LEADING THE VIRGINIA FEDERALISTS
I think nothing better could be done than to make him [Marshall] a
judge. (Jefferson to Madison, June 29, 1792.)
To doubt the holiness of the French cause was the certain road to
odium and proscription. (Alexander Graydon.)
The trouble and perplexities have worn away my mind. (Washington.)
In Richmond, Marshall was growing ever stronger in his belief in
Nationalism. Hamilton's immortal plea for a vital interpretation of the
fundamental law of the Nation and his demonstration of the
constitutionality of extensive implied powers was a clear, compact
statement of what Marshall himself had been thinking. The time was
coming when he would announce it in language still more lucid,
expressive of a reasoning even more convincing. Upon Hamilton's
constitutional doctrine John Marshall was to place the seal of
finality.[195]
But Marshall did not delay until that great hour to declare his
Nationalist opinions. Not only did he fight for them in the House of
Delegates; but in his club at Farmicola's Tavern, on the street corners,
riding the circuit, he argued for the constitutionality and wisdom of
those measures of Washington's Administration which strengthened and
broadened the powers of the National Government.[196]
Although he spoke his mind, in and out of season, for a cause
increasingly unpopular, Marshall, as yet, lost little favor with the
people. At a time when political controversy severed friendship and
interrupted social relations,[197] his personality still held sway over
his associates regardless of their political convictions. Even Mason,
the ultra-radical foe of broad National powers, wrote, at this heated
juncture, that Marshall "is an intimate friend of mine."[198]
His winning frankness, easy manner, and warm-heartedness saved him from
that dislike which his bold views otherwise would have created.
"Independent principles, talents, and integrity are denounced [in
Virginia] as badges of aristocracy; but if you add to these good manners
and a decent appearance, his political death is decreed without the
benefit of a hearing," testifies Francis Corbin.[199]
"Independent principles, talents, and integrity" Marshall possessed in
fullest measure, as all admitted; but his manners were far from those
which men like the modish Corbin called "good," and his appearance would
not have passed muster under the critical eye of that fastidious and
disgruntled young Federalist. We shall soon hear Jefferson denouncing
Marshall's deportment as the artifice of a cunning and hypocritical
craft. As yet, however, Jefferson saw in Marshall only an extremely
popular young man who was fast becoming the most effective supporter in
Virginia of the National Government.
In the year of the Bank Act, Jefferson and Madison went on their
eventful "vacation," swinging up the Hudson and through New England.
During this journey Jefferson drew around Madison "the magic circle"
of his compelling charm and won entirely to the extreme Republican
cause[200] the invaluable aid of that superb intellect. In
agreement as to common warfare upon the Nationalist measures of the
Administration,[201] the two undoubtedly talked over the Virginia
Federalists.[202]
Marshall's repeated successes at the polls with a constituency hostile
to the young lawyer's views particularly impressed them. Might not
Marshall become a candidate for Congress? If elected, here would be a
skillful, dauntless, and captivating supporter of all Nationalist
measures in the House of Representatives. What should be done to avert
this misfortune?
Jefferson's dexterous intellect devised the idea of getting rid of
Marshall, politically, by depositing him on the innocuous heights of the
State bench. Better, far better, to make Marshall a Virginia judge than
to permit him to become a Virginia Representative in Congress. So, upon
his return, Jefferson wrote to Madison:--
"I learn that he [Hamilton] has expressed the strongest desire that
Marshall should come into Congress from Richmond, declaring that there
is no man in Virginia whom he wishes so much to see there; and I am told
that Marshall has expressed half a mind to come. Hence I conclude that
Hamilton has plyed him well with flattery & sollicitation and I think
nothing better could be done than to make him a judge."[203]
Hamilton's "plying" Marshall with "flattery & solicitation" occurred
only in Jefferson's teeming, but abnormally suspicious, mind. Marshall
was in Virginia all this time, as his Account Book proves, while
Hamilton was in New York, and no letters seem to have passed between
them.[204] But Jefferson's information that his fellow Secretary wished
the Nationalist Richmond attorney in Congress was probably correct.
Accounts of Marshall's striking ability and of his fearless zeal in
support of the Administration's measures had undoubtedly reached
Hamilton, perhaps through Washington himself; and so sturdy and capable
a Federalist in Congress from Virginia would have been of great
strategic value.
But Jefferson might have spared his pains to dispose of Marshall by
cloistering him on the State bench. Nothing could have induced the busy
lawyer to go to Congress at this period. It would have been fatal to his
law practice[205] which he had built up until it was the largest in
Richmond and upon the returns from which his increasing family depended
for support. Six years later, Washington himself labored with Marshall
for four days before he could persuade him to stand for the National
House, and Marshall then yielded to his adored leader only as a matter
of duty, at one of the Nation's most critical hours, when war was on the
horizon.[206]
The break-up of Washington's Cabinet was now approaching. Jefferson was
keeping pace with the Anti-Nationalist sentiment of the masses--drilling
his followers into a sternly ordered political force. "The discipline of
the [Republican] party," wrote Ames, "is as severe as the
Prussian."[207] Jefferson and Madison had secured an organ in the
"National Gazette,"[208] edited by Freneau, whom Jefferson employed as
translator in the State Department. Through this paper Jefferson
attacked Hamilton without mercy. The spirited Secretary of the Treasury
keenly resented the opposition of his Cabinet associate which was at
once covert and open.
In vain the President pathetically begged Jefferson for harmony and
peace.[209] Jefferson responded with a bitter attack on Hamilton. "I was
duped," said he, "by the Secretary of the Treasury and made a tool for
forwarding his schemes, not then sufficiently understood by me."[210] To
somewhat, but not much, better purpose did Washington ask Hamilton for
"mutual forbearances."[211] Hamilton replied with spirit, yet pledged
his honor that he would "not, directly or indirectly, say or do a thing
that shall endanger a feud."[212]
The immense speculation, which had unavoidably grown out of the
Assumption and Funding Acts, inflamed popular resentment against the
whole financial statesmanship of the Federalists.[213] More material,
this, for the hands of the artificer who was fashioning the Republican
Party into a capacious vessel into which the people might pour all their
discontent, all their fears, all their woes and all their hopes. And
Jefferson, with practical skill, used for that purpose whatever material
he could find.
Still more potter's earth was brought to Jefferson. The National Courts
were at work. Creditors were securing judgments for debts long due them.
In Virginia the debtors of British merchants, who for many years had
been rendered immune from payment, were brought to the bar of this
"alien" tribunal. Popular feeling ran high. A resolution was introduced
into the House of Delegates requesting the Virginia Senators and
Representatives in Congress to "adopt such measures as will tend, not
only to suspend all executions and the proceedings thereon, but prevent
any future judgments to be given by the Federal Courts in favor of
British creditors until" Great Britain surrendered the posts and runaway
negroes.[214] Thus was the practical overthrow of the National Judiciary
proposed.[215]
Nor was this all. A State had been haled before a National Court.[216]
The Republicans saw in this the monster "consolidation." The Virginia
Legislature passed a resolution instructing her Senators and
Representatives to "unite their utmost and earliest exertions" to secure
a constitutional amendment preventing a State from being sued "in any
court of the United States."[217] The hostility to the National Bank
took the form of a resolution against a director or stockholder of the
Bank of the United States being a Senator or Representative in
Congress.[218] But apparently this trod upon the toes of too many
ambitious Virginians, for the word "stockholders" was stricken out.[219]
The slander that the Treasury Department had misused the public funds
had been thoroughly answered;[220] but the Legislature of Virginia by a
majority of 111 out of a total vote of 124, applauded her Senators and
Representatives who had urged the inquiry.[221] Such was the developing
temper of Republicanism as revealed by the emotionless pages of the
public records; but these furnish scarcely a hint of the violence of
public opinion.
Jefferson was now becoming tigerish in his assaults on the measures of
the Administration. Many members of Congress had been holders of
certificates which Assumption and Funding had made valuable. Most but
not all of them had voted for every feature of Hamilton's financial
plan.[222] Three or four were directors of the Bank, but no dishonesty
existed.[223] Heavy speculation went on in Philadelphia.[224] This, said
Republicans, was the fruit which Hamilton's Nationalist financial scheme
gathered from the people's industry to feed to "monocrats."
"Here [Philadelphia]," wrote Jefferson, "_the unmonied farmer_ ... his
cattle & corps [_sic_] are no more thought of than if they did not feed
us. Script & stock are food & raiment here.... The credit & fate of the
nation seem to hang on the desperate throws & plunges of gambling
scoundrels."[225] But Jefferson comforted himself with the prophecy
that "this nefarious business" would finally "tumble its authors
headlong from their heights."[226]
The National law taxing whiskey particularly aroused the wrath of the
multitude. Here it was at last!--a direct tax laid upon the universal
drink of the people, as the razor-edged Pennsylvania resolutions
declared.[227] Here it was, just as the patriotic foes of the abominable
National Constitution had predicted when fighting the ratification of
that "oppressive" instrument. Here was the exciseman at every man's
door, just as Henry and Mason and Grayson had foretold--and few were the
doors in the back counties of the States behind which the owner's
private still was not simmering.[228] And why was this tribute exacted?
To provide funds required by the corrupt Assumption and Funding laws,
asserted the agitators.
Again it was the National Government that was to blame; in laying the
whiskey tax it had invaded the rights of the States, hotly declared the
Republicans. "All that powerful party," Marshall bears witness, "which
attached itself to the local [State] rather than to the general
[National] government ... considered ... a tax by Congress on any
domestic manufacture as the intrusion of a foreign power into their
particular concerns which excited serious apprehensions for state
importance and for liberty."[229] The tariff did not affect most people,
especially those in the back country, because they used few or no
imported articles; but the whiskey tax did reach them, directly and
personally.[230]
Should such a despotic law be obeyed? Never! It was oppressive! It was
wicked! Above all, it was "unconstitutional"! But what to do! The
agencies of the detested and detestable National Government were at
work! To arms, then! That was the only thing left to outraged freemen
about to be ravaged of their liberty![231] Thus came the physical
defiance of the law in Pennsylvania; Washington's third
proclamation[232] demanding obedience to the National statutes after his
earnest pleas[233] to the disaffected to observe the laws; the march of
the troops accompanied by Hamilton[234] against the insurgents; the
forcible suppression of this first armed assault on the laws of the
United States in which men had been killed, houses burned, mails
pillaged--all in the name of the Constitution,[235] which the
Republicans now claimed as their peculiar property.[236]
Foremost in the fight for the whiskey insurgents were the democratic
societies, which, as has been seen, were the offspring of the French
Jacobin Clubs. Washington finally became certain that these
organizations had inspired this uprising against National law and
authority. While the Whiskey Rebellion was economic in its origin, yet
it was sustained by the spirit which the French Revolution had kindled
in the popular heart. Indeed, when the troops sent to put down the
insurrection reached Harrisburg, they found the French flag flying over
the courthouse.[237]
Marshall's old comrade in the Revolution, close personal friend, and
business partner,[238] Henry Lee, was now Governor of Virginia. He stood
militantly with Washington and it was due to Lee's efforts that the
Virginia militia responded to help suppress the Whiskey Rebellion. He
was made Commander-in-Chief of all the forces that actually took the
field.[239] To Lee, therefore, Washington wrote with unrestrained pen.
"I consider," said the President, "this insurrection as the first
_formidable_ fruit of the Democratic Societies ... instituted by ...
_artful and designing_ members [of Congress] ... to sow the seeds of
jealousy and distrust among the people of the government.... I see,
under a display of popular and fascinating guises, the most diabolical
attempts to destroy ... the government."[240] He declared: "That they
have been the fomenters of the western disturbances admits of no
doubt."[241]
Never was that emphatic man more decided than now; he was sure, he said,
that, unless lawlessness were overcome, republican government was at an
end, "and nothing but anarchy and confusion is to be expected
hereafter."[242] If "the daring and factious spirit" is not crushed,
"adieu to all government in this country, except mob and club
government."[243]
Such were Washington's positive and settled opinions, and they were
adopted and maintained by Marshall, his faithful supporter.
And not only by argument and speech did Marshall uphold the measures of
Washington's Administration. In 1793 he had been commissioned as
Brigadier-General of Militia, and when the President's requisition came
for Virginia troops to enforce the National revenue law against those
who were violently resisting the execution of it, he was placed in
command of one of the detachments to be raised for that purpose.[244]
Although it is not established that his brigade was ordered to
Pennsylvania, the probabilities are that it was and that Marshall, in
command of it, was on the scene of the first armed opposition to the
National Government. And it is certain that Marshall was busy and
effective in the work of raising and properly equipping the troops for
duty. He suggested practical plans for expediting the muster and for
economizing the expenditure of the public money, and his judgment was
highly valued.[245]
All the ability, experience, and zeal at the disposal of the State were
necessary, for the whiskey tax was only less disliked in Virginia than
in Pennsylvania, and a portion of the Commonwealth was inclined to
assist rather than to suppress the insurrection.[246] Whether or not he
was one of the military force that, on the ground, overawed the whiskey
insurgents, it is positively established that Marshall was ready, in
person, to help put down with arms all forcible opposition to the
National laws and authority.
Jefferson, now the recognized commander-in-chief of the new party, was,
however, heartily with the popular outbreak. He had approved
Washington's first proclamations against the whiskey producers;[247]
but, nevertheless, as the anger of the people grew, it found Jefferson
responsive. "The excise law is an infernal one," he cried; the rebellion
against it, nothing more than "riotous" at the worst.[248]
And Jefferson wielded his verbal cat-o'-nine-tails on Washington's order
to put the rebellion down by armed forces.[249] It was all "for the
favorite purpose of strengthening government and increasing public
debt."[250] Washington thought the Whiskey Rebellion treasonable; and
Jefferson admitted that "there was ... a meeting to consult about a
separation" from the Union; but talking was not acting.[251] Thus the
very point was raised which Marshall enforced in the Burr trial twelve
years later, when Jefferson took exactly opposite grounds. But to take
the popular view now made for Republican solidarity and strength.
Criticism is ever more profitable politics than building.
All this had different effects on different public men. The Republican
Party was ever growing stronger, and under Jefferson's skillful
guidance, was fast becoming a seasoned political army. The sentiment of
the multitude against the National Government continued to rise. But
instead of weakening John Marshall's Nationalist principles, this
turbulent opposition strengthened and hardened them. So did other and
larger events of that period which tumultuously crowded fast upon one
another's heels. As we have seen, the horrors of the Reign of Terror in
Paris did not chill the frenzied enthusiasm of the masses of Americans
for France. "By a strange kind of reasoning," wrote Oliver Wolcott to
his brother, "some suppose the liberties of America depend on the right
of cutting throats in France."[252]
In the spring of 1793 France declared war against England. The popular
heart in America was hot for France, the popular voice loud against
England. The idea that the United States was an independent nation
standing aloof from foreign quarrels did not enter the minds of the
people. But it was Washington's one great conception. It was not to make
the American people the tool of any foreign government that he had drawn
his sword for their independence. It was to found a separate nation with
dignity and rights equal to those of any other nation; a nation friendly
to all, and allied with none[253]--this was the supreme purpose for
which he had fought, toiled, and suffered. And Washington believed that
only on this broad highway could the American people travel to ultimate
happiness and power.[254] He determined upon a policy of absolute
impartiality.
On the same day that the Minister of the new French Republic landed on
American shores, Washington proclaimed Neutrality.[255] This action,
which to-day all admit to have been wise and far-seeing statesmanship,
then caused an outburst of popular resentment against Neutrality and the
Administration that had dared to take this impartial stand. For the
first time Washington was openly abused by Americans.[256]
"A great majority of the American people deemed it criminal to remain
unconcerned spectators of a conflict between their ancient enemy [Great
Britain] and republican France," declares Marshall. The people, he
writes, thought Great Britain was waging war "with the sole purpose of
imposing a monarchical government on the French people. The few who did
not embrace these opinions, and they were certainly very few, were held
up as objects of public detestation; and were calumniated as the tools
of Britain and the satellites of despotism."[257]
The National Government was ungrateful, cried the popular voice; it was
aiding the tyrants of Europe against a people struggling for freedom; it
was cowardly, infamous, base. "Could any friend of his kind be neutral?"
was the question on the popular tongue; of course not! unless, indeed,
the miscreant who dared to be exclusively American was a monarchist at
heart. "To doubt the holiness of their [the French] cause was the
certain road to odium and proscription," testifies an observer.[258]
The Republican press, following Paine's theory, attacked "all
governments, including that of the United States, as naturally hostile
to the liberty of the people," asserts Marshall.[259] Few were the
friends of Neutrality outside of the trading and shipping
interests.[260]
Jefferson, although still in Washington's Cabinet, spoke of "the
pusillanimity of the proclamation"[261] and of "the sneaking neutrality"
it set up.[262] "In every effort made by the executive to maintain the
neutrality of the United States," writes Marshall, "that great party
[Republican] which denominated itself 'THE PEOPLE' could perceive only a
settled hostility to France and to liberty."[263]
And, of course, Washington's proclamation of Neutrality was
"unconstitutional," shouted the Republican politicians. Hamilton quickly
answered. The power to deal with foreign affairs was, he said, lodged
somewhere in the National Government. Where, then? Plainly not in the
Legislative or Judicial branches, but in the Executive Department, which
is "the _organ_ of intercourse between the nation and foreign nations"
and "the _interpreter_ of ... treaties in those cases in which the
judiciary is not competent--that is between government and
government.... The _executive power_ of the United States is completely
lodged in the President," with only those exceptions made by the
Constitution, as that of declaring war. But if it is the right of
Congress to declare war, "it is the duty of the Executive to preserve
peace till the declaration is made."[264]
Washington's refusal to take sides in the European war was still more
fuel for the Republican furnace. The bill to maintain Neutrality escaped
defeat in Congress by a dangerously narrow margin: on amendments and
motions in the Senate it was rescued time and again only by the deciding
vote of the Vice-President.[265] In the House, resolutions were
introduced which, in the perspective of history, were stupid. Public
speakers searched for expressions strong enough for the popular taste;
the newspapers blazed with denunciation. "The artillery of the press,"
declares Marshall, "was played with unceasing fury on" the supporters of
Neutrality; "and the democratic societies brought their whole force into
operation. Language will scarcely afford terms of greater outrage, than
were employed against those who sought to stem the torrent of public
opinion and to moderate the rage of the moment."[266]
At the most effective hour, politically, Jefferson resigned[267] from
the Cabinet, as he had declared, two years before, he intended to
do.[268] He had prepared well for popular leadership. His stinging
criticism of the Nationalist financial measures, his warm championship
of France, his bitter hostility to Great Britain, and most of all, his
advocacy of the popular view of the Constitution, secured him the favor
of the people. Had he remained Secretary of State, he would have found
himself in a hazardous political situation. But now, freed from
restraint, he could openly lead the Republican forces which so eagerly
awaited his formal command.[269]
As in the struggle for the Constitution, so now Neutrality was saved by
the combined efforts of the mercantile and financial interests who
dreaded the effect of the war on business and credit;[270] and by the
disinterested support of those who wished the United States to become a
nation, distinct from, unconnected with, and unsubservient to any other
government.
Among these latter was John Marshall, although he also held the view of
the commercial classes from which most of his best clients came; and his
personal loyalty to Washington strengthened his opinions. Hot as
Virginia was against the Administration, Marshall was equally hot in its
favor. Although he was the most prudent of men, and in Virginia silence
was the part of discretion for those who approved Washington's course,
Marshall would not be still. He made speeches in support of Washington's
stand, wrote pamphlets, and appealed in every possible way to the solid
reason and genuine Americanism of his neighbors. He had, of course, read
Hamilton's great defense of Neutrality; and he asserted that sound
National policy required Neutrality and that it was the duty of the
President to proclaim and enforce it. Over and over again, by tongue and
pen, he demonstrated the constitutional right of the Executive to
institute and maintain the Nation's attitude of aloofness from foreign
belligerents.[271]
Marshall rallied the friends of the Administration, not only in
Richmond, but elsewhere in Virginia. "The [Administration] party in
Richmond was soon set in motion," Monroe reported to Jefferson; "from
what I have understood here [I] have reason to believe they mean to
produce the most extensive effect they are capable of. M^r. Marshall
has written G. Jones[272] on the subject and the first appearances
threatened the most furious attack on the French Minister [Genêt]."[273]
At last Marshall's personal popularity could no longer save him from
open and public attack. The enraged Republicans assailed him in
pamphlets; he was criticized in the newspapers; his character was
impugned.[274] He was branded with what, in Virginia, was at that time
the ultimate reproach: Marshall, said the Republicans, was the friend
and follower of Alexander Hamilton, the monarchist, the financial
manipulator, the father of Assumption, the inventor of the rotten
Funding system, the designer of the stock-jobbing Bank of the United
States, and, worst of all, the champion of a powerful Nationalism and
the implacable foe of the sovereignty of the States.
Spiritedly Marshall made reply. He was, indeed, a disciple of
Washington's great Secretary of the Treasury, he said, and proud of it;
and he gloried in his fealty to Washington, for which also he had been
blamed. In short, Marshall was aggressively for the Administration and
all its measures. These were right, he said, and wise and necessary.
Above all, since that was the chief ground of attack, all of them, from
Assumption to Neutrality, were plainly constitutional. At a public
meeting at Richmond, Marshall offered resolutions which he had drawn up
in support of the Administration's foreign policy, spoke in their favor,
and carried the meeting for them by a heavy majority.[275]
Marshall's bold course cost him the proffer of an honor. Our strained
relations with the Spaniards required an alert, able, and cool-headed
representative to go to New Orleans. Jefferson[276] confided to Madison
the task of finding such a man in Virginia. "My imagination has hunted
thro' this whole state," Madison advised the Secretary of State in
reply, "without being able to find a single character fitted for the
mission to N. O. Young Marshall seems to possess some of the
qualifications, but there would be objections of several sorts to
him."[277] Three months later Madison revealed one of these "several
objections" to Marshall; but the principal one was his sturdy, fighting
Nationalism. This "objection" was so intense that anybody who was even a
close friend of Marshall was suspected and proscribed by the
Republicans. The Jacobin Clubs of Paris were scarcely more intolerant
than their disciples in America.
So irritated, indeed, were the Republican leaders by Marshall's
political efforts in support of Neutrality and other policies of the
Administration, that they began to hint at improper motives. With his
brother, brother-in-law, and General Henry Lee (then Governor of
Virginia) Marshall had purchased the Fairfax estate.[278] This was
evidence, said the Republicans, that he was the tool of the wicked
financial interests. Madison hastened to inform Jefferson.
"The circumstances which derogate from full confidence in W[ilson]
N[icholas]," cautioned Madison, "are ... his connection & intimacy with
Marshall, of whose _disinterestedness_ as well as understanding he has
the highest opinion. It is said that Marshall, who is at the head of the
great purchase from Fairfax, has lately obtained pecuniary aids from the
bank [of the United States] or people connected with it. I think it
certain that he must have felt, in the moment of purchase, an absolute
confidence in the monied interests which will explain him to everyone
that reflects in the active character he is assuming."[279]
In such fashion do the exigencies of politics generate suspicion and
false witness. Marshall received no money from the Bank for the Fairfax
purchase and it tied him to "the monied interests" in no way except
through business sympathy. He relied for help on his brother's
father-in-law, Robert Morris, who expected to raise the funds for the
Fairfax purchase from loans negotiated in Europe on the security of
Morris's immense real-estate holdings in America.[280] But even the once
poised, charitable, and unsuspicious Madison had now acquired that state
of mind which beholds in any business transaction, no matter how
innocent, something furtive and sinister. His letter proves, however,
that the fearless Richmond lawyer was making himself effectively felt as
a practical power for Washington's Administration, to the serious
discomfort of the Republican chieftains.
While Marshall was beloved by most of those who knew him and was
astonishingly popular with the masses, jealousy of his ability and
success had made remorseless enemies for him. It appears, indeed, that a
peculiarly malicious envy had pursued him almost from the time he had
gone to William and Mary College. His sister-in-law, with hot
resentment, emphasizes this feature of Marshall's career.
"Notwithstanding his amiable and correct conduct," writes Mrs.
Carrington, "there were those who would catch at the most trifling
circumstance to throw a shade over his fair fame." He had little
education, said his detractors; "his talents were greatly overrated";
his habits were bad. "Tho' no man living ever had more ardent friends,
yet there does not exist one who had at one time more slanderous
enemies."[281]
These now assailed Marshall with all their pent-up hatred. They stopped
at no charge, hesitated at no insinuation. For instance, his
conviviality was magnified into reports of excesses and the tale was
carried to the President. "It was cruelly insinuated to G[eorge]
W[ashington]," writes Marshall's sister-in-law, "by an after great
S[olo?]n that to Mr. M[arsha]lls fondness for play was added an
increasing fondness for liquor." Mrs. Carrington loyally defends
Marshall, testifying, from her personal knowledge, that "this S----n
knew better than most others how Mr. M----ll always played for amusement
and never, never for gain, and that he was, of all men, the most
temperate."[282]
Considering the custom of the time[283] and the habits of the foremost
men of that period,[284] Marshall's sister-in-law is entirely accurate.
Certainly this political slander did not impress Washington, for his
confidence in Marshall grew steadily; and, as we shall presently see, he
continued to tender Marshall high honors and confide to him political
tasks requiring delicate judgment.
Such petty falsehoods did not disturb Marshall's composure. But he
warmly resented the assault made upon him because of his friendship for
Hamilton; and his anger was hot against what he felt was the sheer
dishonesty of the attacks on the measures of the National Government. "I
wish very much to see you," writes Marshall to Archibald Stuart at this
time: "I want to observe [illegible] how much honest men you and I are
[illegible] half our acquaintance. Seriously there appears to me every
day to be more folly, envy, malice, and damn rascality in the world than
there was the day before and I do verily begin to think that plain
downright honesty and unintriguing integrity will be kicked out of
doors."[285]
A picturesque incident gave to the Virginia opponents of Washington's
Administration more substantial cause to hate Marshall than his
pamphlets, speeches, and resolutions had afforded. At Smithfield, not
far from Norfolk, the ship Unicorn was fitting out as a French
privateer. The people of Isle of Wight County were almost unanimous in
their sympathy with the project, and only seven or eight men could be
procured to assist the United States Marshal in seizing and holding the
vessel.[286] Twenty-five soldiers and three officers were sent from
Norfolk in a revenue cutter;[287] but the Governor, considering this
force insufficient to outface resistance and take the ship, dispatched
Marshall, with a considerable body of militia, to Smithfield.
Evidently the affair was believed to be serious; "the Particular
Orders ... to Brigadier General Marshall" placed under his command
forces of cavalry, infantry, and artillery from Richmond and another
body of troops from Petersburg. The Governor assures Marshall that "the
executive know that in your hands the dignity and rights of the
Commonwealth will ever be safe and they are also sure that prudence,
affection to our deluded fellow citizens, and marked obedience to law in
the means you will be compelled to adopt, will equally characterize
every step of your procedure." He is directed to "collect every
information respecting this daring violation of order," and particularly
"the conduct of the Lieutenant Colonel Commandant of Isle of Wight," who
had disregarded his instructions.[288]
Clad in the uniform of a brigadier-general of the Virginia Militia,[289]
Marshall set out for Smithfield riding at the head of the cavalry, the
light infantry and artillery following by boat.[290] He found all
thought of resistance abandoned upon his arrival. A "peaceable search"
of Captain Sinclair's house revealed thirteen cannon with ball,
grape-shot, and powder. Three more pieces of ordnance were stationed on
the shore. Before General Marshall and his cavalry arrived, the United
States Marshal had been insulted, and threatened with violence. Men had
been heard loading muskets in Sinclair's house, and fifteen of these
weapons, fully charged, were discovered. The house so "completely
commanded the Deck of the" Unicorn "that ... one hundred men placed in
the vessel could not have protected her ten minutes from fifteen placed
in the house."[291]
The State and Federal officers had previously been able to get little
aid of any kind, but "since the arrival of distant militia," reports
Marshall, "those of the County are as prompt as could be wished in
rendering any service required of them," and he suggests that the
commandant of the county, rather than the men, was responsible for the
failure to act earlier. He at once sent messengers to the infantry and
artillery detachment which had not yet arrived, with orders that they
return to Richmond and Petersburg.[292]
Marshall "had ... frequent conversations with individuals of the Isle of
Wight" and found them much distressed at the necessity for calling
distant militia "to protect from violence the laws of our common
country.... The commanding officers [of the county] ... seem not to have
become sufficiently impressed with the importance of maintaining the
Sovereignty of the law" says Marshall, but with unwarranted optimism he
believes "that a more proper mode of thinking is beginning to
prevail."[293]
Thus was the Smithfield defiance of Neutrality and the National laws
quelled by strong measures, taken before it had gathered dangerous
headway. "I am very much indebted to Brig.-Gen'l Marshall and Major
Taylor[294] for their exertions in the execution of my orders," writes
Governor Lee to the Secretary of War.[295]
But the efforts of the National Government and the action of Governor
Lee in Virginia to enforce obedience to National laws and observance of
Neutrality, while they succeeded locally in their immediate purpose, did
not modify the public temper toward the Administration. Neutrality, in
particular, grew in disfavor among the people. When the congressional
elections of 1794 came on, all complaints against the National
Government were vivified by that burning question. As if, said the
Republicans, there could be such a status as neutrality between "right
and wrong," between "liberty" and "tyranny."[296]
Thus, in the campaign, the Republicans made the French cause their own.
Everything that Washington's Administration had accomplished was wrong,
said the Republicans, but Neutrality was the work of the Evil One. The
same National power which had dared to issue this "edict" against
American support of French "liberty" had foisted on the people
Assumption, National Courts, and taxes on whiskey. This identical
Nationalist crew had, said the Republicans, by Funding and National
Banks, fostered, nay, created, stock-jobbing and speculation by which
the few "monocrats" were made rich, while the many remained poor. Thus
every Republican candidate for Congress became a knight of the flaming
sword, warring upon all evil, but especially and for the moment against
the dragon of Neutrality that the National Government had uncaged to
help the monarchs of Europe destroy free government in France.[297]
Chiefly on that question the Republicans won the National House of
Representatives.
But if Neutrality lit the flames of public wrath, Washington's next act
in foreign affairs was powder and oil cast upon fires already fiercely
burning. Great Britain, by her war measures against France, did not
spare America. She seized hundreds of American vessels trading with her
enemy and even with neutrals; in order to starve France[298] she lifted
cargoes from American bottoms; to man her warships she forcibly took
sailors from American ships, "often leaving scarcely hands enough to
navigate the vessel into port";[299] she conducted herself as if she
were not only mistress of the seas, but their sole proprietor. And the
British depredations were committed in a manner harsh, brutal, and
insulting.
Even Marshall was aroused and wrote to his friend Stuart: "We fear, not
without reason, a war. The man does not live who wishes for peace more
than I do; but the outrages committed upon us are beyond human bearing.
Farewell--pray Heaven we may weather the storm."[300] If the
self-contained and cautious Marshall felt a just resentment of British
outrage, we may, by that measure, accurately judge of the inflamed and
dangerous condition of the general sentiment.
Thus it came about that the deeply rooted hatred of the people for their
former master[301] was heated to the point of reckless defiance. This
was the same Monarchy, they truly said, that still kept the military and
trading posts on American soil which, more than a decade before, it had,
by the Treaty of Peace, solemnly promised to surrender.[302] The
Government that was committing these savage outrages was the same
faithless Power, declared the general voice, that had pledged
compensation for the slaves its armies had carried away, but not one
shilling of which had been paid.
If ever a country had good cause for war, Great Britain then furnished
it to America; and, had we been prepared, it is impossible to believe
that we should not have taken up arms to defend our ravaged interests
and vindicate our insulted honor. In Congress various methods of
justifiable retaliation were urged with intense earnestness, marred by
loud and extravagant declamation.[303] "The noise of debate was more
deafening than a mill.... We sleep upon our arms," wrote a member of the
National House.[304] But these bellicose measures were rejected because
any one of them would have meant immediate hostilities.
For we were not prepared. War was the one thing America could not then
afford. Our Government was still tottering on the unstable legs of
infancy. Orderly society was only beginning and the spirit of unrest and
upheaval was strong and active. In case of war, wrote Ames, expressing
the conservative fears, "I dread anarchy more than great guns."[305] Our
resources had been bled white by the Revolution and the desolating years
that followed. We had no real army, no adequate arsenals,[306] no
efficient ships of war; and the French Republic, surrounded by hostile
bayonets and guns and battling for very existence, could not send us
armies, fleets, munitions, and money as the French Monarchy had done.
Spain was on our south eager for more territory on the Mississippi, the
mouth of which she controlled; and ready to attack us in case we came
to blows with Great Britain. The latter Power was on our north, the
expelled Loyalists in Canada burning with that natural resentment[307]
which has never cooled; British soldiers held strategic posts within our
territory; hordes of Indians, controlled and their leaders paid by Great
Britain,[308] and hostile to the United States, were upon our borders
anxious to avenge themselves for the defeats we had inflicted on them
and their kinsmen in the savage wars incited by their British
employers.[309] Worst of all, British warships covered the oceans and
patrolled every mile of our shores just beyond American waters. Our
coast defenses, few, poor, and feeble in their best estate, had been
utterly neglected for more than ten years and every American port was at
the mercy of British guns.[310]
Evidence was not wanting that Great Britain courted war.[311] She had
been cold and unresponsive to every approach for a better understanding
with us. She had not even sent a Minister to our Government until eight
years after the Treaty of Peace had been signed.[312] She not only held
our posts, but established a new one fifty miles south of Detroit; and
her entire conduct indicated, and Washington believed, that she meant to
draw a new boundary line which would give her exclusive possession of
the Great Lakes.[313] She had the monopoly of the fur trade[314] and
plainly meant to keep it.
Lord Dorchester, supreme representative of the British Crown in Canada,
had made an ominous speech to the Indians predicting hostilities against
the United States within a year and declaring that a new boundary line
would then be drawn "by the warriors."[315] Rumors flew and gained
volume and color in their flight. Even the poised and steady Marshall
was disturbed.
"We have some letters from Philadelphia that wear a very ugly aspect,"
he writes Archibald Stuart. "It is said that Simcoe, the Governor of
Upper Canada, has entered the territory of the United States at the head
of about 500 men and has possessed himself of Presque Isle." But
Marshall cannot restrain his humor, notwithstanding the gravity of the
report: "As this is in Pennsylvania," he observes, "I hope the
democratic society of Philadelphia will at once demolish him and if they
should fail I still trust that some of our upper brothers [Virginia
Republicans] will at one stride place themselves by him and prostrate
his post. But seriously," continues Marshall, "if this be true we must
bid adieu to all hope of peace and prepare for serious war. My only hope
is that it is a mere speculating story."[316]
Powerless to obtain our rights by force or to prevent their violation by
being prepared to assert them with arms, Washington had no recourse but
to diplomacy. At all hazards and at any cost, war must be avoided for
the time being. It was one of Great Britain's critical mistakes that she
consented to treat instead of forcing a conflict with us; for had she
taken the latter course it is not improbable that, at the end of the
war, the southern boundary of British dominion in America would have
been the Ohio River, and it is not impossible that New York and New
England would have fallen into her hands. At the very least, there can
be little doubt that the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence would have
become exclusively British waters.[317]
Amid a confusion of counsels, Washington determined to try for a treaty
of amity, commerce, and navigation with Great Britain, a decision, the
outcome of which was to bring Marshall even more conspicuously into
politics than he ever had been before. Indeed, the result of the
President's policy, and Marshall's activity in support of it, was to
become one of the important stepping-stones in the latter's career.
Chief Justice Jay was selected for the infinitely delicate task of
negotiation. Even the news of such a plan was received with stinging
criticism. What! Kiss the hand that smote us! It was "a degrading insult
to the American people; a pusillanimous surrender of their honor; and an
insidious injury to France."[318] And our envoy to carry out this
shameful programme!--was it not that same Jay who once tried to barter
away the Mississippi?[319]
It was bad enough to turn our backs on France; but to treat with the
British Government was infamous. So spoke the voice of the people. The
democratic societies were especially virulent; "Let us unite with France
and stand or fall together"[320] was their heroic sentiment. But
abhorrence of the mission did not blind the Republicans to the
advantages of political craft. While the negotiations were in progress
they said that, after all, everything would be gained that America
desired, knowing that they could say afterward, as they did and with
just cause, that everything had been lost.[321]
At last Jay secured from Great Britain the famous treaty that bears his
name. It is perhaps the most humiliating compact into which America ever
entered. He was expected to secure the restriction of contraband--it was
enlarged; payment for the slaves--it was refused; recognition of the
principle that "free ships make free goods"--it was denied; equality
with France as to belligerent rights--it was not granted; opening of the
West Indian trade--it was conceded upon hard and unjust conditions;
payment for British spoliation of American commerce--it was promised at
some future time, but even then only on the award of a commission;
immediate surrender of the posts--their evacuation was agreed to, but
not until a year and a half after the treaty was signed.
On the other hand, the British secured from us free navigation and
trading rights on the Mississippi--never contemplated; agreement that
the United States would pay all debts due from American citizens to
British creditors--a claim never admitted hitherto; prohibition of any
future sequestration of British debts; freedom of all American ports to
British vessels, with a pledge to lay no further restrictions on British
commerce--never before proposed; liberty of Indians and British subjects
to pass our frontiers, trade on our soil, retain lands occupied without
becoming American citizens, but privileged to become such at
pleasure--an odious provision, which, formerly, had never occurred to
anybody.
Thus, by the Treaty of 1794, we yielded everything and gained little not
already ours. But we secured peace; we were saved from war. That
supreme end was worth the sacrifice and that, alone, justified it. It
more than demonstrated the wisdom of the Jay Treaty.
While the Senate was considering the bitter terms which Great Britain,
with unsheathed sword, had forced upon us, Senator Stephen T. Mason of
Virginia, in violation of the Senate rules, gave a copy of the treaty to
the press.[322] Instantly the whole land shook with a tornado of
passionate protest.[323] From one end of the country to the other,
public meetings were held. Boston led off.[324] Washington was smothered
with violent petitions that poured in upon him from every quarter
praying, demanding, that he withhold his assent.[325] As in the struggle
for the Constitution and in the violent attacks on Neutrality, so now
the strongest advocates of the Jay Treaty were the commercial
interests. "The common opinion among men of business of all descriptions
is," declares Hamilton, "that a disagreement would greatly shock and
stagnate pecuniary plans and operations in general."[326]
The printing presses belched pamphlets and lampoons, scurrilous,
inflammatory, even indecent. An example of these was a Boston screed.
This classic of vituperation, connecting the treaty with the financial
measures of Washington's Administration, represented the Federalist
leaders as servants of the Devil; Independence, after the death of his
first wife, Virtue, married a foul creature, Vice, and finally himself
expired in convulsions, leaving Speculation, Bribery, and Corruption as
the base offspring of his second marriage.[327]
Everywhere Jay was burned in effigy. Hamilton was stoned in New York
when he tried to speak to the mob; and with the blood pouring down his
face went, with the few who were willing to listen to him, to the safety
of a hall.[328] Even Washington's granite resolution was shaken. Only
once in our history have the American people so scourged a great public
servant.[329] He was no statesman, raged the Republicans; everybody knew
that he had been a failure as a soldier, they said; and now, having
trampled on the Constitution and betrayed America, let him be impeached,
screamed the infuriated opposition.[330] Seldom has any measure of our
Government awakened such convulsions of popular feeling as did the Jay
Treaty, which, surrendering our righteous and immediate demands, yet
saved our future. Marshall, watching it all, prepared to defend the
popularly abhorred compact; and thus he was to become its leading
defender in the South.
When, finally, Washington reluctantly approved its ratification by the
Senate,[331] many of his friends deserted him.[332] "The trouble and
perplexities ... have worn away my mind," wrote the abused and
distracted President.[333] Mercer County, Kentucky, denounced Senator
Humphrey Marshall for voting for ratification and demanded a
constitutional amendment empowering State Legislatures to recall
Senators at will.[334] The Legislature of Virginia actually passed a
resolution for an amendment of the National Constitution to make the
House of Representatives a part of the treaty-making power.[335] The
Lexington, Kentucky, resolutions branded the treaty as "shameful to the
American name."[336] It was reported that at a dinner in Virginia this
toast was drunk: "A speedy death to General Washington."[337] Orators
exhausted invective; poets wrote in the ink of gall.[338]
Jefferson, in harmony, of course, with the public temper, was against
the treaty. "So general a burst of dissatisfaction," he declared,
"never before appeared against any transaction.... The whole body of the
people ... have taken a greater interest in this transaction than they
were ever known to do in any other."[339] The Republican chieftain
carefully observed the effect of the popular commotion on his own and
the opposite party. "It has in my opinion completely demolished the
monarchical party here[340] [Virginia]." Jefferson thought the treaty
itself so bad that it nearly turned him against all treaties. "I am not
satisfied," said he, "we should not be better without treaties with any
nation. But I am satisfied we should be better without such as
this."[341]
The deadliest charge against the treaty was the now familiar one of
"unconstitutionality." Many urged that the President had no power to
begin negotiations without the assent of the Senate;[342] and all
opponents agreed that it flagrantly violated the Constitution in several
respects, especially in regulating trade, to do which was the exclusive
province of Congress.[343] Once more, avowed the Jeffersonians, it was
the National Government which had brought upon America this disgrace.
"Not one in a thousand would have resisted Great Britain ... in the
beginning of the Revolution" if the vile conduct of Washington had been
foreseen; and it was plain, at this late day, that "either the Federal
or State governments must fall"--so wrote Republican pamphleteers, so
spoke Republican orators.[344]
Again Hamilton brought into action the artillery of his astounding
intellect. In a series of public letters under the signature of
"Camillus," he vindicated every feature of the treaty, evading nothing,
conceding nothing. These papers were his last great constructive work.
In numbers three, six, thirty-seven, and thirty-eight of "Camillus," he
expounded the Constitution on the treaty-making power; demonstrated the
exclusive right of the President to negotiate, and, with the Senate, to
conclude, treaties; and proved, not only that the House should not be
consulted, but that it is bound by the Constitution itself to pass all
laws necessary to carry treaties into effect.[345]
Fearless, indeed, and void of political ambition were those who dared to
face the tempest. "The cry against the Treaty is like that against a
mad-dog," wrote Washington from Mount Vernon.[346] Particularly was this
true of Virginia, where it raged ungovernably.[347] A meeting of
Richmond citizens "have outdone all that has gone before them" in the
resolutions passed,[348] bitterly complained Washington. Virginians,
testified Jefferson, "were never more unanimous. 4. or 5. individuals of
Richmond, distinguished however, by their talents as by their devotion
to all the sacred acts of the government, & the town of Alexandria
constitute the whole support of that instrument [Jay Treaty] here."[349]
These four or five devoted ones, said Jefferson, were "Marshall,
Carrington, Harvey, Bushrod Washington, Doctor Stewart."[350] But, as we
are now to see, Marshall made up in boldness and ability what the
Virginia friends of the Administration lacked in numbers.
FOOTNOTES:
[195] Compare Hamilton's "Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the
Bank of the United States" with Marshall's opinion in McCulloch vs.
Maryland, The student of Marshall cannot devote too much attention to
Hamilton's great state papers, from the "First Report on the Public
Credit" to "Camillus." It is interesting that Hamilton produced all
these within five years, notwithstanding the fact that this was the
busiest and most crowded period of his life.
[196] Binney, in Dillon, iii, 301-02.
[197] La Rochefoucauld, iii, 73. For a man even "to be passive ... is a
satisfactory proof that he is on the wrong side." (Monroe to Jefferson,
July 17, 1792; Monroe's _Writings_: Hamilton, i, 238.)
[198] George Mason to John Mason, July 12, 1791; Rowland, ii, 338.
[199] Corbin to Hamilton, March 17, 1793; as quoted in Beard: _Econ. O.
J. D._, 226.
[200] "Patrick Henry once said 'that he could forgive anything else in
Mr. Jefferson, but his corrupting Mr. Madison.'" (Pickering to Marshall,
Dec. 26, 1828; Pickering MSS., Mass. Hist. Soc.) "His [Madison's]
placing himself under the pupilage of Mr. Jefferson and supporting his
public deceptions, are sufficient to put him out of my book." (Pickering
to Rose, March 22, 1808; _ib._)
[201] Madison's course was irreconcilable with his earlier Nationalist
stand. (See Beard: _Econ. O. J. D._, 77; and see especially the
remarkable and highly important letter of Hamilton to Carrington, May
26, 1792; _Works_: Lodge, ix, 513-35, on Madison's change, Jefferson's
conduct, and the politics of the time.) Carrington was now the
brother-in-law of Marshall and his most intimate friend. Their houses in
Richmond almost adjoined. (See _infra_, chap. V.)
[202] See brief but excellent account of this famous journey in Gay:
_Madison_ (American Statesmen Series), 184-85; and _contra_, Rives, iii,
191.
[203] Jefferson to Madison, June 29, 1792; _Works_: Ford, vii, 129-30.
[204] No letters have been discovered from Hamilton to Marshall or from
Marshall to Hamilton dated earlier than three years after Jefferson's
letter to Madison.
[205] "The length of the last session has done me irreparable injury in
my profession, as it has made an impression on the general opinion that
two occupations are incompatible." (Monroe to Jefferson, June 17, 1792;
Monroe's _Writings_: Hamilton, i, 230.)
[206] See _infra_, chap. X.
[207] Ames to Dwight, Jan., 1793; _Works_: Ames, i, 126-27.
[208] Rives, iii, 192-94; and see McMaster, ii, 52-53; also Hamilton to
Carrington, May 26, 1792; _Works_: Lodge, ix, 513-35.
[209] Washington to Jefferson, Aug. 23, 1792; _Writings_: Ford, xii,
174-75. This letter is almost tearful in its pleading.
[210] Jefferson to Washington, Sept. 9, 1792; _Works_: Ford, vii, 137
_et seq._ The quotation in the text refers to Jefferson's part in the
deal fixing the site of the Capital and passing the Assumption Act.
Compare with Jefferson's letters written at the time. (_Supra_, 64.) It
is impossible that Jefferson was not fully advised; the whole country
was aroused over Assumption, Congress debated it for weeks, it was the
one subject of interest and conversation at the seat of government, and
Jefferson himself so testifies in his correspondence.
[211] Washington to Hamilton, Aug. 26, 1792; _Writings_: Ford, xii,
177-78.
[212] Hamilton to Washington, Sept, 9, 1792; _Works_: Lodge, vii, 306.
[213] See Marshall, ii, 191-92.
[214] Journal, H.D. (Nov. 28, 1793), 101.
[215] _Ib._ The Legislature instructed Virginia's Senators and
Representatives to endeavor to secure measures to "suspend the operation
and completion" of the articles of the treaty of peace looking to the
payment of British debts until the posts and negroes should be given up.
(_Ib._, 124-25; also see Virginia Statutes at Large, New Series, i,
285.) Referring to this Ames wrote: "Thus, murder, at last, is out."
(Ames to Dwight, May 6, 1794; _Works_: Ames, i, 143-44.)
[216] Chisholm _vs._ Georgia, 2 Dallas, 419.
[217] Journal, H.D. (1793), 92-99; also see Virginia Statutes at Large,
New Series, i, 284. This was the origin of the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution. The Legislature "Resolved, That a State cannot, under the
Constitution of the United States, be made a defendant at the suit of
any individual or individuals, and that the decision of the Supreme
Federal Court, that a State may be placed in that situation, is
incompatible with, and dangerous to the sovereignty and independence of
the individual States, as the same tends to a general consolidation of
these confederated republics." Virginia Senators were "instructed" to
make "their utmost exertions" to secure an amendment to the Constitution
regarding suits against States. The Governor was directed to send the
Virginia resolution to all the other States. (Journal, H.D. (1793), 99.)
[218] _Ib._, 125.
[219] _Ib._; also Statutes at Large, _supra_, 284.
[220] See _Annals_, 2d Cong., 900-63.
[221] Journal, H.D. (1793), 56-57. Of Giles's methods in this attack on
Hamilton the elder Wolcott wrote that it was "such a piece of baseness
as would have disgraced the council of Pandemonium." (Wolcott to his
son, March 25, 1793; Gibbs, i, 91.)
[222] Beard: _Econ. O. J. D._, chap. vi.
[223] Professor Beard, after a careful treatment of this subject,
concludes that "The charge of mere corruption must fall to the ground."
(_Ib._, 195.)
[224] "To the northward of Baltimore everybody ... speculates, trades,
and jobs in the stocks. The judge, the advocate, the physician and the
minister of divine worship, are all, or almost all, more or less
interested in the sale of land, in the purchase of goods, in that of
bills of exchange, and in lending money at two or three per cent." (La
Rochefoucauld, iv, 474.) The French traveler was also impressed with the
display of riches in the Capital. "The profusion of luxury of
Philadelphia, on great days, at the tables of the wealthy, in their
equipages and the dresses of their wives and daughters, are ... extreme.
I have seen balls on the President's birthday where the splendor of the
rooms, and the variety and richness of the dresses did not suffer, in
comparison with Europe." The extravagance extended to working-men who,
on Sundays, spent money with amazing lavishness. Even negro servants had
balls; and negresses with wages of one dollar per week wore dresses
costing sixty dollars. (_Ib._, 107-09.)
[225] Jefferson to T. M. Randolph, March 16, 1792; _Works_: Ford, vi,
408.
[226] Jefferson to Short, May 18, 1792; _Works_: Ford, vi, 413; and see
"A Citizen" in the _National Gazette_, May 3, 1792, for a typical
Republican indictment of Funding and Assumption.
[227] Gallatin's _Writings_: Adams, i, 3.
[228] Pennsylvania alone had five thousand distilleries. (Beard: _Econ.
O. J. D._, 250.) Whiskey was used as a circulating medium. (McMaster,
ii, 29.) Every contemporary traveler tells of the numerous private
stills in Pennsylvania and the South. Practically all farmers,
especially in the back country, had their own apparatus for making
whiskey or brandy. (See chap. VII, vol. I, of this work.)
Nor was this industry confined to the lowly and the frontiersmen.
Washington had a large distillery. (Washington to William Augustine
Washington, Feb. 27, 1798; _Writings_: Ford, xiii, 444.)
New England's rum, on the other hand, was supplied by big distilleries;
and these could include the tax in the price charged the consumer. Thus
the people of Pennsylvania and the South felt the tax personally, while
New Englanders were unconscious of it. Otherwise there doubtless would
have been a New England "rum rebellion," as Shays's uprising and as New
England's implied threat in the Assumption fight would seem to prove.
(See Beard: _Econ. O. J. D._, 250-51.)
[229] Marshall, ii, 200.
[230] _Ib._, 238.
[231] Graydon, 372.
[232] Sept. 25, 1794; _Writings_: Ford, xii, 467.
[233] Sept. 15, 1792; Richardson, i, 124; Aug. 7, 1794; _Writings_:
Ford, xii, 445.
[234] Hamilton remained with the troops until the insurrection was
suppressed and order fully established. (See Hamilton's letters to
Washington, written from various points, during the expedition, from
Oct. 25 to Nov. 19, 1794; _Works_: Lodge, vi, 451-60.)
[235] Marshall, ii, 200, 235-38, 340-48; Gibbs, i, 144-55; and see
Hamilton's Report to the President, Aug. 5, 1794; _Works_: Lodge, vi,
358-88. But see Gallatin's _Writings_: Adams, i, 2-12; Beard: _Econ. O.
J. D._, 250-60. For extended account of the Whiskey Rebellion from the
point of view of the insurgents, see Findley: _History of the
Insurrection_, etc., and Breckenridge: _History of the Western
Insurrection_.
[236] The claim now made by the Republicans that they were the only
friends of the Constitution was a clever political turn. Also it is an
amusing incident of our history. The Federalists were the creators of
the Constitution; while the Republicans, generally speaking and with
exceptions, had been ardent foes of its adoption. (See Beard: _Econ. O.
J. D._)
[237] Graydon, 374. Jefferson's party was called Republican because of
its championship of the French Republic. (Ambler, 63.)
[238] In the Fairfax purchase. (See _infra_, chap. V.)
[239] See Hamilton's orders to General Lee; _Works_: Lodge, vi, 445-51;
and see Washington to Lee, Oct. 20, 1794; _Writings_: Ford, xii, 478-80.
[240] Washington to Lee, Aug. 26, 1794; _Writings_: Ford, xii, 454-56.
[241] Washington to Jay, Nov. 1, 1794; _ib._, 486.
[242] Washington to Thruston, Aug. 10, 1794; _ib._, 452.
[243] Washington to Morgan, Oct. 8, 1794; _ib._, 470. The Virginia
militia were under the Command of Major-General Daniel Morgan.
[244] General Order, June 30, 1794; _Cal. Va. St. Prs._, vii, 202.
[245] Carrington to Lieutenant-Governor Wood, Sept. 1, 1794; _ib._, 287.
[246] Major-General Daniel Morgan to the Governor of Virginia, Sept. 7,
1794; _ib._, 297.
[247] Jefferson to Washington, Sept. 18, 1792; _Works_: Ford, vii, 153.
[248] Jefferson to Madison, Dec. 28, 1794; _ib._, viii, 157.
[249] _Ib._
[250] Jefferson to Monroe, May 26, 1795; _ib._, 177.
[251] Jefferson to Madison, Dec. 28, 1794; _ib._, 157.
[252] Wolcott to Wolcott, Dec. 15, 1792; Gibbs, i, 85.
[253] Marshall, ii, 256; see Washington's "Farewell Address."
[254] John Adams claimed this as his particular idea. "Washington
learned it from me ... and practiced upon it." (Adams to Rush, July 7,
1805; _Old Family Letters_, 71.)
"I trust that we shall have too just a sense of our own interest to
originate any cause, that may involve us in it [the European war]."
(Washington to Humphreys, March 23, 1793; _Writings_: Ford, xii, 276.)
[255] Marshall, ii, 259; and see Rules of Neutrality, _ib._, note 13, p.
15. Washington's proclamation was drawn by Attorney-General Randolph.
(Conway, 202.)
[256] Marshall, ii, 259-60. "The publications in Freneau's and Bache's
papers are outrages on common decency." (Washington to Lee, July 21,
1793; _Writings_: Ford, xii, 310.)
[257] Marshall, ii, 256.
[258] Graydon, 382.
[259] Marshall, ii, 260. "A Freeman" in the _General Advertiser_ of
Philadelphia stated the most moderate opinion of those who opposed
Neutrality. "France," said he, "is not only warring against the
despotism of monarchy but the despotism of aristocracy and it would
appear rather uncommon to see men [Washington and those who agreed with
him] welcoming the Ambassador of republicanism who are warring [against]
their darling aristocracy. But ... shall the officers of our government
prescribe rules of conduct to freemen? Fellow citizens, view this
conduct [Neutrality] well and you will discover principles lurking at
bottom at variance with your liberty. Who is the superior of the people?
Are we already so degenerate as to acknowledge a superior in the United
States?" (_General Advertiser_, April 25, 1793.)
[260] "Our commercial and maritime people feel themselves deeply
interested to prevent every act that may put our peace at hazard."
(Cabot to King, Aug. 2, 1793; Lodge: _Cabot_, 74.)
The merchants and traders of Baltimore, "as participants in the general
prosperity resulting from peace, and the excellent laws and constitution
of the United States ... beg leave to express the high sense they
entertain of the provident wisdom and watchfulness over the concerns and
peace of a happy people which you have displayed in your late
proclamation declaring neutrality ... well convinced that the true
interests of America consist in a conduct, impartial, friendly, and
unoffending to all the belligerent powers." (Address of the Merchants
and Traders of Baltimore to George Washington, President of the United
States; _General Advertiser_, Philadelphia, June 5, 1793.)
[261] Jefferson to Madison, May 19, 1793; _Works_: Ford, vii, 336.
[262] Jefferson to Monroe, May 5, 1793; _ib._, 309.
[263] Marshall, ii, 273.
[264] Pacificus No. 1; _Works_: Lodge, iv, 432-44.
[265] Marshall, ii, 327.
[266] Marshall, ii, 322.
[267] Jefferson to Washington, Dec. 31, 1793; _Works_: Ford, viii, 136.
[268] Jefferson to Short, Jan. 28, 1792; _ib._, vi, 382.
[269] Marshall, ii, 233.
[270] Generally speaking, the same classes that secured the Constitution
supported all the measures of Washington's Administration. (See Beard:
_Econ. O. J. D._, 122-24.)
While the Republicans charged that Washington's Neutrality was inspired
by favoritism to Great Britain, as it was certainly championed by
trading and moneyed interests which dealt chiefly with British houses,
the Federalists made the counter-charge, with equal accuracy, that the
opponents of Neutrality were French partisans and encouraged by those
financially interested.
The younger Adams, who was in Europe during most of this period and who
carefully informed himself, writing from The Hague, declared that many
Americans, some of them very important men, were "debtors to British
merchants, creditors to the French government, and speculators in the
French revolutionary funds, all to an immense amount," and that other
Americans were heavily indebted in England. All these interests were
against Neutrality and in favor of war with Great Britain--those owing
British debts, because "war ... would serve as a sponge for their
debts," or at least postpone payment, and the creditors of the French
securities, because French success would insure payment. (J. Q. Adams to
his father, June 24, 1796; _Writings, J. Q. A._: Ford, i, 506.)
[271] Story, in Dillon, iii, 350.
[272] Gabriel Jones, the ablest lawyer in the Valley, and, of course, a
stanch Federalist.
[273] Monroe to Jefferson, Sept. 3, 1793; Monroe's _Writings_: Hamilton,
i, 274-75. Considering the intimate personal friendship existing between
Monroe and Marshall, the significance and importance of this letter
cannot be overestimated.
[274] It was at this point, undoubtedly, that the slander concerning
Marshall's habits was started. (See _infra_, 101-03.)
[275] The above paragraphs are based on Justice Story's account of
Marshall's activities at this period, supplemented by Madison and
Monroe's letters; by the well-known political history of that time; and
by the untrustworthy but not negligible testimony of tradition. While
difficult to reconstruct a situation from such fragments, the account
given in the text is believed to be substantially accurate.
[276] See _Works_: Ford, xii, footnote to 451.
[277] Madison to Jefferson, June 17, 1793; _Writings_: Hunt, vi, 134.
[278] See _infra_, chap. V.
[279] Madison to Jefferson, Sept. 2, 1793; _Writings_: Hunt, vi, 196.
[280] See _infra_, chap. V. Robert Morris secured in this way all the
money he was able to give his son-in-law for the Fairfax purchase.
[281] Mrs. Carrington to her sister Nancy; undated; MS.
[282] _Ib._
[283] See _supra_, vol. I, chap. VII.
[284] See, for instance, Jefferson to Short (Sept 6, 1790; _Works_:
Ford, vi, 146), describing a single order of wine for Washington and one
for himself; and see Chastellux's account of an evening with Jefferson:
"We were conversing one evening over a bowl of punch after Mrs.
Jefferson had retired. Our conversation turned on the poems of
Ossian.... The book was sent for and placed near the bowl, where by
their mutual aid the night far advanced imperceptibly upon us."
(Chastellux, 229.)
Marshall's Account Book does not show any purchases of wine at all
comparable with those of other contemporaries. In March, 1791, Marshall
enters, "wine £60"; August, ditto, "£14-5-8"; September, 1792, "Wine
£70"; in July, 1793, "Whisky 6.3.9" (pounds, shillings, and pence); in
May, 1794, "Rum and brandy 6-4"; August, 1794, ditto, five shillings,
sixpence; May, 1795, "Whisky £6.16"; Sept., "wine £3"; Oct., ditto,
"£17.6."
[285] Marshall to Stuart, March 27, 1794; MS., Va. Hist. Soc.
[286] Major George Keith Taylor to Brigadier-General Mathews, July 19,
1794; _Cal. Va. St. Prs._, vii, 223.
[287] Mathews to Taylor, July 20, 1794; _ib._, 224.
[288] Governor Henry Lee "Commander-in-chief," to Marshall, July 21,
1794; MS., "War 10," Archives, Va. St. Lib.
[289] "Dark blue coat, skirts lined with buff, capes, lapels and cuffs
buff, buttons yellow. Epaulets gold one on each shoulder, black cocked
hat, with black cockade, black stock, boots and side arms." (Division
Orders, July 4, 1794; _Cal. Va. St. Prs._, vii, 204. But see Schoepf
(ii, 43), where a uniform worn by one brigadier-general of Virginia
Militia is described as consisting of "a large white hat, a blue coat, a
brown waistcoat, and green breeches.")
[290] Particular Orders, _supra_.
[291] Marshall to Governor of Virginia, July 23, 1794; _Cal. Va. St.
Prs._, vii, 228; and same to same, July 28, 1794; _ib._, 234.
[292] _Ib._
[293] Marshall to Governor of Virginia, July 28, 1794; _Cal. Va. St.
Prs._, vii, 235.
[294] George Keith Taylor; see _infra_, chaps. X and XII.
[295] Lee to the Secretary of War, July 28, 1794; _Cal. Va. St. Prs._,
vii, 234.
[296] See, for instance, Thompson's speech, _infra_, chap. VI.
[297] Marshall, ii, 293.
[298] _Ib._, 285.
[299] _Ib._, 285.
[300] Marshall to Stuart, March 27, 1794; MS., Va. Hist. Soc.
[301] "The idea that Great Britain was the natural enemy of America had
become habitual" long before this time. (Marshall, ii, 154.)
[302] One reason for Great Britain's unlawful retention of these posts
was her purpose to maintain her monopoly of the fur trade. (_Ib._, 194.
And see Beard: _Econ. O. J. D._, 279.)
[303] Marshall, ii, 320-21; and see _Annals_, 3d Cong., 1st Sess., 1793,
274-90; also Anderson, 29; and see prior war-inviting resolves and
speeches in _Annals_, 3d Cong., _supra_, 21, 30, 544 _et seq._; also
Marshall, ii, 324 _et seq._
[304] Ames to Dwight, Dec. 12, 1794; _Works_: Ames, i, 154.
[305] Ames to Gore, March 26, 1794; _Works_: Ames, i, 140. And see
Marshall, ii, 324 _et seq._
[306] See Washington to Ball, Aug. 10, 1794; _Writings_: Ford, xii, 449.
[307] See Van Tyne, chap. xi.
[308] Marshall, ii, 286, 287.
[309] _Ib._
[310] John Quincy Adams, who was in London and who was intensely
irritated by British conduct, concluded that: "A war at present with
Great Britain must be total destruction to the commerce of our country;
for there is no maritime power on earth that can contend with the
existing naval British force." (J. Q. Adams to Sargent, The Hague, Oct.
12, 1795; _Writings, J. Q. A._: Ford, i, 419.)
[311] "I believe the intention is to draw the United States into it
[war] merely to make tools of them.... The conduct of the British
government is so well adapted to increasing our danger of war, that I
cannot but suppose they are secretly inclined to produce it." (J. Q.
Adams to his father, The Hague, Sept. 12, 1795; _ib._, 409.)
[312] Marshall, ii, 194.
[313] Marshall, ii, 337.
[314] _Ib._, 195; and see Beard: _Econ. O. J. D._, 279.
[315] See this speech in Rives, iii, footnote to 418-19. It is curious
that Marshall, in his _Life of Washington_, makes the error of asserting
that the account of Dorchester's speech was "not authentic." It is one
of the very few mistakes in Marshall's careful book. (Marshall, ii,
320.)
[316] Marshall to Stuart, May 28, 1794; MS., Va. Hist. Soc.
[317] It must not be forgotten that we were not so well prepared for war
in 1794 as the colonies had been in 1776, or as we were a few years
after Jay was sent on his mission. And on the traditional policy of
Great Britain when intending to make war on any country, see J. Q. Adams
to his father, June 24, 1796; _Writings, J. Q. A._: Ford, i, 499-500.
Also, see same to same, The Hague, June 9, 1796; _ib._, 493, predicting
dissolution of the Union in case of war with Great Britain. "I confess
it made me doubly desirous to quit a country where the malevolence that
is so common against America was exulting in triumph." (_Ib._)
"The truth is that the American _Government_ ... have not upon earth
more rancorous enemies, than the springs which move the machine of this
Country [England] ... Between Great Britain and the United States no
_cordiality_ can exist." (Same to same, London, Feb. 10, 1796; _ib._,
477; also, March 24, 1794; _ib._, 18, 183, 187.)
[318] Marshall, ii, 363.
[319] _American Remembrancer_, i, 9.
[320] Resolution of Wythe County (Va.) Democratic Society, quoted in
Anderson, 32.
[321] Ames to Dwight, Feb. 3, 1795; _Works_: Ames, i, 166.
[322] Marshall, ii, 362-64.
[323] _Ib._, 366.
[324] The Boston men, it appears, had not even read the treaty, as was
the case with other meetings which adopted resolutions of protest.
(Marshall, ii, 365 _et seq._) Thereupon the Boston satirists lampooned
the hasty denunciators of the treaty as follows:--
"I've never read it, but I say 'tis bad.
If it goes down, I'll bet my ears and eyes,
It will the people all unpopularize;
Boobies may hear it read ere they decide,
I move it quickly be unratified."
On Dr. Jarvis's speech at Faneuil Hall against the Jay Treaty; Loring:
_Hundred Boston Orators_, 232. The Republicans were equally sarcastic:
"I say the treaty is a good one ... for I do not think about it.... What
did we choose the Senate for ... but to think for us.... Let the people
remember that it is their sacred right to submit and obey; and that all
those who would persuade them that they have a right to think and speak
on the sublime, mysterious, and to them incomprehensible affairs of
government are factious Democrats and outrageous Jacobins." (Essay on
Jacobinical Thinkers: _American Remembrancer_, i, 141.)
[325] See Marshall's vivid description of the popular reception of the
treaty; Marshall, ii, 365-66.
[326] Hamilton to King, June 20, 1795; _Works_: Lodge, x, 103.
[327] "An Emetic for Aristocrats.... Also a History of the Life and
Death of Independence; Boston, 1795." Copies of such attacks were
scattered broadcast--"Emissaries flew through the country spreading
alarm and discontent." (Camillus, no. 1; _Works_: Lodge, v, 189-99.)
[328] McMaster, ii, 213-20; Gibbs, i, 207; and Hildreth, iv, 548.
[329] Present-day detraction of our public men is gentle reproof
contrasted with the savagery with which Washington was, thenceforth,
assailed.
[330] Marshall, ii, 370. Of the innumerable accounts of the abuse of
Washington, Weld may be cited as the most moderate. After testifying to
Washington's unpopularity this acute traveler says: "It is the spirit of
dissatisfaction which forms a leading trait in the character of the
Americans as a people, which produces this malevolence [against
Washington]; if their public affairs were regulated by a person sent
from heaven, I firmly believe his acts, instead of meeting with
universal approbation, would by many be considered as deceitful and
flagitious." (Weld, i, 108-09.)
[331] Washington almost determined to withhold ratification. (Marshall,
ii, 362.) The treaty was signed November 19, 1794; received by the
President, March 7, 1795; submitted to the Senate June 8, 1795; ratified
by the Senate June 24; and signed by Washington August 12, 1795. (_Ib._,
360, 361, 368.)
[332] "Washington now defies the whole Sovereign that made him what he
is----and can unmake him again. Better his hand had been cut off when
his glory was at its height before he blasted all his Laurels!" (Dr.
Nathaniel Ames's Diary, Aug. 14, 1795; _Dedham (Mass.) Historical
Register_, vii, 33.) Of Washington's reply to the address of the
merchants and traders of Philadelphia "An Old Soldier of '76," wrote:
"Has adulation ... so bewildered his senses, that relinquishing even
common decency, he tells 408 merchants and traders of Philadelphia that
they are more immediately concerned than any other class of his fellow
citizens?" (_American Remembrancer_, ii, 280-81.)
[333] Washington to Jay, May 8, 1796; _Writings_: Ford, xiii, 189.
[334] _American Remembrancer_, ii, 265.
[335] Journal, H.D. (1795), 54-55; and see Anderson, 43.
[336] _American Remembrancer_, ii, 269.
[337] Ames to Gore, Jan. 10, 1795; _Works_: Ames, i, 161.
[338]
"This treaty in one page confines,
The sad result of base designs;
The wretched purchase here behold
Of Traitors--who their country sold.
Here, in their proper shape and mien,
Fraud, perjury, and guilt are seen."
(Freneau, iii, 133.)
[339] Jefferson to Monroe, Sept. 6, 1795; _Works_: Ford, viii, 187-88.
[340] _Ib._
[341] Jefferson to Tazewell, Sept. 13, 1795; _Works_: Ford, viii, 191.
The Jay Treaty and Neutrality must be considered together, if the temper
of the times is to be understood. "If our neutrality be still preserved,
it will be due to the President alone," writes the younger Adams from
Europe. "Nothing but his weight of character and reputation, combined
with his firmness and political intrepidity could have stood against the
torrent that is still tumbling with a fury that resounds even across the
Atlantic.... If his system of administration now prevails, ten years
more will place the United States among the most powerful and opulent
nations on earth.... Now, when a powerful party at home and a mighty
influence from abroad, are joining all their forces to assail his
reputation, and his character I think it my duty as an American to avow
my sentiments." (J. Q. Adams to Bourne, Dec. 24, 1795; _Writings, J. Q.
A._: Ford, i, 467.)
[342] Charles Pinckney's Speech; _American Remembrancer_, i, 7.
[343] Marshall, ii, 378. The Republicans insisted that the assent of the
House of Representatives is necessary to the ratification of any treaty
that affects commerce, requires appropriation of money, or where any act
of Congress whatever may be necessary to carry a treaty into effect.
(_Ib._; and see Livingston's resolutions and debate; _Annals_, 4th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1795, 426; 628.)
[344] "Priestly's Emigration," printed in Cobbett, i, 196, quoting
"Agricola."
[345] "Camillus"; _Works_: Lodge, v and vi. It is impossible to give a
satisfactory condensation of these monumental papers. Struck off in
haste and under greatest pressure, they equal if not surpass Hamilton's
"First Report on the Public Credit," his "Opinion as to the
Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States," or his "Report on
Manufactures." As an intellectual performance, the "Letters of Camillus"
come near being Hamilton's masterpiece.
[346] Washington to Hamilton, July 29, 1795; _Writings_: Ford, xiii, 76.
[347] The whole country was against the treaty on general grounds; but
Virginia was especially hostile because of the sore question of runaway
slaves and the British debts.
[348] Washington to Randolph, Aug. 4, 1795; _Writings_: Ford, xiii,
footnote to 86. See Resolutions, which were comparatively mild;
_American Remembrancer_, i, 133-34; and see _Richmond and Manchester
Advertiser_, of July 30, and Aug. 6, 1795.
[349] Jefferson to Coxe, Sept. 10, 1795; _Works_: Ford, vii, 29.
[350] Jefferson to Monroe, Sept. 6, 1795; _ib._, 27.