THE BELGIAN ARMY AND ITS WORK
Independently of delay, there was yet another reason for the defence
of the forts at Liége which compelled the enemy to break them up.
Their destruction meant that Liége _as a fortress_ had ceased for the
time to exist. For Belgium this was a heavy sacrifice. Its possible
bearing, however, in the later stages of the war on a German defence of
the Lower Rhine is manifest. As time goes by the trend of events makes
it clear that the strategy of the Allied Powers was from the outset
inspired by long views.
In consonance with those views the plan of the Belgian campaign was
consistently carried out. From the first it was never part of that plan
that the German inroad should be opposed in Belgium, where, close upon
its base, its strength would have been greatest, and that of the Allies
least. The purpose was to draw the German forces as far from their base
and to lengthen out their line of communications as much as possible,
and then, when they were at their weakest, and the Allies, in point of
position, at their strongest, to face and defeat them.
But manifestly that purpose had by every device to be concealed. It
was concealed. On the face of things all appearances lent colour to
the conclusion that the Belgian army meant to stand or to fall in an
endeavour to cover Brussels. There were announcements of the arrival
of strong French forces. In view of the sufferings entailed by the
invasion the French were indeed ready to send forward five army corps.
Those added to the six divisions of the Belgian army would have offered
a powerful opposition. But it would have been inferior strategy. In the
event of defeat, which has always to be reckoned with, the effective
and designed part of the Belgian army in the campaign must have been
seriously crippled. The situation of the country would have been
worsened.
Remembering that the object of the Belgians was to safeguard their
independence, there was wisdom in the view, which weighed against
present sufferings the vision of a long and peaceful future, and
elected to act in co-operation with the larger scheme. It helps
to appreciate the depth of the love of freedom and the steadfast
fortitude which have justly won the admiration of liberal Europe.
Taking up his headquarters in Louvain, King Albert disposed his forces
along a line from Diest to Wavre. Between Wavre and Namur, with
headquarters at Gembloux, the country was watched by a division of
French cavalry. This line, it will be noted, describes an arc some 45
miles in extent, covering both Brussels and Antwerp. At this stage of
the hostilities the necessity was for a strong force of cavalry. That
of the Belgian army was in numbers inadequate. The French reinforcement
was consequently of the greatest value.
It has commonly been supposed that the Belgian army was somewhat
indifferent alike in discipline and in material. Such was the view then
entertained at Berlin. Apparently it was not there realised that the
time had long gone by when the Belgian as a soldier could justly be
described as a bad copy of the Frenchman. Certainly the Belgian army
was not trained upon the Prussian model. That, however, has proved to
be all to its advantage.
Military efficiency is a relative term, but in every essential the
Belgians were a highly efficient force. One of the best features of
their system is that every regiment has its military school, where
the men learn the elements of soldiering as an intelligent art. The
essence of the Prussian system has been that the rank and file are
taught to obey as machines. The Belgian recruit, on the other hand, had
his interest enlisted in his work. He was taught the reason for things.
In Germany, the conscript spent much of his time learning to march in
exact line at the parade step, every man with his rifle at the same
angle. Even the length of the parade step was measured to an inch. Woe
betide the _bursch_ who fell short, or shouldered his rifle out of the
correct slope. Points lost by officers at the inspection were passed
on with interest. There is a value in this instruction, but in the
Prussian system it was put before other things more valuable still.
The difference in essence between the Belgian army and the German lay
in the fact that the Belgian recruit was not politically suspect of his
superiors. He was a freeman serving his country, not an inferior in
training to support a dominant caste. He could without danger be made
something more than mechanically efficient.
Again his military education in actual field work was distinctly
practical. Belgium is a densely populated country, full of buildings,
hedgerows, and plantations affording excellent cover. Its army anyhow
would be called upon to face forces greatly superior in numbers.
The practical work kept those points in view. It was addressed to
successful ambuscades; to fighting in open order; to rapid changes of
position akin to guerilla tactics; to the defence of trenches, canals,
and bridges. The Belgian soldier was asked to be resourceful and alert.
If on manœuvres the army made none of the imposing show associated with
mimic warfare in Germany, for the purposes it was designed to serve
it was excellent. There could be no comparison, perhaps, between the
parade smartness of a German and a Belgian regiment of infantry, but in
essentials and for fighting on his own ground the Belgian was an easy
first.
No better evidence of the business-like training of the Belgian army
need be offered than its making use of the admirable roads of the
country by organising those corps of cyclist scouts whose co-operation
with the cavalry proved invaluable.
These, then, were the forces the King had at his disposal. As to the
artillery its only fault was that there was not enough of it. It
was strong, however, in light field guns capable of being briskly
manœuvred, and forming a very serviceable and handy weapon of a recent
type.
Hardly an expert is needed to reflect that with an army such as this
the very last thing a capable general would do would be to offer a
pitched battle against the ponderous legions of Germany, supported by
an overwhelming mass of heavy guns. To do that would be asking for
annihilation. The object of the Belgians was to harass, and wear down,
and entrap.
It was a warfare in which instances of individual bravery and prowess
and swift initiative established the value of the Belgian military
training, and indicated that the Germans had no easier work before them
than had Alva’s Spaniards.
The country south of the Meuse the Belgians advisedly made no effort
to defend. It is a country of deep valleys with rugged and precipitous
sides; of ravines and streams falling between steep and rocky banks.
The main mass of the Ardennes runs nearly south to north from Arlon
to Namur. For the most part the hills are covered with dense forests
alternating with marshy and wild plateaux and stretches of pastoral
uplands. Little subsistence could be found by an invader in such a
region.
Into Belgian Luxemburg the Germans poured the army of Saxons commanded
by General von Hausen and the army commanded by Duke Albert of
Wurtemburg. The former fixed his headquarters at Marche, and the
latter at Neufchatel. At the same time the army of the Crown Prince of
Prussia established an advanced base in the city of Luxemburg.
The first purpose of these movements was to seize the railways--the
line from Verviers to Luxemburg, the line from Liége to Jemelle, and in
particular the main line from Namur through Arlon.
In possession of the line from Verviers the invaders at Luxemburg were
linked up with Aix, but until they were in command of Liége and the
junctions there the rest of the railways were of no value to them.
They were obliged to transport supplies at great labour and expense
over roads with heavy gradients. A further forward movement across
the French frontier was in such circumstances impossible. The defence
of Liége consequently held up the advance both north and south of the
Meuse, and imposed a huge and to all intents useless consumption of
resources. It also caused a severe congestion at Aix, where no fewer
than eight army corps were at that time massing for the advance north
of the Meuse across the Belgian plain.
Meanwhile north of the Meuse the Belgians were not idle. They destroyed
bridges, and tore up roads. The railway bridges over the Geer at
Warenne and Tongres were blown up; the railway junction at Landen
rendered useless. All the rolling stock was moved to behind their lines.
Partly to check these defensive measures, partly also to commandeer
much needed supplies as well as to gather information of the Belgian
dispositions and incidentally to overawe the population, the Germans
covered the country immediately to the north-east of Liége with
numerous parties of uhlans. These raiders speedily came into contact
with Belgian cavalry and scouts supported by light artillery and mobile
bodies of infantry expert as skirmishers.
The tactics adopted by the Belgians were skilful. Before a hostile
squadron or flying column they fell back, until what the Germans
thought to be a successful pursuit had been pushed far enough. Then
when the enemy turned to retreat he realised that he had been led into
a _cul-de-sac_, and was attacked in turn from both flanks and from
the rear. From every bit of cover along roads and from plantations
the retreating forces were shelled and sniped at. Their losses in
these running fights were in the aggregate gruelling. Frequently a
last remnant put up a desperate resistance to extermination from the
nearest barn or other building into which they could fling themselves
for refuge.
This unlooked-for experience was put down to the bitter hostility of
the population whom the Belgian Government were assumed to have armed
for the purposes of a guerilla warfare _à outrance_. It seems never
to have entered the German mind that there could be military tactics
different from their own. They still persisted in the belief that the
Belgians as a military force were contemptible. When the heavy losses
were realised, when numbers of their uhlans never returned, or were
found lying dead in woods and along roadsides; above all when, owing
to the danger of it, the requisitioning failed to give the supplies
expected, “reprisals” were resolved upon. The columns sent out were
strengthened, and reinforced by guns and infantry, with orders to lay
waste the villages and farms which had been the scenes of annihilations
and defeats. The “beasts” of Belgium were to be taught a severe lesson.
Very soon the country within sight of Liége was a blaze of devastation.
Without distinction of age or sex, those of the population who could
not escape were butchered. In this rapine, apparently, the German
troops were allowed a free hand.
From now the fighting presented many characteristics of a warfare of
savagery. On the one side, the Belgians were dealt with as “rebels,”
to be slain without mercy. On the other side, revenge inspired a
resistance still more daring. No doubt the reports brought in to the
German headquarters by survivors of the raids asserted that the losses
were mostly due to civilians. Very naturally they would be reluctant to
admit defeat by Belgian soldiery. Men flying for their lives are not
usually exact observers. Evidently on the part of those responsible
the belief prevailed that their men had not been lost in military
operations but had been waylaid and murdered. A policy of systematic
terrorism was entered upon.
At the back of this policy evidently was exasperation at the Belgian
resistance, and its grave results. The policy, however, only aggravated
matters. On the same day (August 10) on which they entered into
occupation of Liége, the invaders began their operations north of the
Meuse on a larger scale. They dispatched a flying column of 6,000
cavalry with artillery and infantry supports towards Limburg by way of
Tongres and Hasselt. At the same time, they attacked the passage over
the Meuse at Huy.
Tongres, held only by some Belgian outposts, was seized by the Limburg
column with little difficulty, but at Hasselt they were opposed by
a nearly equal force of Belgians. They were allowed to advance in
apparent security. Suddenly barricades of stones and carts thrown up
across the roads proved to be cleverly contrived concealments for
machine guns. An unexpected attack developed. The column hastily
deployed through woods and across fields. A strong body attempted to
push on through the town in order to secure the bridge. The attempt
was not successful. The supporting infantry were forced to retreat. In
covering that movement the cavalry lost heavily. A number were made
prisoners. Others dashed across the Dutch frontier into Maastricht. The
retreat was harassed on both flanks and rear as far as Tongres.
At Huy, where there were some fortifications of an unimportant
character, the Belgians held a bridge-head across the river giving
access to the country between Liége and Dinant. The Germans attacked
the works with heavy howitzers. The fort, however, held out until
August 12. Before evacuating the place the Belgians blew up the bridge.
The rearguard of the defenders rushed across under a rain of hostile
shells, closely pursued. A squadron of German cavalry heading the chase
were on the bridge when the part of the structure already mined crashed
skyward in a mass of dust and flame.
Next day (August 11) a reconnaissance in force was undertaken as far
as Tirlemont and Jodoigne by a flying German column some 2,000 strong.
These troops, advancing through Orsnaael and Landen, laid the country
waste in a methodical manner. Civilians arrested on charges of sniping
were shot on the wayside without ceremony. The population fled in
terror. The wake of the invasion was marked by the pall of smoke rising
from burning ricks, and homesteads, and ruined villages. What had been
a fruitful countryside was turned into a desolation. Even priests
administering the last unction to dying victims were cut down or
speared.[B]
At Dormael the incursion was opposed by a body of Belgian lancers, who
fell back before it. The column pushed on as far as Bost, in sight of
Tirlemont. There the Belgian infantry closed in. Fearing an ambuscade
the Germans beat a retreat. They were chased through St. Trond and
Warenne to their lines near Liége. In this pursuit of over twenty miles
they lost a large proportion of their total force.
One effect of these checks was that in succeeding operations the enemy
made a confession of the efficiency of the Belgians by employing their
crack troops. In no modern army is the difference, and it may be added
the distinction, between crack regiments and the rest more marked than
in that of Germany. Out of the mass of the infantry the best shots
and the smartest men are picked to form the regiments of _jaegers_
(hunters) who are trained to fight in open as well as in close order.
This is a coveted promotion, but it leaves the ordinary line regiments
at a standard below modern ideas of real fighting efficiency. The
total strength of the _jaegers_ was, at the beginning of the war,
about 70,000. They form the only element in the Germany infantry which
can seriously compare with, say, British infantry. Taking the Belgian
infantry as a whole they were well up to the same level, and still
mustered close upon 90,000 men.
Admission to the German cavalry rests on a basis of class, but some of
the regiments are close corporations of the Prussian and Hanoverian
aristocracy. One of the most famous, and most exclusive, the Death’s
Head Hussars, a corps which gained its reputation during the Seven
Years’ War, boasted that it had never yet retreated save under orders.
Stories of its daring form part of the pabulum of every German
schoolbook.
On August 12 began the biggest attempt so far made to find out the
disposition and strength of the Belgian main force. The energetic
measures taken by the Belgian Government to deal with the spy system
had evidently disorganised the practice. Nothing was known for certain
either of the Belgian main army’s movements or of its intentions, a
proof of the prudent ability of its command.
It was essential that the enemy should if possible obtain that
information. The importance to the Germans of manœuvring the Belgian
main army into a position which would uncover Antwerp, and, by forcing
it upon Brussels, exposing it to defeat in a situation which would
either compel it to retire across the French frontier or to surrender,
need not be insisted upon. If that could have been accomplished it
would not only affect the whole campaign in the western theatre of war,
but would restore the prestige already so badly damaged.
These considerations explain the attack made upon the Belgian lines on
August 12 and 13. The attack was directed to two points--Eghezée, to
the north of Namur, and Diest. The main German column was directed
against Diest in an attempted turning movement. The attack at Eghezée
was designed to assist that movement by compelling the Belgians to
carry out a general retirement westward.
The troops sent against Diest were a division of cavalry; a brigade
made up of _jaeger_ regiments, and a strong force of artillery. The
total strength was probably some 26,000 men, more than half of them
mounted. Of the cavalry one of the corps was the Death’s Head Hussars.
The force thrown forward to Eghezée was apparently a division, with
strong cavalry support, and a fleet of motor-cars carrying machine guns.
Neither attack accomplished its purpose. That directed against Diest
proved disastrous. With every inhabitant a scout for the defending
troops, it was impossible that, swift as its movement was, the
column could take the Belgians by surprise. Most of the country the
enemy passed through had been wasted, and was apparently deserted.
Appearances, however, are in that respect not to be relied upon. Timely
intimation was received in spite of all the precautions of German
scouts, and when the column reached the village of Zelck both its
strength was known and its objective accurately surmised.
The force divided for a simultaneous attack upon Diest and upon the
village of Haelen three miles to the south-east. The Belgians had
hastily got Haelen ready for a stout defence. They had loop-holed the
houses, and had masked a battery of guns in an ancient fort commanding
the main street. Seven hundred men held the position.
German cavalry tried to rush it. Mr. Wm. Maxwell, the special
correspondent of the _Daily Telegraph_, in a graphic account of the
affair, speaks of the headlong dash made by the German 17th Dragoons
along the main street, and up the glacis of the fort, which they tried
to mount on horseback. They were shot down from the houses, and from
the fort at the same time, and left the street encumbered with dead
and dying men and horses. As they retired they found their retreat cut
off and 300 of the survivors remained in the hands of the victors as
prisoners of war.
At Diest the like headlong tactics met with a similar fate. Evidently
the Germans thought they had worked a surprise, and that impression was
strengthened by their finding the bridge over the deep and sluggish
Dyle still intact. The bridge had been left standing as a ruse. It was
covered by well-hidden machine guns. When German horsemen tried to
race across they were shot down in masses.
In this attack upon Diest the Death’s Head Hussars maintained their
tradition, but at an appalling cost. Only a comparative remnant of the
corps returned alive. They lost the colours of the regiment, which were
afterwards for a time hung in the ancient church as a trophy.
Despite the disaster to the cavalry the attack was fiercely pressed. At
the height of the bombardment Lieut. van Donon, heading the men of the
town fire brigade, crept round to a ditch from which they were enabled
to enfilade a German battery, and shoot down the gunners.
As usual, the heaviest losses were sustained by the invaders during
their retreat. Along the roads and across the fields south of Diest
Belgian peasants found and buried some 2,800 German dead.
In this battle the Belgian force engaged was a cavalry division
reinforced by a brigade of all arms. It was mainly on both sides a
cavalry action, with the Belgian skill and resource in skirmishing
pitted against that of the enemy.
At Eghezée the German attack was intended to break through the French
cavalry. There, too, timely information had been received. At the
critical moment the Germans found themselves suddenly assailed on flank
by Belgian troops from Namur. The result was a severe repulse. Many of
the motor-cars, held up on the roads by troops in retreat, defending
themselves against dashing charges of the French horse, had to be
abandoned.