RESULT OF THE BATTLE OF FIVE FORKSâRETREAT OF LEEâAN INTERCEPTED
DESPATCHâAT AMELIA COURT HOUSEâBATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEKâTHE
CONFEDERATES' STUBBORN RESISTANCEâA COMPLETE VICTORYâIMPORTANCE OF THE
BATTLE.
When the news of the battle at Five Forks reached General Grant, he
realized that the decisive character of our victory would necessitate
the immediate abandonment of Richmond and Petersburg by the enemy; and
fearing that Lee would escape without further injury, he issued orders,
the propriety of which must be settled by history, to assault next
morning the whole intrenched line. But Lee could not retreat at once.
He had not anticipated, disaster at Five Forks, and hence was
unprepared to withdraw on the moment; and the necessity of getting off
his trains and munitions of war, as well as being obliged to cover the
flight of the Confederate Government, compelled him to hold on to
Richmond and Petersburg till the afternoon of the 2d, though before
that Parke, Ord, and Wright had carried his outer intrenchments at
several points, thus materially shortening the line of investment.
The night of the 1st of April, General Humphreys's corpsâthe Secondâhad
extended its left toward the White Oak road, and early next morning,
under instructions from General Grant, Miles's division of that corps
reported to me, and supporting him with Ayres's and Crawford's
divisions of the Fifth Corps, I then directed him to advance toward
Petersburg and attack the enemy's works at the intersection of the
Claiborne and White Oak roads.
Such of the enemy as were still in the works Miles easily forced across
Hatcher's Run, in the direction of Sutherland's depot, but the
Confederates promptly took up a position north of the little stream,
and Miles being anxious to attack, I gave him leave, but just at this
time General Humphreys came up with a request to me from General Meade
to return Miles. On this request I relinquished command of the
division, when, supported by the Fifth Corps it could have broken in
the enemy's right at a vital point; and I have always since regretted
that I did so, for the message Humphreys conveyed was without authority
from General Grant, by whom Miles had been sent to me, but thinking
good feeling a desideratum just then, and wishing to avoid wrangles, I
faced the Fifth Corps about and marched it down to Five Forks, and out
the Ford road to the crossing of Hatcher's Run. After we had gone,
General Grant, intending this quarter of the field to be under my
control, ordered Humphreys with his other two divisions to move to the
right, in toward Petersburg. This left Miles entirely unsupported, and
his gallant attack made soon after was unsuccessful at first, but about
3 o'clock in the afternoon he carried the point which covered the
retreat from Petersburg and Richmond.
Merritt had been sent westward, meanwhile, in the direction of Ford's
Station, to break the enemy's horse which had been collecting to the
north of Hatcher's Run. Meeting, with but little opposition, Merritt
drove this cavalry force in a northerly direction toward Scott's
Corners, while the Fifth Corps was pushed toward Sutherland's depot, in
the hope of coming in on the rear of the force that was confronting
Miles when I left him. Crawford and Merritt engaged the enemy lightly
just before night, but his main column, retreating along the river road
south of the Appomattox, had got across Namozine Creek, and the
darkness prevented our doing more than to pick up some stragglers. The
next morning the pursuit was resumed, the cavalry again in advance, the
Fifth Corps keeping up with it all the while, and as we pressed our
adversaries hundreds and hundreds of prisoners, armed and unarmed, fell
into our hands, together with many wagons and five pieces of artillery.
At Deep Creek the rearguard turned on us, and a severe skirmish took
place. Merritt, finding the enemy very strong, was directed to await
the arrival of Crook and for the rear division of the Fifth Corps; but
by the time they reached the creek, darkness had again come to protect
the Confederates, and we had to be content with meagre results at that
point.
From the beginning it was apparent that Lee, in his retreat, was making
for Amelia Court House, where his columns north and south of the
Appomattox River could join, and where, no doubt, he expected to meet
supplies, so Crook was ordered to march early on April 4 to strike the
Danville railroad, between Jettersville and Burkeville, and then move
south along the railroad toward Jettersville, Merritt to move toward
Amelia Court House, and the Fifth Corps to Jettersville itself.
The Fifth Corps got to Jettersville about 5 in the afternoon, and I
immediately intrenched it across the Burkeville road with the
determination to stay there till the main army could come up, for I
hoped we could force Lee to surrender at Amelia Court House, since a
firm hold on Jettersville would cut him off from his line of retreat
toward Burkeville.
Accompanied only by my escortâthe First United States Cavalry, about
two hundred strongâI reached Jettersville some little time before the
Fifth Corps, and having nothing else at hand I at once deployed this
handful of men to cover the crossroads till the arrival of the corps.
Just as the troopers were deploying, a man on a mule, heading for
Burkeville, rode into my pickets. He was arrested, of course, and
being searched there was found in his boots this telegram in duplicate,
signed by Lee's Commissary General.
"The army is at Amelia Court House, short of provisions. Send 300,000
rations quickly to Burkeville Junction." One copy was addressed to the
supply department at Danville, and the other to that at Lynchburg. I
surmised that the telegraph lines north of Burkeville had been broken
by Crook after the despatches were written, which would account for
their being transmitted by messenger. There was thus revealed not only
the important fact that Lee was concentrating at Amelia Court House,
but also a trustworthy basis for estimating his troops, so I sent word
to Crook to strike up the railroad toward me, and to Merrittâwho, as I
have said, had followed on the heels of the enemyâto leave Mackenzie
there and himself close in on Jettersville. Staff-officers were also
despatched to hurry up Griffin with the Fifth Corps, and his tired men
redoubled their strides.
My troops too were hard up for rations, for in the pursuit we could not
wait for our trains, so I concluded to secure if possible these
provisions intended for Lee. To this end I directed Young to send four
of his best scouts to Burkeville Junction. There they were to
separate, two taking the railroad toward Lynchburg and two toward
Danville, and as soon as a telegraph station was reached the telegram
was to be transmitted as it had been written and the provisions thus
hurried forward.
Although the Fifth Corps arrived at Jettersville the evening of April
4, as did also Crook's and Merritt's cavalry, yet none of the army of
the Potomac came up till about 3 o'clock the afternoon of the 5th, the
Second Corps, followed by the Sixth, joining us then. General Meade
arrived at Jettersville an hour earlier, but being ill, requested me to
put his troops in position. The Fifth Corps being already intrenched
across the Amelia Court House road facing north, I placed the Sixth on
its right and the Second on its left as they reached the ground.
As the enemy had been feeling us ever since morningâto learn what he
was up to I directed Crook to send Davies's brigade on a reconnoissance
to Paine's crossroads. Davies soon found out that Lee was trying to
escape by that flank, for at the crossroads he found the Confederate
trains and artillery moving rapidly westward. Having driven away the
escort, Davies succeeded in burning nearly two hundred wagons, and
brought off five pieces of artillery. Among these wagons were some
belonging to General, Lee's and to General Fitzhugh Lee's headquarters.
This work through, Davies withdrew and rejoined Crook, who, with Smith
and Gregg, was established near Flat Creek.
It being plain that Lee would attempt to escape as soon as his trains
were out of the way, I was most anxious to attack him when the Second
Corps began to arrive, for I felt certain that unless we did so he
would succeed in passing by our left flank, and would thus again make
our pursuit a stern-chase; but General Meade, whose plan of attack was
to advance his right flank on Amelia Court House, objected to assailing
before all his troops were up.
I then sent despatches to General Grant, explaining what Davies had
done, and telling him that the Second Corps was arriving, and that I
wished he himself was present. I assured him of my confidence in our
capturing Lee if we properly exerted ourselves, and informed him,
finally, that I would put all my cavalry, except Mackenzie, on my left,
and that, with such a disposition of my forces, I could see no escape
for Lee. I also inclosed him this letter, which had just been
captured:
"AMELIA C. H., April 5, 1865.
"DEAR MAMMA:
"Our army is ruined, I fear. We are all safe as yet. Shyron left us
sick. John Taylor is wellâsaw him yesterday. We are in line of battle
this morning. General Robert Lee is in the field near us. My trust is
still in the justice of our cause, and that of God. General Hill is
killed. I saw Murray a few minutes since. Bernard, Terry said, was
taken prisoner, but may yet get out. I send this by a negro I see
passing up the railroad to Mechlenburg. Love to all.
"Your devoted son,
"Wm. B. TAYLOR, Colonel."
General Grant, who on the 5th was accompanying General Ord's column
toward Burkeville Junction, did not receive this intelligence till
nearly nightfall, when within about ten miles of the Junction. He set
out for Jettersville immediately, but did not reach us till near
midnight, too late of course to do anything that night. Taking me with
him, we went over to see Meade, whom he then directed to advance early
in the morning on Amelia Court House. In this interview Grant also
stated that the orders Meade had already issued would permit Lee's
escape, and therefore must be changed, for it was not the aim only to
follow the enemy, but to get ahead of him, remarking during the
conversation that, "he had no doubt Lee was moving right then." On this
same occasion Meade expressed a desire to have in the proposed attack
all the troops of the Army of the Potomac under his own command, and
asked for the return of the Fifth Corps. I made no objections, and it
was ordered to report, to him.
When, on the morning of the 6th, Meade advanced toward Amelia Court
House, he found, as predicted, that Lee was gone. It turned out that
the retreat began the evening of the 5th and continued all night.
Satisfied that this would be the case, I did not permit the cavalry to
participate in Meade's useless advance, but shifted it out toward the
left to the road running from Deatonsville to Rice's station, Crook
leading and Merritt close up. Before long the enemy's trains were
discovered on this road, but Crook could make but little impression on
them, they were so strongly guarded; so, leaving Stagg's brigade and
Miller's battery about three miles southwest of Deatonsvilleâwhere the
road forks, with a branch leading north toward the Appomattoxâto harass
the retreating column and find a vulnerable point, I again shifted the
rest of the cavalry toward the left, across-country, but still keeping
parallel to the enemy's line of march.
Just after crossing Sailor's Greek, a favorable opportunity offering,
both Merritt and Crook attacked vigorously, gained the Rice's Station
road, destroyed several hundred wagons, made many prisoners, and
captured sixteen pieces of artillery. This was important, but more
valuable still was the fact that we were astride the enemy's line of
retreat, and had cut off from joining Longstreet, waiting at Rice's
Station, a corps of Confederate infantry under General Ewell, composed
of Anderson's, Kershaw's, and Custis Lee's divisions. Stagg's brigade
and Miller's battery, which, as I have said, had been left at the forks
of the Deatonsville road, had meanwhile broken in between the rear of
Ewell's column and the head of Gordon's, forcing Gordon to abandon his
march for Rice's Station, and to take the right-hand road at the forks,
on which he was pursued by General Humphreys.
The complete isolation of Ewell from Longstreet in his front and Gordon
in his rear led to the battle of Sailor's Creek, one of the severest
conflicts of the war, for the enemy fought with desperation to escape
capture, and we, bent on his destruction, were no less eager and
determined. The capture of Ewell, with six of his generals and most of
his troops, crowned our success, but the fight was so overshadowed by
the stirring events of the surrender three days later, that the battle
has never been accorded the prominence it deserves.
The small creek from which the field takes its name flows in a
northwesterly direction across the road leading from Deatonsville to
Rice's Station. By shifting to the left, Merritt gained the Rice's
Station road west of the creek, making havoc of the wagon-trains, while
Crook struck them further on and planted himself square across the
road. This blocked Ewell, who, advancing Anderson to some high ground
west of the creek, posted him behind barricades, with the intention of
making a hard fight there, while the main body should escape through
the woods in a westerly direction to roads that led to Farmville. This
was prevented, however, by Crook forming his division, two brigades
dismounted and one mounted, and at once assaulting all along Anderson's
front and overlapping his right, while Merritt fiercely attacked to the
right of Crook. The enemy being thus held, enabled the Sixth
Corpsâwhich in the meantime I had sent forâto come upon the ground, and
Ewell, still contending with the cavalry, found himself suddenly beset
by this new danger from his rear. To, meet it, he placed Kershaw to
the right and Custis Lee to the left of the Rice's Station road, facing
them north toward and some little distance from Sailor's Creek,
supporting Kershaw with Commander Tucker's Marine brigade. Ewell's
skirmishers held the line of Sailor's Creek, which runs through a
gentle valley, the north slope of which was cleared ground.
By General Grant's directions the Sixth Corps had been following my
route of march since the discovery, about 9 o'clock in the morning,
that Lee had decamped from Amelia Court House. Grant had promptly
informed me of this in a note, saying, "The Sixth Corps will go in with
a vim any place you may dictate," so when I sent word to Wright of the
enemy's isolation, and asked him to hurry on with all speed, his
gallant corps came as fast as legs could carry them, he sending to me
successively Major McClellan and Colonel Franklin, of his staff, to
report his approach.
pb273-Wright.jpg (76K)
I was well advised as to the position of the enemy through information
brought me by an intelligent young soldier, William A. Richardson,
Company "A," Second Ohio, who, in one of the cavalry charges on
Anderson, had cleared the barricades and made his way back to my front
through Ewell's line. Richardson had told me just how the main body of
the enemy was posted, so as Seymour's division arrived I directed
General Wright to put it on the right of the road, while Wheaton's men,
coming up all hot and out of breath, promptly formed on Seymour's left.
Both divisions thus aligned faced southwest toward Sailor's Creek, and
the artillery of the corps being massed to the left and front of the
Hibbon house, without waiting for Getty's divisionâfor I feared that if
we delayed longer the enemy might effect his escape toward
Farmvilleâthe general attack was begun. Seymour and Wheaton, moving
forward together, assailed the enemy's front and left, and Stagg's
brigade, too, which in the mean time had been placed between Wheaton's
left and Devin's right, went at him along with them, Merritt and Crook
resuming the fight from their positions in front of Anderson. The
enemy, seeing little chance of escape, fought like a tiger at bay, but
both Seymour and Wheaton pressed him vigorously, gaining ground at all
points except just to the right of the road, where Seymour's left was
checked. Here the Confederates burst back on us in a counter-charge,
surging down almost to the creek, but the artillery, supported by
Getty, who in the mean time had come on the ground, opened on them so
terribly that this audacious and furious onset was completely broken,
though the gallant fellows fell back to their original line doggedly,
and not until after they had almost gained the creek. Ewell was now
hemmed in on every side, and all those under his immediate command were
captured. Merritt and Crook had also broken up Anderson by this time,
but he himself, and about two thousand disorganized men escaped by
making their way through the woods toward the Appomattox River before
they could be entirely enveloped. Night had fallen when the fight was
entirely over, but Devin was pushed on in pursuit for about two miles,
part of the Sixth Corps following to clinch a victory which not only
led to the annihilation of one corps of Lee's retreating army, but
obliged Longstreet to move up to Farmville, so as to take a road north
of the Appomattox River toward Lynchburg instead of continuing toward
Danville.
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At the close of the battle I sent one of my staffâColonel Redwood
Priceâto General Grant to report what had been done; that we had taken
six generals and from nine to ten thousand prisoners. On his way Price
stopped at the headquarters of General Meade, where he learned that not
the slightest intelligence of the occurrence on my line had been
received, for I not being under Meade's command, he had paid no
attention to my movements. Price gave the story of the battle, and
General Meade, realizing its importance, sent directions immediately to
General Wright to make his report of the engagement to the headquarters
of the Army of the Potomac, assuming that Wright was operating
independently of me in the face of Grant's despatch Of 2 o'clock, which
said that Wright was following the cavalry and would "go in with a vim"
wherever I dictated. Wright could not do else than comply with Meade's
orders in the case, and I, being then in ignorance of Meade's reasons
for the assumption, could say nothing. But General Grant plainly
intending, and even directing, that the corps should be under my
command, remedied this phase of the matter, when informed of what had
taken place, by requiring Wright to send a report of the battle through
me. What he then did, and what his intentions and orders were, are
further confirmed by a reference to the episode in his "Memoirs," where
he gives his reasons for ordering the Sixth Corps to abandon the move
on Amelia Court House and pass to the left of the army. On the same
page he also says, referring to the 6th of April: "The Sixth Corps now
remained with the cavalry under Sheridan's direct command until after
the surrender." He unquestionably intended all of this, but his
purpose was partly frustrated by General Meade's action next morning in
assuming direction of the movements of the corps; and before General
Grant became aware of the actual conditions the surrender was at hand.