BATTLE OF DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSEâPICKETT REPULSEDâREINFORCED BY THE
FIFTH CORPSâBATTLE OF FIVE FORKSâTURNING THE CONFEDERATE LEFTâAN
UNQUALIFIED SUCCESSâRELIEVING GENERAL WARRENâTHE WARREN COURT OF
INQUIRYâGENERAL SHERMAN'S OPINION.
The night of March 30 Merritt, with Devin's division and Davies's
brigade, was camped on the Five Forks road about two miles in front of
Dinwiddie, near J. Boisseau's. Crook, with Smith and Gregg's brigades,
continued to cover Stony Creek, and Custer was still back at Rowanty
Creek, trying to get the trains up. This force had been counted while
crossing the creek on the 29th, the three divisions numbering 9,000
enlisted men, Crook having 3,300, and Custer and Devin 5,700.
During the 30th, the enemy had been concentrating his cavalry, and by
evening General W. H. F. Lee and General Rosser had joined Fitzhugh Lee
near Five Forks. To this force was added, about dark, five brigades of
infantryâthree from Pickett's division, and two from Johnson'sâall
under command of Pickett. The infantry came by the White Oak road from
the right of General Lee's intrenchments, and their arrival became
positively known to me about dark, the confirmatory intelligence being
brought in then by some of Young's scouts who had been inside the
Confederate lines.
On the 31st, the rain having ceased, directions were given at an early
hour to both Merritt and Crook to make reconnoissances preparatory to
securing Five Forks, and about 9 o'clock Merritt started for the
crossroads, Davies's brigade supporting him. His march was necessarily
slow because of the mud, and the enemy's pickets resisted with
obstinacy also, but the coveted crossroads fell to Merritt without much
trouble, as the bulk of the enemy was just then bent on other things.
At the same hour that Merritt started, Crook moved Smith's brigade out
northwest from Dinwiddie to Fitzgerald's crossing of Chamberlain's
Creek, to cover Merritt's left, supporting Smith by placing Gregg to
his right and rear. The occupation of this ford was timely, for
Pickett, now in command of both the cavalry and infantry, was already
marching to get in Merritt's rear by crossing Chamberlain's Creek.
To hold on to Fitzgerald's ford Smith had to make a sharp fight, but
Mumford's cavalry attacking Devin, the enemy's infantry succeeded in
getting over Chamberlain's Creek at a point higher up than Fitzgerald's
ford, and assailing Davies, forced him back in a northeasterly
direction toward the Dinwiddie and Five Forks road in company with
Devin. The retreat of Davies permitted Pickett to pass between Crook
and Merritt, which he promptly did, effectually separating them and
cutting off both Davies and Devin from the road to Dinwiddie, so that
to get to that point they had to retreat across the country to B.
Boisseau's and then down the Boydton road.
Gibbs's brigade had been in reserve near the intersection of the Five
Forks and Dabney roads, and directing Merritt to hold on there, I
ordered Gregg's brigade to be mounted and brought to Merritt's aid, for
if Pickett continued in pursuit north of the Five Forks road he would
expose his right and rear, and I determined to attack him, in such
case, from Gibbs's position. Gregg arrived in good season, and as soon
as his men were dismounted on Gibbs's left, Merritt assailed fiercely,
compelling Pickett to halt and face a new foe, thus interrupting an
advance that would finally have carried Pickett into the rear of
Warren's corps.
It was now about 4 o'clock in the afternoon and we were in a critical
situation, but having ordered Merritt to bring Devin and Davies to
Dinwiddie by the Boydton road, staff-officers were sent to hurry Custer
to the same point, for with its several diverging roads the Court House
was of vital importance, and I determined to stay there at all hazards.
At the same time orders were sent to Smith's brigade, which, by the
advance of Pickett past its right flank and the pressure of W. H. F.
Lee on its front, had been compelled to give up Fitzgerald's crossing,
to fall back toward Dinwiddie but to contest every inch of ground so as
to gain time.
When halted by the attack of Gregg and Gibbs, Pickett, desisting from
his pursuit of Devin, as already stated, turned his undivided attention
to this unexpected force, and with his preponderating infantry pressed
it back on the Five Forks road toward Dinwiddle, though our men,
fighting dismounted behind barricades at different points, displayed
such obstinacy as to make Pickett's progress slow, and thus give me
time to look out a line for defending the Court House. I selected a
place about three-fourths of a mile northwest of the crossroads, and
Custer coming up quickly with Capehart's brigade, took position on the
left of the road to Five Forks in some open ground along the crest of a
gentle ridge. Custer got Capehart into place just in time to lend a
hand to Smith, who, severely pressed, came back on us here from his
retreat along Chamberlain's "bed"âthe vernacular for a woody swamp such
as that through which Smith retired. A little later the brigades of
Gregg and Gibbs, falling to the rear slowly and steadily, took up in
the woods a line which covered the Boydton Road some distance to the
right of Capehart, the intervening gap to be filled with Pennington's
brigade. By this time our horse-artillery, which for two days had been
stuck in the mud, was all up, and every gun was posted in this line.
It was now near sunset, and the enemy's cavalry thinking the day was
theirs, made a dash at Smith, but just as the assailants appeared in
the open fields, Capehart's men opened so suddenly on their left flank
as to cause it to recoil in astonishment, which permitted Smith to
connect his brigade with Custer unmolested. We were now in good shape
behind the familiar barricades, and having a continuous line, excepting
only the gap to be filled with Pennington, that covered Dinwiddie and
the Boydton Road. My left rested in the woods about half a mile west
of the Court House, and the barricades extended from this flank in a
semicircle through the open fields in a northeasterly direction, to a
piece-of thick timber on the right, near the Boydton Road.
A little before the sun went down the Confederate infantry was formed
for the attack, and, fortunately for us, Pennington's brigade came up
and filled the space to which it was assigned between Capehart and
Gibbs, just as Pickett moved out across the cleared fields in front of
Custer, in deep lines that plainly told how greatly we were
outnumbered.
Accompanied by Generals Merritt and Custer and my staff, I now rode
along the barricades to encourage the men. Our enthusiastic reception
showed that they were determined to stay. The cavalcade drew the
enemy's fire, which emptied several of the saddlesâamong others Mr.
Theodore Wilson, correspondent of the New York Herald, being wounded.
In reply our horse-artillery opened on the advancing Confederates, but
the men behind the barricades lay still till Pickett's troops were
within short range. Then they opened, Custer's repeating rifles
pouring out such a shower of lead that nothing could stand up against
it. The repulse was very quick, and as the gray lines retired to the
woods from which but a few minutes before they had so confidently
advanced, all danger of their taking Dinwiddie or marching to the left
and rear of our infantry line was over, at least for the night. The
enemy being thus checked, I sent a staff-officerâCaptain Sheridanâto
General Grant to report what had taken place during the afternoon, and
to say that I proposed to stay at Dinwiddie, but if ultimately
compelled to abandon the place, I would do so by retiring on the Vaughn
road toward Hatcher's Run, for I then thought the attack might be
renewed next morning. Devin and Davies joined me about dark, and my
troops being now well in hand, I sent a second staff-officerâColonel
John Kelloggâto explain my situation more fully, and to assure General
Grant that I would hold on at Dinwiddie till forced to let go.
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By following me to Dinwiddie the enemy's infantry had completely
isolated itself, and hence there was now offered the Union troops a
rare opportunity. Lee was outside of his works, just as we desired,
and the general-in-chief realized this the moment he received the first
report of my situation; General Meade appreciated it too from the
information he got from Captain Sheridan, en route to army headquarters
with the first tidings, and sent this telegram to General Grant:
"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"March 31, 1865. 9:45 p.m.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT:
"Would it not be well for Warren to go down with his whole corps and
smash up the force in front of Sheridan? Humphreys can hold the line
to the Boydton plank-road, and the refusal along with it. Bartlett's
brigade is now on the road from G. Boisseau's, running north, where it
crosses Gravelly Run, he having gone down the White Oak road. Warren
could go at once that way, and take the force threatening Sheridan in
rear at Dinwiddie, and move on the enemy's rear with the other two.
"G. G. MEADE, Major-General."
An hour later General Grant replied in these words:
"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
"DABNEY'S MILLS, March 311, 1865. 10:15 P. M.
"MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
"Commanding Army of the Potomac.
Let Warren move in the way you propose, and urge him not to stop for
anything. Let Griffin (Griffin had been ordered by Warren to the
Boydton road to protect his rear) go on as he was first directed.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."
These two despatches were the initiatory steps in sending the Fifth
Corps, under Major-General G. K. Warren, to report to me, and when I
received word of its coming and also that Genera Mackenzie's cavalry
from the Army of the James was likewise to be added to my command, and
that discretionary authority was given me to use all my forces against
Pickett, I resolved to destroy him, if it was within the bounds of
possibility, before he could rejoin Lee.
In a despatch, dated 10:05 p.m., telling me of the coming of Warren and
Mackenzie, General Grant also said that the Fifth Corps should reach me
by 12 o'clock that night, but at that hour not only had none of the
corps arrived, but no report from it, so believing that if it came all
the way down to Dinwiddie the next morning, our opportunity would be
gone, I concluded that it would be best to order Warren to move in on
the enemy's rear while the cavalry attacked in front, and, therefore,
at 3 o'clock in the morning of April 1 sent this despatch to General
Warren:
"CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS, DINWIDDIE C. H.,
"April 1, 1865â3. A.M.
"MAJOR-GENERAL WARREN, "Commanding Fifth Army Corps.
"I am holding in front of Dinwiddie Court House, on the road leading to
Five Forks, for three-quarters of a mile with General Custer's
division. The enemy are in his immediate front, lying so as to cover
the road just this side of A. Adams's house, which leads across
Chamberlain's bed, or run. I understand you have a division at J.[G]
Boisseau's; if so, you are in rear of the enemy's line and almost on
his flank. I will hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at
daylight; if so, attack instantly and in full force. Attack at
daylight anyhow, and I will make an effort to get the road this side of
Adams's house, and if I do, you can capture the whole of them. Any
force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak road, will
be in the enemy's rear, and in all probability get any force that may
escape you by a flank movement. Do not fear my leaving here. If the
enemy remains, I shall fight at daylight.
"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General."
With daylight came a slight fog, but it lifted almost immediately, and
Merritt moved Custer and Devin forward. As these divisions advanced
the enemy's infantry fell back on the Five Forks road, Devin pressing
him along the road, while Custer extended on the left over toward
Chamberlain's Run, Crook being held in watch along Stony Creek,
meanwhile, to be utilized as circumstances might require when Warren
attacked.
The order of General Meade to Warren the night of March 31âa copy being
sent me alsoâwas positive in its directions, but as midnight came
without a sign of or word from the Fifth Corps, notwithstanding that
was the hour fixed for its arrival, I nevertheless assumed that there
were good reasons for its non-appearance, but never once doubted that
measures would be taken to comply with my despatch Of 3 A. M. and
therefore hoped that, as Pickett was falling back slowly toward Five
Forks, Griffin's and Crawford's divisions would come in on the
Confederate left and rear by the Crump road near J.[G] Boisseau's
house.
But they did not reach there till after the enemy had got by. As a
matter of fact, when Pickett was passing the all-important point
Warren's men were just breaking from the bivouac in which their chief
had placed them the night before, and the head of Griffin's division
did not get to Boisseau's till after my cavalry, which meanwhile had
been joined by Ayres's division of the Fifth Corps by way of the
Boydton and Dabney roads. By reason of the delay in moving Griffin and
Crawford, the enemy having escaped, I massed the Fifth Corps at J.[G]
Boisseau's so that the men could be rested, and directed it to remain
there; General Warren himself had not then come up. General Mackenzie,
who had reported just after daybreak, was ordered at first to stay at
Dinwiddie Court House, but later was brought along the Five Forks road
to Dr. Smith's, and Crook's division was directed to continue watching
the crossings of Stony Creek and Chamberlain's Run.
That we had accomplished nothing but to oblige our foe to retreat was
to me bitterly disappointing, but still feeling sure that he would not
give up the Five Forks crossroads without a fight, I pressed him back
there with Merritt's cavalry, Custer advancing on the Scott road, while
Devin drove the rearguard along that leading from J.[G] Boisseau's to
Five Forks.
By 2 o'clock in the afternoon Merritt had forced the enemy inside his
intrenchments, which began with a short return about three-quarters of
a mile east of the Forks and ran along the south side of the White Oak
road to a point about a mile west of the Forks. From the left of the
return over toward Hatcher's Run was posted Mumford's cavalry,
dismounted. In the return itself was Wallace's brigade, and next on
its right came Ransom's, then Stewart's, then Terry's, then Corse's. On
the right of Corse was W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry. Ten pieces
of artillery also were in this line, three on the right of the works,
three near the centre at the crossroads, and four on the left, in the
return. Rosser's cavalry was guarding the Confederate trains north of
Hatcher's Run beyond the crossing of the Ford road.
I felt certain the enemy would fight at Five Forksâhe had toâso, while
we were getting up to his intrenchments, I decided on my plan of
battle. This was to attack his whole front with Merritt's two cavalry
divisions, make a feint of turning his right flank, and with the Fifth
Corps assail his left. As the Fifth Corps moved into action, its right
flank was to be covered by Mackenzie's cavalry, thus entirely cutting
off Pickett's troops from communication with Lee's right flank, which
rested near the Butler house at the junction of the Claiborne and White
Oaks roads. In execution of this plan, Merritt worked his men close in
toward the intrenchments, and while he was thus engaged, I ordered
Warren to bring up the Fifth Corps, sending the order by my engineer
officer, Captain Gillespie, who had reconnoitred the ground in the
neighborhood of Gravelly Run Church, where the infantry was to form for
attack.
Gillespie delivered the order about 1 o'clock, and when the corps was
put in motion, General Warren joined me at the front. Before he came,
I had received, through Colonel Babcock, authority from General Grant
to relieve him, but I did not wish to do it, particularly on the eve of
battle; so, saying nothing at all about the message brought me, I
entered at once on the plan for defeating Pickett, telling Warren how
the enemy was posted, explaining with considerable detail, and
concluding by stating that I wished his troops to be formed on the
Gravelly Church road, near its junction with the White Oak road, with
two divisions to the front, aligned obliquely to the White Oak road,
and one in reserve, opposite the centre of these two.
General Warren seemed to understand me clearly, and then left to join
his command, while I turned my attention to the cavalry, instructing
Merritt to begin by making demonstrations as though to turn the enemy's
right, and to assault the front of the works with his dismounted
cavalry as soon as Warren became engaged. Afterward I rode around to
Gravelly Run Church, and found the head of Warren's column just
appearing, while he was sitting under a tree making a rough sketch of
the ground. I was disappointed that more of the corps was not already
up, and as the precious minutes went by without any apparent effort to
hurry the troops on to the field, this disappointment grew into
disgust. At last I expressed to Warren my fears that the cavalry might
expend all their ammunition before the attack could be made, that the
sun would go down before the battle could be begun, or that troops from
Lee's right, which, be it remembered, was less than three miles away
from my right, might, by striking my rear, or even by threatening it,
prevent the attack on Pickett.
Warren did not seem to me to be at all solicitous; his manner exhibited
decided apathy, and he remarked with indifference that "Bobby Lee was
always getting people into trouble." With unconcern such as this, it
is no wonder that fully three hours' time was consumed in marching his
corps from J.[G] Boisseau's to Gravelly Run Church, though the
distance was but two miles. However, when my patience was almost worn
out, Warren reported his troops ready, Ayres's division being formed on
the west side of the Gravelly Church road, Crawford's on the east side,
and Griffin in reserve behind the right of Crawford, a little different
from my instructions. The corps had no artillery present, its
batteries, on account of the mud, being still north of Gravelly Run.
Meanwhile Merritt had been busy working his men close up to the
intrenchments from the angle of the return west, along the White Oak
road.
About 4 o'clock Warren began the attack. He was to assault the left
flank of the Confederate infantry at a point where I knew Pickett's
intrenchments were refused, almost at right angles with the White Oak
road. I did not know exactly how far toward Hatcher's Run this part of
the works extended, for here the videttes of Mumford's cavalry were
covering, but I did know where the refusal began. This return, then,
was the point I wished to assail, believing that if the assault was
made with spirit, the line could be turned. I therefore intended that
Ayres and Crawford should attack the refused trenches squarely, and
when these two divisions and Merritt's cavalry became hotly engaged,
Griffin's division was to pass around the left of the Confederate line;
and I personally instructed Griffin how I wished him to go in, telling
him also that as he advanced, his right flank would be taken care of by
Mackenzie, who was to be pushed over toward the Ford road and Hatcher's
Run.
The front of the corps was oblique to the White Oak road; and on
getting there, it was to swing round to the left till perpendicular to
the road, keeping closed to the left. Ayres did his part well, and to
the letter, bringing his division square up to the front of the return
near the angle; but Crawford did not wheel to the left, as was
intended. On the contrary, on receiving fire from Mumford's cavalry,
Crawford swerved to the right and moved north from the return, thus
isolating his division from Ayres; and Griffin, uncertain of the
enemy's position, naturally followed Crawford.
The deflection of this division on a line of march which finally
brought it out on the Ford road near C. Young's house, frustrated the
purpose I had in mind when ordering the attack, and caused a gap
between Ayres and Crawford, of which the enemy quickly took advantage,
and succeeded in throwing a part of Ayres's division into confusion.
At this juncture I sent word to General Warren to have Crawford
recalled; for the direction he was following was not only a mistaken
one, but, in case the assault at the return failed, he ran great risk
of capture. Warren could not be found, so I then sent for
Griffinâfirst by Colonel Newhall, and then by Colonel Shermanâto come
to the aid of Ayres, who was now contending alone with that part of the
enemy's infantry at the return. By this time Griffin had observed and
appreciated Crawford's mistake, however, and when the staff-officers
reached him, was already faced to the left; so, marching across
Crawford's rear, he quickly joined Ayres, who meanwhile had rallied his
troops and carried the return.
When Ayres's division went over the flank of the enemy's works, Devin's
division of cavalry, which had been assaulting the front, went over in
company with it; and hardly halting to reform, the intermingling
infantry and dismounted cavalry swept down inside the intrenchments,
pushing to and beyond Five Forks, capturing thousands of prisoners.
The only stand the enemy tried to make was when he attempted to form
near the Ford road. Griffin pressed him so hard there, however, that
he had to give way in short order, and many of his men, with three
pieces of artillery, fell into the hands of Crawford while on his
circuitous march.
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The right of Custer's division gained a foothold on the enemy's works
simultaneously with Devin's, but on the extreme left Custer had a very
severe combat with W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, as well as with Corse's and
Terry's infantry. Attacking Terry and Corse with Pennington's brigade
dismounted, he assailed Lee's cavalry with his other two brigades
mounted, but Lee held on so obstinately that Custer gained but little
ground till our troops, advancing behind the works, drove Corse and
Terry out. Then Lee made no further stand except at the west side of
the Gillian field, where, assisted by Corse's brigade, he endeavored to
cover the retreat, but just before dark Custer, in concert with some
Fifth Corps regiments under Colonel Richardson, drove ihe last of the
enemy westward on the White Oak road.
Our success was unqualified; we had overthrown Pickett, taken six guns,
thirteen battle-flags, and nearly six thousand prisoners. When the
battle was practically over, I turned to consider my position with
reference to the main Confederate army. My troops, though victorious,
were isolated from the Army of the Potomac, for on the 31st of March
the extreme left of that army had been thrown back nearly to the
Boydton plank-road, and hence there was nothing to prevent the enemy's
issuing from his trenches at the intersection of the White Oak and
Claiborne roads and marching directly on my rear. I surmised that he
might do this that night or early next morning. It was therefore
necessary to protect myself in this critical situation, and General
Warren having sorely disappointed me, both in the moving of his corps
and in its management during the battle, I felt that he was not the man
to rely upon under such circumstances, and deeming that it was to the
best interest of the service as well as but just to myself, I relieved
him, ordering him to report to General Grant.
I then put Griffin in command of the Fifth Corps, and directed him to
withdraw from the pursuit as quickly as he could after following the
enemy a short distance, and form in line of battle near Gravelly Run
Church, at right angles with the White Oak road, with Ayres and
Crawford facing toward the enemy at the junction of the White Oak and
Claiborne roads, leaving Bartlett, now commanding Griffin's division,
near the Ford road. Mackenzie also was left on the Ford road at the
crossing of Hatcher's Run, Merritt going into camp on the Widow
Gillian's plantation. As I had been obliged to keep Crook's division
along Stony Creek throughout the day, it had taken no active part in
the battle.
Years after the war, in 1879, a Court of Inquiry was given General
Warren in relation to his conduct on the day of the battle. He assumed
that the delay in not granting his request for an inquiry, which was
first made at the close of the war, was due to opposition on my part.
In this he was in error; I never opposed the ordering of the Court, but
when it was finally decided to convene it I naturally asked to be
represented by counsel, for the authorization of the Inquiry was so
peculiarly phrased that it made me practically a respondent.
"NEW YORK CITY, May 3, 1880
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. HANCOCK, U. S. A.
"President Court of Inquiry, Governor's Island.
"Sir: Since my arrival in this city, under a subpoena to appear and
testify before the Court of which you are president, I have been
indirectly and unofficially informed that the Court some time ago
forwarded an invitation to me (which has not been received) to appear
personally or by counsel, in order to aid it in obtaining a knowledge
as to the facts concerning the movements terminating in the battle of
'Five Forks,' with reference to the direct subjects of its inquiry. Any
invitation of this character I should always and do consider it
incumbent on me to accede to, and do everything in my power in
furtherance of the specific purposes for which courts of inquiry are by
law instituted.
"The order convening the Court (a copy of which was not received by me
at my division headquarters until two days after the time appointed for
the Court to assemble) contemplates an inquiry based on the application
of Lieutenant Colonel G. K. Warren, Corps of Engineers, as to his
conduct while major-general commanding the Fifth Army Corps, under my
command, in reference to accusations or imputations assumed in the
order to have been made against him, and I understand through the daily
press that my official report of the battle of Five Forks has been
submitted by him as a basis of inquiry.
"If it is proposed to inquire, either directly or indirectly, as to any
action of mine so far as the commanding general Fifth Army Corps was
concerned, or my motives for such action, I desire to be specifically
informed wherein such action or transaction is alleged to contain an
accusation or imputation to become a subject of inquiry, so that,
knowing what issues are raised, I may intelligently aid the Court in
arriving at the facts.
"It is a long time since the battle of Five Forks was fought, and
during the time that has elapsed the official reports of that battle
have been received and acknowledged by the Government; but now, when
the memory of events has in many instances grown dim, and three of the
principal actors on that field are deadâGenerals Griffin, Custer, and
Devin, whose testimony would have been valuableâan investigation is
ordered which might perhaps do injustice unless the facts pertinent to
the issues are fully developed.
"My duties are such that it will not be convenient for me to be present
continuously during the sessions of the Court. In order, however, that
everything may be laid before it in my power pertinent to such specific
issues as are legally raised, I beg leave to introduce Major Asa Bird
Gardner as my counsel.
"Very respectfully,
"P. H. SHERIDAN, Lieut.-General."
Briefly stated, in my report of the battle of Five Forks there were
four imputations concerning General Warren. The first implied that
Warren failed to reach me on the 1st of April, when I had reason to
expect him; the second, that the tactical handling of his corps was
unskillful; the third, that he did not exert himself to get his corps
up to Gravelly Run Church; and the fourth, that when portions of his
line gave way he did not exert himself to restore confidence to his
troops. The Court found against him on the first and second counts,
and for him on the third and fourth. This finding was unsatisfactory
to General Warren, for he hoped to obtain such an unequivocal
recognition of his services as to cast discredit on my motives for
relieving him. These were prompted by the conditions aloneâby the
conduct of General Warren as described, and my consequent lack of
confidence in him.
It will be remembered that in my conversation with General Grant on the
30th, relative to the suspension of operations because of the mud, I
asked him to let me have the Sixth Corps to help me in breaking in on
the enemy's right, but that it could not be sent me; it will be
recalled also that the Fifth Corps was afterward tendered and declined.
From these facts it has been alleged that I was prejudiced against
General Warren, but this is not true. As we had never been thrown much
together I knew but little of him. I had no personal objection to him,
and certainly could have none to his corps. I was expected to do an
extremely dangerous piece of work, and knowing the Sixth Corps wellâmy
cavalry having campaigned with it so successfully in the Shenandoah
Valley, I naturally preferred it, and declined the Fifth for no other
reason. But the Sixth could not be given, and the turn of events
finally brought me the Fifth after my cavalry, under the most trying
difficulties, had drawn the enemy from his works, and into such a
position as to permit the realization of General Grant's hope to break
up with my force Lee's right flank. Pickett's isolation offered an
opportunity which we could not afford to neglect, and the destruction
of his command would fill the measure of General Grant's expectations
as well as meet my own desires. The occasion was not an ordinary one,
and as I thought that Warren had not risen to its demand in the battle,
I deemed it injudicious and unsafe under the critical conditions
existing to retain him longer. That I was justified in this is plain
to all who are disposed to be fair-minded, so with the following
extract from General Sherman's review of the proceedings of the Warren
Court, and with which I am convinced the judgment of history will
accord, I leave the subject:
"....It would be an unsafe and dangerous rule to hold the commander of
an army in battle to a technical adherence to any rule of conduct for
managing his command. He is responsible for results, and holds the
lives and reputations of every officer and soldier under his orders as
subordinate to the great endâvictory. The most important events are
usually compressed into an hour, a minute, and he cannot stop to
analyze his reasons. He must act on the impulse, the conviction, of
the instant, and should be sustained in his conclusions, if not
manifestly unjust. The power to command men, and give vehement impulse
to their joint action, is something which cannot be defined by words,
but it is plain and manifest in battles, and whoever commands an army
in chief must choose his subordinates by reason of qualities which can
alone be tested in actual conflict.
"No one has questioned the patriotism, integrity, and great
intelligence of General Warren. These are attested by a long record of
most excellent service, but in the clash of arms at and near Five
Forks, March 31 and April 1, 1865, his personal activity fell short of
the standard fixed by General Sheridan, on whom alone rested the great
responsibility for that and succeeding days.
"My conclusion is that General Sheridan was perfectly justified in his
action in this case, and he must be fully and entirely sustained if the
United States expects great victories by her arms in the future."