CHAPTER V

THE FIGHTING UP TO THE 26TH AUGUST

There appeared to be nearly 300 men in Polchow's battery when we went

into action: only fifty-nine remained with the four guns we saved at the

close of the day, and not one of these escaped a more or less serious

hurt, though some were merely scratched by small fragments of shell or

bruised by shrapnel bullets. At least twenty of the men would have been

justified in going to hospital; several ultimately had to do so, and one

died. Even British soldiers could not have shown greater heroism.

Chouraski, the non-commissioned officer who had attached himself to me,

had a bullet through the fleshy part of the left arm, yet he brought me

some hot soup and black bread after dark; whence obtained, or how

prepared, I have no idea. I was much touched by the man's kindness. All

the soldiers with whom I came in contact were equally kind: and I have

noticed that the men of other armies with whom I have come in contact in

the course of my life, even the Germans, seemed to see something in my

personality which attracted them, and to desire to be friendly. Perhaps

they instinctively realized that I am an admirer of the military man; or

perhaps it was the _bonhomie_ which is universal amongst soldiers.

Certainly I got on well with them all, though some time elapsed before

we could understand a simple sentence spoken on either side.

For two days I was not fit for much: then I went to the front with a

detachment of sixty gunners which had arrived from Petrograd via Warsaw.

I found the battery and the rest of the regiment encamped to the

westward of Przasnysz.

Heavy fighting was going on somewhere in front; but the contending

troops were not in sight. The whole country was full of smoke, and the

smell of burning wood and straw was nearly suffocating. The Germans had

set fire to everything that would burn, including the woods. During the

night heavy showers of rain fell, and these extinguished most of the

fires and saved a vast quantity of timber.

I could see that the Germans had been driven back a considerable

distance; and the Russians claimed to have won great victories in the

neighbourhood of Stshutchen and Graevo, and to have already passed

500,000 men across the German border. That they were making progress was

obvious; and on the 20th August I witnessed some desperate infantry

fighting.

The Germans came on, as they always did, in immense columns, literally

jammed together, so that their men were held under fire an unnecessarily

long time. The usual newspaper phrase, "Falling in heaps," was quite

justifiable in this case. Thousands fell in ten minutes; and the

remainder broke and fled in spite of the efforts of their officers to

stop them. I was well in front and saw what took place. The German

officers struck their men with their swords and in several cases cut

them down; and I saw one of them fire his revolver into the crowd. I did

not actually see men fall, but he must have shot several.

The Russians, too, adopted a much closer formation than was wise, and

suffered severely in consequence, but they never wavered. The Germans

came on again and again, nine times in all, and proved themselves

wonderful troops. Four out of the nine charges they drove home, and

there was some desperate bayonet fighting in which the Teutons proved to

be no match for the Muscovites. The last named used the "weapon of

victory" with terrible effect, disproving all the modern theories about

the impossibility of opposing bodies being able to close, or to come

into repeated action on the same day.

On the contrary, it may be taken as certainly proved that men's nerves

are more steeled than ever they were, and that the same body of men can

make repeated and successive attacks within very short periods of time.

In the above attacks fresh bodies of troops were brought up each time,

but the remnants of the battalions previously used were always driven on

in front. I noticed this: on three occasions the 84th regiment (probably

Landwehr) formed part of the attacking force.

"Driven on" is the correct term. The German officers invariably drove

their men in front of them. Arriving in contact with their foes, the

soldiers fought with fury. It was the preliminary advance that seemed to

discompose them: and, indeed, their losses were dreadful. They

certainly left at least 30,000 dead and wounded on the ground on the

20th. The greater number were dead, because those who lay helpless

received a great part of the fire intended for their retreating

comrades, and thus were riddled through and through.

The Russian artillery played on the masses both when they advanced and

retreated; but the fight was chiefly an infantry one. The full effect of

the guns could not be brought into play without danger of injury to our

own men. In the end the Russians chased the enemy back and the artillery

was advanced to support them. Considerable ground was gained; but four

or five versts to the rear of their first position the Germans were

found to be strongly entrenched. The day's fight was finished by a

charge of a large body of Cossacks and Russian light cavalry. They swept

away the force of German horsemen who ventured to oppose them, and also

drove back several battalions of infantry. That part of the Russian Army

which had been engaged bivouacked on the ground they had fought over.

The cries of the wounded during the night were terrible to hear, and

came from many different points and distances. Hundreds must have died

from want of attention, and hundreds more, on both sides, were murdered.

The Germans, who were hovering about in small parties, persistently

fired on the Red Cross men, so little could be done for the dying; and

the cruelties which were perpetrated, and which were revealed (so I was

told) by the shouts, entreaties and imprecations of the sufferers,

aroused a nasty spirit in the Russians, and particularly in the

Cossacks, and led to fearful reprisals, so that in one part of the field

I know that not a German was left alive. I am bound to add that after I

had seen two Russians brought in with their eyes gouged out, and another

with his nose and ears cropped, and his lacerated tongue lolling from

his mouth, I had not a word of protest to utter against these reprisals.

The Germans were finished fiends, and deserved all they got from a body

of men notorious for their fierceness; and they _did get it_. I will say

this, though: that throughout the campaign no instance of a Russian

injuring a woman or a child came under my notice; nor did I hear of any

such cases. But I was told that three Prussian girls, who were seen to

be on friendly terms with some Russian soldiers, were nearly flogged to

death by their own people; and the horrible treatment the Polish women

received from the hands of the Germans has already been mentioned, and

was ever recurring during the whole of the time I spent with the Russian

Army.

I would here make mention of the quality of the Russian and German

soldiery. Conscription sweeps into the ranks of an army numbers of men

who are totally unfit for a military life and a still further number who

abhor it. In the present war, hatred and vindictive feeling generally

has run very high on the northern side of the fighting area; and this

circumstance seems to have greatly increased the war-like instinct of

the masses, and consequently decreased the number of what I may term

the natural non-combatants. In the Russian ranks, and I believe in the

German also, this class is weeded out as far as possible, and relegated

to the organizations which have least to do with the fighting line--that

is, the administrative services, and troops organized to maintain the

lines of communication. But these fellows--the natural non-combatants,

or haters of the soldier's life, I mean--are, when found in the fighting

ranks, the most detestable scoundrels imaginable; and I believe the

greater part of the atrocities committed may be laid to their charge.

They lose no opportunity of indulging in lust and murder; and as in

civil life they are mostly wastrels, thieves and would-be murderers,

they find in war an opportunity to indulge in those vices which,

practised in time of peace, would bring them to the prison and the

noose. In other words, the scum of the big cities is brought into the

army, and often proves as great a curse to its own administrative, as it

does to that of the enemy. Not all the Germans were fiends--not all the

Russians saints.

Early in the war many of the German regiments were composed of

exceedingly fine-looking men. There was a decided deterioration later

on, but this was more in appearance than quality: they still fought with

determined, or desperate, courage; I am inclined to think, often the

last-named. They were taught that the only way to escape the brutality

of their officers was to face the courage of their foes. They chose the

latter. Often hundreds--whole companies together--rushed over to the

Russians, threw down their arms, and surrendered themselves prisoners of

war. No such instance ever occurred in the Russian ranks. The Russian

soldier is a very pious man, and, like the North Aryan stock from which

he has sprung, is a great worshipper of ancestry and his superiors. His

commanding officer, like his Czar, is a Father, or a Little Father--a

sacred being--his priest as well as his temporal master. The consequence

is that officer and soldier are one, a conjunction that is of great

value from the military standpoint.

This is never the case in the German Army. The Teutonic officer is a

brute and a slave-driver, and his soldiers fear him if they do not hate

him. I doubt if any German soldier ever gets through his training

without being repeatedly struck by all his superiors from the

unter-officer upwards. Feathers show how the wind sets. A Prussian

regiment (the Pomeranian Grenadiers) was route-marching. One of the

musicians blew a false note: the bandmaster immediately turned and

struck the man a stinging blow on the face. I believe the German Army is

the only one in the world where such an incident could occur. Like

master, like man. One brute breeds another.

Taken on the whole the old adage that "one volunteer is worth two

pressed men" is true; but an army of ten or twelve millions could not be

successfully met by one of a million or two. Numbers must count when

they are excessive; though things militate against this rule sometimes.

If an army has not its heart in a contest very inferior numbers may win.

In the present case it soon became clear to me that both the great

nations had their hearts in the war: the surprising thing is that Russia

with her huge hordes has so far done so little--Germany hard pressed on

all sides effected so much.

These words will reveal that I do not take the general view that Russia

is progressing as fast and as well as she might reasonably be expected

to do.[1] Yet I am unable to point out very clearly where her principal

defect lies. She brought up troops very rapidly; and by the 20th August

she had an enormous army in the field on the East Prussian frontier. At

this time, and later on, I learned that her lines extended throughout

the German border and far along that of Austria to the Bug; and she was

said to have at least 5,000,000 men massed in these lines. The Germans

had not nearly so many--probably not more than 2,500,000 or 3,000,000;

but they had the power, by means of their railways, to concentrate on a

given point very rapidly, and so equal, or more than equal, the

Russians, who, being without adequate railway communication, could not

take advantage of their superior numbers. If the last-named saw a

weakness in any part of the German defensive and attempted to take

advantage of it, before they could bring up an adequate number of troops

the Germans had discovered their intentions and rushed up a sufficient

force to secure the threatened point: and this they did by bringing men

from positions so numerous, and so distant, that they nowhere materially

weakened their line; or, if they did so, they were enabled to conceal

the fact.

[1] This paragraph was written four or five months ago.

Europe, Austria and Germany, is surrounded by a ring of armed men,

extending, roughly, a distance of 1,500 miles, and defended by a force

of about 14,000,000 men, or some five men to the linear yard. This is,

in modern war, a sufficient number for effective attack or defence, on

ordinary ground; but it is not too many, and in prolonged operation may

prove to be too few on some descriptions of terre-plein. Yet, after ten

months of the fiercest and most destructive fighting the world has ever

seen, this ring of armed men has not been broken, though persistently

attacked by three of the most powerful military nations on earth.

My estimate of the number of German and Austrian troops actually in the

fighting-line at the beginning of the war is much in excess of the

numbers stated in English newspapers. I note this; but do not think that

14,000,000 is an exaggeration. I have information, and am not merely

guessing. Nor are the losses of the enemy overstated by me.

Down to the present date the losses of the Germans and Austrians amount

to about 3,000,000 men; but it must be remembered that quite two-thirds

of these would be wounded men who would recover, and go back to their

respective fighting-lines; so that the actual number of men permanently

put out of action is about 1,000,000, including those accounted for by

the French, British, and Belgian armies. The losses of the Russians are

nearly 2,000,000 men. Of these the greater part fell in the fighting I

have described and am about to describe, fighting which may be called a

prolonged battle for the possession of Warsaw on the one side and its

defence on the other. The importance of this combat will be recognized

when it is considered that the taking of Warsaw is the first necessary

step towards the occupation of Petrograd.

The vision of one man, especially in war, is limited; and I did not see

everything that took place in the region in which I was. I heard a good

deal, and was ever on the watch to learn and verify, but it could not be

otherwise than impossible to be always sure--always correct; and without

doubt there are many errors in my narration. What I saw, I saw, and this

may be relied on: what I guessed, or was told, I have advanced with

caution. Taken as a whole I think my account of the fighting in Poland

and East Prussia is as reliable as that of any one man can be: and let

it be remembered that I held no official position which could help me in

gaining knowledge.

On the evening of the 20th, and morning of the 21st, many rumors reached

our corps of Russian successes in the neighbourhoods of Gumbinnen and

Suvalki, places which were said to be but little more than 100 versts

from our position. The first-named is an open town in East Prussia

twenty-five versts over the border; and the news gave great joy to our

troops, as it proved that Germany was actually invaded. My informants

of the details were Major Polchow and two or three officers who spoke a

little English and French and were able to make themselves understood to

me.

There was said to have been desperate fighting, with heavy losses, the

capture of many German prisoners, and the complete annihilation of a

whole division of the enemy.

The occupation of Gumbinnen was of great importance because it is on the

Prussian direct line to Vilna, one of the most important railway centres

in this part of Russia and perhaps in the whole empire. Although the

Russians could not maintain their hold of it, its temporary occupation,

no doubt, had an important effect, and possibly helped more than seems

to have been seen in saving Warsaw from the enemy's hands. For had they

succeeded in seizing Vilna, the Russian force in Poland would have been

deprived largely, if not entirely, of reinforcements and supplies in

general. It was one of the peculiarities of the war in Poland and East

Prussia that neither side seemed able to keep an important position for

any length of time. Places were seized which had a telling effect for

the moment, and which one would have thought would have greatly

influenced the fate of the campaign; and yet they were soon retaken or

rendered untenable and the advantages of their seizure lost. In fact the

fighting swayed to and fro. Here to-day, there to-morrow, the battle was

lost or won. It was all a question of railways.

On the 21st the Russians crossed the frontier between Janow and

Chorzellen, and advanced towards Ortelsberg, driving in a force of

Uhlans and smashing a battery.

The next day they were met by a force of Villenberg, which partially

outflanked us. Desperate fighting ensued, the Germans suffering terrible

losses: but they had an object to effect--to hold the Russians until

reinforcements arrived. These were run down rapidly from Koenigsberg and

the Russians outnumbered and forced back. The fight was lost because the

Germans had a network of railways behind them, while the nearest Russian

line was 45 versts away. These facts require no comment. A Russian

railway at Chorzellen would have saved the day, and led to the

investment and probable fall of Koenigsberg. It would have made the

occupancy of Tilsit and Memel permanent, and would almost certainly have

changed the results of the campaign in this region.

As it was, we had to fall back; but we did so fighting stubbornly, and

giving ground very slowly, reinforcements hourly arriving by

march-route. Finally we made a stand at Chorzellen, and the Prussians

tried their usual tactics of repeated attacks in masses. They left

10,000 dead before the town (it is scarcely more than a big village),

and then entrenched themselves at a hamlet called Straffenberg, several

miles in a south-westerly direction towards Unterberg: and then a

terrific artillery duel commenced. I calculated that 30,000 shots an

hour were fired from both armies. The air, the ground, everywhere and

everything, seemed to be alive with bursting shells. The roar of guns

and explosions was incessant and quite drowned the sound of the infantry

firing. Afterwards many men were deaf; I myself could hear no sounds for

two days.

I do not know how many guns were in action, nor the calibre of them. On

our side only field guns were used, and if the Germans had any of larger

size they were, at this time, few in number. Hundreds of machine-guns

were used on both sides, and yet the slaughter was not at all in

proportion to the amount of ammunition expended. As in all battles,

according to my experience, the principal part of the destruction was

due to infantry fire. Of course the loss of life was very great. I can

only say the ground was heaped with dead and dying. At each successive

assault the Germans mounted the heaps of corpses to get at our men and,

falling on their comrades, caused the slain to lie in heaps and ridges

in an extraordinary and dreadful way. The wounded in the underlying

layers must have been suffocated; and the blood ran down the slopes in

streams.

This fearful form of fighting went on from the 22nd to the 28th August

without any intermission, except occasionally a few hours in the

night-time, rarely even then. I, like others, sometimes slept the sleep

of utter exhaustion; but during the wakening hours I do not remember

that the firing ever entirely ceased. Generally the sound of it was a

continuous roar. The heavens were lit up by the reflections of

discharged guns and bursting shells, and the pandemonium was dominated

by a shrieking sound, probably occasioned by the rush of projectiles

through the air. The terrific noise affected my brain so that for weeks

afterwards I was afflicted with a head-noise resembling a loud hissing,

almost intolerable to bear as it interfered with necessary rest.

The front of this terrific battle was very extensive--200 versts I was

told; and the Russians claimed to have had 3,000,000 men in action. At

the same time fighting was going on in Galicia, and there were some

isolated contests, south and west of our position. The fortune of the

contending parties varied greatly; in some places the Prussians were

forced back, in others the Russians. Neither side had a decided victory

in any part of the field, and the ground lost or won never exceeded a

verst or two in extent and was often less than a hundred yards. So it is

proved that close and hand-to-hand fighting are not things of the past,

as many have thought them to be. On the contrary, close fighting is more

often and more extensively resorted to than ever it has been previously,

even in the open field; and I think, more fiercely contested. At any

rate I saw several battalions on each side so nearly destroyed that they

were practically wiped out. A battalion of the 9th West Siberian

regiment on our side, and a territorial battalion of the 59th Prussians

met with such a fate. Not fifty of the Russians nor more than a dozen of

the Germans came out of the scrimmages. They were greatly outnumbered,

and some of those lost were probably taken prisoners; but I can say,

from actual sight of the incidents, that in each case the men fought

with desperate bravery and evinced no desire to surrender.

There was some cavalry fighting too; but, generally, the Russians were

numerically superior to their foes; and the Germans, more often than

otherwise, avoided proffered battle. In a few instances squadrons and

regiments charged one another, the Germans always getting the worst of

it, and in one case at least being much cut up. The Russian cavalry even

attacked infantry, but though they got away without serious loss, it is

pretty evident that only in exceptional instances can cavalry now

successfully contend with modernly armed foot soldiers.

In the Russian Ranks: A Soldier's Account of the Fighting in Poland · 第 5 / 26 章