powers, and that a king needs a more divine character, as indeed Plato too
used to say. And now I will write out a passage from Aristotle to the same
effect, not “bringing owls to the Athenians,”(404) but in order to show
you that I do not entirely neglect his writings. In his political
treatises he says: “Now even if one maintain the principle that it is best
for cities to be governed by a king, how will it be about his children?
Ought his children to succeed him? And yet if they prove to be no better
than anybody else, that would be a bad thing for the city. But you may
say, though he has the power he will not leave the succession to his
children? It is difficult indeed to believe that he will not; for that
would be too hard for him, and demands a virtue greater than belongs to
human nature.”(405) And later on, when he is describing a so‐called king
who rules according to law, and says that he is both the servant and
guardian of the laws, he does not call him a king at all, nor does he
consider such a king as a distinct form of government; and he goes on to
say: “Now as for what is called absolute monarchy, that is to say, when a
king governs all other men according to his own will, some people think
that it is not in accordance with the nature of things for one man to have
absolute authority over all the citizens; since those who are by nature
equal must necessarily have the same rights.”(406) Again, a little later
he says: “It seems, therefore, that he who bids Reason rule is really
preferring the rule of God and the laws, but he who bids man rule, adds an
element of the beast. For desire is a wild beast, and passion which warps
even the best men. It follows, therefore, that law is Reason exempt from
desire.” You see the philosopher seems here clearly to distrust and
condemn human nature. For he says so in so many words when he asserts that
human nature is in no case worthy of such an excess of fortune. For he
thinks that it is too hard for one who is merely human to prefer the
general weal of the citizens to his own children; he says that it is not
just that one man should rule over many who are his equals; and, finally,
he puts the finishing stroke(407) to what he has just said when he asserts
that “law is Reason exempt from desire,” and that political affairs ought
to be entrusted to Reason alone, and not to any individual man whatever.
For the reason that is in men, however good they may be, is entangled with
passion and desire, those most ferocious monsters. These opinions, it
seems to me, harmonise perfectly with Plato’s; first, that he who governs
ought to be superior to his subjects and surpass them not only in his
acquired habits but also in natural endowment; a thing which is not easy
to find among men;... thirdly, that he ought by every means in his power
to observe the laws, not those that were framed to meet some sudden
emergency, or established, as now appears, by men whose lives were not
wholly guided by reason; but he must observe them only in case the
lawgiver, having purified his mind and soul, in enacting those laws keeps
in view not merely the crimes of the moment or immediate contingencies;
but rather recognises the nature of government and the essential nature of
justice, and has carefully observed also the essential nature of guilt,
and then applies to his task all the knowledge thus derived, and frames
laws which have a general application to all the citizens without regard
to friend or foe, neighbour or kinsman. And it is better that such a
lawgiver should frame and promulgate his laws not for his contemporaries
only but for posterity also, or for strangers with whom he neither has nor
expects to have any private dealings. For instance, I hear that the wise
Solon, having consulted his friends about the cancelling of debts,
furnished them with an opportunity to make money, but brought on himself a
disgraceful accusation.(408) So hard is it to avoid such fatalities, even
when a man brings a passionless mind to the task of governing.)
Ἃ δεδιὼς ἐγὼ πολλάκις εἰκότως ἐπαινῶ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν βίον, καὶ σοὶ
πειθόμενος μάλιστα ταῦτα ἐγὼ διανοοῦμαι, οὐχ ὅτι μοι τὸν ζῆλον πρὸς
ἐκείνους μόνον ἔφης προκεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας, Σόλωνα καὶ Λυκοῦργον καὶ
Πιττακόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι μεταβῆναί με φὴς ἐκ τῆς ὑποστέγου φιλοσοφίας πρὸς
τὴν ὑπαίθριον. [263] ὥσπερ οὖν, εἰ τῷ χαλεπῶς καὶ μόλις ὑγιείας ἕνεκα τῆς
αὑτοῦ γυμναζομένῳ μετρίως οἴκαδε προύλεγες, ὅτι “Νῦν ἥκεις εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν
καὶ μεταβέβηκας ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ δωματίῳ παλαίστρας ἐπὶ τὸ στάδιον τοῦ Διός,
οὗ θεατὰς ἕξεις τούς τε ἁπανταχόθεν Ἕλληνας καὶ πρώτους γε τοὺς σαυτοῦ
πολίτας, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀγωνίζεσθαι χρή, τινὰς δὲ καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, οὓς ἐκπλῆξαι
χρεών, φοβερωτέραν αὐτοῖς τὴν πατρίδα όο γε εἰς σὲ νῦν ἧκον ἐπιδείξαντα,”
κατέβαλες ἂν εὐθέως καὶ τρέμειν ἐποίησας πρὸ τῆς ἀγωνίας· [B] οὕτω κἀμὲ
νῦν νόμιζε διατεθῆναι τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων εἴτε
ὀρθῶς ἔγνωκα νῦν εἴτε ἐν μέρει σφάλλομαι τοῦ προσήκοντος εἴτε καὶ τοῦ
παντὸς διαμαρτάνω, διδάξεις αὐτίκα μάλα.
(And since this sort of thing is what I dread, it is natural that I should
often dwell on the advantages of my previous mode of life, and I am but
obeying you when I reflect that you said not only that I must emulate
those famous men Solon, Lycurgus and Pittacus, but also that I must now
quit the shades of philosophy for the open air. This is as though you had
announced to a man who for his health’s sake and by exerting himself to
the utmost was able to take moderate exercise at home: “Now you have come
to Olympia and have exchanged the gymnasium in your house for the stadium
of Zeus, where you will have for spectators Greeks who have come from all
parts, and foremost among them your own fellow‐citizens, on whose behalf
you must enter the lists; and certain barbarians will be there also whom
it is your duty to impress, showing them your fatherland in as formidable
a light as lies in your power.” You would have disconcerted him at once
and made him nervous before the games began. You may now suppose that I
have been affected in the same manner by just such words from you. And you
will very soon inform me whether my present view is correct, or whether I
am in part deceived as to my proper course or whether indeed I am wholly
mistaken.)
[C] Ὑπὲρ δὲ ὧν ἀπορῆσαί μοι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τὴν σὴν παρέστη, ὦ φίλη
κεφαλὴ καὶ πάσης ἔμοιγε τιμῆς ἀξία, βούλομαι δηλῶσαι· σαφέστερον γάρ πως
ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμῶ μαθεῖν. ἔφησθα ὅτι τὸν ἐν τῇ πράξει παρὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον
ἐπαινεῖς βίον, καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν σοφὸν ἐκάλεις μάρτυρα, τὴν
εὐδαιμονίαν ἐν τῷ πράττειν εὖ τιθέμενον, καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν σκοποῦντα τοῦ τε
πολιτικοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ θεωρίᾳ ζωῆς, διαπορεῖν ἄττα περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ
τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐν ἄλλοις προτιμᾶν, ἐπαινεῖν δὲ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς τῶν καλῶν
πράξεων ἀρχιτέκτονας. [D] τούτους δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν εἶναι φὴς τοὺς βασιλέας,
Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ εἴρηκεν οὐδαμοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπὸ σοῦ προστεθεῖσαν λέξιν, πλέον
δὲ θάτερον ἐξ ὧν παραγέγραφας ἄν τις νοήσειε. τὸ γὰρ “Μάλιστα δὲ πράττειν
λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις
ἀρχιτέκτονας” εἰς τοὺς νομοθέτας καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς φιλοσόφους καὶ πάντας
ἁπλῶς τοὺς νῷ τε καὶ λόγῳ πράττοντας, οὐχὶ δὲ εἰς τοὺς αὐτουργοὺς [264]
καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων ἐργάτας εἰρῆσθαι νομιστέον· οἷς οὐκ ἀπόχρη μόνον
ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ κατανοῆσαι καὶ τὸ πρακτέον τοῖς ἄλλοις φράσαι, προσήκει δὲ
αὐτοῖς ἕκαστα μεταχειρίζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν ὧν οἱ νόμοι διαγορεύουσι καὶ
πολλάκις οἱ καιροὶ προσαναγκάζουσι, πλὴν εἰ μὴ τὸν ἀρχιτέκτονα καλοῦμεν,
καθάπερ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἡρακλέα καλεῖν εἴωθεν ἐν τῇ ποιήσει “μεγάλων ἐπιίστορα
ἔργων,” αὐτουργότατον ἁπάντων γενόμενον.
(But I should like to make clear to you the points in your letter by which
I am puzzled, my dearest friend to whom I especially am bound to pay every
honour: for I am eager to be more precisely informed about them. You said
that you approve a life of action rather than the philosophic life, and
you called to witness the wise Aristotle who defines happiness as virtuous
activity, and discussing the difference between the statesman’s life and
the life of contemplation, showed a certain hesitation about those lives,
and though in others of his writings he preferred the contemplative life,
in this place you say he approves the architects of noble actions. But it
is you who assert that these are kings, whereas Aristotle does not speak
in the sense of the words that you have introduced: and from what you have
quoted one would rather infer the contrary. For when he says: “We most
correctly use the word ‘act’ of those who are the architects of public
affairs by virtue of their intelligence,”(409) we must suppose that what
he says applies to lawgivers and political philosophers and all whose
activity consists in the use of intelligence and reason, but that it does
not apply to those who do the work themselves and those who transact the
business of politics. But in their case it is not enough that they should
consider and devise and instruct others as to what must be done, but it is
their duty to undertake and execute whatever the laws ordain and
circumstances as well often force them; unless indeed we call that man an
architect who is “well versed in mighty deeds,”(410) a phrase which Homer
in his poems usually applies to Heracles, who was indeed of all men that
ever lived most given to do the work himself.)
[B] Εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθὲς ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἢ καὶ μόνον ἐν τῇ πράττειν τὰ κοινά
φαμεν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς κυρίους(411) ὄντας καὶ βασιλεύοντας πολλῶν, τί ποτε
περὶ Σωκράτους ἐροῦμεν; Πυθαγόραν δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ τὸν Κλαζομένιον
Ἀναξαγόραν ἴσως διὰ τὴν θεωρίαν κατ᾽ ἄλλο φήσεις εὐδαίμονας· Σωκράτης δὲ
τὴν θεωρίαν παραιτησάμενος καὶ τὸν πρακτικὸν ἀγαπήσας βίον οὐδὲ τῆς
γαμετῆς ἦν τῆς αὑτοῦ κύριος οὐδὲ τοῦ παιδός· [C] ἦπού γε δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν
πολιτῶν ἐκείνῳ κρατεῖν ὑπῆρχεν; ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἦν ἐκεῖνος πρακτικός, ἐπεὶ
μηδενὸς ἦν κύριος; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν Ἀλεξάνδρου φημὶ μείζονα τὸν Σωφρονίσκου
κατεργάσασθαι, τὴν Πλάτωνος αὐτῷ σοφίαν ἀνατιθείς, τὴν Ξενοφῶντος
στρατηγίαν, τὴν Ἀντισθένους ἀνδρείαν, τὴν Ἐρετρικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὴν
Μεγαρικήν, τὸν Κέβητα, τὸν Σιμμίαν, [D] τὸν Φαίδωνα, μυρίους ἄλλους· καὶ
οὔπω φημὶ τὰς γενομένας ἡμῖν ἐνθένδ᾽ ἀποικίας, τὸ Λύκειον, τὴν Στοάν, τὰς
Ἀκαδημείας. τίς οὖν ἐσώθη διὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου νίκην; τίς πόλις ἄμεινον
ᾠκήθη; τίς αὑτοῦ γέγονε βελτίων ἰδιώτης ἀνήρ; πλουσιωτέρους μὲν γὰρ
πολλοὺς ἂν εὕροις, σοφώτερον δὲ οὐδένα οὐδὲ σωφρονέστερον αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ, εἰ
μὴ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀλαζόνα καὶ ὑπερόπτην. ὅσοι δὲ σώζονται νῦν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας,
διὰ τὸν Σωκράτη σώζονται. καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐγὼ μόνος, [265] Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ
πρότερος(412) ἔοικεν ἐννοήσας εἰπεῖν, ὅτι μὴ μεῖον αὐτῷ προσήκει φρονεῖν
ἐπὶ τῆς θεολογικῇ συγγραφῇ τοῦ καθελόντος τὴν Περσῶν δύναμιν. καί μοι
δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνος ὀρθῶς ξυννοῆσαι· νικᾶν μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρείας ἐστὶ μάλιστα
καὶ τῆς τύχης, κείσθω δέ, εἰ βούλει, καὶ τῆς ἐντρεχοῦς ταύτης φρονήσεως,
ἀληθεῖς δὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξας ἀναλαβεῖν οὐκ ἀρετῆς μόνον τῆς τελείας
ἔργον ἐστίν, [B] ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιστήσειεν ἄν τις εἰκότως, πότερον χρὴ τὸν τοιοῦτον
ἄνδρα ἢ θεὸν καλεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ λεγόμενον, ὅτι πέφυκεν ἕκαστον
ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων γνωρίζεσθαι, τὴν θείαν οὐσίαν ὁ γνωρίσας θεῖός τις ἂν
εἰκότως νομίζοιτο.
(But if we conceive this to be true, or that only those are happy who
administer public affairs and who are in authority and rule over many,
what then are we to say about Socrates? As for Pythagoras and Democritus
and Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, you will perhaps say that they were happy in
another sense of the word, because of their philosophic speculations. But
as for Socrates who, having rejected the speculative life and embraced a
life of action, had no authority over his own wife or his son, can we say
of him that he governed even two or three of his fellow‐citizens? Then
will you assert that since he had no authority over any one he
accomplished nothing? On the contrary I maintain that the son of
Sophroniscus(413) performed greater tasks than Alexander, for to him I
ascribe the wisdom of Plato, the generalship of Xenophon, the fortitude of
Antisthenes, the Eretrian(414) and Megarian(415) philosophies, Cebes,
Simmias,(416) Phaedo and a host of others; not to mention the offshoots
derived from the same source, the Lyceum, the Stoa and the Academies. Who,
I ask, ever found salvation through the conquests of Alexander? What city
was ever more wisely governed because of them, what individual improved?
Many indeed you might find whom those conquests enriched, but not one whom
they made wiser or more temperate than he was by nature, if indeed they
have not made him more insolent and arrogant. Whereas all who now find
their salvation in philosophy owe it to Socrates. And I am not the only
person to perceive this fact and to express it, for Aristotle it seems did
so before me, when he said that he had just as much right to be proud of
his treatise on the gods as the conqueror(417) of the Persian empire. And
I think he was perfectly correct in that conclusion. For military success
is due to courage and good fortune more than anything else or, let us say,
if you wish, to intelligence as well, though of the common everyday sort.
But to conceive true opinions about God is an achievement that not only
requires perfect virtue, but one might well hesitate whether it be proper
to call one who attains to this a man or a god. For if the saying is true
that it is the nature of everything to become known to those who have an
affinity with it, then he who comes to know the essential nature of God
would naturally be considered divine.)
Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ πάλιν ἐοίκαμεν εἰς τὸν θεωρηματικὸν ὁρμήσαντες βίον τούτῳ
παραβάλλειν τὸν πρακτικόν, ἐξ ἐρχῆς παραιτησαμένου καὶ σοῦ τὴν σύγκρισιν,
[C] αὐτῶν ἐκείνων, ὧν ἐπεμνήσθης, Ἀρείου, Νικολάου, Θρασύλλου καὶ
Μουσωνίου μνημονεύσω. τούτων γὰρ οὐχ ὅπως τις ἦν κύριος τῆς αὑτοῦ πόλεως,
ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν Ἄρειος, ὡς φασί, καὶ διδομένην αὐτῷ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἐπιτροπεῦσαι
παρῃτήσατο, Θράσυλλος δὲ Τιβερίῳ πικρῷ καὶ φύσει χαλεπῷ τυράννῳ
ξυγγενόμενος, εἰ μὴ διὰ τῶν καταλειφθέντων ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ λόγων ἀπελογήσατο,
δείξας ὅστις ἦν, [D] ὦφλεν ἂν εἰς τέλος αἰσχύνην ἀναπάλλακτον, οὕτως αὐτὸν
οὐδὲν ὤνησεν ἡ πολιτεία, Νικόλαος δὲ πράξεων μὲν οὐ μεγάλων αὐτουργὸς
γέγονε γνώριμος δέ ἐστι μὰλλον διὰ τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν λόγους, καὶ Μουσώνιος
ἐξ ὧν ἔπαθεν ἀνδρείως καὶ νὴ Δί᾽ ἤνεγκεν ἐγκρατῶς τὴν τῶν τυράννων ὠμότητα
γέγονε γνώριμος, ἴσως οὐκ ἔλαττον εὐδαιμονῶν ἐκείνων τῶν τὰς μεγάλας
ἐπιτροπευσάντων βασιλείας. Ἄρειος δὲ ὁ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν [266] τῆς Αἰγύπτου
παραιτησάμενος ἑκὼν αὑτὸν ἀπεστέρει τοῦ κρατίστου τέλους εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ᾤετο
κυριώτατον. σὺ δὲ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν ἄπρακτος εἶ, μήτε στρατηγῶν μήτε δημηγορῶν
μήτε ἔθνους ἢ πόλεως ἄρχων; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν φαίη νοῦν ἔχων ἁνήρ. ἔξεστι γάρ
σοι φιλοσόφους πολλοὺς ἀποφήναντι, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας μείζονα τὸν
βίον εὐεργετῆσαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πολλῶν ὁμοῦ βασιλέων. [B] οὐ μικρᾶς γὰρ
μερίδος ὁ φιλόσοφος προέστηκεν, οὐδέ, καθάπερ ἔφης, συμβουλῆς ἐστι μόνης
τῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ἐκεῖνος κύριος, οὐδὲ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς λόγον αὖθις αὐτῷ
περιίσταται, ἔργῳ δὲ βεβαιῶν τοὺς λόγους καὶ φαινόμενος τοιοῦτος, ὁποίους
βούλεται τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι, πιθανώτερος ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ πράττειν
ἀνυσιμώτερος τῶν ἐξ ἐπιτάγματος [C] ἐπὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις παρορμώντων.
(But since I seem to have harked back to the life of contemplation and to
be comparing it with the life of action, though in the beginning of your
letter you declined to make the comparison, I will remind you of those
very philosophers whom you mentioned, Areius,(418) Nicolaus,(419)
Thrasyllus,(420) and Musonius.(421) So far from any one of these governing
his own city, Areius we are told refused the governorship of Egypt when it
was offered to him, and Thrasyllus by becoming intimate with the harsh and
naturally cruel tyrant Tiberius would have incurred indelible disgrace for
all time, had he not cleared himself in the writings that he left behind
him and so shown his true character; so little did his public career
benefit him. Nicolaus did not personally do any great deeds, and he is
known rather by his writings about such deeds; while Musonius became
famous because he bore his sufferings with courage, and, by Zeus,
sustained with firmness the cruelty of tyrants; and perhaps he was not
less happy than those who administered great kingdoms. As for Areius, when
he declined the governorship of Egypt he deliberately deprived himself of
the highest end, if he really thought that this was the most important
thing. And you yourself,—may I ask, do you lead an inactive life because
you are not a general or a public speaker and govern no nation or city?
Nay, no one with any sense would say so. For it is in your power by
producing many philosophers, or even only three or four, to confer more
benefit on the lives of men than many kings put together. To no trivial
province the philosopher appointed, and, as you said yourself, he does not
only direct counsels or public affairs, nor is his activity confined to
mere words; but if he confirm his words by deeds and show himself to be
such as he wishes others to be, he may be more convincing and more
effective in making men act than those who urge them to noble actions by
issuing commands.)
Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπανιτέον εἰς ἀρχὴν καὶ συμπεραντέον τὴν ἐπιστολὴν μείζονα ἴσως οὖσαν
τοῦ δέοντος. ἔστι δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ κεφάλαιον, ὅτι μήτε τὸν πόνον φεύγων μήτε
τὴν ἡδονὴν θηρεύων μήτε ἀπραγμοσύνης καὶ ῥᾳστώνης ἐρῶν τὸν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ
δυσχεραίνω βίον· ἀλλ᾽, ὅπερ ἔφην ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οὔτε παιδείαν ἐμαυτῷ [D]
συνειδὼς τοσαύτην οὔτε φύσεως ὑπεροχήν, καὶ προσέτι δεδιώς, μὴ φιλοσφίαν,
ἧς ἐρῶν οὐκ ἐφικόμην, εἰς τοὺς νῦν ἀνθρώπους οὐδὲ ἄλλως εὐδοκιμοῦσαν
διαβάλλω, πάλαι τε ἔγραφον ἐκεῖνα καὶ νῦν τὰς παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐπιτιμήσεις
ἀπελυσάμην εἰς δύναμιν.
(But I must go back to what I said at the beginning, and conclude this
letter, which is perhaps longer already than it should be. And the main
point in it is that it is not because I would avoid hard work or pursue
pleasure, nor because I am in love with idleness and ease that I am averse
to spending my life in administration. But, as I said when I began, it is
because I am conscious that I have neither sufficient training nor natural
talents above the ordinary; moreover, I am afraid of bringing reproach on
philosophy, which, much as I love it, I have never attained to, and which
on other accounts has no very good reputation among men of our day. For
these reasons I wrote all this down some time ago, and now I have freed
myself from your charges as far as I can.)
Διδοίη δὲ ὁ θεὸς τὴν ἀρίστην τύχην καὶ φρόνησιν ἀξίαν τῆς τύχης, ὡς ἐγὼ
νῦν ἔκ τε τοῦ κρείττονος τό γε πλέον καὶ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν τῶν φιλοσοφούντων [267]
ἁπάσῃ μηχανῇ(422) βοηθητέος εἶναί μοι δοκῶ, προτεταγμένος ὑμῶν καὶ
προκινδυνεύων. εἰ δέ τι μείζον ἀγαθὸν τῆς ἡμετέρας παρασκευῆς καὶ ἧς ὑπὲρ
ἐμαυτοῦ γνώμης ἔχω τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δι᾽ ἡμῶν ὁ θεὸς παράσχοι, χαλεπαίνειν οὐ
χρὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐμαυτῷ συνειδὼς ἀγαθὸν πλὴν
τοῦτο μόνον, ὅτι μηδὲ οἴομαι τὰ μέγιστα ἔχειν ἔχων τε(423) οὐδέν, ὡς ὁρᾷς
αὐτός, εἰκότως βοῶ καὶ μαρτύρομαι μὴ μεγάλα παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ἀπαιτεῖν, [B] ἀλλὰ
τῷ θεῷ τὸ πᾶν ἐπιτρέπειν· οὕτω γὰρ ἐγὼ τῶν τε ἐλλειμμάτων εἴην ἂν
ἀνεύθυνος καί, γενομένων ἁπάντων δεξιῶν, εὐγνώμων ἂν καὶ μέτριος εἴην, οὐκ
ἀλλοτρίοις ἐμαυτὸν ἔργοις ἐπιγράφων, τῷ θεῷ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν δίκαιον,
προσανατεθεικὼς ἅπαντα αὐτός τε εἴσομαι καὶ ὑμᾶς προτρέπω τὴν χάριν
εἰδέναι.
(May God grant me the happiest fortune possible, and wisdom to match my
fortune! For now I think I need assistance from God above all, and also
from you philosophers by all means in your power, since I have proved
myself your leader and champion in danger. But should it be that blessings
greater than of my furnishing and than the opinion that I now have of
myself should be granted to men by God through my instrumentality, you
must not resent my words. For being conscious or no good thing in me, save
this only, that I do not even think that I possess the highest talent, and
indeed have naturally none, I cry aloud and testify(424) that you must not
expect great things of me, but must entrust everything to God. For thus I
shall be free from responsibility for my shortcomings, and if everything
turns out favourably I shall be discreet and moderate, not putting my name
to the deeds of other men,(425) but by giving God the glory for all, as is
right, it is to Him that I shall myself feel gratitude and I urge all of
you to feel the same.)
LETTER TO THE SENATE AND PEOPLE OF ATHENS
Introduction
Of the manifestoes addressed by Julian to Rome, Sparta, Corinth, and
Athens, defending his acceptance of the title of Emperor and his open
rupture with Constantius, the last alone survives. It was written in
Illyricum in 361, when Julian was on the march against Constantius, and is
the chief authority for the events that led to his elevation to the
Imperial rank. Julian writes to the Athenians of the fourth Christian
century as though they still possessed the influence and standards of
their forefathers. He was well known at Athens, where he had studied
before his elevation to the Caesarship and he was anxious to clear himself
in the eyes of the citizens. For the first time he ventures to speak the
truth about Constantius and to describe the latter’s ruthless treatment of
his family. His account of the revolution at Paris is supplemented by
Ammianus 20, Zosimus 3. 9, and the _Epitaph on Julian_ by Libanius.
ΙΟΥΛΙΑΝΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΟΡΟΣ
(Julian, Emperor)
ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΤΗΙ ΒΟΥΛΗΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΙ ΔΗΜΩΙ
(To the Senate and People of Athens.)
Πολλῶν εἰργασμένων τοῖς προγόνοις ὑμῶν, ἐφ᾽ οἷς οὐκ ἐκείνοις μόνον τότε
ἐξῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμῖν νῦν ἔξεστι φιλοτιμεῖσθαι, καὶ πολλῶν ἐγηγερμένων
τροπαίων ὑπέρ τε ἁπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος κοινῇ καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς
πόλεως, ἐν οἷς ἠγωνίσατο μόνη πρός τε τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας καὶ πρὸς τὸν
βάρβαρον, οὐδέν ἐστι τηλικοῦτον ἔργον οὐδὲ ἀνδραγαθία τοσαύτη, [B] πρὸς ἣν
οὐκ ἔνεστι καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἁμιλληθῆναι πόλεσι. τὰ μὲν γὰρ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν καὶ
αὗται, τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν εἰργάσαντο. καὶ ἵνα μὴ μεμνημένος ἔπειτα
ἀντιπαραβάλλων ἢ προτιμᾶν ἑτέρας ἑτέραν ἐν οἷς διαμφισβητοῦσι νομισθείην ἢ
πρὸς τὸ λυσιτελοῦν, ὥσπερ οἱ ῥήτορες, ἐνδεέστερον ἐπαινεῖν τὰς
ἐλαττουμένας, τοῦτο ἐθέλω [C] φράσαι μόνον ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, ᾧ μηδὲν ἀντίπαλον
ἔχομεν ἐξευρεῖν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν, ἐκ τῆς παλαιᾶς φήμης εἰς ἡμᾶς
παραδεδομένον. ἀρχόντων μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων οὐ βίᾳ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ δόξῃ
δικαιοσύνης παρείλεσθε, καὶ τὸν Ἀριστείδην τὸν δίκαιον οἱ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν
ἐθρέψαντο νόμοι. καίτοι γε ταῦτα οὕτως ὄντα λαμπρὰ τεκμήρια [269] διὰ
λαμπροτέρων οἶμαι τῶν ἔργων ὅμως ἐπιστώσασθε. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δόξαι δίκαιον
ἴσως ἂν τῷ καὶ ψευδῶς συμβαίη, καὶ τυχὸν οὐ παράδοξον ἐν πολλοῖς φαύλοις
ἕνα γενέσθαι σπουδαῖον. ἢ γὰρ οὐχὶ καὶ παρὰ Μήδοις ὑμνεῖταί τις Δηιόκης
Ἄβαρίς τε ἐν Ὑπερβορέοις καὶ Ἀνάχαρσις ἐν Σκύθαις; ὑπὲρ ὧν τοῦτο ἦν
θαυμαστόν, ὅτι παρὰ τοῖς ἀδικωτάτοις γεγονότες ἔθνεσι τὴν δίκην ὅμως
ἐτίμησαν, τὼ μὲν ἀληθῶς, [B] ὁ δὲ τῆς χρείας χάριν πλαττόμενος. δῆμον δὲ
ὅλον καὶ πόλιν ἐραστὰς ἔργων καὶ λόγων δικαίων ἔξω τῆς παρ᾽ ὑμῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον
εὑρεῖν. βούλομαι δὲ ὑμᾶς ἑνὸς τῶν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν πολλῶν γε ὄντων ἔργων
ὑπομνῆσαι. Θεμιστοκλέους γὰρ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ γνώμην εἰσηγεῖσθαι
διανοουμένου λάθρᾳ καταφλέξαι τὰ νεώρια τῶν Ἑλλήνων, [C] εἶτα μὴ τολμῶντος
εἰς τὸν δῆμον λέγειν, ἑνὶ δὲ ὁμολογοῦντος πιστεύσειν τὸ ἀπόρρητον, ὅνπερ
ἂν ὁ δῆμος χειροτονήσας προέληται, προυβάλετο μὲν ὁ δῆμος τὸν Ἀριστείδην·
ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας τῆς γνώμης ἔκρυψε μὲν τὸ ῥηθέν, ἐξήνεγκε δὲ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὡς
οὔτε λυσιτελέστερον οὔτε ἀδικώτερον εἴη τι τοῦ βουλεύματος· καὶ ἡ πόλις
ἀπεψηφίσατο παραχρῆμα καὶ παρῃτήσατο, πάνυ γε νὴ Δία μεγαλοψύχως καὶ ὃν
ἐχρῆν τρόπον ἄνδρας [D] ὑπὸ μάρτυρι τῇ φρονιμωτάτῃ θεῷ τρεφομένους.