FACING TALLEYRAND
Society is divided into two classes; the shearers and the shorn.
We should always be with the former against the latter.
(Talleyrand.)
To lend money to a belligerent power is to relinquish our
neutrality. (Marshall.)
Diplomatically Marshall and his associates found themselves marooned.
Many and long were their discussions of the situation. "We have had
several conversations on the extraordinary silence of the Government
concerning our reception," writes Marshall in his Journal. "The plunder
of our commerce sustains no abatements, the condemnations of our vessels
are press'd with ardor ... our reception is postponed in a manner most
unusual & contemptuous.
"I urge repeatedly that we ought, in a respectful communication to the
Minister [Talleyrand] ... to pray for a suspension of all further
proceedings against American vessels until the further order of the
Directory....
"We have already permitted much time to pass away, we could not be
charged with precipitation, & I am willing to wait two or three days
longer but not more.... The existing state of things is to France the
most beneficial & the most desirable, but to America it is ruinous. I
therefore urge that in a few days we shall lay this interesting subject
before the Minister."[611]
Marshall tells us that Gerry again opposed action, holding that for the
envoys to act would "irritate the [French] Government." The Directory
"might take umbrage."[612] Besides, declared Gerry, France was in a
quandary what to do and "any movement on our part" would relieve her and
put the blame on the envoys. "But," records Marshall, "in the address I
propose I would say nothing which could give umbrage, & if, as is to be
feared, France is determined to be offended, she may quarrel with our
answer to any proposition she may make or even with our silence."
Pinckney agreed with Marshall; but they yielded to Gerry in order to
"preserve unanimity."[613]
Tidings soon arrived of the crushing defeat of the Dutch fleet by the
British; and on the heels of this came reports that the Directory were
ready to negotiate with the Americans.[614] Next morning, and four days
after the mysterious intimations to the American envoys from Talleyrand
through his confidential secretary, a Parisian business man called on
Pinckney and told him that a Mr. Hottenguer,[615] "a native of
Switzerland who had been in America,"[616] and "a gentleman of
considerable credit and reputation," would call on Pinckney. Pinckney
had met Hottenguer on a former occasion, probably at The Hague. That
evening this cosmopolitan agent of financiers and foreign offices paid
the expected visit. After a while Hottenguer "whispered ... that he had
a message from Talleyrand." Into the next room went Pinckney and his
caller. There Hottenguer told Pinckney that the Directory were
"exceedingly irritated" at President Adams's speech and that "they
should be softened."
Indeed, the envoys would not be received, said Hottenguer, unless the
mellowing process were applied to the wounded and angry Directory. He
was perfectly plain as to the method of soothing that sore and sensitive
body--"money" for the pockets of its members and the Foreign Minister
which would be "at the disposal of M. Talleyrand." Also a loan must be
made to France. Becoming still more explicit, Hottenguer stated the
exact amount of financial salve which must be applied in the first step
of the healing treatment required from our envoys--a small bribe of one
million two hundred thousand livres [about fifty thousand pounds
sterling, or two hundred and fifty thousand dollars].
"It was absolutely required," reports Marshall, "that we should ... pay
the debts due by contract from France to our citizens ... pay for the
spoliations committed on our commerce ... & make a considerable loan....
Besides this, added Mr. Hottenguer, there must be something for the
pocket ... for the private use of the Directoire & Minister under the
form of satisfying claims which," says Marshall, "did not in fact
exist."[617]
Pinckney reported to his colleagues. Again the envoys divided as to the
course to pursue. "I was decidedly of opinion," runs Marshall's
chronicle, "& so expressed myself, that such a proposition could not be
made by a nation from whom any treaty, short of the absolute surrender
of the independence of the United States was to be expected, but that if
there was a possibility of accommodation, to give any countenance
whatever to such a proposition would be certainly to destroy that
possibility because it would induce France to demand from us terms to
which it was impossible for us to accede. I therefore," continues
Marshall, "thought we ought, so soon as we could obtain the whole
information, to treat the terms as inadmissible and without taking any
notice of them to make some remonstrance to the minister on our
situation & on that of our countrymen." Pinckney agreed with Marshall;
Gerry dissented and declared that "the whole negotiation ... would be
entirely broken off if such an answer was given as I [Marshall] had
hinted & there would be a war between the two nations." At last it was
decided to get Hottenguer's proposition in writing.[618]
When Pinckney so informed Hottenguer, the latter announced that he had
not dealt "immediately with Talleyrand but through another gentleman in
whom Talleyrand had great confidence." Hottenguer had no objection,
however, to writing out his "suggestions," which he did the next
evening.[619] The following morning he advised the envoys that a Mr.
Bellamy, "the confidential friend of M. Talleyrand," would call and
explain matters in person. Decidedly, the fog was thickening. The envoys
debated among themselves as to what should be done.
"I again urg'd the necessity of breaking off this indirect mode of
procedure," testifies Marshall; but "Mr. Gerry reprobated precipitation,
insisted on further explanations as we could not completely understand
the scope & object of the propositions & conceiv'd that we ought not
abruptly object to them." Marshall and Pinckney thought "that they
[Talleyrand's demands] were beyond our powers & ... amounted to a
surrender of the independence of our country."[620] But Gerry had his
way and the weaving of the spider's web went on.
Two hours after candlelight that evening Hottenguer and Bellamy entered
Marshall's room where the three Americans were waiting for them; and
Bellamy was introduced as "the confidential friend of M. Talleyrand," of
whom Hottenguer had told the envoys. Bellamy was, says Marshall, "a
genevan now residing in Hamburg but in Paris on a visit."[621] He went
straight to the point. Talleyrand, he confided to the envoys, was "a
friend of America ... the kindness and civilities he had personally
received in America" had touched his heart; and he was burning to "repay
these kindnesses." But what could this anxious friend of America do when
the cruel Directory were so outraged at the American President's address
to Congress that they would neither receive the envoys nor authorize
"Talleyrand to have any communications with" them.
Bellamy pointed out that under these circumstances Talleyrand could not,
of course, communicate directly with the envoys; but "had authorized"
him to deal with them "and to promise" that the French Foreign Minister
would do his best to get the Directory to receive the Americans if the
latter agreed to Talleyrand's terms. Nevertheless, Bellamy "stated
explicitly and repeatedly that he was clothed with no authority"--he was
not a diplomat, he said, but only the trusted friend of Talleyrand. He
then pointed out the passages from Adams's address[622] which had so
exasperated the French rulers and stated what the envoys must do to make
headway.
The American envoys, asserted Bellamy, must make "a formal disavowal in
writing ... that ... the speech of the Citizen President," Barras, was
"not offensive" to America; must offer "reparation" for President
Adams's address; must affirm that the decree of the Directory,[623]
which Adams had denounced, was not "contrary to the treaty of 1778";
must state "in writing" the depredations on American trade "by the
English and French privateers," and must make "a formal declaration"
that Adams in his speech to Congress had not referred to the French
Government or its agents: if all this were done "the French Republic is
disposed to renew their old-time relations with America" by a new treaty
which should place France "with respect to the United States exactly on
the same footing as they [the United States] should be with England."
But, said Bellamy, there must be a secret article of this new treaty
providing for a loan from America to France.[624]
Impossible as these terms were, the whole business must be preceded by a
bribe. "I will not disguise from you," said Bellamy, "that this
situation being met, the essential part of the treaty remains to be
adjusted.... _You must pay money--you must pay a great deal of money._"
Little was said about the two hundred and fifty thousand dollars bribe;
"that," declare the envoys' dispatches to the American Secretary of
State, "being completely understood on all sides to be required for the
officers of the government, and, therefore, needing no further
explanation." When all these conditions were complied with, said
Bellamy, "M. Talleyrand trusted that, by his influence with the
Directory, he could prevail on the government to receive" the
Americans. For two hours the talk ran on. Before Talleyrand's agents
left, the anxiously hospitable Gerry invited them to breakfast the next
morning.
Into consultation once more went the envoys. "I pressed strongly,"
writes Marshall in his Journal, "the necessity of declaring that the
propositions were totally inadmissible" and that "it was derogatory from
the honor and wounded the real interests of our country to permit
ourselves, while unacknowledg'd, to carry on this clandestine
negotiation with persons who produced no evidence of being authoriz'd by
the Directoire or the Minister to treat with us. Mr. Gerry was quite of
a contrary opinion & the old beaten ground about precipitation &c. was
trodden once again. Gen'l Pinckney advocated decidedly the same opinions
with myself & we determined that the next morning should positively put
an end to these conferences."[625]
"On our retiring," continues Marshall's narrative, "Mr. Gerry began to
propose further delays & that we shou'd inform them [Talleyrand's
go-betweens] that we wou'd take their propositions into consideration--I
improperly interrupted him & declared that I wou'd not consent to any
proposition of the sort, that the subject was already considered & that
so far as my voice wou'd go I wou'd not permit it to be supposed longer
that we cou'd deliberate on such propositions as were made to us."
Pinckney agreed with Marshall; but, for harmony's sake, Marshall finally
said that he would return to America to "consult our government" on
this express condition only--"that France should previously and
immediately suspend all depredations upon American commerce." For once,
Gerry assented and a letter was written accordingly.[626]
Hottenguer was prompt in his engagement to breakfast with Gerry the next
morning; but Bellamy did not come till ten o'clock, explaining that he
had been closeted with Talleyrand. Bellamy was much depressed; the
Directory, he declared, would not receive the envoys until the latter
had disavowed President Adams's speech, _unless_ they "could find the
means to change their [the Directory's] determination in this
particular." What were such "means?" asked the envoys. "I am not
authorized to state them," said Bellamy. "You must search for them and
propose them yourselves."
Still, Bellamy, merely as an individual, was willing to suggest such
"means." It was money, he explained. The "Directory were jealous of
their own honor and the honor of the nation"; they demanded the same
treatment formerly accorded to the King; and their "honor must be
maintained in the manner required" unless "the envoys substituted ...
something perhaps more valuable, and that was money."[627]
It was all so simple, according to Bellamy. All that the envoys had to
do was to buy thirty-two million florins of Dutch inscriptions at twenty
shillings to the pound. "It was certain," he assured the Americans,
"that after a time the Dutch Government would repay ... the money, so
that America would ultimately lose nothing" and everybody would be
happy. But even if the envoys made the loan in this way, the bribe of
two hundred and fifty thousand dollars must be paid in addition.
Thereupon the envoys handed him the letter which Marshall had prepared
the night before, which stated that they had no power to make a loan,
but could send one of their number to America for consultation and
instruction.
Bellamy was "disappointed" and at once modified his language. Why did
the envoys treat the money proposition as coming from the Directory? It
was only his own personal suggestion. Then "what has led to our present
conversation?" asked the envoys. Pinckney recalled Hottenguer's first
visit and the latter confirmed Pinckney's account.
Upon the envoys stating the differences between France and America, to
settle which was the purpose of their mission, and gently resenting the
demands made upon them, Bellamy became excited. The envoys' conduct was
not to be borne, he exclaimed; let them beware of the resentment of
France. They "could not help it," answered the envoys--the Directory
must look after France; the envoys must look after the United States.
Bellamy was "in despair." What a provincial view these Americans took of
a diplomatic negotiation! They must broaden their horizon. They must
acquire worldly wisdom. They must remember "the respect which the
Directory required"; they must realize that that august body "would
exact as much as was paid to the ancient kings." The envoys would not be
received without it; that was flat, Bellamy informed them; and "he
seemed to shudder at the consequences."
Marshall and Pinckney simply would not see the point. But Gerry was a
man of the world who could understand European diplomacy. Marshall
declared that the envoys were there to adjust international differences.
If, however, France "would make war," then, said they: "We regret the
unavoidable necessity of defending ourselves."[628]
For a little while Talleyrand's leeches dropped away from the perplexed
Americans. Marshall reported to Washington French conditions as he had
observed them up to that time. He confirms to the former President the
American report that French agriculture had been improved "in the course
of the present war":--
"In that part of the country through which I have passed the evidences
of plenty abound. The whole earth appears to be in cultivation & the
harvests of the present year appear to be as productive as the fields
which yield them are extensive.
"I am informed that every part of the country exhibits the same aspect.
If this be the fact, there will probably remain, notwithstanding the
demands of the armies, a surplus of provisions."
Marshall briefly but clearly analyzes the economic and commercial
outcome of the war:--
"Manufactures have declined in the same ratio that the cultivation of
the soil has increas'd. War has been made upon the great manufacturing
towns & they are in a considerable degree destroy'd. With manufactures
France does not supply herself fully from her internal resources.
"Those of Britain flow in upon her notwithstanding the most severe
prohibitory laws. The port of Rotterdam is purposely left open by the
English & their goods are imported by the Dutch under Prussian and other
neutral colors. They are smuggled in great quantities into France.
"Peace, then, will find this [French] nation entirely competent to the
full supply of her colonies with provisions and needing manufactures to
be imported for her own consumption.... France can take from America
tobacco & raw cotton she can supply us with wines, brandies & silks."
Marshall then makes a searching commentary on French politics.
"The existing political state of France is connected with certain
internal & powerfully operating causes by which it has been & will
continue to be greatly influenc'd. Not the least of these is the tenure
by which property is held.
"In the course of the revolution it is believed that more than half the
land of France has become national.[629] Of this a very considerable
proportion has been sold at a low rate.
"It is true that much of it belonged to those who have fallen under the
Guillotine or who have been termed emigrants. Among the emigrants are
many whose attachment to their country has never been shaken; & what is
remarkable, among them are many who were never out of France. The law
upon this subject is worthy of attention.
"Any two persons, no matter what their reputation, may, to some
authority, I believe the municipality of the district, write & subscribe
against any person whatever a charge, that such person is an emigrant,
on receipt of which the person so charg'd is without further
investigation inscribed on the list of emigrants.
"If the person so inscribed be afterwards apprehended while his name
remains on the list, the trial, as I understand, is, not of the fact of
emigration, but of the identity of the persons, & if this identity be
established, he is instantly fusiller'd [shot]. The law is either
rightly executed or permitted to be relax'd, as the occasion or the
temper of the times may direct.
"During intervals of humanity some disposition has been manifested to
permit the return of those who have never offended, who have been
banished by a terror which the government itself has reprobated, & to
permit in case of arrestation, an investigation of the fact of
emigration as well as of the identity of the person accus'd.
"There is too a great deal of property which has been sold as national
but which in truth was never so, & which may be reclaimed by the
original proprietors.
"In this state the acquirers of national property are of course
extremely suspicious. They form a vast proportion of the population of
France. They are not only important in consequence of their numbers, but
in consequence of their vigor, their activity & that unity of interest
which produces a unity of effort among them.
"The armies too have been promised a milliard. This promise rests upon
the national property for its performance. The effect of these
circumstances cannot escape your observation. Classes of citizens are to
be disfranchised against the next election."
Marshall and Pinckney, at this early stage of Talleyrand's
financial-diplomatic intrigue, were so disgusted that they were on the
point of "returning to America immediately." The continuance of French
depredations on the high seas caused Marshall to write to Washington as
follows:--
"The captures of our vessels seem to be only limited by the ability to
capture. That ability is increasing, as the government has let out to
hardy adventurers the national frigates. Among those who plunder us, who
are most active in this infamous business, & most loud in vociferating
criminations equally absurd and untrue, are some unprincipled apostates
who were born in America.
"These sea rovers by a variety of means seem to have acquired great
influence in the government.
"This influence will be exerted to prevent an accommodation between the
United States & France and to prevent any regulations which may
intercept the passage of the spoils they have made on our commerce, to
their pockets. The government I believe is too well disposed to promote
their views. At present it seems to me to be radically hostile to our
country.
"I cou'd wish to form a contrary opinion, but to do so I must shut my
eyes on every object which presents itself to them & fabricate in my own
mind non-existing things, to be substituted for realities, & to form the
basis of my creed.
"Might I be permitted to hazard an opinion it wou'd be the Atlantic only
can save us, & that no consideration will be sufficiently powerful to
check the extremities to which the temper of this government will carry
it, but an apprehension that we may be thrown into the arms of Britain."
Although the Treaty of Campo Formio had been signed on the 17th of
October, Paris had not yet heard of it. This treaty marked Bonaparte as
the most constructive diplomat, as well as the foremost captain, of the
age, for such he had already proved himself to be. A week later, when
Marshall wrote the above letter to Washington (October 24, 1797), he
reported that "The negotiations with the Emperor of Austria are said not
to have been absolutely broken off. Yesterday it was said that peace
with him was certain. Several couriers have arrived lately from
Buonaparte & the national debt rose yesterday from seven to ten livres
in the hundred. Whether this is founded on a real expectation of peace
with Austria or is the mere work of stock jobbers is not for me to
decide."
But three days afterward (October 27) the news reached Paris; and
Marshall adds this postscript: "The definitive peace is made with the
Emperor. You will have seen the conditions. Venice has experienced the
fate of Poland. England is threatened with an invasion."[630]
The thunders of cannon announcing Bonaparte's success were still rolling
through Paris when Talleyrand's plotters again descended upon the
American envoys. Bellamy came and, Pinckney and Gerry being at the
opera, saw Marshall alone. The triumph of Bonaparte was his theme. The
victorious general was now ready to invade England, announced Bellamy;
but "concerning America not a syllable was said."[631]
Already Talleyrand, sensitive as any hawk to coming changes in the
political weather, had begun to insinuate himself into the confidence of
the future conqueror of Europe, whose diplomatic right arm he so soon
was to become. The next morning the thrifty Hottenguer again visits the
envoys. Bonaparte's success in the negotiations of Campo Formio, which
sealed the victories of the French arms, has alarmed Hottenguer, he
declares, for the success of the American mission.
Why, he asks, have the Americans made no proposition to the Directory?
That haughty body "were becoming impatient and would take a decided
course in regard to America" if the envoys "could not soften them,"
exclaims Talleyrand's solicitous messenger. Surely the envoys can see
that Bonaparte's treaty with Austria has changed everything, and that
therefore the envoys themselves must change accordingly.
Exhibiting great emotion, Hottenguer asserts that the Directory have
determined "that all nations should aid them [the French], or be
considered and treated as enemies." Think, he cries, of the "power and
violence of France." Think of the present danger the envoys are in.
Think of the wisdom of "softening the Directory." But he hints that "the
Directory might be made more friendly." Gain time! Gain time! Give the
bribe, and gain time! the wily agent advises the Americans. Otherwise,
France may declare war against America.
That would be most unfortunate, answer the envoys, but assert that the
present American "situation was more ruinous than a declared war could
be"; for now American "commerce was floundering unprotected." In case of
war "America would protect herself."
"You do not speak to the point," Hottenguer passionately cries out; "it
is money; it is expected that you will offer money."
"We have given an answer to that demand," the envoys reply.
"No," exclaims Hottenguer, "you have not! What is your answer?"
"It is no," shouts Pinckney; "no; not a sixpence!"
The persistent Hottenguer does not desist. He tells the envoys that they
do not know the kind of men they are dealing with. The Directory, he
insists, disregard the justice of American claims; care nothing even for
the French colonies; "consider themselves as perfectly invulnerable"
from the United States. Money is the only thing that will interest such
terrible men. The Americans, parrying, ask whether, even if they give
money, Talleyrand will furnish proofs that it will produce results.
Hottenguer evades the question. A long discussion ensues.
Pay the bribe, again and again urges the irritated but tenacious
go-between. Does not your Government "know that nothing is to be
obtained here without money?"
"Our Government had not even suspected such a state of things," declare
the amazed Americans.
"Well," answers Hottenguer, "there is not an American in Paris who could
not have given that information.... Hamburgh and other states of Europe
were obliged to buy peace ... nothing could resist" the power of France;
let the envoys think of "the danger of a breach with her."[632]
Thus far Pinckney mostly had spoken for the envoys. Marshall now took up
the American case. Few utterances ever made by him more clearly reveal
the mettle of the man; and none better show his conception of the
American Nation's rights, dignity, and station among the Governments of
the world.
[Illustration: CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY]
"I told him [Hottenguer]," writes Marshall, "that ... no nation
estimated her [France's] power more highly than America or wished more
to be on amicable terms with her, but that one object was still dearer
to us than the friendship of France which was our national independence.
That America had taken a neutral station. She had a right to take it.
No nation had a right to force us out of it. That to lend ... money
to a belligerent power abounding in every thing requisite for war but
money was to relinquish our neutrality and take part in the war. To lend
this money under the lash & coercion of France was to relinquish the
government of ourselves & to submit to a foreign government imposed on
us by force," Marshall declared. "That we would make at least one manly
struggle before we thus surrendered our national independence.
"Our case was different from that of the minor nations of Europe," he
explained. "They were unable to maintain their independence & did not
expect to do so. America was a great, & so far as concerned her
self-defense, a powerful nation. She was able to maintain her
independence & must deserve to lose it if she permitted it to be wrested
from her. France & Britain have been at war for near fifty years of the
last hundred & might probably be at war for fifty years of the century
to come."
Marshall asserted that "America has no motives which could induce her to
involve herself in those wars and that if she now preserved her
neutrality & her independence it was most probable that she would not in
future be afraid as she had been for four years past--but if she now
surrendered her rights of self government to France or permitted them to
be taken from her she could not expect to recover them or to remain
neutral in any future war."[633]
For two hours Talleyrand's emissary pleads, threatens, bullies, argues,
expostulates. Finally, he departs to consult with his fellow
conspirator, or to see Talleyrand, the master of both. Thus ran the
opening dialogue between the French bribe procurers and the American
envoys. Day after day, week after week, the plot ran on like a play upon
the stage. "A Mr. Hauteval whose fortune lay in the island of St.
Domingo" called on Gerry and revealed how pained Talleyrand was that the
envoys had not visited him. Again came Hauteval, whom Marshall judged to
be the only one of the agents "solicitous of preserving peace."
Thus far the envoys had met with the same request, that they "call upon
Talleyrand at private hours." Marshall and Pinckney said that, "having
been treated in a manner extremely disrespectful" to their country, they
could not visit the Minister of Foreign Affairs "in the existing state
of things ... unless he should expressly signify his wish" to see them
"& would appoint a time & place." But, says Marshall, "Mr. Gerry having
known Mr. Talleyrand in Boston considered it a piece of personal respect
to wait on him & said that he would do so."[634]
Hottenguer again calls to explain how anxious Talleyrand was to serve
the envoys. Make "one more effort," he urges, "to enable him to do so."
Bonaparte's daring plan for the invasion of England was under way and
Hottenguer makes the most of this. "The power and haughtiness of
France," the inevitable destruction of England, the terrible
consequences to America, are revealed to the Americans. "Pay by way of
fees" the two hundred and fifty thousand dollar bribe, and the Directory
would allow the envoys to stay in Paris; Talleyrand would then even
consent to receive them while one of them went to America for
instructions.[635]
Why hesitate? It was the usual thing; the Portuguese Minister had been
dealt with in similar fashion, argues Hottenguer. The envoys counter by
asking whether American vessels will meanwhile be restored to their
owners. They will not, was the answer. Will the Directory stop further
outrages on American commerce, ask the envoys? Of course not, exclaims
Hottenguer. We do "not so much regard a little money as [you] said,"
declare the envoys, "although we should hazard ourselves by giving it
but we see only evidences of the most extreme hostility to us."
Thereupon they go into a long and useless explanation of the American
case.
Gerry's visit to his "old friend" Talleyrand was fruitless; the Foreign
Minister would not receive him.[636] Gerry persisted, nevertheless, and
finally found the French diplomat at home. Talleyrand demanded the loan,
and held a new decree of the Directory before Gerry, but proposed to
withhold it for a week so that the Americans could think it over. Gerry
hastened to his colleagues with the news. Marshall and Pinckney told
Hauteval to inform Talleyrand "that unless there is a hope that the
Directory itself might be prevailed upon by reason to alter its arrêté,
we do not wish to suspend it for an instant."[637]
The next evening, when Marshall and Pinckney were away from their
quarters, Bellamy and Hottenguer called on Gerry, who again invited them
to breakfast. This time Bellamy disclosed the fact that Talleyrand was
now intimately connected with Bonaparte and the army in Italy. Let Gerry
ponder over that! "The fate of Venice was one which might befall the
United States," exclaimed Talleyrand's mouthpiece; and let Gerry not
permit Marshall and Pinckney to deceive themselves by expecting help
from England--France could and would attend to England, invade her,
break her, force her to peace. Where then would America be? Thus for an
hour Bellamy and Hottenguer worked on Gerry.[638]
Far as Talleyrand's agents had gone in trying to force the envoys to
offer a bribe of a quarter of a million dollars, to the Foreign Minister
and Directory, they now went still further. The door of the chamber of
horrors was now opened wide to the stubborn Americans. Personal violence
was intimated; war was threatened. But Marshall and Pinckney refused to
be frightened.
The Directory, Talleyrand, and their emissaries, however, had not
employed their strongest resource. "Perhaps you believe," said Bellamy
to the envoys, "that in returning and exposing to your countrymen the
unreasonableness of the demands of this government, you will unite them
in their resistance to those demands. You are mistaken; you ought to
know that the diplomatic skill of France and the means she possesses in
your country are sufficient to enable her, with the French party in
America,[639] to throw the blame which will attend the rupture of the
negotiations on the federalists, as you term yourselves, but on the
British party as France terms you. And you may assure yourselves that
this will be done."[640]
Thus it was out at last. This was the hidden card that Talleyrand had
been keeping back. And it was a trump. Talleyrand managed to have it
played again by a fairer hand before the game was over. Yes, surely;
here was something to give the obstinate Marshall pause. For the envoys
knew it to be true. There was a French party in America, and there could
be little doubt that it was constantly growing stronger.[641] Genêt's
reception had made that plain. The outbursts throughout America of
enthusiasm for France had shown it. The popular passion exhibited, when
the Jay Treaty was made public, had proved it. Adams's narrow escape
from defeat had demonstrated the strength of French sympathy in
America.
A far more dangerous circumstance, as well known to Talleyrand as it was
to the envoys, made the matter still more serious--the democratic
societies, which, as we have seen, had been organized in great numbers
throughout the United States had pushed the French propaganda with zeal,
system, and ability; and were, to America, what the Jacobin Clubs had
been to France before their bloody excesses. They had already incited
armed resistance to the Government of the United States.[642] Thorough
information of the state of things in the young country across the ocean
had emboldened Barras, upon taking leave of Monroe, to make a direct
appeal to the American people in disregard of their own Government, and,
indeed, almost openly against it. The threat, by Talleyrand's agents, of
the force which France could exert in America, was thoroughly understood
by the envoys. For, as we have seen, there was a French party in
America--"a party," as Washington declared, "determined to advocate
French measures under _all_ circumstances."[643] It was common knowledge
among all the representatives of the American Government in Europe that
the French Directory depended upon the Republican Party in this country.
"They reckon ... upon many friends and partisans among us," wrote the
American Minister in London to the American Minister at The Hague.[644]
The Directory even had its particular agents in the United States to
inflame the American people against their own Government if it did not
yield to French demands. Weeks before the President, in 1797, had called
Congress in special session on French affairs, "the active and incessant
manoeuvres of French agents in" America made William Smith think that
any favorable action of France "will drive the great mass of knaves &
fools back into her [France's] arms," notwithstanding her piracies upon
our ships.[645]
On November 1 the envoys again decided to "hold no more indirect
intercourse with" Talleyrand or the Directory. Marshall and Pinckney
told Hottenguer that they thought it "degrading our country to carry on
further such an indirect intercourse"; and that they "would receive no
propositions" except from persons having "acknowledged authority." After
much parrying, Hottenguer again unparked the batteries of the French
party in America.
He told Marshall and Pinckney that "intelligence had been received from
the United States, that if Colonel Burr and Mr. Madison had constituted
the Mission, the difference between the two nations would have been
accommodated before this time." Talleyrand was even preparing to send a
memorial to America, threatened Hottenguer, complaining that the envoys
were "unfriendly to an accommodation with France."
The insulted envoys hotly answered that Talleyrand's "correspondents in
America took a good deal on themselves when they undertook to say how
the Directory would have received Colonel Burr and Mr. Madison"; and
they defied Talleyrand to send a memorial to the United States.[646]
Disgusted with these indirect and furtive methods, Marshall insisted on
writing Talleyrand on the subject that the envoys had been sent to
France to settle. "I had been for some time extremely solicitous" that
such a letter should be sent, says Marshall. "It appears to me that for
three envoys extraordinary to be kept in Paris thirty days without being
received can only be designed to degrade & humiliate their country & to
postpone a consideration of its just & reasonable complaints till future
events in which it ought not to be implicated shall have determined
France in her conduct towards it. Mr. Gerry had been of a contrary
opinion & we had yielded to him but this evening he consented that the
letter should be prepared."[647]
Nevertheless Gerry again objected.[648] At last the Paris newspapers
took a hand. "It was now in the power of the Administration
[Directory]," says Marshall, "to circulate by means of an enslaved press
precisely those opinions which are agreeable to itself & no printer
dares to publish an examination of them."
"With this tremendous engine at its will, it [the Directory] almost
absolutely controls public opinion on every subject which does not
immediately affect the interior of the nation. With respect to its
designs against America it experiences not so much difficulty as ...
would have been experienced had not our own countrymen labored to
persuade them that our Government was under a British influence."[649]
On November 3, Marshall writes Charles Lee: "When I clos'd my last
letter I did not expect to address you again from this place. I
calculated on being by this time on my return to the United States....
My own opinion is that France wishes to retain America in her present
situation until her negotiation with Britain, which it is believed is
about to recommence, shall have been terminated, and a present absolute
rupture with America might encourage England to continue the war and
peace with England ... will put us more in her [France's] power.... Our
situation is more intricate and difficult than you can believe.... The
demand for money has been again repeated. The last address to us ...
concluded ... that the French party in America would throw all the blame
of a rupture on the federalists.... We were warned of the fate of
Venice. All these conversations are preparing for a public letter but
the delay and the necessity of writing only in cypher prevents our
sending it by this occasion.... I wish you could ... address the
Minister concerning our reception. We despair of doing anything.... Mr.
Putnam an American citizen has been arrested and sent to jail under the
pretext of his cheating frenchmen.... This ... is a mere pretext. It is
considered as ominous toward Americans generally. He like most of them
is a creditor of the [French] government."[650]
Finally the envoys sent Talleyrand the formal request, written by
Marshall,[651] that the Directory receive them. Talleyrand ignored it.
Ten more days went by. When might they expect an answer? inquired the
envoys. Talleyrand parried and delayed. "We are not yet received," wrote
the envoys to Secretary of State Pickering, "and the condemnation of our
vessels ... is unremittingly continued. Frequent and urgent attempts
have been made to inveigle us again into negotiations with persons not
officially authorized, of which the obtaining of money is the basis; but
we have persisted in declining to have any further communication
relative to diplomatic business with persons of that description."[652]
Anxious as Marshall was about the business of his mission, which now
rapidly was becoming an intellectual duel between Talleyrand and
himself, he was far more concerned as to the health of his wife, from
whom he had heard nothing since leaving America. Marshall writes her a
letter full of apprehension, but lightens it with a vague account of the
amusements, distractions, and dissipations of the French Capital.
"I have not, since my departure from the United States," Marshall tells
his wife, "received a single letter from you or from any one of my
friends in America. Judge what anxiety I must feel concerning you. I do
not permit myself for a moment to suspect that you are in any degree to
blame for this. I am sure you have written often to me but unhappily
for me your letters have not found me. I fear they will not. They have
been thrown over board or intercepted. Such is the fate of the greater
number of the letters addressed by Americans to their friends in France,
such I fear will be the fate of all that may be address'd to me.
"In my last letter I informed you that I counted on being at home in
March. I then expected to have been able to leave this country by
christmas at furthest & such is my impatience to see you & my dear
children that I had determined to risk a winter passage." He asks his
wife to request Mr. Wickham to see that one of Marshall's law cases "may
ly till my return. I think nothing will prevent my being at the chancery
term in May.
"Oh God," cries Marshall, "how much time & how much happiness have I
thrown away! Paris presents one incessant round of amusement &
dissipation but very little I believe even for its inhabitants of that
society which interests the heart. Every day you may see something new
magnificent & beautiful, every night you may see a spectacle which
astonishes & enchants the imagination. The most lively fancy aided by
the strongest description cannot equal the reality of the opera. All
that you can conceive & a great deal more than you can conceive in the
line of amusement is to be found in this gay metropolis but I suspect it
would not be easy to find a friend.
"I would not live in Paris," Marshall tells his "dearest Polly" "[if I
could] ... be among the wealthiest of its citizens. I have changed my
lodging much for the better. I liv'd till within a few days in a house
where I kept my own apartments perfectly in the style of a miserable old
bachelor without any mixture of female society. I now have rooms in the
house of a very accomplished a very sensible & I believe a very amiable
Lady whose temper, very contrary to the general character of her country
women, is domestic & who generally sits with us two or three hours in
the afternoon.
"This renders my situation less unpleasant than it has been but nothing
can make it eligible. Let me see you once more & I ... can venture to
assert that no consideration would induce me ever again to consent to
place the Atlantic between us. Adieu my dearest Polly. Preserve your
health & be happy as possible till the return of him who is ever
yours."[653]
The American Minister in London was following anxiously the fortunes of
our envoys in Paris, and gave them frequent information and sound
advice. Upon learning of their experiences, King writes that "I will not
allow myself yet to despair of your success, though my apprehensions are
greater than my hopes." King enclosed his Dispatch number 52 to the
American Secretary of State, which tells of the Portuguese Treaty and
the decline of Spain's power in Paris.[654]
In reply, Pinckney writes King, on December 14, that the Directory "are
undoubtedly hostile to our Government, and are determined, if possible,
to effectuate a change in our administration, and to oblige our present
President [Adams] to resign," and further adds that the French
authorities contemplate expelling from France "every American who could
not prove" that he was for France and against America.
"Attempts," he continues, "are made to divide the Envoys and with that
view some civilities are shown to Mr. G.[erry] and none to the two
others [Marshall and Pinckney].... The American Jacobins here pay him
[Gerry] great Court."[655] The little New Englander already was yielding
to the seductions of Talleyrand, and was also responsive to the flattery
of a group of unpatriotic Americans in Paris who were buttering their
own bread by playing into the hands of the Directory and the French
Foreign Office.
Marshall now beheld a stage of what he believed was the natural
development of unregulated democracy. Dramatic events convinced him that
he was witnessing the growth of license into absolutism. Early in
December Bonaparte arrived in Paris. Swiftly the Conqueror had come from
Rastadt, traveling through France _incognito_, after one of his
lightning-flash speeches to his soldiers reminding them of "the Kings
whom you have vanquished, the people upon whom you have conferred
liberty." The young general's name was on every tongue.
Paris was on fire to see and worship the hero. But Bonaparte kept aloof
from the populace. He made himself the child of mystery. The future
Emperor of the French, clad in the garments of a plain citizen, slipped
unnoticed through the crowds. He would meet nobody but scholars and
savants of world renown. These he courted; but he took care that this
fact was known to the people. In this course he continued until the
stage was set and the cue for his entrance given.
Finally the people's yearning to behold and pay homage to their
soldier-statesman becomes a passion not to be denied. The envious but
servile Directory yield, and on December 10, 1797, a splendid festival
in Bonaparte's honor is held at the Luxembourg. The scene flames with
color: captured battle-flags as decorations; the members of the
Directory appareled as Roman Consuls; foreign ministers in their
diplomatic costumes; officers in their uniforms; women brilliantly
attired in the height of fashion.[656] At last the victorious general
appears on the arm of Talleyrand, the latter gorgeously clad in the
dress of his high office; but Bonaparte, short, slender, and delicate,
wearing the plainest clothes of the simplest citizen.
Upon this superb play-acting John Marshall looked with placid wonder.
Here, then, thought this Virginian, who had himself fought for liberty
on many a battlefield, were the first fruits of French revolutionary
republicanism. Marshall beheld no devotion here to equal laws which
should shield all men, but only adoration of the sword-wielder who was
strong enough to rule all men. In the fragile, eagle-faced little
warrior,[657] Marshall already saw the man on horseback advancing out of
the future; and in the thunders of applause he already heard the sound
of marching armies, the roar of shotted guns, the huzzas of charging
squadrons.
All this was something that Jefferson had not seen. Jefferson's sojourn
in France had been at the time when the French Revolution was just
sprouting; and he foresaw only that beautiful idealism into which the
glorious dreamers of the time fondly imagined the Revolution would
flower.
But Marshall was in Paris after the guillotine had done its work; when
corruption sat in the highest places of government; and when military
glory in the name of liberty had become the deity of the people. So
where Jefferson expected that the roses of peace would bloom, Marshall
saw clusters of bayonets, as the fruitage of the French Revolution.
FOOTNOTES:
[611] Marshall's Journal, Oct. 15, 4-5.
[612] Paris made an impression on the envoys as different as their
temperaments. Vans Murray records the effect on Gerry, who had written
to his friends in Boston of "how handsomely they [the envoys] were
received in Paris and how hopeful he is of settlement!!!"
"Good God--he has mistaken the lamps of Paris for an illumination on his
arrival," writes our alarmed Minister at The Hague, "and the salutations
of fisherwomen for a procession of chaste matrons hailing the great
Pacificator!... His foible is to mistake things of common worldly
politeness for deference to his rank of which he rarely loses the
idea.... Gerry is no more fit to enter the labyrinth of Paris as a
town--alone--than an innocent is, much less formed to play a game with
the political genius of that city ... without some very steady friend at
his elbow.... Of all men in America he is ... the least qualify'd to
play a part in Paris, either among the men or the women--he is too
virtuous for the last--too little acquainted with the world and himself
for the first." (Vans Murray to J. Q. Adams, April 13, 1798; _Letters_:
Ford, 394.)
[613] Marshall's Journal, 5.
[614] _Ib._, Oct. 17, 6.
[615] Probably the same Hottenguer who had helped Marshall's brother
negotiate the Fairfax loan in Amsterdam. (_Supra_, chap. IV.)
[616] Marshall's Journal, Oct. 17, 6.
[617] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 158; Marshall's Journal, 6-7.
[618] Marshall's Journal, 7-8.
[619] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 158.
[620] Marshall's Journal, Oct. 20, 8-9.
[621] Marshall's Journal, Oct. 20, 8-9.
[622] _Supra_, 226.
[623] Directing the capture of enemy goods on American ships, thus
nullifying the declaration in the Franco-American Treaty that "free
bottoms make free goods."
[624] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 159.
[625] Marshall's Journal, Oct. 20, 10. _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii,
159.
[626] Marshall's Journal, Oct. 21, 10-11.
[627] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 159-60.
[628] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 159-60.
[629] By "national" lands, Marshall refers to the confiscated estates.
[630] Marshall to Washington, Paris, Oct. 24 (postscript, 27th), 1797:
_Amer. Hist. Rev._, Jan., 1897, ii, 301-03; also, Washington MSS., Lib.
Cong.; or Sparks MSS., Mass. Hist. Soc.
[631] Marshall's Journal, Oct. 26, 12.
[632] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 161-62.
[633] Marshall's Journal, Oct. 27, 16-17. This statement of the American
case by Marshall is given in the dispatches, which Marshall prepared as
coming from the envoys generally. (See _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii,
161-62.)
[634] Marshall's Journal, Oct. 23, 11-12.
[635] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 163; Marshall's Journal, Oct. 29,
21-22.
[636] Marshall's Journal, Oct. 23, 12.
[637] Marshall's Journal, Oct. 28, 18-19.
[638] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 163.
[639] "Infinite pains have been taken there [in France] to spread
universally the idea that there are, in America, only two parties, the
one entirely devoted to France and the other to England." (J. Q. Adams
to his father, The Hague, July 2, 1797; _Writings, J. Q. A._: Ford, ii,
181.)
[640] Marshall's Journal, Oct. 30, 25-26; _Am St. Prs., For. Rel._, 164.
[641] "The French were extremely desirous of seeing Mr. Jefferson
President; ... they exerted themselves to the utmost in favor of his
election [in 1796]; ... they made a great point of his success." (Harper
to his Constituents, Jan. 5, 1797; _Bayard Papers_: Donnan, 25; and see
_supra_, chaps. I, II, III, and IV, of this volume.)
[642] See _supra_, chap. III, 86 _et seq._
[643] Washington to King, June 25, 1797; King, ii, 194.
[644] King to Murray, March 31, 1798; _ib._, 294.
[645] Smith to King, Philadelphia, April 3, 1797; King, ii, 165.
[646] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 163-64.
[647] Marshall's Journal, Nov. 4, 31.
[648] _Ib._, 31.
[649] Marshall's Journal, Nov. 8, 33.
[650] Marshall to Lee, Nov. 3, 1797; MS., Lib. Cong. Lee was
Attorney-General. Marshall's letter was in cipher.
[651] Marshall to Lee, Nov. 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11; MS., Lib. Cong.
[652] _Am. St. Prs., For. Rel._, ii, 166.
[653] Marshall to his wife, Paris, Nov. 27, 1797; MS.
[654] King to Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, Nov. 15, 1797; enclosing
Dispatch no. 52 to Pinckney; King, ii, 240-41. See _ib._, 245; and Dec.
9, 1797; _ib._, 247.
[655] Pinckney to King, Paris, Dec. 14, 1797; King, ii, 259-60.
[656] Talleyrand, who gave the fête, wrote: "I spared no trouble to make
it brilliant and attractive; although in this I experienced some
difficulty on account of the vulgarity of the directors' wives who, of
course, enjoyed precedence over all other ladies." (_Memoirs of
Talleyrand_: Broglie's ed., i, 197; also see Sloane: _Life of Napoleon_,
ii, 20; and Lanfrey: _Life of Napoleon_, i, 254-57.)
[657] "At first sight he [Bonaparte] seemed ... to have a charming face,
so much do the halo of victory, fine eyes, a pale and almost consumptive
look, become a young hero." (_Memoirs of Talleyrand_: Broglie's ed., i,
196.)