PAN-AMERICANISM
The relations of Latin America with the United States are chiefly
connected with those tendencies of United States policy which are
associated with the name of Monroe. A survey of the Monroe Doctrine
would here be out of place: but the main points bearing on the present
situation may be indicated. The injunction imposed in 1823 by President
Monroe upon European interference in America was intended to meet
certain European designs which at that time seemed to endanger the
"peace and safety" of the United States. But Monroe's declaration,
although its immediate purpose was self-defence, involved a permanent
protest against any European aggression in Latin America, and thus set
up the United States as self-constituted champion of those countries.
Such a position involves a certain superiority of attitude and cannot be
very clearly distinguished from protection; and protection is apt to
merge by gradual steps, often only half perceived and not deliberately
intended, into Protectorate. Thus, the development of the Monroe
Doctrine has followed two parallel lines of policy, protection against
Europe and national self-assertion. This latter more positive aspect has
impressed itself upon the public mind. The advances in the Caribbean
region, which have been mentioned in the first chapter, were undertaken
not in order to satisfy any doctrine or theory, but to satisfy the
irresistible needs of a vigorous growing Power. But since, for a
generation past, it has been expected of American statesmen that they
should justify their orthodoxy as adherents of this doctrine, these
steps towards protectorate or dominion have been explained in a series
of public pronouncements as developments or examples of the doctrine.
Naturally, therefore, the term "Monroe Doctrine" is popularly understood
as connoting an imperial policy, a movement towards supremacy or
hegemony.
In any case, the obvious comment on the Monroe Doctrine is that it has
indeed protected the American republics from European aggression, but
has not protected them from American aggression. It has not protected
Peru from Chile nor Mexico and Colombia from the United States. Again,
it is a uni-lateral arrangement announced by one Power alone, on the
assumption that this action would be taken for granted by the other
American republics. This attitude does not entirely commend itself to
those states, especially as they grow stronger and more conscious of
their strength. American business men plainly assert that the Monroe
Doctrine is bad for business[4], and warn their countrymen against
straining after a fictitious inter-American sentiment--an attitude which
"is often a cause for resentment, the more felt because seldom expressed
by the courteous Latin[5]." An article in the Pan-American Bulletin for
December 1917 deserves particular attention. It cleaves through the
difficulty by declaring, on the authority of Mr Root, that the Monroe
Doctrine today means no more than what President Monroe meant a century
ago: "The Monroe Doctrine is an assertion of the right of self-defence,
that and nothing more. France and Britain are in the field to protect
their Monroe Doctrine, the sovereignty and independence of Belgium ...
there is nothing here ... in any way derogatory to the full sovereignty
and independence of even the smallest of the Latin-American countries.
It is true that the first proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine carried
with it an implied offer of aid to the newly liberated Spanish-American
colonies against proposed aggressions by the Holy Alliance.
Self-protection was the motive ... it counts for nothing against a set
purpose to defend one's own house that in so doing one performs an act
by which one's neighbour is likewise defended." The article concludes by
declaring that the Monroe Doctrine still prevails, strictly limited to
its original sense, and that Pan-Americanism is an entirely distinct
policy, which must not be confused with it.
This re-statement of the Monroe Doctrine in its original terms, this
declaration that United States policy is just like that of other
nations, was probably prompted by the sense that the later developments
of the Monroe Doctrine hindered the economic propaganda which is the
main business of the Pan-American Union. But it has been further argued
that the great war has exposed the weakness of Monroism, since, in the
event of a German victory, nothing but superior force could prevent
German invasion and occupation in Canada or in any trans-Atlantic
country which might be at war with Germany. The arming of the United
States has in some degree answered this objection, which is perhaps as
contingent and theoretical as the doctrine itself. But the war has
certainly emphasised the fact that emergencies must be met and settled
as they arise, and that, since they cannot be foreseen, they cannot be
covered by pre-conceived theories. At any rate a sentiment has for some
time been gaining force that the inter-American policy of the United
States calls for some kind of revision or re-statement; and the solution
is sought in "Pan-Americanism."
In seeking a definition of that phrase, European analogies will scarcely
help us. The word "Pan-Germanism" usually implies some common action or
interest among all those who speak the German language, and suggests
some kind of racial bond or sense of kindred. The word "Pan-Slavism"
appears to mean common action or interest among all who speak the Slav
tongues, and similarly suggests some ethnological bond of kinship.
Obviously Pan-Americanism must mean something quite different, for the
American differs from his nearest southern neighbour, the Mexican, more
widely than the Norwegian differs from the Greek. Moreover,
"Pan-American" is a term of recent origin and still somewhat fluid in
its application. It has sometimes been used merely as the equivalent of
"European" or "Asiatic"; for the word "American" commonly bears a
national sense and there is no convenient and accepted term covering the
two Americas. For example, Mr Taft in his Presidential message of 1909
spoke of "our Pan-American policy" much as a British Prime Minister
might speak of "our European policy."
Thus, the obvious application of the term is geographical. Yet Americans
of authority are fully aware of the need of reservation in this
geographical application. In 1909, the Director of the Pan-American
Union pointed out, with some mortification, that on the occasion of the
Pan-American Congress at Buenos Aires, most of the delegates from the
north found that the easiest route from the chief city of North America
to the chief city of South America lay through Europe. And an eminent
American economist[6] has lately uttered a warning against geographical
misapprehensions, explaining that, whereas the Panamá Canal makes the
west coast of South America an extension of the east coast of the United
States, nevertheless the bulk of the South American population lives
upon the Atlantic coast and prefers its traditional, customary and
natural intercourse with Europe.
But in considering the meaning of an incipient and growing force, it
would be a mistake to dwell on possible limitations and difficulties;
and it would be pedantic and unpractical to demand precise consistency
or exact definition. We are rather concerned with aspirations,
tendencies and formative ideas. Indeed, it might fairly be argued that
these limitations, which are fully realised and avowed in North America,
are no argument against the Pan-American movement, but rather an
argument in support of it, as being a prudent and wholesome effort to
overcome existing obstacles and promote a better understanding between
neighbours.
Pan-Americanism may be described as the movement which aims at uniting
all the American republics:--one cannot say all the American countries;
for in the map printed on the cover of the Pan-American Bulletin, Canada
is left blank, as not forming part of "Pan-America." This omission alone
is enough to prove, if proof were needed, that there is something
artificial about Pan-Americanism: for obviously a New Yorker is more at
home in Toronto or Halifax than in Rio or Buenos Aires; and there is a
closer political similarity as well as a closer political bond between
Washington and Ottawa than between Washington and Caracas. But, after
all, most political combinations are largely artificial: they are
products of statesmanship rather than of nature, or at all events they
are products of nature assisted by statesmanship. And Pan-Americanism
need not be less real or less valuable for being a construction
deliberately planned instead of a spontaneous organism. But since the
Pan-American movement is artificial, and a matter of policy and
management, still rather formless, Americans of both continents differ
considerably both as to its meaning and its usefulness, some declaring
that it means nothing and is useless or even mischievous, while others
regard it as a kind of perfect circle embracing all the future.
Dr Usher, the American historian, dismisses the whole notion, on the
ground that the United States and Latin America are utterly unlike,
unsympathetic and even antipathetic to one another. Against this
conclusion may be quoted two opinions from Chile and from Colombia, the
two South American countries which have in the past shown most
resentment at North American pretensions. "We want no papa" exclaimed a
Chilian public man some years ago: yet in 1910 Señor Echeverria, Chilian
consul in London, in a public lecture declared himself a decided
believer in the benefits of Pan-Americanism, and as disposed to accept
the sincerity of North American pacific and non-aggressive professions:
and in the same year Señor Pérez Triana, the Colombian diplomatist,
expressed a restrained but decided optimism concerning the benefits to
be derived from the Pan-American Congresses, and pointed out that they
had already brought about the general acceptance of the principle of
arbitration among American Governments. These favourable views have
regard to the practical benefits to be found in a certain course of
action. The destiny of Pan-Americanism depends on the question whether
these practical benefits are strong enough to overcome the barriers of
race, language, religion, law, customs and tradition.
The objections based upon these obstacles to union is not quite
convincing. Incompatibility of temper is a bar to marriage: it is no bar
to a practical and thoroughly friendly business understanding supported
by mutual respect and methods of give and take. The tendencies of the
age favour large combinations, overstepping the bounds of nationality
and sometimes cutting across the lines of kindred and tradition. The
challenge of Central Europe has raised up such a combination in Western
Europe, and may help to give birth to a fresh and large grouping of the
Powers of the western hemisphere.
The question occurs whether, apart from reasons of practical
convenience, any fundamental basis can be found for the union of
communities so dissimilar in character and in action. These republics
have this at least in common: they have all started life in "new lands";
they are all trans-Atlantic offshoots from European monarchies; they
have all thrown off political dependence upon Europe; they have all
adopted republican forms of government; and, to whatever extent some of
them may avoid democratic or even republican methods, they have all
rejected the hereditary principle in government. Moreover, before the
present crisis they all cultivated, so far as possible, a certain
political aloofness from Europe: and they all aim at pursuing a destiny
distinct from and, in their belief, transcending that of Europe through
the inexhaustible possibilities offered by a New World.
What success has attended the United States in her recent policy of
approaching Latin America? Here we are on delicate ground, and whatever
view be expressed is sure to meet with disagreement on the part of
qualified judges. It is not easy to keep one's finger on the pulse of
South American sentiment, nor can we expect to find unanimity. We can
only watch indications and symptoms. In the past, on the whole, the
attitude of the United States has been accepted in so far as it implied
protection; but it has been warmly resented in so far as it seemed to
imply any kind of protectorate. A certain arrogance in the public
pretensions of the United States has been felt to be an offence and a
menace; and this feeling has been intensified by the bearing of
individual Americans. Yet a representative Chilian, Señor Vildósola,
writing since the outbreak of the war, says, "The United States was not
popular in Chile; her political attitude was rude and overbearing (_une
politique brutale_); but in the past ten years this is changed. The Big
Stick is relegated to the cellars of the White House. A certain
refinement of forms has appeared in the Secretaryship of State, and a
deeper knowledge of the peoples of the continent has induced the
Government, press and people of the United States to treat Chile and her
neighbours with a new respect and consideration." It may here be noted
that Chile has lately entered into close economic relations with the
United States, through the American acquisition of great mining
properties in Chile and through the export of nitrate and copper to
North America, largely carried in Chilian government transports.
A representative Brazilian lately remarked to the present writer, "I
believe there is no danger at all from the United States" and, referring
to the preferential tariff granted by Brazil to certain imports from the
United States, he added, "The Americans admit our coffee free, and we
grant this abatement in return. They tax imports of things that they
produce, and admit free the things they cannot produce. You English are
different. You tax our coffee: you tax things you cannot produce and let
in free the things you can produce." There can be no doubt that these
close commercial relations and recent large American investments in
Brazilian industries conduce to this tentative entente with the United
States.
The relations of the A.B.C. countries seem to indicate similar
tendencies. It is probable that the main object, which led these three
republics to entertain proposals of alliance, was security against
possible danger from the United States. As these apprehensions
diminished, the proposals were shelved, and the A.B.C. resolved itself
into its component alphabet. There was another not less interesting
reason for this dissolution: the proposed combination of the stronger
South American states was not welcomed by the other republics, which
felt that an arrangement of this kind did not favour the union and
harmony of the whole continent, even though the professed intention was
that it should serve as a nucleus which might gradually win the
voluntary adhesion of other republics.
Again, those republics which have been drawn closely under the influence
of the United States, threw in their lot with her by declaring war
against Germany--a decision which seems to be an act of gratitude, and a
recognition that their position of dependence is not felt to be irksome
or degrading.
A recent act of the small but sturdy Republic of Uruguay seems to be
very significant. After first severing relations with Germany and then
rescinding her declaration of neutrality, Uruguay decreed that "No
American State, if engaged in a war against a European State in defence
of its rights, shall be treated as a belligerent by Uruguay." There is
something a little whimsical in this previous sweeping aside of all
contingencies, and one may imagine circumstances where the
interpretation of this decree might puzzle the legal advisers of the
Uruguayan Foreign Office. But the whole-hearted comprehensive intention
of the decree is obvious. Uruguay is prepared to go the whole way in the
direction of Pan-Americanism, and opens her arms equally to all the
republics of both American continents.
The proposal to establish a Pan-American University at Panamá may be
worth mentioning here. The suggestion sounds like a product of the
tropical spirit of those regions; but it may yet take significant shape.
The United States, before entering the war, had largely increased her
trade with Latin America. She succeeded in supplying, in great degree,
the gaps left by Germany and Great Britain. Her entry into the war has
deprived her of part of that advantage. But, on the other hand, the
final decision, the manner in which it was made, and the resolute way in
which it is being pursued, have vastly strengthened the moral standing
of the United States in the New World. Those Latin-American states which
are dependent on her joined her as belligerents. The action of Brazil,
though taken independently and inspired more by French than by North
American sympathies, followed North American action and cannot be wholly
dissociated from it. Most of the Latin-American states, by their
attitude towards the war, have as it were mounted guard behind the
Allies. But the United States stands embattled in front of her southern
neighbours, to fight the monster which threatens them all. The United
States now, at last, appears, not merely as the theoretic propounder of
a protection which was really ensured by the assent of Great Britain and
the strength of the British fleet, but as the active champion in a
common cause. This position has been strengthened by President Wilson's
solemn disavowals of any aggressive intention. These promises have
produced a marked impression in South America.
The war has brought into view another practical reason for a closer
inter-American understanding. As long as the United States remained
neutral, no other American state, such as Brazil, could have incurred
the risk of entering the war. In the past, while South American
countries were able to keep apart from European politics, this
complication or hindrance was latent and remote. But the period of
aloofness is closed, and the American republics are taking their place
among the nations of the world. Some kind of permanent entente, some
standing arrangement for exchanging views and adjusting policy, would
seem to be the best means of obviating any friction or awkwardness
between north and south in respect of external relations. Thus a closer
understanding with the United States may be regarded as a necessary
condition of closer relations with the rest of the world.
Many who know South America well will dissent from the suggestion that
the war is helping to mould into some kind of shape the rather shadowy
scheme called Pan-Americanism. They will point to the fact that most
South Americans would rather have dealings with a European than with a
North American and will recall what has been said elsewhere, namely,
that the two Americas, both historically and actually, face severally
towards Europe and not towards one another. All this is true; yet there
are signs that the tendency called Pan-Americanism, hitherto a rather
unsubstantial vision, may become a reality, differing indeed from the
picture traced by some North American prophets, but resting upon more
solid bases. We have touched upon business relations and the machinery
for carrying them on. As to political relations, the growing strength of
the greater South American republics counts for much. They feel
themselves to be in a position to say, "We do not want your protection;
but we value your equal friendship; for we are Americans as well as you.
And we are willing to group ourselves together for the preservation and
protection of that America which is ours." An equal understanding
between equals--provided it is not too formal at first, and is allowed
to be moulded by the course of events--would probably meet with a fairly
general assent, which might gradually win over those holding aloof at
first. Something of the kind seems to be taking form at the present
time. The ultimate result may be the formation of a Concert of America,
in which the more tranquil and educated elements may guide the whole.
President Wilson has suggested some such arrangement, and proposes a
combination of American republics as the best security against
aggression by one American Power upon another.
From what has been said above, it is obvious that some of the Caribbean
lands would enter such a combination as satellites or subject-allies of
the United States. Such an arrangement is not unparalleled and does not
seem impracticable, since these small states have already entered the
war in that capacity. Obviously, Pan-Americanism cannot aim at precise
symmetry or theoretical consistency. It must be an elastic system, and
must be prepared to meet and overcome difficulties. That is the purpose
of its existence. But in general the first condition of a Pan-American
combination would seem to be the abandonment of any pretensions to
hegemony by any one state. Such pretensions have shattered the Concert
of Europe. But America is a younger Europe which may take example--and
warning too--from that old Europe which has given her such institutions
and such order as she possesses. Thus a New World may indeed arise to
redress the balance of the Old.
* * * * *
To the emancipation of Latin America Great Britain and the British
contributed more than any other outside nation. In the subsequent
development of those countries, Britain has had a large share. In the
moral protection afforded to them by the attitude of the United States,
the unostentatious and almost tacit support of Great Britain has counted
for much. And those countries are now being drawn nearer to Great
Britain and nearer to Europe than ever before. The question now
arises:--In the closer grouping of American states now in process of
formation, is Great Britain to stand aloof, a sympathetic but silent and
inactive spectator? That this question has actually been raised in the
United States, is shown by the following quotation from _The Times
History of the War_ (chapter 222, page 9): "As the _Philadelphia Ledger_
put it 'it seemed an absurdity to talk of Pan-Americanism and in the
same breath to ignore the fact that one of the greatest of the American
Powers is not included in it.' The _New Republic_ went further ...
'Pan-Americanism,' it declared, 'is a tripod that cannot stand on two
legs for ever. Only a combination of the Latin countries, the United
States and Great Britain, that is to say a combination of all the
American Powers, can make it a safe and useful organization in the world
to-day.'"
There is nothing new in this idea; for Bolívar, with singular
magnanimity, invited Great Britain and the Kingdom of the Netherlands to
send delegates to the Pan-American Congress which he attempted to
assemble at Panamá in 1826: the circumstances of the time precluded an
invitation to France. And now that Brazil and Cuba sit at the
council-board of the Allies in Paris, a conception, which seemed
feasible a century ago to a great imaginative mind, may perhaps not seem
so very remote to a practical mind today. For the present epoch has
brought home to all Americans of both continents a fact which has long
been known to Canadians and Englishmen, namely that the ocean is no
estranging gulf between nations. Today it is known that the geographical
boundary which divides the peoples into two categories and separates the
Old World of force from the New World of reason is not the Atlantic but
the Rhine. Thus now, more than ever, does it seem a little incongruous
that Washington should deny to Ottawa a community of American interests
which is conceded to Caracas, Asunción and La Paz.
Yet the scheme thus adumbrated is not at the present time clearly in
sight. The inclusion of Canada would reverse the system which now
confines Pan-Americanism to those states which have thrown off all
political connexion with Europe together with all monarchical forms.
Moreover, new and large combinations must keep within manageable limits.
Yet it is significant that a Uruguayan public man, Señor Lopez Lomba, is
now vigorously agitating, in Paris and in South America, for the
formation of a Pan-Atlantic Union, wherein the three great Atlantic
Powers, Britain, France and the United States, are to combine with the
Latin-American states, in order to wield with full effect that economic
weapon which is to decide the world conflict. A combination formed for
an immediate purpose may well have further and larger results. It is an
interesting speculation whether, in some not very remote future, the
daughter nations of the Iberian Peninsula may not be drawn into a wide
circle of understanding with Britain and her daughter nations. Thus,
that grouping of the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon peoples, which has been
formed under stress of war, might continue its beneficent working
through generations of peace. Portugal and Brazil, Great Britain and the
United States stand side by side. Most of the daughter nations of Spain
have ranged themselves in the same ranks, beside France, their
intellectual foster-mother. Spain may yet re-discover herself and her
true place in the comity of nations. At all events it is a great thing
to have proved that the line dividing freedom from autocracy does not
divide the peoples of the New World from their mother Europe, or
preclude the whole of the former from joining any great international
league such as the future may have in store for succeeding generations.
FOOTNOTES:
[4] Notably an article by Mr Pratt, Chief of the United States Bureau of
Commerce, in the _Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political
Science_.
[5] Bulletin of the Pan-American Union, March 1918.
[6] Mr Pepper, former Foreign Trade Adviser to the United States
Government, writing in the _Annals of the American Academy of Social and
Political Science_.
LATIN-AMERICAN REPUBLICS
DATES OF INDEPENDENCE
The struggle of the Latin-American States for independence, viewed as a
whole, extended from 1810 to 1824 and was marked by many vicissitudes.
Buenos Aires, with most of the Argentine Provinces, practically achieved
independence in 1810, but did not formally proclaim it till 1816.
Paraguay detached herself both from Spain and from the Argentine
Provinces in 1811. Spanish authority was overthrown in Montevideo in
1814; but it was not until 1828 that that city was recognised as capital
of an independent Republic, now known as the Republic of Uruguay. Chile
practically achieved independence in 1818. New Granada, Venezuela and
Quito were successively liberated from the Spaniards in 1819-22; and
these three countries were united for a few years under the name of
Colombia: but in 1829-30 this union broke up into the three Republics of
Venezuela, Ecuador and New Granada (now known as Colombia). In 1824 the
battle of Ayacucho gave independence to Peru; and the province of Upper
Peru was formed into the Republic of Bolivia. The Brazilian monarchy
became independent in 1821, and was converted into a Republic in 1889.
Mexico became independent in 1821, and adopted Republican forms in 1823.
The five provinces to the south-east of Mexico united in 1824 to form a
Federal Republic under the name of Central America; but in 1839 this
unstable union broke up into the five Republics of Guatemala, Honduras,
Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. In consequence of events in France,
the island of Haiti became independent in 1803; but Spain occupied the
eastern part, Santo Domingo, in 1806 and held it for 16 years. The
island formed one state from 1822 to 1844, in which year it was divided
into the two existing Republics of Santo Domingo and Haiti. Cuba was
separated from the Spanish monarchy and formed into a Republic in 1899.
The province of Panamá seceded from Colombia in 1903 and became a
separate Republic.
* * * * *
Since external recognition is an essential condition of complete
independence, it may here be added that in 1822 the United States
recognised the independence of Colombia, Chile, Buenos Aires and Mexico;
and in January 1825 Great Britain recognised the independence of Buenos
Aires, Colombia and Mexico. This formal recognition was preceded by
amicable intercourse, by the dispatch of consuls, by relations of a
commercial and semi-official kind, and by diplomatic action which gave
countenance and support to the insurgent governments.
PRESENT STATUS (AUGUST 1918) AS TOWARDS THE WAR
The following states have declared war with Germany: Brazil, Cuba,
Panamá, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras.
Uruguay has broken off diplomatic relations with Germany, rescinded her
edict of neutrality, offered the use of her ports to the warships of the
Allies, and seized the German ships in her harbours.
Peru has broken off relations with Germany, offered the use of her ports
to the Allies and seized the German ships at Callao.
Bolivia, Ecuador and Santo Domingo have broken off relations with
Germany. The exact position of Santo Domingo is not easy to define.
Since May 1916, the administration of that Republic has been practically
controlled by the United States; and this intimate connexion with a
belligerent power may perhaps be regarded as constituting a state of
belligerency for the Dominican Republic.
Mexico, Salvador, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Argentina and Paraguay
maintain their neutrality and their diplomatic relations with Germany.
CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY
J. B. PEACE, M.A.,
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
[Illustration: SPANISH & PORTUGUESE SETTLEMENTS IN AMERICA]
[Illustration: THE LATIN-AMERICAN REPUBLICS]
* * * * *
Transcriber's Notes:
Unusual punctuation and spellings retained when used consistently (for
example, dispatch and despatch); otherwise changed to majority use, with
the following exceptions:
P. 24: Greek word transliterated ~apoikia~ appears as Greek script in
original. See utf8 or html for original script.
P. 76: hyphenated "to-day" retained, as quoted from other print source.
P. 76: "organization" retained, as quoted from other print source.
End of Project Gutenberg's South America and the War, by F. A. Kirkpatrick