, the naval
officers assigned for that duty reporting to the military officer
commanding in the West. The fleet, or flotilla, while under this
arrangement, really constituted a division of the army, and its
commanding officer was liable to interference, not only at the hands
of the commander-in-chief, but of subordinate officers of higher rank
than himself.
On May 16, 1861, Commander John Rodgers was directed to report to the
War Department for this service. Under his direction there were
purchased in Cincinnati three river-steamers, the Tyler, Lexington,
and Conestoga. These were altered into gunboats by raising around them
perpendicular oak bulwarks, five inches thick and proof against
musketry, which were pierced for ports, but bore no iron plating. The
boilers were dropped into the hold, and steam-pipes lowered as much as
possible. The Tyler mounted six 64-pounders in broadside, and one
32-pounder stern gun; the Lexington, four 64s and two 32s; the
Conestoga, two broadside 32s and one light stern gun. After being
altered, these vessels were taken down to Cairo, where they arrived
August 12th, having been much delayed by the low state of the river;
one of them being dragged by the united power of the three over a bar
on which was one foot less water than her draught.
On the 7th of August, a contract was made by the War Department with
James B. Eads, of St. Louis, by which he undertook to complete seven
gunboats, and deliver them at Cairo on the 10th day of October of the
same year. These vessels were one hundred and seventy-five feet long
and fifty feet beam. The propelling power was one large paddle-wheel,
which was placed in an opening prepared for it, midway of the breadth
of the vessel and a little forward of the stern, in such wise as to be
materially protected by the sides and casemate. This opening, which
was eighteen feet wide, extended forward sixty feet from the stern,
dividing the after-body into two parts, which were connected abaft the
wheel by planking thrown from one side to the other. This after-part
was called the fantail. The casemate extended from the curve of the
bow to that of the stern, and was carried across the deck both forward
and aft, thus forming a square box, whose sides sloped in and up at an
angle of forty-five degrees, containing the battery, the machinery,
and the paddle-wheel. The casemate was pierced for thirteen guns,
three in the forward end ranging directly ahead, four on each
broadside, and two stern guns.
As the expectation was to fight generally bows on, the forward end of
the casemate carried iron armor two and a half inches thick, backed by
twenty-four inches of oak. The rest of the casemate was not protected
by armor, except abreast of the boilers and engines, where there were
two and a half inches of iron, but without backing. The stern,
therefore, was perfectly vulnerable, as were the sides forward and
abaft the engines. The latter were high pressure, like those of all
Western river-boats, and, though the boilers were dropped into the
hold as far as possible, the light draught and easily pierced sides
left the vessels exposed in action to the fearful chance of an
exploded boiler. Over the casemate forward was a pilot-house of
conical shape, built of heavy oak, and plated on the forward side with
2½-inch iron, on the after with 1½-inch. With guns, coal, and stores
on board, the casemate deck came nearly down to the water, and the
vessels drew from six to seven feet, the peculiar outline giving them
no small resemblance to gigantic turtles wallowing slowly along in
their native element. Below the water the form was that of a scow, the
bottom being flat. Their burden was five hundred and twelve tons.
The armament was determined by the exigencies of the time, such guns
as were available being picked up here and there and forwarded to
Cairo. The army supplied thirty-five old 42-pounders, which were
rifled, and so threw a 70-pound shell. These having lost the metal cut
away for grooves, and not being banded, were called upon to endure the
increased strain of firing rifled projectiles with actually less
strength than had been allowed for the discharge of a round ball of
about half the weight. Such make-shifts are characteristic of nations
that do not prepare for war, and will doubtless occur again in the
experience of our navy; fortunately, in this conflict, the enemy was
as ill-provided as ourselves. Several of these guns burst; their crews
could be seen eyeing them distrustfully at every fire, and when at
last they were replaced by sounder weapons, many were not turned into
store, but thrown, with a sigh of relief, into the waters of the
Mississippi. The remainder of the armament was made up by the navy
with old-fashioned 32-pound and VIII-inch smooth-bore guns, fairly
serviceable and reliable weapons. Each of these seven gunboats, when
thus ready for service, carried four of the above-described rifles,
six 32-pounders of 43 cwt., and three VIII-inch shell-guns; total,
thirteen.
The vessels, when received into service, were named after cities
standing upon the banks of the rivers which they were to
defend--Cairo, Carondelet, Cincinnati, Louisville, Mound City,
Pittsburg, St. Louis. They, with the Benton, formed the backbone of
the river fleet throughout the war. Other more pretentious, and
apparently more formidable, vessels, were built; but from thorough bad
workmanship, or appearing too late on the scene, they bore no
proportionate share in the fighting. The eight may be fairly called
the ships of the line of battle on the western waters.
The Benton was of the same general type as the others, but was
purchased by, not built for, the Government. She was originally a
snag-boat, and so constructed with special view to strength. Her size
was 1,000 tons, double that of the seven; length, 202 feet; extreme
breadth, 72 feet. The forward plating was 3 inches of iron, backed by
30 inches of oak; at the stern, and abreast the engines, there was
2½-inch iron, backed by 12 inches of oak; the rest of the sides of the
casemates was covered with 5/8-inch iron. With guns and stores on
board, she drew nine feet. Her first armament was two IX-inch
shell-guns, seven rifled 42s, and seven 32-pounders of 43 cwt.; total,
sixteen guns. It will be seen, therefore, that she differed from the
others simply in being larger and stronger; she was, indeed, the most
powerful fighting-machine in the squadron, but her speed was only five
knots an hour through the water, and her engines so little
commensurate with her weight that Flag-Officer Foote hesitated long to
receive her. The slowness was forgiven for her fitness for battle, and
she went by the name of the old war-horse.
There was one other vessel of size equal to the Benton, which, being
commanded by a son of Commodore Porter, of the war of 1812, got the
name Essex. After bearing a creditable part in the battle of Fort
Henry, she became separated by the batteries of Vicksburg from the
upper squadron, and is less identified with its history. Her armament
was three IX-inch, one X-inch, and one 32-pounder.
On the 6th of September Commander Rodgers was relieved by Captain A.H.
Foote, whose name is most prominently associated with the equipment
and early operations of the Mississippi flotilla. At that time he
reported to the Secretary that there were three wooden gunboats in
commission, nine ironclads and thirty-eight mortar-boats building. The
mortar-boats were rafts or blocks of solid timber, carrying one
XIII-inch mortar.
The construction and equipment of the fleet was seriously delayed by
the lack of money, and the general confusion incident to the vast
extent of military and naval preparations suddenly undertaken by a
nation having a very small body of trained officers, and accustomed to
raise and expend comparatively insignificant amounts of money.
Constant complaints were made by the officers and contractors that
lack of money prevented them from carrying on their work. The first of
the seven ironclads was launched October 12th and the seven are
returned by the Quartermaster's Department as received December 5,
1861. On the 12th of January, 1862, Flag-Officer Foote reported that
he expected to have all the gunboats in commission by the 20th, but
had only one-third crews for them. The crews were of a heterogeneous
description. In November a draft of five hundred were sent from the
seaboard, which, though containing a proportion of men-of-war's men,
had a yet larger number of coasting and merchant seamen, and of
landsmen. In the West two or three hundred steamboat men, with a few
sailors from the Lakes, were shipped. In case of need, deficiencies
were made up by drafts from regiments in the army. On the 23d of
December, 1861, eleven hundred men were ordered from Washington to be
thus detailed for the fleet. Many difficulties, however, arose in
making the transfer. General Halleck insisted that the officers of the
regiments must accompany their men on board, the whole body to be
regarded as marines and to owe obedience to no naval officer except
the commander of the gunboat. Foote refused this, saying it would be
ruinous to discipline; that the second in command, or executive
officer, by well-established naval usage, controlled all officers,
even though senior in rank to himself; and that there were no quarters
for so many more officers, for whom, moreover, he had no use. Later on
Foote writes to the Navy Department that not more than fifty men had
joined from the army, though many had volunteered; the derangement of
companies and regiments being the reason assigned for not sending the
others. It does not appear that more than these fifty came at that
time. There is no more unsatisfactory method of getting a crew than by
drafts from the commands of other men. Human nature is rarely equal to
parting with any but the worst; and Foote had so much trouble with a
subsequent detachment that he said he would rather go into action half
manned than take another draft from the army. In each vessel the
commander was the only trained naval officer, and upon him devolved
the labor of organizing and drilling this mixed multitude. In charge
of and responsible for the whole was the flag-officer, to whom, though
under the orders of General Fremont, the latter had given full
discretion.
Meanwhile the three wooden gunboats had not been idle during the
preparation of the main ironclad fleet. Arriving at Cairo, as has been
stated, on the 12th of August, the necessity for action soon arose.
During the early months of the war the State of Kentucky had announced
her intention of remaining a neutral between the contending parties.
Neither of the latter was willing to precipitate her, by an invasion
of her soil, into the arms of the other, and for some time the
operations of the Confederates were confined to Tennessee, south of
her borders, the United States troops remaining north of the Ohio. On
September 4th, however, the Confederates crossed the line and occupied
in force the bluffs at Columbus and Hickman, which they proceeded at
once to fortify. The military district about Cairo was then under the
command of General Grant, who immediately moved up the Ohio, and
seized Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee River, and Smithland, at
the mouth of the Cumberland. These two rivers enter the Ohio ten miles
apart, forty and fifty miles above Cairo. Rising in the Cumberland and
Alleghany Mountains, their course leads through the heart of
Tennessee, to which their waters give easy access through the greater
part of the year. Two gunboats accompanied this movement, in which,
however, there was no fighting.
On the 10th of September, the Lexington, Commander Stembel, and
Conestoga, Lieutenant-Commanding Phelps, went down the Mississippi,
covering an advance of troops on the Missouri side. A brisk cannonade
followed between the boats and the Confederate artillery, and shots
were exchanged with the gunboat Yankee. On the 24th, Captain Foote, by
order of General Fremont, moved in the Lexington up the Ohio River to
Owensboro. The Conestoga was to have accompanied this movement, but
she was up the Cumberland or Tennessee at the time; arriving later she
remained, by order, at Owensboro till the falling of the river
compelled her to return, there being on some of the bars less water
than she drew. A few days later this active little vessel showed
herself again on the Mississippi, near Columbus, endeavoring to reach
a Confederate gunboat that lay under the guns of the works; then again
on the Tennessee, which she ascended as far as the Tennessee State
Line, reconnoitring Fort Henry, subsequently the scene of Foote's
first decisive victory over the enemy. Two days later the Cumberland
was entered for the distance of sixty miles. On the 28th of October,
accompanied by a transport and some companies of troops, she again
ascended the Cumberland, and broke up a Confederate camp, the enemy
losing several killed and wounded. The frequent appearances of these
vessels, while productive of no material effect beyond the capture or
destruction of Confederate property, were of service in keeping alive
the attachment to the Union where it existed. The crews of the
gunboats also became accustomed to the presence of the enemy, and to
the feeling of being under fire.
On the 7th of November a more serious affair took place. The evening
before, the gunboats Tyler, Commander Walke, and Lexington, Commander
Stembel, convoyed transports containing three thousand troops, under
the command of General Grant, down the Mississippi as far as Norfolk,
eight miles, where they anchored on the east side of the river. The
following day the troops landed at Belmont, which is opposite Columbus
and under the guns of that place. The Confederate troops were easily
defeated and driven to the river's edge, where they took refuge on
their transports. During this time the gunboats engaged the batteries
on the Iron Banks, as the part of the bluff above the town is called.
The heavy guns of the enemy, from their commanding position, threw
easily over the boats, reaching even to and beyond the transports on
the opposite shore up stream. Under Commander Walke's direction the
transports were moved further up, out of range.
Meanwhile the enemy was pushing reinforcements across the stream below
the works, and the Union forces, having accomplished the diversion
which was the sole object of the expedition, began to fall back to
their transports. It would seem that the troops, yet unaccustomed to
war, had been somewhat disordered by their victory, so that the return
was not accomplished as rapidly as was desirable, the enemy pressing
down upon the transports. At this moment the gunboats, from a
favorable position, opened upon them with grape, canister, and
five-second shell, silencing them with great slaughter. When the
transports were under way the two gunboats followed in the rear,
covering the retreat till the enemy ceased to follow.
In this succession of encounters the Tyler lost one man killed and two
wounded. The Lexington escaped without loss.
When a few miles up the river on the return, General McClernand,
ascertaining that some of the troops had not embarked, directed the
gunboats to go back for them, the general himself landing to await
their return. This service was performed, some 40 prisoners being
taken on board along with the troops.
In his official report of this, the first of his many gallant actions
on the rivers, Commander Walke praises warmly the efficiency as well
as the zeal of the crews of the gunboats, though as yet so new to
their duties.
The flotilla being at this time under the War Department, as has been
already stated, its officers, each and all, were liable to orders from
any army officer of superior rank to them. Without expressing a
decided opinion as to the advisability of this arrangement under the
circumstances then existing, it was entirely contrary to the
established rule by which, when military and naval forces are acting
together, the commander of each branch decides what he can or can not
do, and is not under the control of the other, whatever the relative
rank. At this time Captain Foote himself had only the rank of colonel,
and found, to use his own expression, that "every brigadier could
interfere with him." On the 13th of November, 1861, he received the
appointment of flag-officer, which gave him the same rank as a
major-general, and put him above the orders of any except the
commander-in-chief of the department. Still the subordinate naval
officers were liable to orders at any time from any general with whom
they might be, without the knowledge of the flag-officer. It is
creditable to the good feeling and sense of duty of both the army and
navy that no serious difficulty arose from this anomalous condition of
affairs, which came to an end in July, 1862, when the fleet was
transferred to the Navy Department.
After the battle of Belmont nothing of importance occurred in the year
1861. The work on the ironclads was pushed on, and there are traces of
the reconnoissances by the gunboats in the rivers. In January, 1862,
some tentative movements, having no particular result, were made in
the direction of Columbus and up the Tennessee. There was a great
desire to get the mortar-boats completed, but they were not ready in
time for the opening operations at Fort Henry and Donelson, their
armaments not having arrived.
On the 2d of February, Flag-Officer Foote left Cairo for Paducah,
arriving the same evening. There were assembled the four armored
gunboats, Essex, Commander Wm. D. Porter; Carondelet, Commander Walke;
St. Louis, Lieutenant Paulding; and Cincinnati, Commander Stembel; as
well as the three wooden gunboats, Conestoga, Lieutenant Phelps;
Tyler, Lieutenant Gwin; and Lexington, Lieutenant Shirk. The object of
the expedition was to attack, conjointly with the army, Fort Henry on
the Tennessee, and, after reducing the fort, to destroy the railroad
bridge over the river connecting Bowling Green with Columbus. The
flag-officer deplored that scarcity of men prevented his coming with
four other boats, but to man those he brought it had been necessary to
strip Cairo of all men except a crew for one gunboat. Only 50 men of
the 1,100 promised on December 23d had been received from the army.
Fort Henry was an earthwork with five bastions, situated on the east
bank of the Tennessee River, on low ground, but in a position where a
slight bend in the stream gave it command of the stretch below for two
or three miles. It mounted twenty guns, but of these only twelve bore
upon the ascending fleet. These twelve were: one X-inch columbiad, one
60-pounder rifle, two 42- and eight 32-pounders. The plan of attack
was simple. The armored gunboats advanced in the first order of
steaming, in line abreast, fighting their bow guns, of which eleven
were brought into action by the four. The flag-officer purposed by
continually advancing, or, if necessary, falling back, to constantly
alter the range, thus causing error in the elevation of the enemy's
guns, presenting, at the same time, the least vulnerable part, the
bow, to his fire. The vessels kept their line by the flag-ship
Cincinnati. The other orders were matters of detail, the most
important being to fire accurately rather than with undue rapidity.
The wooden gunboats formed a second line astern, and to the right of
the main division.
Two days previous to the action there were heavy rains which impeded
the movements of the troops, caused the rivers to rise, and brought
down a quantity of drift-wood and trees. The same flood swept from
their moorings a number of torpedoes, planted by the Confederates,
which were grappled with and towed ashore by the wooden gunboats.
Half an hour after noon on the 6th, the fleet, having waited in vain
for the army, which was detained by the condition of the roads,
advanced to the attack. The armored vessels opened fire, the flag-ship
beginning, at seventeen hundred yards distance, and continued steaming
steadily ahead to within six hundred yards of the fort. As the
distance decreased, the fire on both sides increased in rapidity and
accuracy. An hour after the action began the 60-pound rifle in the
fort burst, and soon after the priming wire of the 10-inch columbiad
jammed and broke in the vent, thus spiking the gun, which could not be
relieved. The balance of force was, however, at once more than
restored, for a shot from the fort pierced the casemate of the Essex
over the port bow gun, ranged aft, and killing a master's mate in its
flight, passed through the middle boiler. The rush of high-pressure
steam scalded almost all in the forward part of the casemate,
including her commander and her two pilots in the pilot-house. Many of
the victims threw themselves into the water, and the vessel, disabled,
drifted down with the current out of action. The contest was
vigorously continued by the three remaining boats, and at 1.45 P.M.
the Confederate flag was lowered. The commanding officer, General
Tilghman, came on board and surrendered the fort and garrison to the
fleet; but the greater part of the Confederate forces had been
previously withdrawn to Fort Donelson, twelve miles distant, on the
Cumberland. Upon the arrival of the army the fort and material
captured were turned over to the general commanding.
In this sharp and decisive action the gunboats showed themselves well
fitted to contend with most of the guns at that time to be found upon
the rivers, provided they could fight bows on. Though repeatedly
struck, the flag-ship as often as thirty-one times, the armor proved
sufficient to deflect or resist the impact of the projectiles. The
disaster, however, that befell the Essex made fearfully apparent a
class of accidents to which they were exposed, and from which more
than one boat, on either side, on the Western waters subsequently
suffered. The fleet lost two killed and nine wounded, besides
twenty-eight scalded, many of whom died. The Essex had also nineteen
soldiers on board; nine of whom were scalded, four fatally.
The surrender of the fort was determined by the destruction of its
armament. Of the twelve guns, seven, by the commander's report, were
disabled when the flag was hauled down. One had burst in discharging,
the rest were put out of action by the fire of the fleet. The
casualties were few, not exceeding twenty killed and wounded.
Flag-Officer Foote, having turned over his capture to the army,
returned the same evening to Cairo with three armored vessels, leaving
the Carondelet. At the same time the three wooden gunboats, in
obedience to orders issued before the battle, started up river under
the command of Lieutenant Phelps, reaching the railroad bridge,
twenty-five miles up, after dark. Here the machinery for turning the
draw was found to be disabled, while on the other side were to be seen
some transport steamers escaping up stream. An hour was required to
open the draw, when two of the boats proceeded in chase of the
transports, the Tyler, as the slowest, being left to destroy the track
as far as possible. Three of the Confederate steamers, loaded with
military stores, two of them with explosives, were run ashore and
fired. The Union gunboats stopped half a mile below the scene, but
even at that distance the force of the explosion shattered glasses,
forced open doors, and raised the light upper decks.
The Lexington, having destroyed the trestle-work at the end of the
bridge, rejoined the following morning; and the three boats,
continuing their raid, arrived the next night at Cerro Gordo, near the
Mississippi line. Here was seized a large steamer called the Eastport,
which the Confederates were altering into a gunboat. There being at
this point large quantities of lumber, the Tyler was left to ship it
and guard the prize.
The following day, the 8th, the two boats continued up river, passing
through the northern part of the States of Mississippi and Alabama, to
Florence, where the Muscle Shoals prevented their farther progress. On
the way two more steamers were seized, and three were set on fire by
the enemy as they approached Florence. Returning the same night, upon
information received that a Confederate camp was established at
Savannah, Tennessee, on the bank of the river, a party was landed,
which found the enemy gone, but seized or destroyed the camp equipage
and stores left behind. The expedition reached Cairo again on the
11th, bringing with it the Eastport and one other of the captured
steamers. The Eastport had been intended by the Confederates for a
gunboat, and was in process of conversion when captured. Lieutenant
Phelps reported her machinery in first-rate order and the boilers
dropped into the hold. Her hull had been sheathed with oak planking
and the bulkheads, forward, aft, and thwartships, were of oak and of
the best workmanship. Her beautiful model, speed, and manageable
qualities made her specially desirable for the Union fleet, and she
was taken into the service. Two years later she was sunk by torpedoes
in the Red River, and, though partially raised, it was found
impossible to bring her over the shoals that lay below her. She was
there blown up, her former captor and then commander, Lieutenant
Phelps, applying the match.
Lieutenant Phelps and his daring companions returned to Cairo just in
time to join Foote on his way to Fort Donelson. The attack upon this
position, which was much stronger than Fort Henry, was made against
the judgment of the flag-officer, who did not consider the fleet as
yet properly prepared. At the urgent request of Generals Halleck and
Grant, however, he steamed up the Cumberland River with three
ironclads and the wooden gunboats, the Carondelet having already, at
Grant's desire, moved round to Donelson.
Fort Donelson was on the left bank of the Cumberland, twelve miles
southeast of Fort Henry. The main work was on a bluff about a hundred
feet high, at a bend commanding the river below. On the slope of the
ridge, looking down stream, were two water batteries, with which alone
the fleet had to do. The lower and principal one mounted eight
32-pounders and a X-inch columbiad; in the upper there were two
32-pounder carronades and one gun of the size of a X-inch smooth-bore,
but rifled with the bore of a 32-pounder and said to throw a shot of
one hundred and twenty-eight pounds. Both batteries were excavated in
the hillside, and the lower had traverses between the guns to protect
them from an enfilading fire, in case the boats should pass their
front and attack them from above. At the time of the fight these
batteries were thirty-two feet above the level of the river.
General Grant arrived before the works at noon of February 12th. The
gunboat Carondelet, Commander Walke, came up about an hour earlier. At
10 A.M. on the 13th, the gunboat, at the general's request, opened
fire on the batteries at a distance of a mile and a quarter,
sheltering herself partly behind a jutting point of the river, and
continued a deliberate cannonade with her bow guns for six hours,
after which she withdrew. In this time she had thrown in one hundred
and eighty shell, and was twice struck by the enemy, half a dozen of
her people being slightly injured by splinters. On the side of the
enemy an engineer officer was killed by her fire.
The fleet arrived that evening, and attacked the following day at 3
P.M. There were, besides the Carondelet, the armored gunboats St.
Louis, Lieutenant Paulding; Louisville, Commander Dove; and Pittsburg,
Lieutenant E. Thompson; and the wooden vessels Conestoga and Tyler,
commanded as before. The order of steaming was the same as at Henry,
the wooden boats in the rear throwing their shell over the armored
vessels. The fleet reserved its fire till within a mile, when it
opened and advanced rapidly to within six hundred yards of the works,
closing up later to four hundred yards. The fight was obstinately
sustained on both sides, and, notwithstanding the commanding position
of the batteries, strong hopes were felt on board the fleet of
silencing the guns, which the enemy began to desert, when, at 4.30
P.M., the wheel of the flag-ship St. Louis and the tiller of the
Louisville were shot away. The two boats, thus rendered unmanageable,
drifted down the river; and their consorts, no longer able to maintain
the unequal contest, withdrew. The enemy returned at once to their
guns, and inflicted much injury on the retiring vessels.
Notwithstanding its failure, the tenacity and fighting qualities of
the fleet were more markedly proved in this action than in the victory
at Henry. The vessels were struck more frequently (the flag-ship
fifty-nine times, and none less than twenty), and though the power of
the enemy's guns was about the same in each case, the height and
character of the soil at Donelson placed the fleet at a great
disadvantage. The fire from above, reaching their sloping armor nearly
at right angles, searched every weak point. Upon the Carondelet a
rifled gun burst. The pilot-houses were beaten in, and three of the
four pilots received mortal wounds. Despite these injuries, and the
loss of fifty-four killed and wounded, the fleet was only shaken from
its hold by accidents to the steering apparatus, after which their
batteries could not be brought to bear.
Among the injured on this occasion was the flag-officer, who was
standing by the pilot when the latter was killed. Two splinters struck
him in the arm and foot, inflicting wounds apparently slight; but the
latter, amid the exposure and anxiety of the succeeding operations,
did not heal, and finally compelled him, three months later, to give
up the command.
On the 16th the Confederates, after an unsuccessful attempt to cut
their way through the investing army, hopeless of a successful
resistance, surrendered at discretion to General Grant. The capture of
this post left the way open to Nashville, the capital of Tennessee,
and the flag-officer was anxious to press on with fresh boats brought
up from Cairo; but was prevented by peremptory orders from General
Halleck, commanding the Department. As it was, however, Nashville fell
on the 25th.
After the fall of Fort Donelson and the successful operations in
Missouri, the position at Columbus was no longer tenable. On the 23d
Flag-Officer Foote made a reconnoissance in force in that direction,
but no signs of the intent to abandon were as yet perceived. On March
1st, Lieutenant Phelps, being sent with a flag of truce, reported the
post in process of being evacuated, and on the 4th it was in
possession of the Union forces. The Confederates had removed the
greater part of their artillery to Island No. 10.
About this time, March 1st, Lieutenant Gwin, commanding the Lexington
and Tyler on the Tennessee, hearing that the Confederates were
fortifying Pittsburg Landing, proceeded to that point, carrying with
him two companies of sharpshooters. The enemy was readily dislodged,
and Lieutenant Gwin continued in the neighborhood to watch and
frustrate any similar attempts. This was the point chosen a few weeks
later for the concentration of the Union army, to which Lieutenant
Gwin was again to render invaluable service.
After the fall of Columbus no attempt was made to hold Hickman, but
the Confederates fell back upon Island No. 10 and the adjacent banks
of the Mississippi to make their next stand for the control of the
river. The island, which has its name (if it can be called a name)
from its position in the numerical series of islands below Cairo, is
just abreast the line dividing Kentucky from Tennessee. The position
was singularly strong against attacks from above, and for some time
before the evacuation of Columbus the enemy, in anticipation of that
event, had been fortifying both the island and the Tennessee and
Missouri shores. It will be necessary to describe the natural features
and the defences somewhat in detail.
From a point about four miles above Island No. 10 the river flows
south three miles, then sweeps round to the west and north, forming a
horse-shoe bend of which the two ends are east and west from each
other. Where the first horse-shoe ends a second begins; the river
continuing to flow north, then west and south to Point Pleasant on the
Missouri shore. The two bends taken together form an inverted S
[inverted S]. In making this detour, the river, as far as Point
Pleasant, a distance of twelve miles, gains but three miles to the
south. Island No. 10 lay at the bottom of the first bend, near the
left bank. It was about two miles long by one-third that distance
wide, and its general direction was nearly east and west. New Madrid,
on the Missouri bank, is in the second bend, where the course of the
river is changing from west to south. The right bank of the stream is
in Missouri, the left bank partly in Kentucky and partly in Tennessee.
From Point Pleasant the river runs southeast to Tiptonville, in
Tennessee, the extreme point of the ensuing operations.
When Columbus fell the whole of this position was in the hands of the
Confederates, who had fortified themselves at New Madrid, and thrown
up batteries on the island as well as on the Tennessee shore above it.
On the island itself were four batteries mounting twenty-three guns,
on the Tennessee shore six batteries mounting thirty-two guns. There
was also a floating battery, which, at the beginning of operations,
was moored abreast the middle of the island, and is variously reported
as carrying nine or ten IX-inch guns. New Madrid, with its works, was
taken by General Pope before the arrival of the flotilla.
The position of the enemy, though thus powerful against attack, was
one of great isolation. From Hickman a great swamp, which afterward
becomes Reelfoot Lake, extends along the left bank of the Mississippi,
discharging its waters into the river forty miles below Tiptonville. A
mile below Tiptonville begin the great swamps, extending down both
sides of the Mississippi for a distance of sixty miles. The enemy
therefore had the river in his front, and behind him a swamp,
impassable to any great extent for either men or supplies in the then
high state of the river. The only way of receiving help, or of
escaping, in case the position became untenable, was by way of
Tiptonville, to which a good road led. It will be remembered that
between New Madrid and Point Pleasant there is a low ridge of land,
rising from one to fifteen feet above overflow.
As soon as New Madrid was reduced, General Pope busied himself in
establishing a series of batteries at several prominent points along
the right bank, as far down as opposite Tiptonville. The river was
thus practically closed to the enemy's transports, for their gunboats
were unable to drive out the Union gunners. Escape was thus rendered
impracticable, and the ultimate reduction of the place assured; but
to bring about a speedy favorable result it was necessary for the army
to cross the river and come upon the rear of the enemy. The latter,
recognizing this fact, began the erection of batteries along the shore
from the island down to Tiptonville.
On the 15th of March the fleet arrived in the neighborhood of Island
No. 10. There were six ironclads, one of which was the Benton carrying
the flag-officer's flag, and ten mortar-boats. The weather was
unfavorable for opening the attack, but on the 16th the mortar boats
were placed in position, reaching at extreme range all the batteries,
as well on the Tennessee shore as on the island. On the 17th an attack
was made by all the gunboats, but at the long range of two thousand
yards. The river was high and the current rapid, rendering it very
difficult to manage the boats. A serious injury, such as had been
received at Henry and at Donelson, would have caused the crippled boat
to drift at once into the enemy's arms; and an approach nearer than
that mentioned would have exposed the unarmored sides of the vessels,
their most vulnerable parts, to the fire of the batteries. The fleet
of the flag-officer was thought none too strong to defend the Upper
Mississippi Valley against the enemy's gunboats, of whose number and
power formidable accounts were continually received; while the fall of
No. 10 would necessarily be brought about in time, as that of Fort
Pillow afterward was, by the advance of the army through Tennessee.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be doubted that Foote was
justified in not exposing his vessels to the risks of a closer action;
but to a man of his temperament the meagre results of long-range
firing must have been peculiarly trying.
The bombardment continued throughout the month. Meanwhile the army
under Pope was cutting a canal through the swamps on the Missouri
side, by which, when completed on the 4th of April, light transport
steamers were able to go from the Mississippi above, to New Madrid
below, Island No. 10 without passing under the batteries.
On the night of the 1st of April an armed boat expedition, under the
command of Master J.V. Johnson, carrying, besides the boat's crew,
fifty soldiers under the command of Colonel Roberts of the
Forty-second Illinois Regiment, landed at the upper battery on the
Tennessee shore. No resistance was experienced, and, after the guns
had been spiked by the troops, the expedition returned without loss to
the ships. In a despatch dated March 20th the flag-officer had
written: "When the object of running the blockade becomes adequate to
the risk I shall not hesitate to do it." With the passage of the
transports through the canal, enabling the troops to cross if properly
protected, the time had come. The exploit of Colonel Roberts was
believed to have disabled one battery, and on the 4th of the month,
the floating battery before the island, after a severe cannonade by
the gunboats and mortars, cut loose from her moorings and drifted down
the river. It is improbable that she was prepared, in her new
position, for the events of the night.
At ten o'clock that evening the gunboat Carondelet, Commander Henry
Walke, left her anchorage, during a heavy thunder-storm, and
successfully ran the batteries, reaching New Madrid at 1 A.M. The
orders to execute this daring move were delivered to Captain Walke on
the 30th of March. The vessel was immediately prepared. Her decks were
covered with extra thicknesses of planking; the chain cables were
brought up from below and ranged as an additional protection. Lumber
and cord-wood were piled thickly round the boilers, and arrangements
made for letting the steam escape through the wheel-houses, to avoid
the puffing noise ordinarily issuing from the pipes. The pilot-house,
for additional security, was wrapped to a thickness of eighteen
inches in the coils of a large hawser. A barge, loaded with bales of
hay, was made fast on the port quarter of the vessel, to protect the
magazine.
The moon set at ten o'clock, and then too was felt the first breath of
a thunder-storm, which had been for some time gathering. The
Carondelet swung from her moorings and started down the stream. The
guns were run in and ports closed. No light was allowed about the
decks. Within the darkened casemate or the pilot-house all her crew,
save two, stood in silence, fully armed to repel boarding, should
boarding be attempted. The storm burst in full violence as soon as her
head was fairly down stream. The flashes of lightning showed her
presence to the Confederates who rapidly manned their guns, and whose
excited shouts and commands were plainly heard on board as the boat
passed close under the batteries. On deck, exposed alike to the storm
and to the enemy's fire, were two men; one, Charles Wilson, a seaman,
heaving the lead, standing sometimes knee-deep in the water that
boiled over the forecastle; the other, an officer, Theodore Gilmore,
on the upper deck forward, repeating to the pilot the leadsman's
muttered "No bottom." The storm spread its sheltering wing over the
gallant vessel, baffling the excited efforts of the enemy, before
whose eyes she floated like a phantom ship; now wrapped in
impenetrable darkness, now standing forth in the full blaze of the
lightning close under their guns. The friendly flashes enabled her
pilot, William E. Hoel, who had volunteered from another gunboat to
share the fortunes of the night, to keep her in the channel; once
only, in a longer interval between them, did the vessel get a
dangerous sheer toward a shoal, but the peril was revealed in time to
avoid it. Not till the firing had ceased did the squall abate.
The passage of the Carondelet was not only one of the most daring and
dramatic events of the war; it was also the death-blow to the
Confederate defence of this position. The concluding events followed
in rapid succession. Having passed the island, as related, on the
night of the 4th, the Carondelet on the 6th made a reconnoissance down
the river as far as Tiptonville, with General Granger on board,
exchanging shots with the Confederate batteries, at one of which a
landing was made and the guns spiked. That night the Pittsburg also
passed the island, and at 6.30 A.M. of the 7th the Carondelet got
under way, in concert with Pope's operations, went down the river,
followed after an interval by the Pittsburg, and engaged the enemy's
batteries, beginning with the lowest. This was silenced in
three-quarters of an hour, and the others made little resistance. The
Carondelet then signalled her success to the general and returned to
cover the crossing of the army, which began at once. The enemy
evacuated their works, pushing down toward Tiptonville, but there were
actually no means for them to escape, caught between the swamps and
the river. Seven thousand men laid down their arms, three of whom were
general officers. At ten o'clock that evening the island and garrison
surrendered to the navy, just three days to an hour after the
Carondelet started on her hazardous voyage. How much of this result
was due to the Carondelet and Pittsburg may be measured by Pope's
words to the flag-officer: "The lives of thousands of men and the
success of our operations hang upon your decision; with two gunboats
all is safe, with one it is uncertain."
The passage of a vessel before the guns of a fortress under cover of
night came to be thought less dangerous in the course of the war. To
do full justice to the great gallantry shown by Commander Walke, it
should be remembered that this was done by a single vessel three
weeks before Farragut passed the forts down the river with a fleet,
among the members of which the enemy's fire was distracted and
divided; and that when Foote asked the opinion of his subordinate
commanders as to the advisability of making the attempt, all, save
one, "believed that it would result in the almost certain destruction
of the boats, passing six forts under the fire of fifty guns." This
was also the opinion of Lieutenant Averett, of the Confederate navy,
who commanded the floating battery at the island--a young officer, but
of clear and calm judgment. "I do not believe it is impossible," he
wrote to Commodore Hollins, "for the enemy to run a part of his
gunboats past in the night; but those that I have seen are slow and
hard to turn, and it is probable that he would lose some, if not all,
in the attempt." Walke alone in the council of captains favored the
trial, though the others would doubtless have undertaken it as
cheerfully as he did. The daring displayed in this deed, which, to use
the flag-officer's words, Walke "so willingly undertook," must be
measured by the then prevalent opinion and not in the light of
subsequent experience. Subsequent experience, indeed, showed that the
danger, if over-estimated, was still sufficiently great.
Justly, then, did it fall to Walke's lot to bear the most conspicuous
part in the following events, ending with the surrender. No less
praise, however, is due to the flag-officer for the part he bore in
this, the closing success of his career. There bore upon him the
responsibility of safe-guarding all the Upper Mississippi, with its
tributary waters, while at the same time the pressure of public
opinion, and the avowed impatience of the army officer with whom he
was co-operating, were stinging him to action. He had borne for months
the strain of overwork with inadequate tools; his health was
impaired, and his whole system disordered from the effects of his
unhealed wound. Farragut had not then entered the mouth of the
Mississippi, and the result of his enterprise was yet in the unknown
future. Reports, now known to be exaggerated, but then accepted,
magnified the power of the Confederate fleet in the lower waters.
Against these nothing stood, nor was soon likely, as it then seemed,
to stand except Foote's ironclads. He was right, then, in his refusal
to risk his vessels. He showed judgment and decision in resisting the
pressure, amounting almost to a taunt, brought upon him. Then, when it
became evident that the transports could be brought through the canal,
he took what he believed to be a desperate risk, showing that no lack
of power to assume responsibility had deterred him before.
In the years since 1862, Island No. 10, the scene of so much interest
and energy, has disappeared. The river, constantly wearing at its
upper end, has little by little swept away the whole, and the deep
current now runs over the place where the Confederate guns stood, as
well as through the channel by which the Carondelet passed. On the
other shore a new No. 10 has risen, not standing as the old one, in
the stream with a channel on either side, but near a point and
surrounded by shoal water. It has perhaps gathered around a steamer,
which was sunk by the Confederates to block the passage through a
chute then existing across the opposite point.
While Walke was protecting Pope's crossing, two other gunboats were
rendering valuable service to another army a hundred miles away, on
the Tennessee River. The United States forces at Pittsburg Landing,
under General Grant, were attacked by the Confederates in force in the
early morning of April 6th. The battle continued with fury all day,
the enemy driving the centre of the army back half way from their
camps to the river, and at a late hour in the afternoon making a
desperate attempt to turn the left, so as to get possession of the
landing and transports. Lieutenant Gwin, commanding the Tyler, and
senior officer present, sent at 1.30 P.M. to ask permission to open
fire. General Hurlburt, commanding on the left, indicated, in reply,
the direction of the enemy and of his own forces, saying, at the same
time, that without reinforcements he would not be able to maintain his
then position for an hour. At 2.50 the Tyler opened fire as indicated,
with good effect, silencing their batteries. At 3.50 the Tyler ceased
firing to communicate with General Grant, who directed her commander
to use his own judgment. At 4 P.M. the Lexington, Lieutenant Shirk,
arrived, and the two boats began shelling from a position
three-quarters of a mile above the landing, silencing the Confederate
batteries in thirty minutes. At 5.30 P.M., the enemy having succeeded
in gaining a position on the Union left, an eighth of a mile above the
landing and half a mile from the river, both vessels opened fire upon
them, in conjunction with the field batteries of the army, and drove
them back in confusion.
The army being largely outnumbered during the day, and forced steadily
back, the presence and services of the two gunboats, when the most
desperate attacks of the enemy were made, were of the utmost value,
and most effectual in enabling that part of our line to be held until
the arrival of the advance of Buell's army from Nashville, about 5
P.M., allowed the left to be reinforced and restored the fortunes of
the day. During the night, by request of General Nelson, the gunboats
threw a shell every fifteen minutes into the camp of the enemy.
Considering the insignificant and vulnerable character of these two
wooden boats, it may not be amiss to quote the language of the two
commanders-in-chief touching their services; the more so as the
gallant young officers who directed their movements are both dead,
Gwin, later in the war, losing his life in action. General Grant says:
"At a late hour in the afternoon a desperate attempt was made to turn
our left and get possession of the landing, transports, etc. This
point was guarded by the gunboats Tyler and Lexington, Captains Gwin
and Shirk, United States Navy, commanding, four 20-pounder Parrotts,
and a battery of rifled guns. As there is a deep and impassable ravine
for artillery and cavalry, and very difficult for infantry, at this
point, no troops were stationed here, except the necessary
artillerists and a small infantry force for their support. Just at
this moment the advance of Major-General Buell's column (a part of the
division under General Nelson) arrived, the two generals named both
being present. An advance was immediately made upon the point of
attack, and the enemy soon driven back. In this repulse much is due to
the presence of the gunboats." In the report in which these words
occur it is unfortunately not made clear how much was due to the
gunboats before Buell and Nelson arrived.
The Confederate commander, on the other hand, states that, as the
result of the attack on the left, the "enemy broke and sought refuge
behind a commanding eminence covering the Pittsburg Landing, not more
than half a mile distant, under the guns of the gunboats, which opened
a fierce and annoying fire with shot and shell of the heaviest
description." Among the reasons for not being able to cope with the
Union forces next day, he alleges that "during the night the enemy
broke the men's rest by a discharge, at measured intervals, of heavy
shells thrown from the gunboats;" and further on he speaks of the army
as "sheltered by such an auxiliary as their gunboats." The impression
among Confederates there present was that the gunboats saved the army
by saving the landing and transports, while during the night the
shrieking of the VIII-inch shells through the woods, tearing down
branches and trees in their flight, and then sharply exploding, was
demoralizing to a degree. The nervous strain caused by watching for
the repetition, at measured intervals, of a painful sensation is known
to most.
General Hurlburt, commanding on the left during the fiercest of the
onslaught, and until the arrival of Buell and Nelson, reports: "From
my own observation and the statement of prisoners his (Gwin's) fire
was most effectual in stopping the advance of the enemy on Sunday
afternoon and night."
Island No. 10 fell on the 7th. On the 11th Foote started down the
river with the flotilla, anchoring the evening of the 12th fifty miles
from New Madrid, just below the Arkansas line. Early the next morning
General Pope arrived with 20,000 men. At 8 A.M. five Confederate
gunboats came in sight, whereupon the flotilla weighed and advanced to
meet them. After exchanging some twenty shots the Confederates
retreated, pursued by the fleet to Fort Pillow, thirty miles below, on
the first, or upper Chickasaw bluff. The flag-officer continued on
with the gunboats to within a mile of the fort, making a leisurely
reconnoissance, during which he was unmolested by the enemy. The fleet
then turned, receiving a few harmless shots as they withdrew, and tied
up to the Tennessee bank, out of range.
The following morning the mortar-boats were placed on the Arkansas
side, under the protection of gunboats, firing as soon as secured. The
army landed on the Tennessee bank above the fort, and tried to find a
way by which the rear of the works could be reached, but in vain.
Plans were then arranged by which it was hoped speedily to reduce the
place by the combined efforts of army and navy; but these were
frustrated by Halleck's withdrawal of all Pope's forces, except 1,500
men under command of a colonel. From this time the attacks on the fort
were confined to mortar and long-range firing. Reports of the number
and strength of the Confederate gunboats and rams continued to come
in, generally much exaggerated; but on the 27th news of Farragut's
successful passage of the forts below New Orleans, and appearance
before that city, relieved Foote of his most serious apprehensions
from below.
On the 23d, Captain Charles H. Davis arrived, to act as second in
command to the flag-officer, and on the 9th of May the latter, whose
wound, received nearly three months before at Donelson, had become
threatening, left Davis in temporary command and went North, hoping to
resume his duties with the flotilla at no distant date. It was not,
however, so to be. An honorable and distinguished career of forty
years afloat ended at Fort Pillow. Called a year later to a yet more
important command, he was struck down by the hand of death at the
instant of his departure to assume it. His services in the war were
thus confined to the Mississippi flotilla. Over the birth and early
efforts of that little fleet he had presided; upon his shoulders had
fallen the burden of anxiety and unremitting labor which the early
days of the war, when all had to be created, everywhere entailed. He
was repaid, for under him its early glories were achieved and its
reputation established; but the mental strain and the draining wound,
so long endured in a sickly climate, hastened his end.
The Confederate gunboats, heretofore acting upon the river at Columbus
and Island No. 10, were in the regular naval service under the command
of Flag Officer George N. Hollins, formerly of the United States Navy.
At No. 10 the force consisted of the McRae, Polk, Jackson, Calhoun,
Ivy, Ponchartrain, Maurepas, and Livingston; the floating battery had
also formed part of his command. Hollins had not felt himself able to
cope with the heavy Union gunboats. His services had been mainly
confined to a vigorous but unsuccessful attack upon the batteries
established by Pope on the Missouri shore, between New Madrid and
Tiptonville, failing in which the gunboats fell back down the river.
They continued, however, to make frequent night trips to Tiptonville
with supplies for the army, in doing which Pope's comparatively light
batteries did not succeed in injuring them, the river being nearly a
mile wide. The danger then coming upon New Orleans caused some of
these to be withdrawn, and at the same time a novel force was sent up
from that city to take their place and dispute the control of the
river with Foote's flotilla.
In the middle of January, General Lovell, commanding the military
district in which New Orleans was, had seized, under the directions of
the Confederate Secretary of War, fourteen river steamboats. This
action was taken at the suggestion of two steamboat captains,
Montgomery and Townsend. The intention was to strengthen the vessels
with iron casing at the bows, and to use them with their high speed as
rams. The weakness of the sterns of the ironclad boats, their slowness
and difficulty in handling, were well known to the Confederate
authorities. Lovell was directed to allow the utmost latitude to each
captain in fitting his own boat, and, as there was no military
organization or system, the details of the construction are not now
recoverable. The engines, however, were protected with cotton bales
and pine bulwarks, and the stems for a length of ten feet shod with
iron nearly an inch thick, across which, at intervals of about two
feet, were bolted iron straps, extending aft on either bow for a
couple of feet so as to keep the planking from starting when the blow
was delivered. It being intended that they should close with the
enemy as rapidly as possible, but one gun was to be carried; a rule
which seems not to have been adhered to. While the force was to be
under the general command of the military chief of department, all
interference by naval officers was jealously forbidden; and, in fact,
by implication, any interference by any one. Lovell seems to have
watched the preparations with a certain anxious amusement, remarking
at one time, "that fourteen Mississippi pilots and captains will never
agree when they begin to talk;" and later, "that he fears too much
latitude has been given to the captains." However, by the 15th of
April he had despatched eight, under the general command of Captain
Montgomery, to the upper river; retaining six at New Orleans, which
was then expecting Farragut's attack. These eight were now lying under
the guns of Fort Pillow; the whole force being known as the River
Defence Fleet.
When Foote left, the ironclads of the squadron were tied up to the
banks with their heads down stream, three on the Tennessee, and four
on the Arkansas shore, as follows:
_Arkansas Shore._
Mound City, COMMANDER A.H. KILTY.
Cincinnati, COMMANDER R.N. STEMBEL.
St. Louis, LIEUTENANT HENRY ERBEN.
Cairo, LIEUTENANT N.C. BRYANT.
_Tennessee Shore._
Benton (flag-ship), LIEUTENANT S.L. PHELPS.
Carondelet, COMMANDER HENRY WALKE.
Pittsburg, LIEUTENANT EGBERT THOMPSON.
The place at which they lay on the Tennessee side is called Plum
Point; three miles lower down on the Arkansas side is another point
called Craighead's. Fort Pillow is just below Craighead's, but on the
opposite bank. It was the daily custom for one of the gunboats to tow
down a mortar-boat and place it just above Craighead's, remaining near
by during the twenty-four hours as guard. The mortar threw its shells
across the point into Pillow, and as the fire was harassing to the
enemy, the River Defence Fleet, which was now ready for action,
determined to make a dash at her. Between 4 and 5 A.M. on the morning
of the 10th of May, the day after Foote's departure, the Cincinnati
placed Mortar No. 16, Acting-Master Gregory, in the usual position,
and then made fast herself to a great drift pile on the same side,
with her head up stream; both ends of her lines being kept on board,
to be easily slipped if necessary. The mortar opened her fire at five.
At six the eight Confederate rams left their moorings behind the fort
and steamed up, the black smoke from their tall smoke-stacks being
seen by the fleet above as they moved rapidly up river. At 6.30 they
came in sight of the vessels at Plum Point. As soon as they were seen
by the Cincinnati she slipped her lines, steamed out into the river,
and then rounded to with her head down stream, presenting her
bow-guns, and opening at once upon the enemy. The latter approached
gallantly but irregularly, the lack of the habit of acting in concert
making itself felt, while the fire of the Cincinnati momentarily
checked and, to a certain extent, scattered them. The leading vessel,
the General Bragg, was much in advance of her consorts. She advanced
swiftly along the Arkansas shore, passing close by the mortar-boat and
above the Cincinnati; then rounding to she approached the latter at
full speed on the starboard quarter, striking a powerful blow in this
weak part of the gunboat. The two vessels fell alongside, the
Cincinnati firing her broadside as they came together; then the ram
swinging clear made down stream, and, although the Confederate
commander claims that her tiller ropes alone were out of order, she
took no further part in the fray.
Two other Confederates now approached the Cincinnati, the General
Price and General Sumter. One of them succeeded in ramming in the same
place as the Bragg, and it was at this moment that Commander Stembel,
who had gathered his men to board the enemy, was dangerously shot by a
rifle-ball through the throat, another officer of the vessel, Master
Reynolds, falling at the same time mortally wounded. The other
assailant received a shot through her boilers from the Benton, which
was now in action; an explosion followed and she drifted down stream.
The Cincinnati, aided by a tug and the Pittsburg, then steamed over to
the Tennessee shore, where she sank on a bar in eleven feet of water.
As soon as the rams were seen, the flag-ship had made a general signal
to get under way, but the morning being calm, the flags did not fly
out well. Orders were passed by hail to the Carondelet and Pittsburg,
and the former vessel slipped immediately and stood down. The Mound
City on the other side did not wait for signals, but, being in
advance, started at once, taking the lead with the Carondelet; the
Benton following, her speed being less. The Carondelet got up in time
to open fire upon the Bragg as she retreated, and to cut the
steam-pipe of the other of the two rams which had attacked the
Cincinnati after the Bragg's fatal assault.
The fourth Confederate, the General Van Dorn, passed by the Cincinnati
and her assailants and met the Mound City. The latter, arriving first
of the Union squadron on the Arkansas side of the river, had already
opened upon the Sumter and Price, and now upon the Van Dorn also with
her bow-guns. The Confederate rounded to and steered to ram
amidships, but the Mound City sheered and received a glancing blow in
the starboard bow. This disabled her, and to avoid sinking she was run
on the Arkansas shore.
Two of the Union gunboats and three rams were now disabled; the latter
drifting down with the current under the guns of Fort Pillow. Those
remaining were five in number, and only two gunboats, the Benton and
Carondelet, were actually engaged, the St. Louis just approaching. The
enemy now retired, giving as a reason that the Union gunboats were
taking position in water too shoal for the rams to follow.
There can be no denying the dash and spirit with which this attack was
made. It was, however, the only service of value performed by this
irregular and undisciplined force. At Memphis, a month later, and at
New Orleans, the fleet proved incapable of meeting an attack and of
mutual support. There were admirable materials in it, but the mistake
of withdrawing them from strict military control and organization was
fatal. On the other hand, although the gunboats engaged fought
gallantly, the flotilla as an organization had little cause for
satisfaction in the day's work. Stated baldly, two of the boats had
been sunk while only four of the seven had been brought into action.
The enemy were severely punished, but the Cincinnati had been
unsupported for nearly half an hour, and the vessels came down one by
one.
After this affair the Union gunboats while above Pillow availed
themselves of shoal spots in the river where the rams could not
approach them, while they could use their guns. Whatever the injuries
received by the Confederates, they were all ready for action at
Memphis a month later. The Cincinnati and Mound City were also
speedily repaired and again in service by the end of the month. The
mortar-boat bore her share creditably in the fight, levelling her
piece as nearly as it could be and keeping up a steady fire. It was
all she could do and her commander was promoted.
Shortly after this, a fleet of rams arrived under the command of
Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr. Colonel Ellet was by profession a civil
engineer, and had, some years before, strongly advocated the steam ram
as a weapon of war. His views had then attracted attention, but
nothing was done. With the outbreak of the war he had again urged them
upon the Government, and on March 27, 1862, was directed by the
Secretary of War to buy a number of river steamers on the Mississippi
and convert them into rams upon a plan of his own. In accordance with
this order he bought,[1] at Pittsburg, three stern-wheel boats, having
the average dimensions of 170 feet length, 31 feet beam, and over 5
feet hold; at Cincinnati, three side-wheel boats, of which the largest
was 180 feet long by 37 feet beam, and 8 feet hold; and at New Albany,
one side-wheel boat of about the same dimensions; in all seven boats,
chosen specially with a view to strength and speed. To further
strengthen them for their new work, three heavy, solid timber
bulkheads, from twelve to sixteen inches thick, were built, running
fore and aft from stem to stern, the central one being over the
keelson. These bulkheads were braced one against the other, the outer
ones against the hull of the boat, and all against the deck and floor
timbers, thus making the whole weight of the boat add its momentum to
that of the central bulkhead at the moment of collision. The hull was
further stayed from side to side by iron rods and screw-bolts. As it
would interfere with this plan of strengthening to drop the boilers
into the hold, they were left in place; but a bulwark of oak two feet
thick was built around them. The pilot-houses were protected against
musketry.
It is due to Colonel Ellet to say that these boats were not what he
wished, but merely a hasty adaptation, in the short period of six
weeks, of such means as were at once available to the end in view. He
thought that after striking they might probably go down, but not
without sinking the enemy too. When they were ready he was given the
command, and the rank of Colonel, with instructions which allowed him
to operate within the limits of Captain Davis's command, and in entire
independence of that officer; a serious military error which was
corrected when the Navy Department took control of the river work.
No further attack was made by the Confederate fleet, and operations
were confined to bombardment by the gunboats and constant reply on the
part of the forts until June 4th. That night many explosions were
heard and fires seen in the fort, and the next morning the fleet moved
down, found the works evacuated and took possession. Memphis and its
defences became no longer tenable after Beauregard's evacuation of
Corinth on the 30th of May.
On June 5th, the fleet with transports moved down the river, anchoring
at night two miles above the city. The next morning at dawn the River
Defence Fleet was sighted lying at the levee. They soon cast off, and
moved into the river, keeping, however, in front of the city in such a
way as to embarrass the fire of the Union flotilla.
The Confederate vessels, still under Montgomery's command, were in
number eight, mounting from two to four guns each: the Van Dorn, flag
steamer; General Price, General Lovell, General Beauregard, General
Thompson, General Bragg, General Sumpter, and the Little Rebel.
The Union gunboats were five, viz.: the Benton, Louisville,
Carondelet, St. Louis, recently taken charge of by Lieutenant
McGunnegle, and Cairo. In addition, there were present and
participating in the ensuing action, two of the ram fleet, the Queen
of the West and the Monarch, the former commanded by Colonel Ellet in
person; the latter by a younger brother, Lieutenant-Colonel A.W.
Ellet.
The Confederates formed in double line for their last battle, awaiting
the approach of the flotilla. The latter, embarrassed by the enemy
being in line with the city, kept under way, but with their heads up
stream, dropping slowly with the current. The battle was opened by a
shot from the Confederates, and then the flotilla, casting away its
scruples about the city, replied with vigor. The Union rams, which
were tied up to the bank some distance above, cast off at the first
gun and steamed boldly down through the intervals separating the
gunboats, the Queen of the West leading, the Monarch about half a mile
astern. As they passed, the flotilla, now about three-quarters of a
mile from the enemy, turned their heads down the river and followed,
keeping up a brisk cannonade; the flag-ship Benton leading. The
heights above the city were crowded by the citizens of Memphis,
awaiting with eager hope the result of the fight. The ram attack was
unexpected, and, by its suddenness and evident determination, produced
some wavering in the Confederate line, which had expected to do only
with the sluggish and unwieldy gunboats. Into the confusion the Queen
dashed, striking the Lovell fairly and sinking her in deep water,
where she went down out of sight. The Queen herself was immediately
rammed by the Beauregard and disabled; she was then run upon the
Arkansas shore opposite the city. Her commander received a pistol
shot, which in the end caused his death. The Monarch following, was
charged at the same time by the Beauregard and Price; these two
boats, however, missed their mark and crashed together, the Beauregard
cutting the Price down to the water-line, and tearing off her port
wheel. The Price then followed the Queen, and laid herself up on the
Arkansas shore. The Monarch successfully rammed her late assailant,
the Beauregard, as she was discharging her guns at the Benton, which
replied with a shot in the enemy's boiler, blowing her up and fatally
scalding many of her people. She went down near shore, being towed
there by the Monarch. The Little Rebel in the thickest of the fight
got a shot through her steam-chest; whereupon she also made for the
limbo on the Arkansas shore, where her officers and crew escaped.
The Confederates had lost four boats, three of them among the heaviest
in their fleet. The remaining four sought safety in flight from the
now unequal contest, and a running fight followed, which carried the
fleet ten miles down the river and resulted in the destruction of the
Thompson by the shells of the gunboats and the capture of the Bragg
and Sumter. The Van Dorn alone made good her escape, though pursued
some distance by the Monarch and Switzerland, another of the ram fleet
which joined after the fight was decided. This was the end of the
Confederate River Defence Fleet, the six below having perished when
New Orleans fell. The Bragg, Price, Sumpter, and Little Rebel were
taken into the Union fleet.
The city of Memphis surrendered the same day. The Benton and the
flag-officer, with the greater part of the fleet, remained there till
June 29th. On the 10th Davis received an urgent message from Halleck
to open communication by way of the White River and Jacksonport with
General Curtis, who was coming down through Missouri and Arkansas,
having for his objective point Helena, on the right bank of the
Mississippi. The White River traverses Arkansas from the Missouri
border, one hundred and twenty miles west of the Mississippi, and
pursuing a southeasterly and southerly course enters the Mississippi
two hundred miles below Memphis, one hundred below Helena. A force was
despatched, under Commander Kilty, comprising, besides his own ship,
the St. Louis, Lieutenant McGunnegle, with the Lexington and
Conestoga, wooden gunboats, Lieutenants Shirk and Blodgett. An Indiana
regiment under Colonel Fitch accompanied the squadron. On the 17th of
June, at St. Charles, eighty-eight miles up, the enemy were discovered
in two earthworks, mounting six guns. A brisk engagement followed, the
Mound City leading; but when six hundred yards from the works a
42-pound shell entered her casemate, killing three men in its flight
and then exploding her steam-drum. Of her entire crew of 175, but 3
officers and 22 men escaped uninjured; 82 died from wounds or
scalding, and 43 were either drowned or killed in the water, the
enemy, in this instance, having the inhumanity to fire on those who
were there struggling for their lives. Unappalled by this sickening
catastrophe, the remaining boats pressed on to the attack, the
Conestoga taking hold of the crippled vessel to tow her out of action.
A few minutes later, at a signal from Colonel Fitch, the gunboats
ceased firing, and the troops, advancing, successfully stormed the
battery. The commander of the post was Captain Joseph Fry, formerly a
lieutenant in the United States Navy, who afterward commanded the
filibustering steamer Virginius, and was executed in Cuba, with most
of his crew, when captured by the Spaniards in 1874. There being no
further works up the stream and but one gunboat of the enemy, the
Ponchartrain, this action gave the control of the river to the fleet.
After taking possession of St. Charles, the expedition went on up the
river as far as a point called Crooked Point Cutoff, sixty-three
miles above St. Charles, and one hundred and fifty-one miles from the
mouth of the river. Here it was compelled to turn back by the falling
of the water. The hindrance caused by the low state of the rivers led
Davis to recommend a force of light-draught boats, armed with
howitzers, and protected in their machinery and pilot-houses against
musketry, as essential to control the tributaries of the Mississippi
during the dry season. This was the germ of the light-draught
gunboats, familiarly called "tinclads" from the thinness of their
armor, which in the following season were a usual and active adjunct
to the operations of the heavier vessels.
On the 29th of June, Flag-Officer Davis, who had received that rank
but a week before, went down the river, taking with him the Benton,
Carondelet, Louisville, and St. Louis, with six mortar-boats. Two days
later, July 1st, in the early morning, Farragut's fleet was sighted,
at anchor in the river above Vicksburg. A few hours more and the naval
forces from the upper waters and from the mouth of the Mississippi had
joined hands.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Letter of Colonel Ellet to Lieutenant McGunnegle. United States
Navy.
[Illustration: MISSISSIPPI VALLEY--VICKSBURG TO THE GULF.]
CHAPTER III.
FROM THE GULF TO VICKSBURG.
The task of opening the Mississippi from its mouth was entrusted to
Captain David G. Farragut, who was appointed to the command of the
Western Gulf Blockading Squadron on the 9th of January, 1862. On the
2d of February he sailed from Hampton Roads, in his flag-ship, the
Hartford, of twenty-four guns; arriving on the 20th of the same month
at Ship Island in Mississippi Sound, which was then, and, until
Pensacola was evacuated by the Confederates, continued to be the
principal naval station in the West Gulf. Here he met Flag-Officer
McKean, the necessary transfers were made, and on the 21st Farragut
formally assumed the command of the station which he was to illustrate
by many daring deeds, and in which he was to make his brilliant
reputation.
With the exception of the vessels already employed on the blockade,
the flag-ship was the first to arrive of the force destined to make
the move up the river. One by one they came in, and were rapidly
assembled at the Southwest Pass, those whose draught permitted
entering at once; but the scanty depth of water, at that time found on
the bar, made it necessary to lighten the heavier vessels. The
Pensacola, while at Ship Island, chartered a schooner, into which she
discharged her guns and stores; then taking her in tow went down to
the Pass. She arrived there on the 24th of March and made five
different attempts to enter when the water seemed favorable. In the
first four she grounded, though everything was out of her, and was got
off with difficulty, on one occasion parting a hawser which killed two
men and injured five others; but on the 7th of April, the powerful
steamers of the mortar flotilla succeeded in dragging her and the
Mississippi through a foot of mud fairly into the river. These two
were the heaviest vessels that had ever entered. The Navy Department
at Washington had hopes that the 40-gun frigate Colorado, Captain
Theodorus Bailey, then lying off the Pass, might be lightened
sufficiently to join in the attack. This was to the flag-officer and
her commander plainly impracticable, but the attempt had to be made in
order to demonstrate its impossibility. After the loss of a fortnight
working she remained outside, drafts being made from her crew to
supply vacancies in the other vessels; while her gallant captain
obtained the privilege of leading the fleet into action, as a
divisional officer, in the gunboat Cayuga, the commander of the latter
generously yielding the first place on board his own ship.
A fleet of twenty mortar-schooners, with an accompanying flotilla of
six gunboats, the whole under the command of Commander (afterward
Admiral) David D. Porter, accompanied the expedition. Being of light
draught of water, they entered without serious difficulty by Pass à
l'Outre, one of three branches into which the eastern of the three
great mouths of the Mississippi is subdivided. Going to the head of
the Passes on the 18th of March, they found there the Hartford and
Brooklyn, steam sloops, with four screw gunboats. The steam vessels of
the flotilla were at once ordered by the flag-officer to Southwest
Pass, and, after finishing the work of getting the heavy ships across,
they were employed towing up the schooners and protecting the advance
of the surveyors of the fleet.
The squadron thus assembled in the river consisted of four screw
sloops, one side-wheel steamer, three screw corvettes, and nine screw
gunboats, in all seventeen vessels, of all classes, carrying,
exclusive of brass howitzers, one hundred and fifty-four guns. Their
names and batteries were as follows:
-----------------------+------+-----+----------------------------------
NAME. | Tons.|Guns.| Commanding Officer.
-----------------------+------+-----+----------------------------------
_Screw Sloops._ | | |
| | |
Hartford | 1990 | 24 | Flag-Officer David G. Farragut.
| | | Fleet-Captain Henry H. Bell.
| | | Commander Richard Wainwright.
Pensacola | 2158 | 23 | Captain Henry W. Morris.
Brooklyn | 2070 | 22 | Captain Thomas T. Craven.
Richmond | 1929 | 24 | Commander James Alden.
| | |
_Side-Wheel._ | | |
| | |
Mississippi | 1692 | 17 | Commander Melancton Smith.
| | |
_Screw Corvettes._ | | |
| | |
Oneida | 1032 | 9 | Commander S. Phillips Lee.
Varuna | 1300 | 10 | Commander Charles S. Boggs.
Iroquois | 1016 | 7 | Commander John De Camp.
| | |
_Screw Gunboats._ | | |
| | |
Cayuga | 507 | 2 | Lieutenant Napoleon B. Harrison.
Itasca | 507 | 2 | Lieutenant C.H.B. Caldwell.
Katahdin | 507 | 2 | Lieutenant George H. Preble.
Kennebec | 507 | 2 | Lieutenant John H. Russell.
Kineo | 507 | 2 | Lieutenant George M. Ransom.
Pinola | 507 | 2 | Lieutenant Pierce Crosby.
Sciota | 507 | 2 | Lieutenant Edward Donaldson.
Winona | 507 | 2 | Lieutenant Edward T. Nichols.
Wissahickon | 507 | 2 | Lieutenant Albert N. Smith.
-----------------------+------+-----+----------------------------------
About ninety per cent. of the batteries of the eight larger vessels
were divided, as is usual, between the two sides of the ship, so that
only one half of the guns could be used at any one time, except in the
rare event of having an enemy on each side; and even then the number
of the crew is based on the expectation of fighting only one
broadside. A few guns, however, varying in number in different ships,
were mounted on pivots so that they could be fought on either side. In
estimating the number of available guns in a fleet of sea-going
steamers of that day, it may be roughly said that sixty per cent.
could be brought into action on one side. In the Mississippi Squadron
sometimes only one-fourth could be used. To professional readers it
may seem unnecessary to enter on such familiar and obvious details;
but a military man, in making his estimate, has fallen into the
curious blunder of making a fleet fire every gun, bow, stern, and both
broadsides, into one fort, a hundred yards square; a feat which only
could be performed by landing a ship in the centre of the works, in
which case it could enjoy an all-round fire. The nine gunboats carried
one heavy and one light gun, both pivots and capable of being fought
on either side. None of this fleet could fire right ahead. All the
vessels were built for ships of war, with the exception of the Varuna,
which was bought from the merchant service.[2]
The mortar-schooners each carried one XIII-inch mortar. Of the six
gunboats attached to this part of the expedition, one, the Owasco, was
of the same class as the Cayuga and others. The Clifton, Jackson, and
Westfield were large side-wheel ferry boats, of the ordinary
double-ended type; carrying, however, heavy guns. They were powerful
as tugboats and easily managed; whereas the Miami, also a
double-ender, but built for the Government, was like most of her kind,
hard to steer or manoeuvre, especially in a narrow stream and tideway.
The sixth was the Harriet Lane, a side-wheel steamer of 600 tons,
which had been transferred from the Revenue Service.
The tonnage and batteries of these steamers were:[3]
------------------------+-----+-----+----------------------------------
NAME. |Tons.|Guns.| Commanding Officer.
------------------------+-----+-----+----------------------------------
_Screw Gunboat._ | | |
| | |
Owasco | 507 | 2 |Lieutenant John Guest.
| | |
_Paddle-Wheel | | |
Steamers._ | | |
| | |
Westfield } | 891 | 6 |Commander William B. Renshaw.
Miami } Double- | 730 | 5 |Lieutenant A. Davis Harrell.
Clifton } enders. | 892 | 7 |Lieutenant Charles H. Baldwin.
Jackson } | 777 | 7 |Lieutenant Selim E. Woodworth.
Harriet Lane | 619 | 3 |Lieutenant Jonathan M. Wainwright.
------------------------+-----+-----+----------------------------------
When the ships were inside, the flag-officer issued special
instructions for their preparation for the river service. They were
stripped to the topmasts, and landed all spars and rigging, except
those necessary for the topsails, jib, and spanker. Everything forward
was brought close in to the bowsprit, so as not to interfere with the
forward range of the battery. Where it could be done, guns were
especially mounted on the poop and forecastle, and howitzers placed in
the tops, with iron bulwarks to protect their crews from musketry. The
vessels were ordered to be trimmed by the head, so that if they took
the bottom at all it would be forward. In a rapid current, like that
of the Mississippi, a vessel which grounded aft would have her bow
swept round at once and fall broadside to the stream, if she did not
go ashore. To get her pointed right again would be troublesome; and
the same consideration led to the order that, in case of accident to
the engines involving loss of power to go ahead, no attempt should be
made to turn the ship's head down stream. If the wind served she
should be handled under sail; but if not, an anchor should be let go,
with cable enough to keep her head up stream while permitting her to
drop bodily down. Springs were prepared on each quarter; and, as the
ships were to fight in quiet water, at short range, and in the dark,
special care was taken so to secure the elevating screws that the guns
should not work themselves to too great elevation.
In accordance with these instructions the ships stripped at Pilot
Town, sending ashore spars, boats, rigging, and sails; everything that
was not at present needed. The chronometers of the fleet were sent on
board the Colorado. The larger ships snaked down the rigging, while
the gunboats came up their lower rigging, carrying it in and securing
it close to the mast. The flag-ship being now at the Head of the
Passes remained there, the flag-officer shifting his flag from one
small vessel to another as the requirements of the squadron called him
to different points. A detachment of lighter vessels, one of the
corvettes and a couple of gunboats, occupied an advance station at the
"Jump," a bayou entering the river on the west side, eight miles above
the Head of the Passes; the enemy's gunboats were thus unable to push
their reconnoissances down in sight of the main fleet while the latter
were occupied with their preparations. The logs of the squadron show
constant bustle and movement, accompanied by frequent accidents, owing
to the swift current of the river, which was this year exceptionally
high, even for the season. A hospital for the fleet was established in
good houses at Pilot Town, but the flag-officer had to complain of the
entire insufficiency of medical equipment, as well as a lack of most
essentials for carrying on the work. Ammunition of various kinds was
very deficient, and the squadron was at one time threatened with
failure of fuel, the coal vessels arriving barely in time.
The first and at that time the only serious obstacle to the upward
progress of the fleet was at the Plaquemine Bend, twenty miles from
the Head of the Passes, and ninety below New Orleans. At this point
the river, which has been running in a southeasterly direction, makes
a sharp bend, the last before reaching the sea, runs northeast for a
mile and three-quarters, and then resumes its southeast course. Two
permanent fortifications existed at this point, one on the left, or
north bank of the stream, called Fort St. Philip, the other on the
right bank, called Fort Jackson. Jackson is a little below St. Philip,
with reference to the direction of the river through the short reach
on which they are placed, but having regard to the general southeast
course, may be said to be lower down by 800 yards; the width of the
river actually separating the faces of the two works. At the time the
fleet arrived, the woods on the west bank had been cleared away below
Jackson almost to the extreme range of its guns, thus affording no
shelter from observation; the east bank was nearly treeless. Extending
across the river from below Jackson, and under the guns of both works,
was a line of obstructions which will be described further on.