THE AMERICAN MEMORIAL
Separated far from Europe, we mean not to mingle in her quarrels.
(Marshall.)
A fraudulent neutrality is no neutrality at all. (Marshall.)
We have a very considerable party in America who are strongly in
our interest. (Madame de Villette.)
Four days after the festival of triumph to Bonaparte, Talleyrand's
agents resumed their work. The sordid scenes were repeated, but their
monotony was broken. Now the lady of the plot appeared upon the scene.
In the long, vexed, and fruitless days of their stay in Paris, the
American envoys, it seems, were not without the solace and diversion of
the society of the French Capital.
Among the attractive feminine acquaintances they made, one was
undoubtedly an agent of the French Foreign Office. Madame de Villette
was one of the most engaging women in the French Capital.[658]
Cultivated, brilliant, and altogether charming, she made herself
particularly agreeable to the American envoys. She and Marshall became
especially good friends; but Madame de Villette ventured no diplomatic
suggestions to him, notwithstanding his easy good nature. She was far
too good a judge of character to commit that indiscretion. So was
Talleyrand, who by this time had begun to appreciate Marshall's
qualities. But Pinckney, hearty, handsome man of the world, but without
Marshall's penetration and adroitness, was another matter. Gerry the
intriguers could already count upon; and only one other member of the
commission was necessary to their ends. Perhaps Pinckney might be won
over by this captivating Frenchwoman. On some occasion Madame de
Villette approached him:--
"Why will you not lend us money?" said she to Pinckney. "If you were to
make us a loan, all matters will be adjusted. When you were contending
for your Revolution we lent you money." Pinckney pointed out the
differences--that America had _requested_ a loan of France, and France
now _demanded_ a loan of America. "Oh, no," said she. "We do not make a
demand; we think it more delicate that the offer should come from you;
but M. Talleyrand has mentioned to me (who am surely not in his
confidence) the necessity of your making us a loan, and I know that he
has mentioned it to two or three others; and that you have been informed
of it; and I will assure you that, if you remain here six months longer,
you will not advance a single step further in your negotiations without
a loan."
If that is so, bluntly answered Pinckney, the envoys might as well leave
at once. "Why," exclaimed Talleyrand's fair agent, "that might possibly
lead to a rupture, which you had better avoid; for we have a very
considerable party in America who are strongly in our interest."[659]
The fox-like Talleyrand had scented another hole by which he might get
at his elusive quarry. "Every man has his price" was his doctrine; and
his experience hitherto had proved it sound. He found that the brilliant
Paris adventurer, Beaumarchais, had a lawsuit against the State of
Virginia. Beaumarchais had won this suit in the lower court and it was
now pending on appeal. John Marshall was his attorney.[660] Here, then,
thought Talleyrand, was the way to reach this unknown quantity in his
problem.
On December 17, Marshall, happening into Gerry's apartment, found
Bellamy there. Beaumarchais had given a dinner to Marshall and his
fellow envoys, from which Bellamy had been kept by a toothache. The
envoys had returned Beaumarchais's courtesy; and he had retired from
this dinner "much indisposed."[661] Since then Marshall had not seen his
client. Bellamy casually remarked that he had not known, until within a
short time, that Marshall was the attorney for Beaumarchais, who, he
said, had very high regard for his Virginia attorney.
Marshall, his lawyer's instincts at once aroused, told Bellamy that
Beaumarchais's case was of very great magnitude and that he was deeply
interested in it. Whereupon, in a low tone, spoken aside for his ear
only, Bellamy told Marshall that, in case the latter won the suit,
Beaumarchais would "sacrifice £50,000 Sterling of it as the private
gratification" demanded by the Directory and Talleyrand, "so that the
gratification might be made without any actual loss to the American
government." Marshall rejected this offer and informed Pinckney of
it.[662]
Marshall's character is revealed by the entry he promptly made in his
Journal. "Having been originally the Counsel of Mr. de Beaumarchais, I
had determined & so I informed Genl. Pinckney, that I would not by my
voice establish any argument in his favor, but that I would positively
oppose any admission of the claim of any French citizen if not
accompanied with the admission of claims of the American citizens to
property captured and condemned for want of a Rôle d'équipage."[663]
Bellamy then urged upon Gerry his plan of the Marshall-Beaumarchais
arrangement. Talleyrand had been entertaining Gerry privately, and the
flattered New Englander again wished to call on the French Minister, "to
return the civility" by inviting Talleyrand to dinner.[664] To
Talleyrand, then, went Gerry in company with Bellamy and asked the
Foreign Minister to dine with him. Then Gerry tediously reviewed the
situation, concluding in a manner that must have amused the bored
Talleyrand: He would rather see the envoys depart for some city in
another nation, said Gerry, until the Directory would receive them, than
to stay in Paris under the circumstances.
Gerry was sure that the French diplomat was alarmed by this stern
threat. "M. Talleyrand appeared to be uneasy at this declaration," he
told his colleagues. Still, Talleyrand avoided "saying a word on it";
but he did say that Bellamy's representations "might always be relied
on." Talleyrand declared that he would go further; he would himself
write out his propositions. This he proceeded to do, held the writing
before Gerry's eyes and then burned it; after this performance
Talleyrand said he would dine with Gerry "the decade [ten days] after
the present."[665]
Meanwhile, however, Gerry dined with the Foreign Minister. It was not a
merry function. Aside from his guest of honor, the French Minister also
had at his board Hottenguer, Bellamy, and Hauteval. Gerry could not
speak French and Hauteval acted as translator. It must have been a
pallid feast; the brilliant, witty, accomplished Talleyrand, man of the
world, _bon vivant_, and lover of gayety; the solemn, dull, and rigid
Gerry; the three trained French agents, one of them, as interpreter, the
only means of general communication.[666] On rising from the table,
Hottenguer at once brought up the question of the bribe. Would the
envoys now give it? Had they the money ready? Gerry answered no![667]
Talleyrand, by now the mouthpiece of the rising Bonaparte, had proposed
terms of peace to Great Britain; "the price was a Bribe of a Million
Sterling to be divided among Directors, Ministers, and others.
Talleyrand's Department was to share one hundred thousand Pounds
Sterling." The British Government declined.[668]
King in London hastens to inform his American diplomatic associates in
Paris of this offer, and cautions the envoys to act in concert. To
Pinckney, King writes in cipher his anxiety about Gerry, whose integrity
King had hoped would "overcome a miserable vanity and a few little
defects of character ... which I now fear have been discovered by those
who will be assiduous to turn them to mischief."
From the same source Pinckney is warned: "You must not appear to suspect
what you may really know; ... you must ... save him [Gerry] and, in
doing so, prevent the Division that would grow out of a Schism in your
Commission." Gerry will be all right, thinks King, "unless Pride shall
be put in opposition to Duty, or Jealousy shall mislead a mind neither
ingenuous nor well organized, but habitually suspicious, and, when
assailed by personal vanity, inflexible."[669]
Pinckney informs King of the situation in Paris on December 27,
declaring "that we ought to request our Passports and no longer exhibit
to the World the unprecedented Spectacle of three Envoys Extraordinary
from a free and independent nation, in vain soliciting to be
heard."[670]
Marshall now insists that the American case be formally stated to the
French Government. Gerry at last agrees.[671] Marshall, of course,
prepares this vastly important state paper. For two weeks he works over
the first half of this historic document. "At my request Genl. Pinckney
& Mr. Gerry met in my room & I read to them the first part of a letter
to the Minister of Exterior Relations which consisted of a justification
of the American Government,"[672] he relates in his Journal.
Over the last half of the American case, Marshall spends seven days.
"The Second part of the letter to the Minister of Exterior Relations,
comprehending the claims of the United States upon France, being also
prepared, I read it to Genl Pinckney & Mr. Gerry." Both sections of
Marshall's letter to Talleyrand were submitted to his colleagues for
suggestions.[673]
It was hard work to get Gerry to examine and sign the memorial. "I had
so repeatedly pressed Mr. Gerry," notes Marshall, "on the subject of our
letter prepared for the Minister of Exterior Relations & manifested such
solicitude for its being so completed as to enable us to send it, that I
had obviously offended. Today I have urged that subject and for the last
time."[674] Two days later Marshall chronicles that "Mr. Gerry finished
the examination of our letter to the Minister of Exterior
Relations."[675] A week later the letter, translated and signed, is
delivered to Talleyrand.[676]
Upon this memorial were based future and successful American
negotiations,[677] and the statement by Marshall remains to this day one
of the ablest state papers ever produced by American diplomacy.
Marshall reminds Talleyrand of the frequent and open expressions of
America's regard for France, given "with all the ardor and sincerity of
youth." These, he says, were considered in America "as evidencing a
mutual friendship, to be as durable as the republics themselves."
Unhappily the scene changed, says Marshall, and "America looks around in
vain for the ally or the friend." He pictures the contrast in the
language and conduct of the French Government with what had passed
before, and says that the French charge of American partiality toward
Great Britain is unfounded.
Marshall then reviews the international situation and makes it so plain
that America could not take part in the European wars, that even
Talleyrand was never able to answer the argument. "When that war [began]
which has been waged with such unparalleled fury," he writes, "which in
its vast vicissitudes of fortune has alternately threatened the very
existence of the conflicting parties, but which, in its progress, has
surrounded France with splendor, and added still more to her glory than
to her territory," America found herself at peace with all the
belligerent Powers; she was connected with some of them by treaties of
amity and commerce, and with France by a treaty of alliance.
But these treaties, Marshall points out, did not require America to take
part in this war. "Being bound by no duty to enter into the war, the
Government of the United States conceived itself bound by duties, the
most sacred, to abstain from it." Upon the ground that man, even in
different degrees of social development, is still the natural friend of
man, "the state of peace, though unstipulated by treaty," was the only
course America could take. "The laws of nature" enjoined this, Marshall
announces; and in some cases "solemn and existing engagements ...
require a religious observance" of it.[678]
Such was the moral ground upon which Marshall built his argument, and he
strengthened it by practical considerations. "The great nations of
Europe," he writes, "either impelled by ambition or by existing or
supposed political interests, peculiar to themselves, have consumed more
than a third of the present century in wars." The causes that produced
this state of things "cannot be supposed to have been entirely
extinguished, and humanity can scarcely indulge the hope that the temper
or condition of man is so altered as to exempt the next century from the
ills of the past. Strong fortifications, powerful navies, immense
armies, the accumulated wealth of ages, and a full population, enable
the nations of Europe to support those wars."[679]
Problems of this character, Marshall explains, must be solved by
European countries, not by the United States. For, "encircled by no
dangerous Powers, they [the Americans] neither fear, nor are jealous of
their neighbors," says Marshall, "and are not, on that account, obliged
to arm for their own safety." He declares that America, separated from
Europe "by a vast and friendly ocean," has "no motive for a voluntary
war," but "the most powerful reasons to avoid it."[680]
America's great and undefended commerce, made necessary by her then
economic conditions, would be, Marshall contends, the "immediate and
certain victim" of engaging in European wars; and he then demonstrates
the disastrous results to America of departing from her policy of
Neutrality.
The immense and varied resources of the United States can only be used
for self-defense, reasons the Virginia lawyer. "Neither the genius of
the nation, nor the state of its own finances admit of calling its
citizens from the plough but to defend their own liberty and their own
firesides."
He then points out that, in addition to the moral wrong and material
disaster of America's taking part in France's wars, such a course means
the launching into the almost boundless ocean of European politics. It
implies "contracting habits of national conduct and forming close
political connections which must have compromitted the future peace of
the nation, and have involved it in all the future quarrels of Europe."
Marshall then describes the "long train of armies, debts, and taxes,
checking the growth, diminishing happiness, and perhaps endangering the
liberty of the United States, which must have followed." And all this
for what? Not to fulfill America's treaties; "not to promote her own
views, her own objects, her own happiness, her own safety; but to move
as a satellite around some other greater planet, whose laws she must of
necessity obey."[681]
"It was believed," he declares, "that France would derive more benefit
from the Neutrality of America than from her becoming a party in the
war." Neutrality determined upon, he insists that "increased motives of
honor and of duty commanded its faithful observance.... A fraudulent
neutrality is no neutrality at all.... A ... nation which would be
admitted to its privileges, should also perform the duties it enjoins."
If the American Government, occupying a neutral position, had granted
"favors unstipulated by treaty, to one of the belligerent Powers which
it refused to another, it could no longer have claimed the immunities of
a situation of which the obligations were forgotten; it would have
become a party to the war as certainly as if war had been openly and
formally declared, and it would have added to the madness of wantonly
engaging in such a hazardous conflict, the dishonor of insincere and
fraudulent conduct; it would have attained, circuitously, an object
which it could not plainly avow or directly pursue, and would have
tricked the people of the United States into a war which it would not
venture openly to declare."
Then follows this keen thrust which Talleyrand could not evade: "It was
a matter of real delight to the government and people of America,"
suavely writes Marshall, "to be informed that France did not wish to
interrupt the peace they [the American people] enjoyed."
Marshall then makes a sudden and sharp attack memorable in the records
of diplomatic dueling. He calls attention to the astounding conduct of
the French Minister on American soil immediately after the American
Government had proclaimed its Neutrality to the world and had notified
American citizens of the duties which that Neutrality enjoined. In
polite phrase he reminds Talleyrand of Genêt's assumption of "the
functions of the government to which he was deputed, ... although he was
not even acknowledged as a minister or had reached the authority which
should inspect his credentials."
But, notwithstanding this, says Marshall, "the American Government
resolved to see in him [Genêt] only the representative of a republic to
which it was sincerely attached" and "gave him the same warm and cordial
reception which he had experienced from its citizens without a single
exception from Charleston to Philadelphia."
Two paragraphs follow of fulsome praise of France, which would seem to
have been written by Gerry, who insisted on revising the memorial.[682]
But in swift contrast Marshall again throws on the screen the
indefensible performances of the French Minister in America and the
tolerance with which the American Government treated them. "In what
manner would France have treated any foreign minister, who should have
dared to so conduct himself toward this republic?... In what manner
would the American Government have treated him [Genêt] had he been the
representative of any other nation than France?"
No informed man can doubt the answer to these questions, says Marshall.
"From the Minister of France alone could this extraordinary conduct be
borne with temper." But "to have continued to bear it without perceiving
its extreme impropriety would have been to have merited the contempt" of
the world and of France herself. "The Government of the United States
did feel it," declares Marshall, but did not attribute Genêt's
misconduct to the French Nation. On the contrary, the American
Government "distinguished strongly between the [French] Government and
its Minister," and complained "in the language of a friend afflicted but
not irritated." Genêt's recall "was received with universal joy" in
America, "as a confirmation that his ... conduct was attributable only
to himself"; and "not even the publication of his private instructions
could persuade the American Government to ascribe any part of it to this
[French] republic."[683]
Marshall further points out "the exertions of the United States to pay
up the arrearages" of their debt to France; America's "disinterested and
liberal advances to the sufferers of St. Domingo ... whose
recommendation was that they were Frenchmen and unfortunate"; and other
acts of good-will of the American Government toward the French Republic.
He then makes a characteristically clear and convincing argument upon
the points at issue between France and America. France complained that
one article of the Jay Treaty provided that in case of war the property
of an enemy might be taken by either out of the ships of the other;
whereas, by the Treaty of 1778 between France and America, neither party
should take out of the vessels of the other the goods of its enemy.
France contended that this was a discrimination against her in favor of
Great Britain. Marshall shows that this provision in the Jay Treaty was
merely the statement of the existing law of nations, and that therefore
the Jay Treaty gave no new rights to Great Britain.
Marshall reminds Talleyrand that any two nations by treaty have the
power to alter, as to their mutual intercourse, the usages prescribed by
international law; that, accordingly, France and America had so changed,
as between themselves, the law of nations respecting enemy's goods in
neutral bottoms. He cites the ordinance of France herself in 1744 and
her long continued practice under it; and he answers so overwhelmingly
the suggestion that the law of nations had not been changed by the rules
laid down by the "Armed Neutrality" of the Northern Powers of Europe in
the war existing at the time of that confederation, that the resourceful
Talleyrand made no pretense of answering it.
The stipulation in the Franco-American Treaty of "protecting the goods
of the enemy of either party in the vessels of the other, and in turn
surrendering its own goods found in the vessels of the enemy," extended,
Marshall insists, to no other nation except to France and America; and
contends that this could be changed only by further specific agreements
between those two nations.
Marshall wishes "that the principle that neutral bottoms shall make
neutral goods" were universally established, and declares that that
principle "is perhaps felt by no nation on earth more strongly than by
the United States." On this point he is emphatic, and reiterates that
"no nation is more deeply interested in its establishment" than America.
"It is an object they [the United States] have kept in view, and which,
if not forced by violence to abandon it, they will pursue in such manner
as their own judgment may dictate as being best calculated to attain
it."
"But," he says, "the wish to establish a principle is essentially
different from a determination that it is already established....
However solicitous America might be to pursue all proper means, tending
to obtain for this principle the assent of any or all of the maritime
Powers of Europe, she never conceived the idea of attaining that consent
by force."[684] "The United States will only arm to defend their own
rights," declares Marshall; "neither their policy nor their interests
permit them to arm, in order to compel a surrender of the rights of
others."
He then gives the history of the Jay Treaty, and points out that Jay's
particular instructions not to preserve peace with Great Britain, "nor
to receive compensations for injuries sustained, nor security against
their future commission, at the expense of the smallest of its
[America's] engagements to France,"[685] were incorporated in the treaty
itself, in the clause providing that "nothing in this treaty shall,
however, be construed or operate contrary to former and existing public
treaties with other sovereignties or states."[686] So careful, in fact,
was America to meet the views of France that "previous to its
ratification" the treaty was submitted to the French Minister to the
United States, who did not even comment on the article relating to
enemy's goods in neutral bottoms, but objected only to that enlarging
the list of contraband;[687] and the American Government went to extreme
lengths to meet the views of the French Minister, who finally appeared
to be satisfied.
The articles of contraband enumerated in the Jay Treaty, to which the
French Government objected, says Marshall, were contraband by the laws
of nations and so admitted by France herself in her treaties with other
countries.[688]
Answering the charge that in the treaty the United States had agreed
that more articles should be contraband than she had in compacts with
other Powers, Marshall explains that "the United States, desirous of
liberating commerce, have invariably seized every opportunity which
presented itself to diminish or remove the shackles imposed on that of
neutrals. In pursuance of this policy, they have on no occasion
hesitated to reduce the list of contraband, as between themselves and
any nation consenting to such reduction. Their preëxisting treaties have
been with nations as willing as themselves to change this old rule." But
these treaties leave other governments, who do not accept the American
policy, "to the law which would have governed had such particular
stipulation never been made"--that is, to the law of nations.
Great Britain declined to accept this American view of the freedom of
the seas; and, therefore, America was forced to leave that nation where
it had found her on the subject of contraband and freedom of ocean-going
commerce. Thus, contends Marshall, the Jay Treaty "has not added to the
catalog of contraband a single article ... ceded no privilege ...
granted no right," nor changed, in the most minute circumstance, the
preëxisting situation of the United States in relation either to France
or to Great Britain. Notwithstanding these truths, "the Government of
the United States has hastened to assure its former friend [France],
that, if the stipulations between them are found oppressive in practice,
it is ready to offer up those stipulations a willing sacrifice at the
shrine of friendship."[689]
Stating the general purposes of the United States, Marshall strikes at
the efforts of France to compel America to do what France wishes and in
the manner that France wishes, instead of doing what American interests
require and in the manner America thinks wisest.
The American people, he asserts, "must judge exclusively for themselves
how far they will or ought to go in their efforts to acquire new rights
or establish new principles. When they surrender this privilege, they
cease to be independent, and they will no longer deserve to be free.
They will have surrendered into other hands the most sacred of
deposits--the right of self-government; and instead of approbation, they
will merit the contempt of the world."[690]
Marshall states the economic and business reasons why the United States,
of all countries, must depend upon commerce and the consequent necessity
for the Jay Treaty. He tartly informs Talleyrand that in doing so the
American Government was "transacting a business exclusively its own."
Marshall denies the insinuation that the negotiations of the Jay Treaty
had been unusually secret, but sarcastically observes that "it is not
usual for nations about to enter into negotiations to proclaim to others
the various objects to which those negotiations may possibly be
directed. Such is not, nor has it ever been, the principle of France."
To suppose that America owed such a duty to France, "is to imply a
dependence to which no Government ought willingly to submit."[691]
Marshall then sets forth specifically the American complaints against
the French Government,[692] and puts in parallel columns the words of
the Jay Treaty to which the French objected, and the rules which the
French Directory pretended were justified by that treaty. So strong is
Marshall's summing up of the case in these portions of the American
memorial that it is hard for the present-day reader to see how even the
French Directory of that lawless time could have dared to attempt to
withstand it, much less to refuse further negotiations.
Drawing to a conclusion, Marshall permits a lofty sarcasm to lighten his
weighty argument. "America has accustomed herself," he observes, "to
perceive in France only the ally and the friend. Consulting the feelings
of her own bosom, she [America] has believed that between republics an
elevated and refined friendship could exist, and that free nations were
capable of maintaining for each other a real and permanent affection. If
this pleasing theory, erected with so much care, and viewed with so much
delight, has been impaired by experience, yet the hope continues to be
cherished that this circumstance does not necessarily involve the
opposite extreme."[693]
Then, for a moment, Marshall indulges his eloquence: "So intertwined
with every ligament of her heart have been the cords of affection which
bound her to France, that only repeated and continued acts of hostility
can tear them asunder."[694]
Finally he tells Talleyrand that the American envoys, "searching only
for the means of effecting the objects of their mission, have permitted
no personal considerations to influence their conduct, but have waited,
under circumstances beyond measure embarrassing and unpleasant, with
that respect which the American Government has so uniformly paid to that
of France, for permission to lay before you, citizen Minister, these
important communications with which they have been charged." But, "if no
such hope" remains, "they [the envoys] have only to pray that their
return to their own country may be facilitated."[695]
But Marshall's extraordinary power of statement and logic availed
nothing with Talleyrand and the Directory. "I consider Marshall, whom I
have heard speak on a great subject,[696] as one of the most powerful
reasoners I ever met with either in public or in print," writes William
Vans Murray from The Hague, commenting on the task of the envoys.
"Reasoning in such cases will have a fine effect in America, but to
depend upon it in Europe is really to place Quixote with Ginés de
Passamonte and among the men of the world whom he reasoned with, and so
sublimely, on their way to the galleys. They answer him, with you know
stones and blows, though the Knight is an _armed_ as well as an eloquent
Knight."[697]
The events which had made Marshall and Pinckney more resolute in
demanding respectful treatment had made Gerry more pliant to French
influence. "Mr. Gerry is to see Mr. Talleyrand the day after to-morrow.
Three appointments have been made by that gentleman," Marshall notes in
his Journal, "each of which Mr. Gerry has attended and each of which Mr.
Talleyrand has failed to attend; nor has any apology for these
disappointments been thought necessary."[698] Once more Gerry waits on
Talleyrand, who remains invisible.[699] And now again Beaumarchais
appears. The Directory issues more and harsher decrees against American
commerce. Marshall's patience becomes finite. "I prepared to-day a
letter to the Minister remonstrating against the decree, ... subjecting
to confiscation all neutral vessels having on board any article coming
out of England or its possessions." The letter closes by "requesting our
passports."[700]
[Illustration: ELBRIDGE GERRY]
Marshall's memorial of the American case remained unread. One of
Talleyrand's many secretaries asked Gerry "what it contained? (for they
could not take the trouble to read it) and he added that such long
letters were not to the taste of the French Government who liked a short
address coming straight to the point."[701] Gerry, who at last saw
Talleyrand, "informed me [Marshall] that communications & propositions
had been made to him by that Gentleman, which he [Gerry] was not at
liberty to impart to Genl Pinckney or myself." Upon the outcome of his
secret conferences with Talleyrand, said Gerry, "probably depended peace
or war."[702]
Gerry's "communication necessarily gives birth to some very serious
reflections," Marshall confides to his Journal. He recalls the attempts
to frighten the envoys "from our first arrival"--the threats of "a
variety of ills ... among others with being ordered immediately to
quit France," none of them carried out; "the most haughty & hostile
conduct ... towards us & our country and yet ... an unwillingness ... to
profess the war which is in fact made upon us."[703]
A French agent, sent by the French Consul-General in America, just
arrived in Paris, "has probably brought with him," Marshall concludes,
"accurate details of the state of parties in America.... I should think
that if the French Government continues its hostility and does not relax
some little in its hauteur its party in the United States will no longer
support it. I suspect that some intelligence of this complexion has been
received ... whether she [France] will be content to leave us our
Independence if she can neither cajole or frighten us out of it or will
even endeavor to tear it from us by open war there can be no doubt of
her policy in one respect--she will still keep up and cherish, if it be
possible, ... her party in the United States." Whatever course France
takes, Marshall thinks will be "with a view to this her primary object."
Therefore, reasons Marshall, Talleyrand will maneuver to throw the blame
on Pinckney and himself if the mission fails, and to give Gerry the
credit if it succeeds. "I am led irresistibly by this train of thought
to the opinion that the communication made to Mr. Gerry in secret is a
proposition to furnish passports to General Pinckney and myself and to
retain him for the purpose of negotiating the differences between the
two Republics." This would give the advantage to the French party in any
event.
"I am firmly persuaded of his [Talleyrand's] unwillingness to dismiss us
while the war with England continues in its present uncertain state. He
believed that Genl Pinckney and myself are both determined to remain no
longer unless we can be accredited." Gerry had told Marshall that he
felt the same way; "but," says Marshall, "I am persuaded the Minister
[Talleyrand] does not think so. He would on this account as well as on
another which has been the base of all propositions for an accommodation
[the loan and the bribe] be well pleased to retain only one minister and
to chuse that one [Gerry]."[704]
Marshall and Pinckney decided to let Gerry go his own gait. "We shall
both be happy if, by remaining without us, Mr. Gerry can negotiate a
treaty which shall preserve the peace without sacrificing the
independence of our country. We will most readily offer up all personal
considerations as a sacrifice to appease the haughtiness of this
Republic."[705]
Marshall gave Gerry the letter on the decree and passport question "and
pressed his immediate attention to it." But Gerry was too excited by his
secret conferences with Talleyrand to heed it. Time and again Gerry,
bursting with importance, was closeted with the Foreign Minister,
hinting to his colleagues that he held peace or war in his hand.
Marshall bluntly told him that Talleyrand's plan now was "only to
prevent our taking decisive measures until the affairs of Europe shall
enable France to take them. I have pressed him [Gerry] on the subject of
the letter concerning the Decree but he has not yet read it."[706]
Talleyrand and Gerry's "private intercourse still continues," writes
Marshall on February 10. "Last night after our return from the Theatre
Mr. Gerry told me, just as we were separating to retire each to his own
apartment, that he had had in the course of the day a very extraordinary
conversation with" a clerk of Talleyrand. It was, of course, secret.
Marshall did not want to hear it. Gerry said he could tell his
colleagues that it was on the subject of money. Then, at last,
Marshall's restraint gave way momentarily and his anger, for an instant,
blazed. Money proposals were useless; Talleyrand was playing with the
Americans, he declared. "Mr. Gerry was a little warm and the
conversation was rather unpleasant. A solicitude to preserve harmony
restrained me from saying all I thought."[707]
Money, money, money! Nothing else would do! Gerry, by now, was for
paying it. No answer yet comes to the American memorial delivered to
Talleyrand nearly three weeks before. Marshall packs his belongings, in
readiness to depart. An unnamed person[708] calls on him and again
presses for money; France is prevailing everywhere; the envoys had
better yield; why resist the inevitable, with a thousand leagues of
ocean between them and home? Marshall answers blandly but crushingly.
Again Talleyrand's clerk sees Gerry. The three Americans that night talk
long and heatedly. Marshall opposes any money arrangement; Gerry urges
it "very decidedly"; while Pinckney agrees with Marshall. Gerry argues
long about the horrors of war, the expense, the risk. Marshall presents
the justice of the American cause. Gerry reproaches Marshall with being
too suspicious. Marshall patiently explains, as to a child, the real
situation. Gerry again charges Marshall and Pinckney with undue
suspicion. Marshall retorts that Gerry "could not answer the argument
but by misstating it." The evening closes, sour and chill.[709]
The next night the envoys once more endlessly debate their course.
Marshall finally proposes that they shall demand a personal meeting with
Talleyrand on the real object of the mission. Gerry stubbornly dissents
and finally yields, but indulges in long and childish discussion as to
what should be said to Talleyrand, confusing the situation with every
word.[710] Talleyrand fixes March 2 for the interview.
The following day Marshall accidentally discovers Gerry closeted with
Talleyrand's clerk, who came to ask the New Englander to attend
Talleyrand "in a particular conversation." Gerry goes, but reports that
nothing important occurred. Then it comes out that Talleyrand had
proposed to get rid of Marshall and Pinckney and keep Gerry. Gerry
admits it. Thus Marshall's forecast made three weeks earlier[711] is
proved to have been correct.
At last, for the first time in five months, the three envoys meet
Talleyrand face to face. Pinckney opens and Talleyrand answers. Gerry
suggests a method of making the loan, to which Talleyrand gives
qualified assent. The interview seems at an end. Then Marshall comes
forward and states the American case. There is much parrying for an
hour.[712]
The envoys again confer. Gerry urges that their instructions permit them
to meet Talleyrand's demands. He goes to Marshall's room to convince the
granite-like Virginian, who would not yield. "I told him," writes
Marshall, "that my judgment was not more perfectly convinced that the
floor was wood or that I stood on my feet and not on my head than that
our instructions would not permit us to make the loan required."[713]
Let Gerry or Marshall or both together return to America and get new
instructions if a loan must be made.
Two days later, another long and absurd discussion with Gerry occurs.
Before the envoys go to see Talleyrand the next day, Gerry proposes to
Marshall that, with reference to President Adams's speech, the envoys
should declare, in any treaty made, "that the complaints of the two
governments had been founded in mistake." Marshall hotly retorts: "With
my view of things, I should tell an absolute lye if I should say that
our complaints were founded in mistake. He [Gerry] replied hastily and
with warmth that he wished to God, I would propose something which was
accommodating: that I would propose nothing myself and objected to every
thing which he proposed. I observed that it was not worth while to talk
in that manner: that it was calculated to wound but not to do good: that
I had proposed every thing which in my opinion was calculated to
accommodate differences on just and reasonable grounds. He said that ...
to talk about justice was saying nothing: that I should involve our
country in a war and should bring it about in such a manner, as to
divide the people among themselves. I felt a momentary irritation, which
I afterwards regretted, and told Mr. Gerry that I was not accustomed to
such language and did not permit myself to use it with respect to him
or his opinions."
Nevertheless, Marshall, with characteristic patience, once more begins
to detail his reasons. Gerry interrupts--Marshall "might think of him
[Gerry] as I [he] pleased." Marshall answers moderately. Gerry softens
and "the conversation thus ended."[714]
Immediately after the bout between Marshall and Gerry the envoys saw
Talleyrand for a third time. Marshall was dominant at this interview,
his personality being, apparently, stronger even than his words. These
were strong enough--they were, bluntly, that the envoys could not and
would not accept Talleyrand's proposals.
A week later Marshall's client, Beaumarchais, called on his American
attorney with the alarming news that "the effects of all Americans in
France were to be Sequestered." Pay the Government money and avoid this
fell event, was Beaumarchais's advice; he would see Talleyrand and call
again. "Mr. Beaumarchais called on me late last evening," chronicles
Marshall. "He had just parted from the Minister. He informed me that he
had been told confidentially ... that the Directory were determined to
give passports to General Pinckney and myself but to retain Mr. Gerry."
But Talleyrand would hold the order back for "a few days to give us time
to make propositions conforming to the views of the Government," which
"if not made Mr. Talleyrand would be compelled to execute the order."
"I told him," writes Marshall, "that if the proposition ... was a loan
it was perfectly unnecessary to keep it [the order] up [back] a single
day: that the subject had been considered for five months" and that the
envoys would not change; "that for myself, if it were impossible to
effect the objects of our mission, I did not wish to stay another day in
France and would as cheerfully depart the next day as at any other
time."[715]
Beaumarchais argued and appealed. Of course, France's demand was not
just--Talleyrand did not say it was; but "a compliance would be useful
to our country [America]." "France," said Beaumarchais, "thought herself
sufficiently powerful to give the law to the world and exacted from all
around her money to enable her to finish successfully her war against
England."
Finally, Beaumarchais, finding Marshall flint, "hinted" that the envoys
themselves should propose which one of them should remain in France,
Gerry being the choice of Talleyrand. Marshall countered. If two were to
return for instructions, the envoys would decide that for themselves. If
France was to choose, Marshall would have nothing to do with it.
"General Pinckney and myself and especially me," said Marshall, "were
considered as being sold to the English." Beaumarchais admitted "that
our positive refusal to comply with the demands of France was attributed
principally to me who was considered as entirely English.... I felt some
little resentment and answered that the French Government thought no
such thing; that neither the government nor any man in France thought me
English: but they knew I was not French: they knew I would not sacrifice
my duty and the interest of my country to any nation on earth, and
therefore I was not a proper man to stay, and was branded with the
epithet of being English: that the government knew very well I loved my
own country exclusively, and it was impossible to suppose any man who
loved America, fool enough to wish to engage her in a war with France if
that war was avoidable."
Thus Marshall asserted his purely American attitude. It was a daring
thing to do, considering the temper of the times and the place where he
then was. Even in America, at that period, any one who was exclusively
American and, therefore, neutral, as between the European belligerents,
was denounced as being British at heart. Only by favoring France could
abuse be avoided. And to assert Neutrality in the French Capital was, of
course, even more dangerous than to take this American stand in the
United States.
But Beaumarchais persisted and proposed to take passage with his
attorney to America; not on a public mission, of course (though he had
hinted at wishing to "reconcile" the two governments), but merely "to
testify," writes Marshall, "to the moderation of my conduct and to the
solicitude I had uniformly expressed to prevent a rupture with France."
Beaumarchais "hinted very plainly," continues Marshall, "at what he had
before observed that means would be employed to irritate the people of
the United States against me and that those means would be successful. I
told him that I was much obliged to him but that I relied entirely on my
conduct itself for its justification and that I felt no sort of
apprehension for consequences, as they regarded me personally; that in
public life considerations of that sort never had and never would in any
degree influence me. We parted with a request, on his part, that,
whatever might arise, we would preserve the most perfect temper, and
with my assuring him of my persuasion that our conduct would always
manifest the firmness of men who were determined, and never the violence
of passionate men."
"I have been particular," concludes Marshall, "in stating this
conversation, because I have no doubt of its having been held at the
instance of the Minister [Talleyrand] and that it will be faithfully
reported to him. I mentioned to-day to Mr. Gerry that the Government
wished to detain him and send away General Pinckney and myself. He said
he would not stay; but I find I shall not succeed in my efforts to
procure a Serious demand of passports for Mr. Gerry and myself."[716]
During his efforts to keep Gerry from dangerously compromising the
American case, and while waiting for Talleyrand to reply to his
memorial, Marshall again writes to Washington a letter giving a survey
of the war-riven and intricate European situation. He tells Washington
that, "before this reaches you it will be known universally in
America[717] that scarcely a hope remains of" honorable adjustment of
differences between France and America; that the envoys have not been
and will not be "recognized" without "acceding to the demands of
France ... for money--to be used in the prosecution of the present war";
that according to "reports," when the Directory makes certain that the
envoys "will not add a loan to the mass of American property already in
the hands of this [French] government, they will be ordered out of
France and a nominal [formally declared] as well as actual war will be
commenc'd against the United States."[718]
Marshall goes on to say that his "own opinion has always been that this
depends on the state of war with England"; the French are absorbed in
their expected attack on Great Britain; "and it is perhaps justly
believed that on this issue is stak'd the independence of Europe and
America." He informs Washington of "the immense preparations for an
invasion" of England; the "numerous and veteran army lining the coast";
the current statement that if "50,000 men can be" landed "no force in
England will be able to resist them"; the belief that "a formidable and
organized party exists in Britain, ready, so soon as a landing shall be
effected, to rise and demand a reform"; the supposition that England
then "will be in ... the situation of the batavian and cisalpine
republics and that its wealth, its commerce, and its fleets will be at
the disposition of this [French] government."
But, he continues, "this expedition is not without its hazards. An army
which, arriving safe, would sink England, may itself be ... sunk in the
channel.... The effect of such a disaster on a nation already tir'd of
the war and groaning under ... enormous taxation" and, intimates
Marshall, none too warm toward the "existing arrangements ... might be
extremely serious to those who hold the reins of government" in France.
Many intelligent people therefore think, he says, that the "formidable
military preparations" for the invasion of England "cover and favor
secret negotiations for peace." This view Marshall himself entertains.
He then briefly informs Washington of Bonaparte's arrangement with
Austria and Prussia which will "take from England, the hope of once more
arming" those countries "in her favor," "influence the secret [French]
negotiations with England," and greatly affect "Swisserland." Marshall
then gives an extended account of the doings and purposes of the French
in Switzerland, and refers to revolutionary activities in Sardinia,
Naples, and Spain.
But notwithstanding the obstacles in its way, he concludes that "the
existing [French] government ... needs only money to enable it to effect
all its objects. A numerous brave and well disciplined army seems to be
devoted to it. The most military and the most powerful nation on earth
[the French] is entirely at its disposal.[719] Spain, Italy, and
Holland, with the Hanseatic towns, obey its mandates."
But, says he, it is hard to "procure funds to work this vast machine.
Credit being annihilated ... the enormous contributions made by foreign
nations," together with the revenue from imposts, are not enough to meet
the expenses; and, therefore, "France is overwhelmed with taxes. The
proprietor complains that his estate yields him nothing. Real property
pays in taxes nearly a third of its produce and is greatly reduc'd in
its price."[720]
While Marshall was thus engaged in studying French conditions and
writing his long and careful report to Washington, Talleyrand was in no
hurry to reply to the American memorial. Indeed, he did not answer until
March 18, 1798, more than six weeks after receiving it. The French
statement reached Marshall and Pinckney by Gerry's hands, two days after
its date. "Mr. Gerry brought in, just before dinner, a letter from the
Minister of exterior relations," writes Marshall, "purporting to be an
answer to our long memorial criminating in strong terms our government
and ourselves, and proposing that two of us should go home leaving for
the negotiation the person most acceptable to France. The person is not
named but no question is entertained that Mr. Gerry is alluded to. I
read the letter and gave it again to Mr. Gerry."[721]
The next day the three envoys together read Talleyrand's letter. Gerry
protests that he had told the French Foreign Minister that he would not
accept Talleyrand's proposal to stay, "That," sarcastically writes
Marshall, "is probably the very reason why it was made." Talleyrand's
clerk calls on Gerry the next morning, suggesting light and innocent
duties if he would remain. No, theatrically exclaims Gerry, I "would
sooner be thrown into the Seine."[722] But Gerry remained.
It is impossible, without reading Talleyrand's answer in full, to get an
idea of the weak shiftiness to which that remarkable man was driven in
his reply to Marshall. It was, as Pinckney said, "weak in argument, but
irritating and insulting in style."[723] The great diplomat complains
that the Americans have "claimed the right to take cognizance of the
validity of prizes carried into the ports of the United States by French
cruisers"; that the American Government permitted "any vessels to put
into the ports of the United States after having captured the property
of ships belonging to French citizens"; that "a French corvette had
anchored at Philadelphia and was seized by the Americans"; and that the
Jay Treaty was hostile to France.
But his chief complaint was with regard to the American newspapers
which, said Talleyrand, "have since the treaty redoubled the invectives
and calumnies against the [French] republic, and against her
principles, her magistrates, and her envoys";[724] and of the fact that
the American Government might have, but did not, repress "pamphlets
openly paid for by the Minister of Great Britain" which contained
"insults and calumnies." So far from the American Government stopping
all this, snarls Talleyrand, it encouraged "this scandal in its public
acts" and, through its President, had denounced the French Directory as
endeavoring to propagate anarchy and division within the United States.
Talleyrand then openly insults Marshall and Pinckney by stating that it
was to prevent the restoration of friendship that the American
Government had sent "to the French republic persons whose opinions and
connections are too well known to hope from them dispositions sincerely
conciliatory." Appealing directly to the French party in the United
States, he declares that he "does not hesitate to believe that the
American nation, like the French nation, sees this state of affairs with
regret, and does not consider its consequences without sorrow. He
apprehends that the American people will not commit a mistake concerning
the prejudices with which it has been desired to inspire them against an
allied people, nor concerning the engagements which it seems to be
wished to make them contract to the detriment of an alliance, which so
powerfully contributed to place them in the rank of nations, and to
support them in it; and that they will see in these new combinations
the only dangers their prosperity and importance can incur."[725]
Finally, with cynical effrontery, Talleyrand actually proposes that
Gerry alone shall conduct the negotiations. "Notwithstanding the kind of
prejudice which has been entertained with respect to them [the envoys],
the Executive Directory is disposed to treat with that one of the three,
whose opinions, presumed to be more impartial, promise, in the course of
explanations, more of that reciprocal confidence which is
indispensable."[726]
Who should answer Talleyrand? Marshall, of course. "It was agreed ...
that I should ... prepare an answer ... in which I should state that no
one of the ministers could consent to remain on a business committed to
all three."[727] In the discussion leading to this decision, "I," writes
Marshall, "was perfectly silent." Again Dutrimond, a clerk of
Talleyrand's, calls on Gerry, but sees Marshall instead, Gerry being
absent.
Dutrimond's advice to Marshall is to leave France. The truth is, he
declares, that his chief must order the envoys out of France "in three
days at farthest." But spare them Gerry; let him remain--all this in
polite terms and with plausible argument. "I told him," relates
Marshall, "that personally nothing could be more desirable to me than to
return immediately to the United States."
Then go on your own initiative, urges Talleyrand's clerk. Marshall grows
evasive; for he wishes the Directory to order his departure. A long
talk ensues. Dutrimond leaves and Gerry returns. Marshall relates what
had passed. "To prevent war I will stay," exclaims Gerry. "I made no
observation on this," dryly observes Marshall in his Journal.[728]
Beaumarchais again tries his luck with Marshall, who replies that he
will go home by "the direct passage to America" if he can get
safe-conduct, "tho' I had private business of very considerable
consequence in England."[729] Otherwise, declares Marshall, "I should
embark immediately for England." That would never do, exclaims
Beaumarchais; it would enrage the Directory and subject Marshall to
attacks at home. Marshall remarks that he prefers to sail direct,
although he knows "that the captains of privateers had received orders
to cruise for us ... and take us to the West Indies."[730]
Beaumarchais sees Talleyrand and reports that the Foreign Minister is
horrified at the thought of Marshall's returning by way of England; it
would "irritate this government" and delay "an accommodation"; it would
blast Marshall's reputation; the Directory "would immediately
publish ... that I was gone to England to receive the wages I had
earned by breaking off the treaty with France," Marshall records of
the representations made to him.
"I am entitled to safe conduct," cries Marshall; and "the calumny
threatened against myself is too contemptible to be credited for a
moment by those who would utter it." I "despise" it, exclaims the
insulted Virginian.[731] Thus back and forth went this fantastic dance
of corrupt diplomacy and cautious but defiant honesty.
At the long last, the interminable Gerry finished his review of
Marshall's reply to Talleyrand and made a lengthy and unctuous speech to
his colleagues on the righteousness of his own motives. Pinckney,
intolerably bored and disgusted, told Gerry what he thought of him. The
New Englander peevishly charged Marshall and Pinckney with concealing
their motives.
"It is false, sir," shouted Pinckney. Gerry, he said, was the one who
had concealed from his colleagues, not only his purposes, but his
clandestine appointments with Talleyrand. Pinckney rode Gerry hard, "and
insisted in plain terms on the duplicity which had been practiced [by
Gerry] upon us both." The latter ridiculously explained, evaded, and, in
general, acted according to the expectation of those who warned Adams
against his appointment. Finally, however, Marshall's reply was signed
by all three and sent to Talleyrand.[732]
The calmness, dignity, and conclusiveness of Marshall's rejoinder can be
appreciated only by reading the entire document. Marshall begins his
final statement of the American case and refutation of the French claims
by declaring what he had stated before, that the American envoys "are
ready to consider and to compensate the injury, if the American
Government has given just cause of complaint to that of France"; and
points out that the negotiations which the American envoys had sought
fruitlessly for six months, if taken up even now, would "demonstrate the
sincerity of this declaration."[733] This offer Marshall repeats again
and again.
Before taking up Talleyrand's complaints in detail, he states that if
the envoys cannot convince Talleyrand that the American Government is
not in the wrong on a single point Talleyrand mentions, the envoys will
prove their good faith; and thus, with an offer to compensate France for
any wrong, "a base for an accommodation" is established. Every grievance
Talleyrand had made is then answered minutely and at great length.
History, reason, evidence, march through these pages like infantry,
cavalry, and artillery going to battle. Marshall's paper was
irresistible. Talleyrand never escaped from it.
In the course of it there is a passage peculiarly applicable to the
present day. Answering Talleyrand's complaints about newspapers,
Marshall says:--
"The genius of the Constitution, and the opinions of the people of the
United States, cannot be overruled by those who administer the
Government. Among those principles deemed sacred in America, ... there
is no one ... more deeply impressed on the public mind, than the liberty
of the press. That this liberty is often carried to excess, that it has
sometimes degenerated into licentiousness, is seen and lamented; but the
remedy has not been discovered. Perhaps it is an evil inseparable from
the good with which it is allied; perhaps it is a shoot which cannot be
stripped from the stalk, without wounding vitally the plant from which
it is torn."
At any rate, declares Marshall, there is, in America, no redress for
"the calumnies and invectives" of the press except "legal prosecution in
courts which are alike open to all who consider themselves as injured.
Without doubt this abuse of a valuable privilege is [a] matter of
peculiar regret when it is extended to the Government of a foreign
nation." It never is so extended "with the approbation of the Government
of the United States." But, he goes on to say, this is unavoidable
"especially on points respecting the rights and interests of
America, ... in a nation where public measures are the results of public
opinion."
This practice of unrestricted criticism was not directed toward France
alone, Marshall assures Talleyrand; "it has been lavished still more
profusely on its [France's] enemies and has even been bestowed, with an
unsparing hand, on the Federal [American] Government itself. Nothing can
be more notorious than the calumnies and invectives with which the
wisest measures and most virtuous characters of the United States have
been pursued and traduced [by American newspapers]." It is plain,
therefore, that the American Government cannot influence the American
press, the excesses of which are, declares Marshall, "a calamity
incident to the nature of liberty."
He reminds Talleyrand that "the same complaint might be urged on the
part of the United States. You must well know what degrading and
unworthy calumnies against their Government, its principles, and its
officers, have been published to the world by French journalists and in
French pamphlets." Yet America had not complained of "these calumnies,
atrocious as they are.... Had not other causes, infinitely more serious
and weighty, interrupted the harmony of the two republics, it would
still have remained unimpaired and the mission of the undersigned would
never have been rendered necessary."[734]
Marshall again briefly sums up in broad outline the injuries which the
then French Government had inflicted upon Americans and American
property, and finally declares: "It requires no assurance to convince,
that every real American must wish sincerely to extricate his country
from the ills it suffers, and from the greater ills with which it is
threatened; but all who love liberty must admit that it does not exist
in a nation which cannot exercise the right of maintaining its
neutrality."
Referring to Talleyrand's desire that Gerry remain and conduct the
negotiations, Marshall remarks that the request "is not accompanied by
any assurances of receding from those demands of money heretofore made
the consideration on which alone the cessation of hostility on American
commerce could be obtained." No one of the three American envoys had
power to act alone, he maintains. In spite of neglect and insult
Marshall still hopes that negotiations may begin; but if that is
impossible, he asks for passports and safe-conduct.
Marshall made his final preparations for sailing, in order, he says,
"that I might be in readiness to depart so soon as the will of the
government should be signified to me." He was so hurried, he declares,
that "I could not even lay in a moderate stock of wine or send my foul
linen to be washed."[735] The now inescapable Beaumarchais saw Marshall
again and told him that Talleyrand said that "I [Marshall] was no
foreign minister; that I was to be considered as a private American
citizen, to obtain my passport in the manner pursued by all others
through the Consul ... I must give my name, stature, age, complexion,
&c., to our Consul."
Marshall answered with much heat. Beaumarchais conferred with
Talleyrand, taking Marshall's side. Talleyrand was obdurate and said
that "he was mistaken in me [Marshall]; that I prevented all negotiation
and that so soon as I was gone the negotiation would be carried on; that
in America I belonged to the English faction, which universally hated
and opposed the French faction; that all I sought for was to produce a
rupture in such a manner as to throw the whole blame on France."
Marshall replied that Talleyrand "endeavored to make our situation more
unpleasant than his orders required, in order to gratify his personal
feelings," and he flatly refused to leave until ordered to go.[736]
Finally Marshall and Pinckney received their passports. Pinckney, whose
daughter was ill and could leave France at that time only at the risk of
her life, had serious difficulty in getting permission to stay in the
south of France. On April 24, Marshall sailed for home. It is
characteristic of the man that, notwithstanding his humiliating
experiences and the failure of the mission, he was neither sour nor
depressed. He had made many personal friends in Paris; and on taking
ship at Bordeaux he does not forget to send them greetings, singling out
Madame de Villette for a gay message of farewell. "Present me to my
friends in Paris," he writes the American Consul-General at the French
Capital, "& have the goodness to say to Madam Vilette in my name & in
the handsomest manner, every thing which respectful friendship can
dictate. When you have done that You will have rendered not quite half
justice to my sentiments."[737]
Gerry, to whom Pinckney and Marshall did not even bid farewell,[738]
remained in Paris, "extremely miserable."[739] Infinitely disgusted,
Pinckney writes King that Gerry, "as I suspected, is resolved to remain
here," notwithstanding Pinckney's "warm remonstrances with him on the
bad consequences ... of such conduct and on the impropriety of" his
secret "correspondence with Talleyrand under injunction not to
communicate it to his colleagues." Pinckney says: "I have made great
sacrifices of my feelings to preserve union; but in vain. I never met
with a man of less candour and so much duplicity as Mr. Gerry. General
Marshall is a man of extensive ability, of manly candour, and an honest
heart."[740]
FOOTNOTES:
[658] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 167. This lady was "understood to
be Madame de Villette, the celebrated Belle and Bonne of Voltaire."
(Lyman: _Diplomacy of the United States_, ii, footnote to 336.) Lyman
says that "as to the lady an intimation is given that that part of the
affair was not much to the credit of the Americans." (And see Austin:
_Gerry_, ii, footnote to 202.) Madame de Villette was the widow of a
Royalist colonel. Her brother, an officer in the King's service, was
killed while defending Marie Antoinette. Robespierre proscribed Madame
de Villette and she was one of a group confined in prison awaiting the
guillotine, of whom only a few escaped. (_Ib._)
[659] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 167.
[660] Beaumarchais was one of the most picturesque figures of that
theatrical period. He is generally known to-day only as the author of
the operas, _The Barber of Seville_ and the _Marriage of Figaro_. His
suit was to recover a debt for supplies furnished the Americans during
the Revolution. Silas Deane, for our Government, made the original
contract with Beaumarchais. In addition to the contest before the
courts, in which Marshall was Beaumarchais's attorney, the matter was
before Congress three times during the claimant's life and, through his
heirs, twice after his death. In 1835 the case was settled for 800,000
francs, which was nearly 2,500,000 francs less than Alexander Hamilton,
in an investigation, ordered by Congress, found to be due the Frenchman;
and 3,500,000 livres less than Silas Deane reported that America owed
Beaumarchais.
Arthur Lee, Beaumarchais's enemy, to whom Congress in 1787 left the
adjustment, had declared that the Frenchman owed the United States two
million francs. This prejudiced report was the cause of almost a
half-century of dispute, and of gross injustice. (See Loménie:
_Beaumarchais et son temps_; also, Channing, iii, 283, and references in
the footnote; and Perkins: _France in the American Revolution_. Also see
Henry to Beaumarchais, Jan. 8, 1785; Henry, iii, 264, in which Henry
says: "I therefore feel myself gratified in seeing, as I think, ground
for hope that yourself, and those worthy and suffering of ours in your
nation, who in so friendly a manner advanced their money and goods when
we were in want, will be satisfied that nothing has been omitted which
lay in our power towards paying them.")
[661] Marshall's Journal, ii, Dec. 17, 36.
[662] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 167; Marshall's Journal, Dec. 17,
36-37.
[663] Marshall's Journal, Dec. 17, 38. The "_Rôle d'équipage_" was a
form of ship's papers required by the French Government which it was
practically impossible for American masters to furnish; yet, without it,
their vessels were liable to capture by French ships under one of the
many offensive decrees of the French Government.
[664] Marshall's Journal, Dec. 17, 38.
[665] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 168.
[666] This account in the dispatches is puzzling, for Talleyrand spoke
English perfectly.
[667] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 230.
[668] King to Secretary of State (in cipher) London, Dec. 23, 1797;
King, ii, 261. King to Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, Dec. 23, 1797;
_ib._, 263.
[669] King to Pinckney (in cipher) London, Dec. 24, 1797; King, ii,
263-64.
[670] Pinckney to King, Dec. 27, 1797; King, ii, 266-67.
[671] Marshall's Journal, Dec. 18, 1797, 38.
[672] _Ib._, Jan. 2, 1798, 39.
[673] Marshall's Journal, Jan. 2 and 10, 39.
[674] _Ib._, Jan. 22, 40.
[675] _Ib._, 40.
[676] _Ib._, Jan. 31.
[677] The Ellsworth mission. (See _infra_, chap. XII.)
[678] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 169.
[679] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 169-70.
[680] _Ib._, 170.
[681] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 170.
[682] Marshall's Journal, 39; also see Austin: _Gerry_, ii, chap. VI.
[683] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 170-71.
[684] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 172.
[685] _Ib._, 173.
[686] _Ib._
[687] _Ib._
[688] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 175.
[689] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 175.
[690] _Ib._, 176.
[691] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 177.
[692] _Ib._, 178.
[693] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 181.
[694] _Ib._, 181-82.
[695] _Ib._, 182.
[696] British Debts cases. (See vol. I, CHAP. V.)
[697] Murray to J. Q. Adams, Feb. 20, 1798, _Letters_: Ford, 379. Murray
thought Marshall's statement of the American case "unanswerable" and
"proudly independent." (_Ib._, 395.) Contrast Murray's opinion of
Marshall with his description of Gerry, _supra_, chap. VII, 258, and
footnote.
[698] Marshall's Journal, Jan. 31, 1798, 40.
[699] _Ib._, Feb. 2.
[700] _Ib._, Feb. 2, 41.
[701] Marshall's Journal, Feb. 3, 42.
[702] _Ib._, Feb. 4, 42.
[703] _Ib._, 42-43, 46.
[704] Marshall's Journal, Feb. 4, 42-45.
[705] Marshall's Journal, Feb. 5, 45-46.
[706] _Ib._, Feb. 6 and 7, 46.
[707] Marshall's Journal, Feb. 10, 47-48.
[708] Undoubtedly Beaumarchais. Marshall left his client's name blank in
his Journal, but Pickering, on the authority of Pinckney, in the
official copy, inserted Beaumarchais's name in later dates of the
Journal.
[709] Marshall's Journal, Feb. 26, 52-60.
[710] Marshall's Journal, Feb. 27, 61-67.
[711] _Ib._, Feb. 28, 67-68. See _supra_, 312.
[712] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 186-87; Marshall's Journal, March
2, 68-72.
[713] Marshall's Journal, March 3, 74.
[714] Marshall's Journal, March 6, 79-81.
[715] Marshall's Journal, 82-88; _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 187-88.
[716] Marshall's Journal, March 13, 87-93.
[717] This would seem to indicate that Marshall knew that his famous
dispatches were to be published.
[718] France was already making "actual war" upon America; the threat of
formally declaring war, therefore, had no terror for Marshall.
[719] Here Marshall contradicts his own statement that the French Nation
was tired of the war, groaning under taxation, and not "universally"
satisfied with the Government.
[720] Marshall to Washington, Paris, March 8, 1798; _Amer. Hist. Rev._,
Jan., 1897, ii, 303; also MS., Lib. Cong.
[721] Marshall's Journal, March 20, 93.
[722] Marshall's Journal, March 22, 95.
[723] Murray to J. Q. Adams, April 3, 1798, quoting Pinckney; _Letters_:
Ford, 391.
[724] The exact reverse was true. Up to this time American newspapers,
with few exceptions, were hot for France. Only a very few papers, like
Fenno's _Gazette of the United States_, could possibly be considered as
unfriendly to France at this point. (See _supra_, chap. I.)
[725] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 190-91.
[726] _Ib._, 191.
[727] Marshall's Journal, March 22, 95.
[728] Marshall's Journal, March 22, 95-97.
[729] The Fairfax purchase.
[730] Marshall's Journal, March 23, 99.
[731] Marshall's Journal, March 29, 99-100.
[732] _Ib._, April 3, 102-07.
[733] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 191.
[734] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 196.
[735] This would seem to dispose of the story that Marshall brought home
enough "very fine" Madeira to serve his own use, supply weddings, and
still leave a quantity in existence three quarters of a century after
his return. (_Green Bag_, viii, 486.)
[736] Marshall's Journal, April 10 and 11, 1798, 107-14.
[737] Marshall to Skipwith, Bordeaux, April 21, 1798; MS., Pa. Hist.
Soc.
[738] Murray to J. Q. Adams, April 24, 1798; _Letters_: Ford, 399.
[739] Same to same, May 18, 1798; _ib._, 407.
[740] Pinckney to King, Paris, April 4, 1798, enclosed in a letter to
Secretary of State, April 16, 1798; Pickering MSS., Mass. Hist. Soc.