WASHINGTON'S DEFENDER
His [Marshall's] lax, lounging manners have made him popular.
(Jefferson.)
Having a high opinion of General Marshall's honor, prudence, and
judgment, consult him. (Washington.)
The man [Washington] who is the source of all the misfortunes of
our country is no longer possessed of the power to multiply evils
on the United States. (The _Aurora_ on Washington's retirement
from the Presidency.)
Jefferson properly named Marshall as the first of Washington's friends
in Virginia. For, by now, he had become the leader of the Virginia
Federalists. His lucid common sense, his level poise, his steady
courage, his rock-like reliability--these qualities, together with his
almost uncanny influence over his constituents, had made him chief in
the Virginia Federalist councils.
So high had Marshall risen in Washington's esteem and confidence that
the President urged him to become a member of the Cabinet.
"The office of Attorney Gen^l. of the United States has become vacant by
the death of Will Bradford, Esq.[351] I take the earliest opportunity of
asking if you will accept the appointment? The salary annexed thereto,
and the prospects of lucrative practice in this city [Philadelphia]--the
present seat of the Gen^l. Government, must be as well known to you,
perhaps better, than they are to me, and therefore I shall say nothing
concerning them.
"If your answer is in the affirmative, it will readily occur to you that
no unnecessary time should be lost in repairing to this place. If, on
the contrary, it should be the negative (which would give me concern) it
might be as well to say nothing of this offer. But in either case, I
pray you to give me an answer as promptly as you can."[352]
Marshall decided instantly; he could not possibly afford to accept a
place yielding only fifteen hundred dollars annually, the salary of the
Attorney-General at that period,[353] and the duties of which permitted
little time for private practice which was then allowable.[354] So
Marshall, in a "few minutes" declined Washington's offer in a letter
which is a model of good taste.
"I had the honor of receiving a few minutes past your letter of the 26th
inst.
"While the business I have undertaken to complete in Richmond,[355]
forbids me to change my situation tho for one infinitely more eligible,
permit me Sir to express my sincere acknowledgments for the offer your
letter contains & the real pride & gratification I feel at the favorable
opinion it indicates.
"I respect too highly the offices of the present government of the
United States to permit it to be suspected that I have declined one of
them."[356]
When he refused the office of Attorney-General, Washington, sorely
perplexed, wrote Marshall's brother-in-law,[357] Edward Carrington,
United States Marshal and Collector of Internal Revenue for the District
of Virginia,[358] a letter, "the _whole_" of which "is perfectly
confidential, written, perhaps, with more candor than prudence,"
concerning Innes or Henry for the place; but, says the President,
"having a high opinion of General[359] Marshall's honor, prudence, and
judgment," Carrington must consult him.[360]
The harassed President had now come to lean heavily on Marshall in
Virginia affairs; indeed, it may be said that he was Washington's
political agent at the State Capital. Carrington's answer is typical of
his reports to the President: "The inquiry [concerning the selection of
an Attorney-General] which you have been pleased to submit to Gen^l.
Marshall and myself demands & receives our most serious attention--On
his [Marshall's] aid I rely for giving you accurate information."[361]
[Illustration: _John Marshall_
_From a painting by Rembrandt Peale_]
Later Carrington advises Washington that Marshall "wishes an opportunity
of conversing with Col. Innes before he decides."[362] Innes was absent
at Williamsburg; and although the matter was urgent, Marshall and
Carrington did not write Innes, because, to do so, would involve a
decisive offer from Washington which "Gen^l. Marshall does not think
advisable."[363]
When Washington's second letter, suggesting Patrick Henry, was received
by Carrington, he "immediately consulted Gen^l. Marshall thereon"; and
was guided by his opinion. Marshall thought that Washington's letter
should be forwarded to Henry because "his nonacceptance, from domestic
considerations, may be calculated on"; the offer "must tend to soften"
Henry "if he has any asperities"; and the whole affair would make Henry
"active on the side of Government & order."[364]
Marshall argued that, if Henry should accept, his friendship for the
Administration could be counted on. But Marshall's strongest reason for
trying to induce Henry to become a member of the Cabinet was, says
Carrington, that "we are fully persuaded that a more deadly blow could
not be given to the Faction [Republican party] in Virginia, &
perhaps elsewhere, than that Gentleman's acceptance of the"
Attorney-Generalship. "So much have the opposers of the Government held
him [Henry] up as their oracle, even since he has ceased to respond to
them, that any event demonstrating his active support to Government,
could not but give the [Republican] party a severe shock."[365]
A week later Carrington reports that Henry's "conduct & sentiments
generally both as to government & yourself [Washington] are such as we
[Marshall and Carrington] calculated on ... which assure us of his
discountenancing calumny of every description & disorder,"[366] meaning
that Henry was hostile to the Republicans.
In the rancorous assaults upon the Jay Treaty in Virginia, Marshall, of
course, promptly took his position by Washington's side, and stoutly
defended the President and even the hated compact itself. Little cared
Marshall for the effect of his stand upon his popularity. Not at all did
he fear or hesitate to take that stand. And high courage was required to
resist the almost universal denunciation of the treaty in Virginia. Nor
was this confined to the masses of the people; it was expressed also by
most of the leading men in the various communities. At every meeting of
protest, well-drawn and apparently convincing resolutions were adopted,
and able, albeit extravagant, speeches were made against the treaty and
the Administration.
Typical of these was the address of John Thompson at Petersburg, August
1, 1795.[367] With whom, asked Thompson, was the treaty made? With the
British King "who had sworn eternal enmity to republics"; that hateful
monarch who was trying "to stifle the liberty of France" and "to starve
thirty millions of men" by "intercepting the correspondence and
plundering the commerce of neutral nations," especially that of the
United States. The British, declared Thompson, sought "the destruction
of our rising commerce; the annihilation of our growing navigation," and
were pursuing that object "with all the ... oppression which rapacity
can practice."
Sequestration of British debts and other justifiable measures of
retaliation would, said he, have stopped Great Britain's lawless
practices. But the Administration preferred to treat with that malign
Power; and our envoy, Jay, instead of "preserving the attitude of
dignity and speaking the language of truth ... basely apostatizing from
republican principles, stooped to offer the incense of flattery to a
tyrant, the scourge of his country, the foe of mankind.... Yes!"
exclaimed the radical orator, "we hesitated to offend a proud King, who
had captured our vessels, enslaved our fellow-citizens, ruined our
merchants, invaded our territory and trampled on our sovereignty." In
spite of these wrongs and insults, "we prostrated ourselves before him,
smiled in his face, flattered, and obtained this treaty."
The treaty thus negotiated was, declared Thompson, the climax of the
Funding system which had "organized a great aristocracy ... usurped the
dominion of the senate ... often preponderated in the house of
representatives and which proclaims itself in servile addresses to our
supreme executive, in dangerous appointments, in monstrous accumulations
of debt, in violation of the constitution, in proscriptions of
democrats, and, to complete the climax of political infamy, in this
treaty."
Concerning the refusal to observe the principle that "free bottoms make
free goods," our yielding the point rendered us, avowed Thompson, "a
cowardly confederate ... of ... ruthless despots, who march to desolate
France, to restore the altars of barbarous superstition and to
extinguish the celestial light which has burst upon the human mind. O my
countrymen, when you are capable of such monstrous baseness, even the
patriot will invoke upon you the contempt of ages." This humiliation had
been thrust upon us as a natural result of Washington's Neutrality
proclamation--"a sullen neutrality between freemen and despots."
Thompson's searching, if boyish, rhetoric truly expressed the feeling in
the hearts of the people; it was a frenzied sentiment with which
Marshall had to contend. Notwithstanding his blazing language, Thompson
analyzed the treaty with ability. In common with opponents of the treaty
everywhere, he laid strongest emphasis on its unconstitutionality and
the "usurpation" by the President and Senate of the rights and powers of
the House of Representatives.
But Thompson also mentioned one point that touched Marshall closely.
"The ninth article," said he, "invades the rights of this commonwealth,
by contemplating the case of Denny Fairfax."[369] Marshall and his
brother were now the owners of this estate;[370] and the Jay Treaty
confirmed all transfers of British property and authorized British
subjects to grant, sell, or devise lands held in America in the same
manner as if they were citizens of the United States. In Congress a few
months later, Giles, who, declared Ames, "has no scruples and certainly
less sense,"[371] touched lightly on this same chord.[372] So did Heath,
who was from that part of Virginia lying within the Fairfax grant.[373]
Such was the public temper in Virginia, as accurately if bombastically
expressed by the youthful Thompson, when the elections for the
Legislature of 1795 were held. It was certain that the General Assembly
would take drastic and hostile action against the treaty; and, perhaps,
against Washington himself, in case the Republicans secured a majority
in that body. The Federalists were in terror and justly so; for the
Republicans, their strength much increased by the treaty, were
aggressive and confident.
The Federalist candidate in Richmond was the member of the Legislature
whom the Federalists had succeeded in electing after Marshall's
retirement three years before. He was Marshall's intimate friend and a
stanch supporter of Washington's Administration. But it appears that in
the present crisis his popularity was not sufficient to secure his
election, nor his courage robust enough for the stern fight that was
certain to develop in the General Assembly.
The polls were open and the voting in progress. Marshall was among the
first to arrive; and he announced his choice.[374] Upon his appearance
"a gentleman demanded that a poll be opened for Mr. Marshall."[375]
Marshall, of course, indignantly refused; he had promised to support his
friend, he avowed, and now to become a candidate was against "his wishes
and feeling and honor." But Marshall promised that he would stand for
the Legislature the following year.
Thereupon Marshall left the polls and went to the court-house to make an
argument in a case then pending. No sooner had he departed than a poll
was opened for him in spite of his objections;[376] he was elected; and
in the evening was told of the undesired honor with which the
freeholders of Richmond had crowned him.
Washington was apprehensive of the newly elected Legislature. He
anxiously questioned Carrington "as to the temper of our Assembly." The
latter reported that he did not "expect an extravagant conduct during
the session."[377] He thought that "the spirit of dissatisfaction is
considerably abated abroad" (throughout Virginia and away from
Richmond), because recent attempts to hold county and district meetings
"for the avowed purpose of condemning the Administration & the Treaty"
had been "abortive." It seemed to him, however, that "there is a very
general impression unfavorable to the Treaty, owing to the greater
industry of those who revile, over the supporters of it."[378]
Still, Carrington was not sure about the Legislature itself; for, as he
said, "it has every year for several past been observable, that, at
meeting [of the Legislature] but few hot heads were to be seen, while
the great body were rational; but in the course of the session it has
seldom happened otherwise than that the spirit of party has been
communicated so as to infect a majority. In the present instance I
verily believe a question put on this day [the first day of the session]
for making the Treaty a subject of consideration would be negatived--yet
sundry members are here who will attempt every injury to both the
Administration & the Treaty. The party will want ability in their
leaders.... General Lee, C. Lee, Gen^l. Marshall & Mr. Andrews will act
with ability on the defensive."[379]
Three days later the buoyant official advised the President that the
Republicans doubted their own strength and, at worst, would delay their
attack "in order that, as usual, a heat may be generated." Marshall was
still busy searching for a properly qualified person to appoint to the
unfilled vacancy in the office of Attorney-General; and Carrington tells
Washington that "Gen^l. Marshall and myself have had a private
consultation" on that subject and had decided to recommend Judge Blain.
But, he adds, "The suggestion rests entirely with Gen^l. M[arshall] &
myself & will there expire, should you, for any consideration, forbear
to adopt it." His real message of joy, however, was the happy frame of
mind of the Legislature.[380]
Alas for this prophecy of optimism! The Legislature had not been in
session a week before the anti-Administration Banquo's ghost showed its
grim visage. The Republicans offered a resolution approving the vote of
Virginia Senators against the Jay Treaty. For three days the debate
raged. Marshall led the Federalist forces. "The support of the Treaty
has fallen altogether on Gen^l. Marshall and Mr. Chas. Lee," Carrington
reports to Washington.[382]
Among the many objections to the treaty the principal one, as we have
seen, was that it violated the Constitution. The treaty regulated
commerce; the Constitution gave that power to Congress, which included
the House of Representatives; yet the House had not been consulted. The
treaty involved naturalization, the punishment of piracies, the laying
of imposts and the expenditure of money--all of these subjects were
expressly placed under the control of Congress and one of them[383] (the
raising and expending of public money) must originate in the House; yet
that popular branch of the Government had been ignored. The treaty
provided for a quasi-judicial commission to settle the question of the
British debts; yet "all the power of the Federal government with respect
to debts is given [Congress] by a concise article of the
Constitution.... What article of the Constitution authorizes President
and Senate to establish a judiciary colossus which is to stand with one
foot on America and the other on Britain, and drag the reluctant
governments of those countries to the altar of justice?"[384]
Thus the question was raised whether a commercial treaty, or an
international compact requiring an appropriation of money, or, indeed,
any treaty whatever in the execution of which any action of any kind on
the part of the House of Representatives was necessary, could be made
without the concurrence of the House as well as the Senate. On this, the
only vital and enduring question involved, Marshall's views were clear
and unshakable.
The defense of the constitutional power of the President and Senate to
make treaties was placed solely on Marshall's shoulders. The Federalists
considered his argument a conclusive demonstration. Carrington wrote
Washington that "on the point of constitutionality many conversions were
acknowledged."[385] He was mistaken; the Republicans were not impressed.
On the contrary, they thought that the treaty "was much less ably
defended than opposed."[386]
The Republicans had been very much alarmed over Marshall and especially
feared the effect of one clever move. "John Marshall," wrote Jefferson's
son-in-law from Richmond to the Republican commander in Monticello, "it
was once apprehended would make a great number of converts by an
argument which cannot be considered in any other light than an uncandid
artifice. To prevent what would be a virtual censure of the President's
conduct he maintained _that the treaty in all its commercial parts was
still under the power of the H._[ouse] _of R._[epresentatives]."[387]
Marshall, indeed, did make the most of this point. It was better, said
he, and "more in the spirit of the constitution" for the National House
to refuse support after ratification than to have a treaty "stifled in
embryo" by the House passing upon it before ratification. "He compared
the relation of the Executive and the Legislative department to that
between the states and the Congress under the old confederation. The old
Congress might have given up the right of laying discriminating duties
in favor of any nation by treaty; it would never have thought of taking
beforehand the assent of each state thereto. Yet, no one would have
pretended to deny the power of the states to lay such [discriminating
duties]."[388]
Such is an unfriendly report of this part of Marshall's effort which,
wrote Jefferson's informant, "is all that is original in his argument.
The sophisms of Camillus, & the nice distinctions of the Examiner made
up the rest."[389] Marshall's position was that a "treaty is as
completely a valid and obligatory contract when negotiated by the
President and ratified by him, with the assent and advice of the Senate,
as if sanctioned by the House of Representatives also, under a
constitution requiring such sanction"; and he admitted only that the
powers of the House in reference to a treaty were limited to granting
or refusing appropriations to carry it into effect.[390]
But as a matter of practical tactics to get votes, Marshall appears to
have put this in the form of an assertion--no matter what treaty the
President and Senate made, the House held the whip hand, he argued, and
in the end, could do what it liked; why then unnecessarily affront and
humiliate Washington by applauding the Virginia Senators for their vote
against the treaty? This turn of Marshall's, thought the Republicans,
"was brought forward for the purpose of gaining over the unwary &
wavering. It has never been admitted by the writers in favor of the
treaty to the northward."[391]
But neither Marshall's unanswerable argument on the treaty-making power,
nor his cleverness in holding up the National House of Representatives
as the final arbiter, availed anything. The Federalists offered an
amendment affirming that the President and Senate "have a right to make"
a treaty; that discussion of a treaty in a State Legislature, "except as
to its constitutionality," was unnecessary; and that the Legislature
could not give "any mature opinion upon the conduct of the Senators from
Virginia ... without a full investigation of the treaty." They were
defeated by a majority of 46 out of a total of 150 members present and
voting; John Marshall voting for the amendment.[392] On the main
resolution proposed by the Republicans the Federalists lost two votes
and were crushed by a majority of two to one; Marshall, of course,
voting with the minority.[393]
Carrington hastily reported to Washington that though "the discussion
has been an able one on the side of the Treaty," yet, "such was the
apprehension that a vote in its favor would be unpopular, that argument
was lost"; and that, notwithstanding many members were convinced by
Marshall's constitutional argument, "obligations of expediency" held
them in line against the Administration. The sanguine Carrington assured
the President, however, that "during the discussion there has been
preserved a decided respect for & confidence in you."[394]
But alas again for the expectations of sanguinity! The Republican
resolution was, as Jefferson's son-in-law had reported to the Republican
headquarters at Monticello, "a virtual censure of the President's
conduct." This was the situation at the close of the day's debate.
Realizing it, as the night wore on, Washington's friends determined to
relieve the President of this implied rebuke by the Legislature of his
own State. The Republicans had carried their point; and surely, thought
Washington's supporters, the Legislature of Virginia would not openly
affront the greatest of all Americans, the pride of the State, and the
President of the Nation.
Infatuated imagination! The next morning the friends of the
Administration offered a resolution that Washington's "motives" in
approving the treaty met "the entire approbation of this House"; and
that Washington, "for his great abilities, _wisdom_ and integrity merits
and possesses the undiminished confidence of his country." The
resolution came near passing. But some lynx-eyed Republican discovered
in the nick of time the word "_wisdom_."[395] That would never do. The
Republicans, therefore, offered an amendment "that this House do
entertain the highest sense of the integrity and patriotism of the
President of the United States; and that while they approve of the vote
of the Senators of this State" on the treaty, "they in no wise censure
the motives which influenced him in his [Washington's] conduct
thereupon."[396]
The word "wisdom" was carefully left out. Marshall, Lee, and the other
Federalists struggled hard to defeat this obnoxious amendment; but the
Republicans overwhelmed them by a majority of 33 out of a total of 145
voting, Marshall, of course, casting his vote against it.[397]
In worse plight than ever, Washington's friends moved to amend the
Republican amendment by resolving: "That the President of the United
States, for his great abilities, _wisdom_, and integrity, merits and
possesses the undiminished confidence of this House." But even this,
which omitted all reference to the treaty and merely expressed
confidence in Washington's "abilities, wisdom, and integrity," was
beaten by a majority of 20 out of a total of 138 voting.[398]
As soon as Jefferson got word of Marshall's support of Washington's
Administration in the Legislature, he poured out his dislike which had
long been distilling:--
"Though Marshall will be able to embarras [_sic_] the republican party
in the assembly a good deal," wrote Jefferson to Madison, "yet upon the
whole his having gone into it will be of service. He has been, hitherto,
able to do more mischief acting under the mask of Republicanism than he
will be able to do after throwing it plainly off. His lax lounging
manners have made him popular with the bulk of the people of Richmond; &
a profound hypocrisy, with many thinking men of our country. But having
come forth in the plenitude of his English principles the latter will
see that it is high time to make him known."[399]
Such was Jefferson's inability to brook any opposition, and his
readiness to ascribe improper motives to any one having views different
from his own. So far from Marshall's having cloaked his opinions, he had
been and was imprudently outspoken in avowing them. Frankness was as
much a part of Marshall's mental make-up as his "lax, lounging manners"
were a part of his physical characteristics. Of all the men of the
period, not one was cleaner of hypocrisy than he. From Patrick Henry in
his early life onward to his associates on the bench at the end of his
days the testimony as to Marshall's open-mindedness is uniform and
unbroken.
With the possible exception of Giles and Roane, Jefferson appears to
have been the only man who even so much as hinted at hypocrisy in
Marshall. Although strongly opposing his views and suggesting the
influence of supposed business connections, Madison had supreme
confidence in Marshall's integrity of mind and character. So had Monroe.
Even Jefferson's most panegyrical biographer declares Marshall to have
been "an earnest and sincere man."[400]
The House of Delegates having refused to approve Washington, even
indirectly, the matter went to the State Senate. There for a week
Washington's friends fought hard and made a slight gain. The Senate
struck out the House resolution and inserted instead: "The General
Assembly entertain the highest sense of the integrity, patriotism and
wisdom of the President of the United States, and in approving the vote
of the Senators of the State in the Congress of the United States,
relative to the treaty with Great Britain, they in no wise mean to
censure the motives which influenced him in his conduct thereupon." To
this the House agreed, although by a slender majority, Marshall, of
course, voting for the Senate amendment.[401]
During this session Marshall was, as usual, on the principal standing
committees and did his accustomed share of general legislative work. He
was made chairman of a special committee to bring in a bill "authorizing
one or more branches of the bank of the United States in this
commonwealth";[402] and later presented the bill,[403] which finally
passed, December 8, 1795, though not without resistance, 38 votes being
cast against it.[404]
But the Republicans had not yet finished with the Jay Treaty or with its
author. On December 12, 1795, they offered a resolution instructing
Virginia's Senators and Representatives in Congress to attempt to secure
amendments to the Constitution providing that: "Treaties containing
stipulations upon the subject of powers vested in Congress shall be
approved by the House of Representatives"; that "a tribunal other than
the Senate be instituted for trying impeachments"; that "Senators shall
be chosen for three years"; and that "U.S. Judges shall hold no other
appointments."[405]
The Federalists moved to postpone this resolution until the following
year "and print and distribute proposed amendments for the consideration
of the people"; but they were beaten by a majority of 11 out of a total
vote of 129, Marshall voting for the resolution. The instruction to
secure these radical constitutional changes then passed the House by a
majority of 56 out of a total vote of 120, Marshall voting against
it.[406]
Marshall's brother-in-law, United States Marshal Carrington, had a hard
time explaining to Washington his previous enthusiasm. He writes: "The
active powers of the [Republican] party ... unveiled themselves, &
carried in the House some points very extraordinary indeed, manifesting
disrespect towards you." But, he continues, when the Virginia Senate
reversed the House, "the zealots of Anarchy were backward to act ...
while the friends of Order were satisfied to let it [the Virginia Senate
amendment] remain for farther effects of reflection"; and later
succeeded in carrying it.
"The fever has raged, come to its crisis, and is abating." Proof of
this, argued Carrington, was the failure of the Republicans to get
signatures to "some seditious petitions [against the Jay Treaty] which
was sent in vast numbers from Philadelphia" and which "were at first
patronized with great zeal by many of our distinguished anarchists;
but ... very few copies will be sent to Congress fully signed."[407]
Never was appointive officer so oblivious of facts in his reports to his
superior, as was Carrington. Before adjournment on December 12, 1795,
the Legislature adopted part of the resolution which had been offered in
the morning: "No treaty containing any stipulation upon the subject of
powers vested in Congress by the eighth section of the first article [of
the Constitution] shall become the Supreme law of the land until it
shall have been approved in those particulars by a majority in the
House of Representatives; and that the President, before he shall
ratify _any_ treaty, shall submit the same to the House of
Representatives."[408]
Carrington ignored or failed to understand this amazing resolution of
the Legislature of Virginia; for nearly three months later he again
sought to solace Washington by encouraging reports. "The public mind in
Virginia was never more tranquil than at present. The fever of the late
session of our assembly, had not been communicated to the Country....
The people do not approve of the violent and petulant measures of the
Assembly, because, in several instances, public meetings have declared a
decided disapprobation." In fact, wrote Carrington, Virginia's
"hostility to the treaty has been exaggerated." Proof "of the mass of
the people being less violent than was asserted" would be discovered "in
the failure of our Zealots in getting their signatures to certain
printed papers, sent through the Country almost by Horse loads, as
copies of a petition to Congress on the subject of the Treaty."[409] But
a few short months would show how rose-colored were the spectacles which
Mr. Carrington wore when he wrote this reassuring letter.
The ratification of the British treaty; the rage against England; and
the devotion to France which already had made the Republican a French
party; the resentment of the tri-color Republic toward the American
Government--all forged a new and desperate menace. It was, indeed,
Scylla or Charybdis, as Washington had foreseen, and bluntly stated,
that confronted the National Government. War with France now seemed the
rock on which events were driving the hard-pressed Administration--war
for France or war from France.
The partisan and simple-minded Monroe had been recalled from his
diplomatic post at Paris. The French mission, which at the close of our
Revolution was not a place of serious moment,[410] now became
critically--vitally--important. Level must be the head and stout the
heart of him who should be sent to deal with that sensitive, proud, and
now violent country. Lee thus advises the President: "No person would be
better fitted than John Marshall to go to France for supplying the place
of our minister; but it is scarcely short of absolute certainty that he
would not accept any such office."[411]
But Washington's letter was already on the way, asking Marshall to
undertake this delicate task:--
"In confidence I inform you," wrote Washington to Marshall, "that it has
become indispensably necessary to recall our minister at Paris & to send
one in his place, who will explain faithfully the views of this
government & ascertain those of France.
"Nothing would be more pleasing to me than that you should be this
organ, if it were only for a temporary absence of a few months; but it
being feared that even this could not be made to comport with your
present pursuits, I have in order that as little delay as possible may
be incurred put the enclosed letter [to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney]
under cover to be forwarded to its address, if you decline the present
offer or to be returned to me if you accept it. Your own correct
knowledge of circumstances renders details unnecessary."[412]
Marshall at once declined this now high distinction and weighty service,
as he had already refused the United States district attorneyship and a
place in Washington's Cabinet. Without a moment's delay, he wrote the
President:--
"I will not attempt to express those sensations which your letter of the
8th instant has increased. Was it possible for me in the present crisis
of my affairs to leave the United States, such is my conviction of the
importance of that duty which you would confide to me, &, pardon me if I
add, of the fidelity with which I shoud attempt to perform it, that I
woud certainly forego any consideration not decisive with respect to my
future fortunes, & woud surmount that just diffidence I have entertain^d
of myself, to make one effort to convey truly & faithfully to the
government of France those sentiments which I have ever believed to be
entertained by that of the United States.
"I have forwarded your letter to Mr. Pinckney. The recall of our
minister at Paris has been conjectured while its probable necessity has
been regretted by those who love more than all others, our own country.
I will certainly do myself the honor of waiting on you at Mt.
Vernon."[413]
Washington, although anticipating Marshall's refusal of the French
mission, promptly answered: "I ... regret that present circumstances
should deprive our Country of the services, which, I am confident, your
going to France would have rendered it"; and Washington asks Marshall's
opinion on the proper person to appoint to the office of
Surveyor-General.[414]
The President's letter, offering the French post to Pinckney, was lost
in the mails; and the President wrote Marshall about it, because it also
enclosed a note "containing three bank bills for one hundred dollars
each for the sufferers by fire in Charlestown."[415] In answer, Marshall
indulged in a flash of humor, even at Washington's expense. "Your letter
to General Pinckney was delivered by myself to the post master on the
night on which I received it and was, as he says, immediately forwarded
by him. Its loss is the more remarkable, as it could not have been
opened from a hope that it contained bank notes." He also expressed his
gratification "that a gentleman of General Pinckney's character will
represent our government at the court of France."[416]
The office of Secretary of State now became vacant, under circumstances
apparently forbidding. The interception of Fauchet's[417] famous
dispatch number 10[418] had been fatal to Randolph. The French
Minister, in this communication to his Government, portrays a frightful
state of corrupt public thinking in America; ascribes this to the
measures of Washington's Administration; avows that a revolution is
imminent; declares that powerful men, "all having without doubt"
Randolph at their head, are balancing to decide on their party; asserts
that Randolph approached him with suggestions for money; and
concludes:--
"Thus with some thousands of dollars the [French] republic could have
decided on civil war or on peace [in America]! Thus the consciences of
the pretended patriots of America have already their prices!... What
will be the old age of this [American] government, if it is thus early
decrepid!"[419]
The discovery of this dispatch of the French Minister destroyed Randolph
politically. Washington immediately forced his resignation.[420]
The President had great difficulty in finding a suitable successor to
the deposed Secretary of State. He tendered the office to five men, all
of whom declined.[421] "What am I to do for a Secretary of State?" he
asks Hamilton; and after recounting his fruitless efforts to fill that
office the President adds that "Mr. Marshall, of Virginia, has declined
the office of Attorney General, and I am pretty certain, would accept
of no other."[422] It is thus made clear that Washington would have
made Marshall the head of his Cabinet in 1795 but for the certainty that
his Virginia champion would refuse the place, as he had declined other
posts of honor and power.
Hardly had the Virginia Legislature adjourned when the conflict over the
treaty was renewed in Congress. The Republicans had captured the House
of Representatives and were full of fight. They worked the mechanism of
public meetings and petitions to its utmost. On March 7 the House
plunged into a swirl of debate over the British treaty; time and again
it seemed as though the House would strangle the compact by withholding
appropriations to make it effective.[423] If the treaty was to be saved,
all possible pressure must be brought to bear on Congress. So the
Federalists took a leaf out of the book of Republican tactics, and got
up meetings wherever they could to petition Congress to grant the
necessary money.
In Virginia, as elsewhere, the merchants were the principal force in
arranging these meetings.[424] As we have seen, the business and
financial interests had from the first been the stanchest supporters of
Washington's Administration. "The commercial and monied people are
zealously attached to" and support the Government, wrote Wolcott in
1791.[425] And now Hamilton advised King that "men of business of all
descriptions" thought the defeat of the treaty "would greatly shock and
stagnate pecuniary plans and operations in general."[426] Indeed, the
one virtue of the treaty, aside from its greatest purpose, that of
avoiding war, was that it prevented the collapse of credit and the wreck
of Hamilton's financial system.
Washington, with the deceptive hopefulness of responsibility, had, even
when it seemed that the people were as one man against the treaty,
"doubted much whether the great body of the yeomanry have formed any
opinions on the subject."[427] The Federalist meetings were designed to
show that the "yeomanry," having been "educated," had at last made up
its mind in favor of Washington's policy.
Marshall and Carrington arranged for the Richmond gathering. "The
disorganizing machinations of a faction [Republicans]," reported the
busy United States Marshal, "are no longer left to be nourished and
inculcated on the minds of the credulous by clamorous demagogues, while
the great mass of citizens, viewing these, as evils at a distance,
remain inactive.... All who are attached to peace and order, ... will
now come forward and speak for themselves.... A meeting of the people of
this city will take place on Monday next" to petition the National House
of Representatives to support the treaty. So Carrington advised the
President; and the same thing, said he, was to be done "extensively" by
"public meetings and Petitions throughout Virginia."[428]
Washington was expecting great results from the Richmond demonstration.
"It would give me and ... every friend to order and good government
throughout the United States very great satisfaction," he wrote to
encourage the Virginia Federalists; "more so than similar sentiments
from any other State in the Union; for people living at a distance from
it [Virginia] know not how to believe it possible" that the Virginia
Legislature and her Senators and Representatives in Congress should
speak and act as they had done.[429] "It is," philosophized Washington,
"on _great_ occasions _only_ and after time has been given for cool and
deliberate reflection that the _real_ voice of the people can be known.
The present ... is one of those great occasions, than which none more
important has occurred, or probably may occur again to call forth their
decision."[430]
By such inspiration and management the historic Federalist gathering was
brought about at Richmond on April 25, 1796, where the "Marshall
eloquence" was to do its utmost to convert a riotously hostile sentiment
into approval of this famous treaty and of the Administration which was
responsible for it. All day the meeting lasted. Marshall put forth his
whole strength. At last a "decided majority" adopted a favorable
resolution drawn by an "original opponent" of the treaty. Thus were
sweetened the bitter resolutions adopted by these same freeholders of
Richmond some months before, which had so angered Washington.
The accounts of this all-day public discussion are as opposite as were
the prejudices and interests of the narrators. Justice Story tells us
that Marshall's speech was "masterly," the majority for the resolution
"flattering," and the assemblage itself made up of the "same citizens"
who formerly had "denounced" the treaty.[431] But there was present at
the meeting an onlooker who gives a different version. Randolph, who, in
disgrace, was then sweating venom from every pore, thus reports to
Madison at the end of the hard-fought day:--
"Between 3 & 400 persons were present; a large proportion of whom were
British merchants, some of whom pay for the British purchases of
horses--their clerks--officers, who have held posts under the President
at his will,--stockholders--expectants of office--and many without the
shadow of a freehold.[432] Notwithstanding this, the numbers on the
republican side, tho' inferior, were inferior in a small degree only;
and it is believed on good grounds that the majority of free-holders
were on the side of the house of representatives [against the treaty].
"Campbell[433] and Marshall the principal combatants [word illegible] as
you know without being told. Marshall's argument was inconsistent, and
shifting; concluding every third sentence with the horrors of war.
Campbell spoke elegantly and forcibly; and threw ridicule and absurdity
upon his antagonist with success. Mr. Clofton [Clopton, member of
Congress from Richmond] will receive two papers; one signed by the
treaty men, many of whom he will know to have neither interest nor
feeling in common with the citizens of Virginia, and to have been
transplanted hither from England or Caledonia since the war,
interspersed pretty considerably with fugitive tories who have returned
under the amnesty of peace.
"The notice, which I sent you the other day," he goes on to say, "spoke
of instructions and a petition; but Marshall, suspecting that he would
be outnumbered by freeholders, and conscious that none should instruct
those who elect, quitted the idea of instruction, and betook himself to
a petition, in which he said all the inhabitants of Richmond, though not
freeholders, might join. Upon which Campbell gave notice, that it would
be published that he (Marshall) declined hazarding the question on the
true sense of the country. Very few of the people [freeholders] of the
county were present; but three-fourths of those who were present voted
with Campbell. Dr. Foushee was extremely active and influential."[434]
Marshall, on the contrary, painted in rich colors his picture of this
town-hall contest. He thus reports to Hamilton: "I had been informed of
the temper of the House of Representatives and we [Richmond Federalists]
had promptly taken such measures as appeared to us fitted to the
occasion. We could not venture an expression of the public mind under
the violent prejudices with which it has been impressed, so long as a
hope remained, that the House of Representatives might ultimately
consult the interest or honor of the nation.... But now, when all hope
of this has vanished, it was deemed advisable to make the experiment,
however hazardous it might be.
"A meeting was called," continues Marshall, "which was more numerous
than I have ever seen at this place; and after a very ardent and zealous
discussion which consumed the day, a decided majority declared in favor
of a resolution that the wellfare and honor of the nation required us to
give full effect to the treaty negotiated with Britain. This resolution,
with a petition drawn by an original opponent of the treaty, will be
forwarded by the next post to Congress."[435]
The resolution which Marshall's speech caused an "original
opponent"[436] of the treaty to draw was "that the Peace, Happiness, &
Wellfare, not less than the National Honor of the United States, depend
in a great degree upon giving, with good faith, Full effect to the
Treaty lately negotiated with Great Britain." The same newspaper that
printed this resolution, in another account of the meeting "which was
held at the instance of some friends of the British Treaty," says that
"in opposition to that resolution a vast number of the meeting"
subscribed to counter-declarations which "are now circulated throughout
this City and the county of Henrico for the subscription of all those
who" are opposed to the treaty.[437] Even the exultant Carrington
reported "that the enemies of the Treaty or rather of the Government,
are putting in practice every part and effort to obtain subscriptions to
a counteracting paper."
Carrington denounced the unfavorable newspaper account as "a most
absolute falsehood." He tells Washington that the opposition resolution
"was not even listened [to] in the meeting." But still he is very
apprehensive--he beholds the politician's customary "crisis" and strives
to make the people see it: "There never was a crisis at which the
activity of the Friends of Government was more urgently called for--some
of us here have endeavored to make this impression in different parts of
the Country."[438] The newspaper reported that the Federalists had
induced "school boys & apprentices" to sign the petition in favor of the
treaty; Carrington adds a postscript stating that this was, "I believe,
a little incorrect."
Marshall foresaw that the Republicans would make this accusation and
hastened to anticipate it by advancing the same charge against his
opponents. The Republicans, says Marshall, secured the signatures to
their petition not only "of many respectable persons but of still a
greater number of mere boys.... Altho' some caution has been used by us
in excluding those who might not be considered as authorized to vote,"
yet, Marshall advises King, "they [Republicans] will not fail to charge
us with having collected a number of names belonging to foreigners and
to persons having no property in the place. The charge is as far
untrue," asserts Marshall, "as has perhaps ever happened on any occasion
of the sort. We could, by resorting to that measure, have doubled our
list of petitioners." And he adds that "the ruling party [Republican] of
Virginia are extremely irritated at the vote of to-day, and will spare
no exertion to obtain a majority in other counties. Even here they will
affect to have the greater number of freeholders."[439]
It was in this wise that petitions favorable to the Jay Treaty and to
Washington were procured in the President's own State. It was thus that
the remainder of the country was assured that the Administration was not
without support among the people of Virginia. Unsuspected and wholly
unforeseen was the influence on Marshall's future which his ardent
championship of this despised treaty was to exercise.
The Federalists were wise to follow the Republican practice of petition
to Congress; for, "nothing ... but the torrent of petitions and
remonstrances ... would have produced a division (fifty-one to
forty-eight) in favor of the appropriation."[440] So great was the joy
of the commercial classes that in Philadelphia, the financial heart of
the country, a holiday was celebrated when the House voted the
money.[441]
Marshall's activity, skill, courage, ability, and determination in the
Legislature and before the people at this critical hour lifted him
higher than ever, not only in the regard of Washington, but in the
opinion of the Federalist leaders throughout the country.[442] They were
casting about for a successor to Washington who could be most easily
elected. The Hamiltonian Federalists were already distrustful of Adams
for the presidency, and, even then, were warily searching for some other
candidate. Why not Patrick Henry? Great changes had occurred in the old
patriot's mind and manner of thinking. He was now a man of wealth and
had come to lean strongly toward the Government. His friendship for
Washington, Marshall, and other Virginia Federalists had grown; while
for Jefferson and other Virginia Republicans it had turned to dislike.
Still, with Henry's lifelong record, the Federalists could not be sure
of him.
To Marshall's cautious hands the Federalist leaders committed the
delicate business of sounding Henry. King of New York had written
Marshall on the subject. "Having never been in habits of correspondence
with Mr. H.[enry]," replies Marshall, "I cou'd not by letter ask from
him a decision on the proposition I was requested to make him without
giving him at the same time a full statement of the whole conversation &
of the persons with whom that conversation was held." Marshall did not
think this wise, for "I am not positively certain what course that
Gentleman might take. The proposition might not only have been rejected
but mentioned publickly to others in such manner as to have become an
unpleasant circumstance."
A prudent man was Marshall. He thought that Lee, who "corresponds
familiarly with Mr. H. & is in the habit of proposing offices to him,"
was the man to do the work; and he asked Lee "to sound Mr. H. as from
himself or in such manner as might in any event be perfectly safe." Lee
did so, but got no answer. However, writes Marshall, "Mr. H.[enry] will
be in Richmond on the 22^d of May. I can then sound him myself & if I
find him (as I suspect I shall) totally unwilling to engage in the
contest, I can stop where prudence may direct. I trust it will not then
be too late to bring forward to public view Mr. H. or any other
gentleman who may be thought of in his stead. Shou'd anything occur to
render it improper to have any communication with M^r. H. on this
subject, or shou'd you wish the communication to take any particular
shape you will be so obliging as to drop me a line concerning it."[443]
Marshall finally saw Henry and at once wrote the New York lieutenant of
Hamilton the result of the interview. "Mr. Henry has at length been
sounded on the subject you communicated to my charge," Marshall advises
King. "Gen^l. Lee and myself have each conversed with him on it, tho'
without informing him particularly of the persons who authorized the
communication. He is unwilling to embark in the business. His
unwillingness, I think, proceeds from an apprehension of the
difficulties to be encountered by those who shall fill high Executive
offices."[444]
The autumn of 1796 was at hand. Washington's second term was closing in
Republican cloudbursts and downpours of abuse of him. He was, said the
Republicans, an aristocrat, a "monocrat," a miser, an oppressor of the
many for the enrichment of the few. Nay, more! Washington was a thief,
even a murderer, charged the Republicans. His personal habits were low
and base, said these champions of purity.[445] Washington had not even
been true to the cause of the Revolution, they declared; and to prove
this, an ancient slander, supported by forged letters alleged to have
been written by Washington during the war, was revived.[446]
Marshall, outraged and insulted by these assaults on the great American,
the friend of his father and himself and the commander of the patriots
who had, by arms, won liberty and independence for the very men who
were now befouling Washington's name, earnestly defended the President.
Although his law practice and private business called for all his
strength and time, Marshall, in order to serve the President more
effectively, again stood for the Legislature, and again he was elected.
In the Virginia House of Delegates, Marshall and the other friends of
Washington took the initiative. On November 17, 1796, they carried a
motion for an address to the President, declaratory of Virginia's
"gratitude for the services of their most excellent fellow citizen"; who
"has so wisely and prosperously administrated the national
concerns."[447] But how should the address be worded? The Republicans
controlled the committee to which the resolution was referred. Two days
later that body reported a cold and formal collection of sentences as
Virginia's address to Washington upon his leaving, apparently forever,
the service of America. Even Lee, who headed the committee, could not
secure a declaration that Washington was or had been wise.
This stiff "address" to Washington, reported by the committee, left out
the word "wisdom." Commendation of Washington's conduct of the
Government was carefully omitted. Should his friends submit to this? No!
Better to be beaten in a manly contest. Marshall and the other
supporters of the President resolved to try for a warmer expression. On
December 10, they introduced a substitute declaring that, if Washington
had not declined, the people would have reëlected him; that his whole
life had been "strongly marked by wisdom, valor, and patriotism"; that
"posterity to the most remote generations and the friends of true and
genuine liberty and of the rights of man throughout the world, and in
all succeeding ages, will unite" in acclaiming "that you have never
ceased to deserve well of your country"; that Washington's "valor and
wisdom ... had essentially contributed to establish and maintain the
happiness and prosperity of the nation."[448]
But the Republicans would have none of it. After an acrid debate and in
spite of personal appeals made to the members of the House, the
substitute was defeated by a majority of three votes. John Marshall was
the busiest and most persistent of Washington's friends, and of course
voted for the substitute,[449] which, almost certainly, he drew. Cold as
was the original address which the Federalists had failed to amend, the
Republicans now made it still more frigid. They would not admit that
Washington deserved well of the whole country. They moved to strike out
the word "country" and in lieu thereof insert "native state."[450]
Many years afterward Marshall told Justice Story his recollection of
this bitter fight: "In the session of 1796 ... which," said Marshall,
"called forth all the strength and violence of party, some Federalist
moved a resolution expressing the high confidence of the House in the
virtue, patriotism, and wisdom of the President of the United States. A
motion was made to strike out the word _wisdom_. In the debate the whole
course of the Administration was reviewed, and the whole talent of each
party was brought into action. Will it be believed that the word was
retained by a very small majority? A very small majority in the
legislature of Virginia acknowledged the wisdom of General
Washington!"[451]
Dazed for a moment, the Federalists did not resist. But, their courage
quickly returning, they moved a brief amendment of twenty words
declaring that Washington's life had been "strongly marked by wisdom, in
the cabinet, by valor, in the field, and by the purest patriotism in
both." Futile effort! The Republicans would not yield. By a majority of
nine votes[452] they flatly declined to declare that Washington had been
wise in council, brave in battle, or patriotic in either; and the
original address, which, by these repeated refusals to endorse either
Washington's sagacity, patriotism, or even courage, had now been made a
dagger of ice, was sent to Washington as the final comment of his
native State upon his lifetime of unbearable suffering and incalculable
service to the Nation.
Arctic as was this sentiment of the Virginia Republicans for Washington,
it was tropical compared with the feeling of the Republican Party toward
the old hero as he retired from the Presidency. On Monday, March 5,
1797, the day after Washington's second term expired, the principal
Republican newspaper of America thus expressed the popular sentiment:--
"'Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, for mine eyes have
seen thy salvation,' was the pious ejaculation of a man who beheld a
flood of happiness rushing in upon mankind....
"If ever there was a time that would license the reiteration of the
exclamation, that time is now arrived, for the man [Washington] who is
the source of all the misfortunes of our country, is this day reduced to
a level with his fellow citizens, and is no longer possessed of power to
multiply evils upon the United States.
"If ever there was a period for rejoicing this is the moment--every
heart, in unison with the freedom and happiness of the people ought to
beat high with exultation, that the name of Washington from this day
ceases to give a currency to political iniquity, and to legalize
corruption....
"A new æra is now opening upon us, an æra which promises much to the
people; for public measures must now stand upon their own merits, and
nefarious projects can no longer be supported by a name.
"When a retrospect is taken of the Washingtonian administration for
eight years, it is a subject of the greatest astonishment, that a single
individual should have cankered the principles of republicanism in an
enlightened people, just emerged from the gulph of despotism, and should
have carried his designs against the public liberty so far as to have
put in jeopardy its very existence.
"Such however are the facts, and with these staring us in the face, this
day ought to be a JUBILEE in the United States."[453]
Such was Washington's greeting from a great body of his fellow citizens
when he resumed his private station among them after almost twenty years
of labor for them in both war and peace. Here rational imagination must
supply what record does not reveal. What must Marshall have thought? Was
this the fruit of such sacrifice for the people's welfare as no other
man in America and few in any land throughout all history had ever
made--this rebuke of Washington--Washington, who had been the soul as
well as the sword of the Revolution; Washington, who alone had saved the
land from anarchy; Washington, whose level sense, far-seeing vision, and
mighty character had so guided the newborn Government that the American
people had taken their place as a separate and independent Nation?
Could any but this question have been asked by Marshall?
He was not the only man to whom such reflections came. Patrick Henry
thus expressed his feelings: "I see with concern our old
commander-in-chief most abusively treated--nor are his long and great
services remembered.... If he, whose character as our leader during the
whole war, was above all praise, is so roughly handled in his old age,
what may be expected by men of the common standard of character?"[454]
And Jefferson! Had he not become the voice of the majority?
Great as he was, restrained as he had arduously schooled himself to be,
Washington personally resented the brutal assaults upon his character
with something of the fury of his unbridled youth: "I had no conception
that parties would or even could go to the length I have been witness
to; nor did I believe, until lately, that it was within the bounds of
probability--hardly within those of possibility--that ... every act of
my administration would be tortured and the grossest and most insidious
misrepresentations of them be made ... and that too in such exaggerated
and indecent terms as could scarcely be applied to a Nero--a notorious
defaulter--or even to a common pickpocket."[455]
Here, then, once more, we clearly trace the development of that
antipathy between Marshall and Jefferson, the seeds of which were sown
in those desolating years from 1776 to 1780, and in the not less trying
period from the close of the Revolution to the end of Washington's
Administration. Thus does circumstance mould opinion and career far more
than abstract thinking; and emotion quite as much as reason shape
systems of government. The personal feud between Marshall and Jefferson,
growing through the years and nourished by events, gave force and speed
to their progress along highways which, starting at the same point,
gradually diverged and finally ran in opposite directions.
FOOTNOTES:
[351] When Jefferson resigned, Randolph succeeded him as Secretary of
State, and continued in that office until driven out of public life by
the famous Fauchet disclosure. William Bradford of Pennsylvania
succeeded Randolph as Attorney-General.
[352] Washington to Marshall, Aug. 26, 1795; Washington MSS., Lib. Cong.
[353] Act of 1789, _Annals_, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix, 2238.
[354] For Randolph's pathetic account of his struggles to subsist as
Attorney-General, see Conway, chap. xv.
[355] The Fairfax purchase. See _infra_, chap. V.
[356] Marshall to Washington, Aug. 31, 1795; Washington MSS., Lib. Cong.
[357] See _infra_, chap. V.
[358] Executive Journal, U.S. Senate, i, 81, 82. And see Washington's
_Diary_: Lossing, 166. Carrington held both of these offices at the same
time.
[359] Referring to Marshall's title as General of Virginia Militia. He
was called "General" from that time until he became Chief Justice of the
United States.
[360] Washington to Carrington, Oct. 9, 1795; _Writings_: Ford, xiii,
116.
[361] Carrington to Washington, Oct. 2, 1795; MS., Lib. Cong.
[362] _Ib._
[363] Carrington to Washington, Oct. 8, 1795; MS., Lib. Cong.
[364] _Ib._, Oct. 13, 1795; MS., Lib. Cong.
[365] _Ib._ A passage in this letter clearly shows the Federalist
opinion of the young Republican Party and suggests the economic line
dividing it from the Federalists. "In the present crisis Mr. H.[enry]
may reasonably be calculated on as taking the side of Government, even
though he may retain his old prejudices against the Constitution. He has
indubitably an abhorrence of Anarchy.... We know too that he is
improving his fortune fast, which must additionally attach him to the
existing Government & order, the only Guarantees of property. Add to all
this, that he has no affection for the present leaders of the opposition
in Virg^a." (Carrington to Washington, Oct. 13, 1795; MS., Lib. Cong.)
[366] Carrington to Washington, Oct. 20, 1795; MS., Lib. Cong.
Carrington's correspondence shows that everything was done on Marshall's
judgment and that Marshall himself personally handled most of the
negotiations. (See _ib._, Oct. 28; Oct. 30, 1795.)
[367] _American Remembrancer_, i, 21 _et seq._ John Thompson was
nineteen years old when he delivered this address. His extravagant
rhetoric rather than his solid argument is quoted in the text as better
illustrating the public temper and prevailing style of oratory. (See
sketch of this remarkable young Virginian, _infra_, chap. X.)
[368] A favorite Republican charge was that the treaty would separate us
from France and tie us to Great Britain: "A treaty which children cannot
read without discovering that it tends to disunite us from our present
ally, and unite us to a government which we abhor, detest and despise."
("An Old Soldier of '76"; _American Remembrancer_, ii, 281.)
[369] _American Remembrancer_, i, 27.
[370] See _infra_, chap. V.
[371] Ames to Gore, March 11, 1796; _Works_: Ames, i, 189.
[372] _Annals_, 4th Cong., 1st Sess., 1033-34.
[373] _Ib._, 1063. See Anderson, 41-43. As one of the purchasers of the
Fairfax estate, Marshall had a personal interest in the Jay Treaty,
though it does not appear that this influenced him in his support of it.
[374] The voting was _viva voce_. See _infra_, chap. X.
[375] Undoubtedly this gentleman was one of the perturbed Federalist
managers.
[376] _North American Review_, xxvi, 22. While this story seems
improbable, no evidence has appeared which throws doubt upon it. At any
rate, it serves to illustrate Marshall's astonishing popularity.
[377] Carrington's reports to Washington were often absurd in their
optimistic inaccuracy. They are typical of those which faithful
office-holding politicians habitually make to the appointing power. For
instance, Carrington told Washington in 1791 that, after traveling all
over Virginia as United States Marshal and Collector of Internal
Revenue, he was sure the people were content with Assumption and the
whiskey tax (Washington's _Diary_: Lossing, footnote to 166), when, as a
matter of fact, the State was boiling with opposition to those very
measures.
[378] The mingling, in the Republican mind, of the Jay Treaty,
Neutrality, unfriendliness to France, and the Federalist Party is
illustrated in a toast at a dinner in Lexington, Virginia, to Senator
Brown, who had voted against the treaty: "The French Republic--May every
power or party who would attempt to throw any obstacle in the way of its
independence or happiness receive the reward due to corruption."
(_Richmond and Manchester Advertiser_, Oct. 15, 1795.)
[379] Carrington to Washington, Nov. 10, 1795; MS., Lib. Cong.
[380] _Ib._, Nov. 13, 1795; MS.; Lib. Cong.
[381] The resolution "was warmly agitated three whole days." (Randolph
to Jefferson, Nov. 22, 1795; _Works_: Ford, viii, footnote to 197.)
[382] Carrington to Washington, Nov. 20, 1795; MS., Lib. Cong.
[383] See debates; _Annals_, 4th Cong., 1st Sess., 423-1291; also see
Petersburg Resolutions; _American Remembrancer_, i, 102-07.
[384] Thompson's address, Aug. 1, 1795, at Petersburg; _ib._, 21 _et
seq._
[385] Carrington to Washington, Nov. 20, 1795; MS., Lib. Cong.
[386] Randolph to Jefferson, Nov. 22, 1795; _Works_: Ford, viii,
footnote to 197.
[387] Randolph to Jefferson, Nov. 22, 1795; _Works_: Ford, viii,
footnote to 197.
[388] _Ib._
[389] _Ib._ See Hamilton's dissertation on the treaty-making power in
numbers 36, 37, 38, of his "Camillus"; _Works_: Lodge, vi, 160-97.
[390] Marshall to Hamilton, April 25, 1796; _Works_: Hamilton, vi, 109.
[391] Randolph to Jefferson, Nov. 22, 1795; _Works_: Ford, viii, 198.
[392] Journal, H.D. (Nov. 20, 1795), 27-28.
[393] Journal, H.D. (Nov. 20, 1795), 28.
[394] Carrington to Washington, Nov. 20, 1795; MS., Lib. Cong.
[395] The italics are mine. "The word 'wisdom' in expressing the
confidence of the House in the P.[resident] was so artfully introduced
that if the fraudulent design had not been detected in time the vote of
the House, as to its effect upon the P. would have been entirely done
away.... A resolution so worded as to acquit the P. of all evil
intention, but at the same time silently censuring his error, was passed
by a majority of 33." (Letter of Jefferson's son-in-law, enclosed by
Jefferson to Madison; _Works_: Ford, viii, footnote to 198.)
[396] Journal, H.D. (Nov. 21, 1795), 29.
[397] _Ib._
[398] Journal, H.D. (Nov. 21, 1795), 29.
[399] Jefferson to Madison, Nov. 26, 1795; _Works_: Ford, viii, 197-98.
[400] Randall, ii, 36.
[401] Journal, H.D. (1795), 72.
[402] Journal, H.D. (1795), 50.
[403] _Ib._, 53.
[404] _Ib._, 79.
[405] _Ib._, 90.
[406] _Ib._, 91-92.
[407] Carrington to Washington, Dec. 6, 1795; MS., Lib. Cong.
[408] Journal, H.D. (Dec. 12, 1795), 91-92.
[409] Carrington to Washington, Feb. 24, 1796; MS., Lib. Cong.
[410] Dodd, 39.
[411] Lee to Washington, July 7, 1796; _Writings_: Sparks, xi, 487.
[412] Washington to Marshall, July 8, 1796; Washington MSS., Lib. Cong.
[413] Marshall to Washington, July 11, 1796; _ib._
[414] Washington to Marshall, July 15, 1796; Washington's Private Letter
Book; MS., Lib. Cong.
[415] Washington to Marshall, Oct. 10, 1796; _ib._
[416] Marshall to Washington, Oct. 12, 1796; Washington MSS., Lib. Cong.
[417] Genêt's successor as French Minister to the United States.
[418] _Interesting State Papers_, 48 _et seq._
[419] _Interesting State Papers_, 55.
[420] For able defense of Randolph see Conway, chap. xxiii; but
_contra_, see Gibbs, i, chap. ix.
[421] Patterson of New Jersey, Johnson of Maryland, C. C. Pinckney of
South Carolina, Patrick Henry of Virginia, and Rufus King of New York.
(Washington to Hamilton, Oct. 29, 1795; _Writings_: Ford, xiii, 129-30.)
King declined because of the abuse heaped upon public officers.
(Hamilton to Washington, Nov. 5, 1795; _ib._, footnote to 130.)
[422] Washington to Hamilton, Oct. 29, 1795; _Writings_: Ford, xiii,
131.
[423] For debate see _Annals_, 4th Cong., 1st Sess., 423-1291.
[424] Carrington to Washington, May 9, 1796; MS., Lib. Cong.
[425] Oliver Wolcott to his father, Feb. 12, 1791; Gibbs, i, 62.
[426] Hamilton to King, June 20, 1795; _Works_: Lodge, x, 103.
[427] Washington to Knox, Sept. 20, 1795; _Writings_: Ford, xiii,
105-06.
[428] Carrington to the President, April 22, 1796; _Writings_: Ford,
xiii, footnote to 185.
[429] Washington to Carrington, May 1, 1796; _ib._, 185.
[430] _Ib._, 186.
[431] Story, in Dillon, iii, 352.
[432] Senator Stephen Thompson Mason wrote privately to Tazewell that
the Fairfax purchasers and British merchants were the only friends of
the treaty in Virginia. (Anderson, 42.)
[433] Alexander Campbell. (See _infra_, chap. V.)
[434] Randolph to Madison, Richmond, April 25, 1796; Conway, 362. Only
freeholders could vote.
[435] Marshall to Hamilton, April 25, 1796; _Works_: Hamilton, vi, 109.
[436] Author unknown.
[437] _Richmond and Manchester Advertiser_, April 27, 1796.
[438] Carrington to the President, April 27, 1796; MS., Lib. Cong.
[439] Marshall to King, April 25, 1796; King, ii, 45-46.
[440] Washington to Thomas Pinckney, May 22, 1796; _Writings_: Ford,
xiii, 208.
[441] Robert Morris to James M. Marshall, May 1, 1796; Morris's Private
Letter Book; MS., Lib. Cong.
[442] Story, in Dillon, iii, 350.
[443] Marshall to King, April 19, 1796; Hamilton MSS., Lib. Cong.
Hamilton, it seems, had also asked Marshall to make overtures to Patrick
Henry for the Presidency. (King, ii, footnote to 46.) But no
correspondence between Hamilton and Marshall upon this subject has been
discovered. Marshall's correspondence about Henry was with King.
[444] Marshall to King, May 24, 1796; King, ii, 48.
[445] For an accurate description of the unparalleled abuse of
Washington, see McMaster, ii, 249-50, 289-91, 302-06.
[446] Marshall, ii, 391-92. Also see Washington to Pickering, March 3,
1797; _Writings_: Ford, xiii, 378-80; and to Gordon, Oct. 15; _ib._,
427.
[447] Journal, H.D. (1796), 46-47; MS. Archives, Va. St. Lib.
[448] Journal, H.D. (1796), 153; MS. Archives, Va. St. Lib.
[449]_ Ib._
[450] _Ib._ This amendment is historically important for another reason.
It is the first time that the Virginia Legislature refers to that
Commonwealth as a "State" in contra-distinction to the country. Although
the Journal shows that this important motion was passed, the manuscript
draft of the resolution signed by the presiding officer of both Houses
does not show the change. (MS. Archives, Va. St. Lib.)
[451] Story, in Dillon, iii, 355. Marshall's account was inaccurate, as
we have seen. His memory was confused as to the vote in the two contests
(_supra_), a very natural thing after the lapse of twenty years. In the
first contest the House of Delegates voted overwhelmingly against
including the word "wisdom" in the resolutions; and on the Senate
amendment restored it by a dangerously small majority. On the second
contest in 1796, when Marshall declares that Washington's friends won
"by a very small majority," they were actually defeated.
[452] Journal, H. D., 153-90.
[453] _Aurora_, Monday, March 5, 1797. This paper, expressing Republican
hatred of Washington, had long been assailing him. For instance, on
October 24, 1795, a correspondent, in the course of a scandalous attack
upon the President, said: "The consecrated ermine of Presidential
chastity seems too foul for time itself to bleach." (See Cobbett, i,
411; and _ib._, 444, where the _Aurora_ is represented as having said
that "Washington has the ostentation of an eastern bashaw.") From August
to September the _Aurora_ had accused Washington of peculation. (See
"Calm Observer" in _Aurora_, Oct. 23 to Nov. 5, 1795.)
[454] Henry to his daughter, Aug. 20, 1796; Henry, ii, 569-70. Henry was
now an enemy of Jefferson and his dislike was heartily reciprocated.
[455] Washington to Jefferson, July 6, 1796; _Writings_: Ford, xiii,
230-31. This letter is in answer to a letter from Jefferson denying
responsibility for the publication of a Cabinet paper in the _Aurora_.
(Jefferson to Washington, June 19, 1796; _Works_: Ford, viii, 245; and
see Marshall, ii, 390-91.) Even in Congress Washington did not escape.
In the debate over the last address of the National Legislature to the
President, Giles of Virginia declared that Washington had been "neither
wise nor firm." He did not think "so much of the President." He "wished
him to retire ... the government of the United States could go on very
well without him." (_Annals_, 4th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 14, 1796),
1614-18.) On the three roll-calls and passage of the address Giles voted
against Washington. (_Ib._, 1666-68.) So did Andrew Jackson, a new
member from Tennessee. (_Ib._)
The unpopularity of Washington's Administration led to the hostile
policy of Bache's paper, largely as a matter of business. This provident
editor became fiercely "Republican" because, as he explained to his
relative, Temple Franklin, in England, he "could not [otherwise]
maintain his family," and "he had determined to adopt a bold experiment
and to come out openly against the Administration. He thought the public
temper would bear it." (Marshall to Pickering, Feb. 28, 1811, relating
the statement of Temple Franklin to James M. Marshall while in England
in 1793.)