CHAPTER III.

_THE DOCTRINE CONDEMNED IN THE PASTORAL EPISTLES A JEWISH FORM OF

GNOSTICISM.--THE GNOSTIC'S PROBLEM._

"As I exhorted thee to tarry at Ephesus, when I was going into

Macedonia, that thou mightest charge certain men not to teach a

different doctrine, neither to give heed to fables and endless

genealogies, the which minister questionings, rather than a

dispensation of God which is in faith; so do I now"--_1 Tim._ i. 2,

3.

This Epistle falls into two main divisions, of which the first continues

down to the 13th verse of chap. iii. It treats of three different

subjects: Christian doctrine; Christian worship; and the Christian

ministry. The first of these three subjects is introduced in the words

of the text, which in the original form an incomplete sentence. The last

four words, "so do I now," are not expressed in the Greek. But something

must be supplied to complete the sense; and it is more natural to

understand with the Revisers "So do I now exhort thee," than with the A.

V. "So do thou tarry at Ephesus." But the question is not of great

moment and cannot be decided with absolute certainty. It is of more

importance to enquire what was the nature of the "different doctrine"

which Timothy was to endeavour to counteract. And on this point we are

not left in serious doubt. There are various expressions used respecting

it in these two letters to Timothy which seem to point to two factors

in the heterodoxy about which St. Paul is anxious. It is clear that the

error is Jewish in origin; and it is almost equally clear that it is

Gnostic as well. The evidence of the letter to Titus tends materially to

confirm these conclusions.

(1) The heresy is _Jewish_ in character. Its promoters "desire to be

teachers of the Law" (ver. 7). Some of them are "they of the

circumcision" (Tit. i. 10). It consists in "Jewish fables" (Tit. i. 14).

The questions which it raises are "fightings about the Law" (Tit. iii.

9).

(2) Its _Gnostic_ character is also indicated. We are told both in the

text and in the Epistle to Titus (i. 14; iii. 9) that it deals in

"fables and genealogies." It is "empty talking" (ver. 6), "disputes of

words" (vi. 4), and "profane babblings" (vi. 20). It teaches, an

unscriptural and unnatural asceticism (iv. 3, 8). It is "Gnosis falsely

so called" (vi. 20).

A heresy containing these two elements, Judaism and Gnosticism, meets us

both before and after the period covered by the Pastoral Epistles:

before in the Epistle to the Colossians; afterwards in the Epistles of

Ignatius. The evidence gathered from these three sources is entirely in

harmony with what we learn elsewhere--that the earliest forms of

Christian Gnosticism were Jewish in character. It will be observed that

this is indirect confirmation of the genuineness of the Pastoral

Epistles. The Gnosticism condemned in them is Jewish; and any form of

Gnosticism that was in existence in St. Paul's time would almost

certainly be Jewish.[12]

Professor Godet has pointed out how entirely the relation of Judaism to

Christianity which is implied in these Epistles, fits in with their

being the last group of Epistles written by St. Paul. At first, Judaism

was entirely outside the Church, opposing and blaspheming. Then it

entered the Church and tried to make the Church Jewish, by foisting the

Mosaic Law upon it. Lastly, it becomes a fantastic heresy inside the

Church, and sinks into profane frivolity. "Pretended revelations are

given as to the names and genealogies of angels; absurd ascetic rules

are laid down as counsels of perfection, while daring immorality defaces

the actual life."[13] This is the phase which is confronted in the

Pastoral Epistles: and St. Paul meets it with a simple appeal to faith

and morality.

It is quite possible that the "fables," or "myths," and "genealogies"

ought to be transferred from the Gnostic to the Jewish side of the

account. And thus Chrysostom interprets the passage. "By fables he does

not mean the Law; far from it; but inventions and forgeries, and

counterfeit doctrines. For, it seems, the Jews wasted their whole

discourse on these unprofitable points. They numbered up their fathers

and grandfathers, that they might have the reputation of historical

knowledge and research." The "fables" then, may be understood to be

those numerous legends which the Jews added to the Old Testament,

specimens of which abound in the Talmud. But similar myths abound in

Gnostic systems, and therefore "fables" may represent _both_ elements of

the heterodox teaching. So also with the "endless genealogies." These

cannot well refer to the genealogies in Genesis, for they are not

endless, each of them being arranged in tens. But it is quite possible

that Jewish speculations about the genealogies of angels may be meant.

Such things, being purely imaginary, would be endless. Or the Gnostic

doctrine of emanations, in its earlier and cruder forms, may be

intended. By genealogies in this sense early thinkers, especially in the

East, tried to bridge the chasm between the Infinite and the Finite,

between God and creation. In various systems it is assumed that matter

is inherently evil. The material universe has been from the beginning

not "very good" but very bad. How then can it be believed that the

Supreme Being, infinite in goodness, would create such a thing? This is

incredible: the world must be the creature of some inferior and perhaps

evil being. But when this was conceded, the distance between this

inferior power and the supreme God still remained to be bridged. This,

it was supposed, might be done by an indefinite number of generations,

each lower in dignity than the preceding one, until at last a being

capable of creating the universe was found. From the Supreme God

emanated an inferior deity, and from this lower power a third still more

inferior; and so on, until the Creator of the world was reached. These

ideas are found in the Jewish philosopher Philo; and it is to these that

St. Paul probably alludes in the "endless genealogies which minister

questionings rather than a dispensation of God." The idea that matter is

evil dominates the whole philosophy of Philo. He endeavoured to

reconcile this with the Old Testament, by supposing that matter is

eternal; and that it was out of pre-existing material that God, acting

through His creative powers, made the world which He pronounced to be

"very good." These powers are sometimes regarded as the angels,

sometimes as existences scarcely personal. But they have no existence

apart from their source, any more than a ray apart from the sun. They

are now the instruments of God's Providence, as formerly of His creative

power.

St. Paul condemns such speculations on four grounds. (1) They are

_fables_, myths, mere imaginings of the human intellect in its attempt

to account for the origin of the world and the origin of evil. (2) They

are _endless_ and interminable. From the nature of things there is no

limit to mere guesswork of this kind. Every new speculator may invent a

fresh genealogy of emanations in his theory of creation, and may make it

any length that he pleases. If hypotheses need never be verified,--need

not even be _capable_ of verification,--one may go on constructing them

_ad infinitum_. (3) As a natural consequence of this (=haitines=) they

_minister questionings_ and nothing better. It is all barren speculation

and fruitless controversy. Where any one may assert without proof, any

one else may contradict without proof; and nothing comes of this see-saw

of affirmation and negation. (4) Lastly, these vain imaginings are _a

different doctrine_. They are not only empty but untrue, and are a

hindrance to the truth. They occupy the ground which ought to be filled

with the _dispensation of God which is in faith_. Human minds are

limited in their capacity, and, even if these empty hypotheses were

innocent, minds that were filled with them would have little room left

for the truth. But they are not innocent: and those who are attracted by

them become disaffected towards the truth. It is impossible to love

both, for the two are opposed to one another. These fables are

baseless; they have no foundation either in revelation or in human life.

Moreover they are vague, shifting, and incoherent. They ramble on

without end. But the Gospel is based on a Divine Revelation, tested by

human experience. It is an economy, a system, an organic whole, a

dispensation of means to ends. Its sphere is not unbridled imagination

or audacious curiosity, but faith.

The history of the next hundred and fifty years amply justifies the

anxiety and severity of St. Paul. The germs of Gnostic error, which were

in the air when Christianity was first preached, fructified with amazing

rapidity. It would be hard to find a parallel in the history of

philosophy to the speed with which Gnostic views spread in and around

Christendom between A.D. 70 and 220. Eusebius tells us that, as soon as

the Apostles and those who had listened "with their own ears to their

inspired wisdom had passed away, then the conspiracy of godless error

took its rise through the deceit of false teachers, who (now that none

of the Apostles was any longer left) henceforth endeavoured with brazen

face to preach their _knowledge falsely so called_ in opposition to the

preaching of the truth."[14] Throughout the Christian world, and

especially in intellectual centres such as Ephesus, Alexandria and Rome,

there was perhaps not a single educated congregation which did not

contain persons who were infected with some form of Gnosticism. Jerome's

famous hyperbole respecting Arianism might be transferred to this

earlier form of error, perhaps the most perilous that the Church has

ever known: "The whole world groaned and was amazed to find itself

_Gnostic_."

However severely we may condemn these speculations, we cannot but

sympathize with the perplexities which produced them. The origin of the

universe, and still more the origin of evil, still remain unsolved

problems. No one in this life is ever likely to reach a complete

solution of either. What is the origin of the material universe? To

assume that it is not a creature, but that matter is eternal, is to make

two first principles, one spiritual and one material; and this is

perilously near making two Gods. But the belief that God made the world

is by no means free from difficulty. What was His motive in making the

world? Was His perfection increased by it? Then God was once not fully

perfect. Was His perfection diminished by the act of creation? Then God

is now not fully perfect; and how can we suppose that He would

voluntarily surrender anything of His absolute perfection? Was God

neither the better nor the worse for the creation of the universe? Then

the original question returns with its full force: What induced Him to

create it? We cannot suppose that creation was an act of caprice. No

complete answer to this enigma is possible for us. One thing we

know;--that _God is light_ and that _God is love_. And we may be sure

that in exercising His creative power He was manifesting His perfect

wisdom and His exhaustless affection.

But will the knowledge that _God is light_ and that _God is love_ help

us to even a partial solution of that problem which has wrung the souls

of countless saints and thinkers with anguish--the problem of the origin

of evil? How could a God who is perfectly wise and perfectly good, make

it possible for evil to arise, and allow it to continue after it had

arisen? Once more the suggestion that there are two First Principles

presents itself, but in a more terrible form. Before, it was the thought

that there are two co-eternal Existences, God and Matter. Now, it is the

suggestion that there are two co-eternal, and perhaps co-equal Powers,

Good and Evil. This hypothesis, impossible for a Christian and rejected

by John Stuart Mill,[15] creates more difficulties than it solves. But,

if this is the wrong answer, what is the right one? Cardinal Newman, in

one of the most striking passages even in his works, has told us how the

problem presents itself to him. "Starting then with the being of God

(which, as I have said, is as certain to me as the certainty of my own

existence, though when I try to put the grounds of that certainty into

logical shape, I find difficulty in doing so in mood and figure to my

satisfaction), I look out of myself into the world of men, and there I

see a sight which fills me with unspeakable distress. The world seems

simply to give the lie to that great truth, of which my whole being is

so full; and the effect upon me is, in consequence, as a matter of

necessity, as confusing as if it denied that I am in existence myself.

_If I looked into a mirror, and did not see my face, I should have the

sort of feeling which actually comes upon me, when I look into this

living busy world and see no reflection of its Creator._ This is, to me,

one of the great difficulties of this absolute primary truth, to which I

referred just now. Were it not for this voice, speaking so clearly in my

conscience and my heart, I should be an atheist, or a pantheist, or a

polytheist, when I looked into the world. I am speaking for myself only;

and I am far from denying the real force of the arguments in proof of a

God, drawn from the general facts of human society, but these do not

warm me or enlighten me; they do not take away the winter of my

desolation, or make the buds unfold and the leaves grow within me, and

my moral being rejoice. The sight of the world is nothing else than the

prophet's scroll full of 'lamentations, and mourning, and woe.' ... What

shall be said to this heart-piercing, reason-bewildering fact? I can

only answer, that either there is no Creator, or this living society of

men is in a true sense discarded from His presence. Did I see a boy of

good make and mind, with the tokens on him of a refined nature, cast

upon the world without provision, unable to say whence he came, his

birthplace or his family connexions, I should conclude that there was

some mystery connected with his history, and that he was one, of whom,

from one cause or other, his parents were ashamed. Thus only should I be

able to account for the contrast between the promise and condition of

his being. And so I argue about the world;--_if_ there be a God, _since_

there is a God, the human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal

calamity. It is out of joint with the purposes of its Creator. This is a

fact, a fact as true as the fact of its existence; and thus the doctrine

of what is theologically called original sin becomes to me almost as

certain as that the world exists, and as the existence of God."[16]

But this only carries us a short way towards a solution. Why did God

allow the "aboriginal calamity" of sin to be possible? This was the

Gnostic's difficulty, and it is our difficulty still. Can we say more

than this by way of an answer? God willed that angels and men should

honour Him with a voluntary and not a mechanical service. If they

obeyed Him, it should be of their own free will, and not of necessity.

It should be possible to them to refuse service and obedience. In short,

God willed to be reverenced and worshipped, and not merely served and

obeyed. A machine can render service; and a person under the influence

of mesmerism may be forced to obey. But do we not all feel that the

voluntary service of a conscious and willing agent, who prefers to

render rather than to withhold his service, is a nobler thing both for

him who gives, and him who receives it? Compulsory labour is apt to turn

the servant into a slave and the master into a tyrant. We see,

therefore, a reason why the Creator in creating conscious beings made

them also moral; made them capable of obeying Him of their own free

will, and therefore also capable of disobeying Him. In other words, He

made sin, with all its consequences, possible. Then it became merely a

question of historical fact whether any angelic or human being would

ever abuse his freedom by choosing to disobey. That "aboriginal

calamity," we know, has taken place; and all the moral and physical evil

which now exists in the world, is the natural consequence of it.

This is, perhaps, the best solution that the human mind is likely to

discover, respecting this primeval and terrible mystery. But it is only

a partial solution; and the knowledge that we have still not attained to

a complete answer to the question which perplexed the early Gnostics,

ought to banish from our minds anything like arrogance or contempt, when

we condemn their answer as unchristian and inadequate. "The end of the

charge" which has been given to us is not the condemnation of others,

but "love out of a pure heart and a good conscience and faith

unfeigned."

FOOTNOTES:

[12] F. C. Baur himself contends that the false teachers here condemned

are "Judaizing Gnostics, who put forth their figurative interpretation

of the Law as true knowledge of the Law. Such were the earlier Gnostics,

such as the Ophites and Saturninus" (_Protestant Commentary_, note on 1

Tim. i. 7).

[13] _Expositor_, July, 1888, p. 42.

[14] _H. E._, VI, xxxii. 8.

[15] _Three Essays on Religion_, pp. 185, 186.

[16] _Apologia pro Vita Sua_ (Longmans, 1864), pp. 376-379.

The Expositor's Bible: The Pastoral Epistles · 第 3 / 37 章