THE ENGLISH FAILURE IN ARGENTINA
In the early years of the nineteenth century England was engaged in a
life and death struggle with Napoleon, and Spain and Holland, two of
the chief colonial Powers, were in alliance with the Corsican. At
Trafalgar, in 1805, the naval power of France and Spain had been
shattered, but Napoleon was master of practically the whole of Europe,
and he was devising weapons against his enemies which he hoped would
be more potent than fleets or armies. England's trade and industries
were advancing rapidly, but the long-continued war tended to spoil her
markets, and Napoleon was attempting to prevent his subject allies
from engaging in any trade whatever with the enemy. Consequently there
was throughout the war frequent distress, especially in the North of
England, and the manufacturing interest was urgent upon the Government
to find new markets. Possibly in some cases the effective fighting
strength of England was dissipated in distant expeditions, but in
these years some of the most valuable additions were made to our
Empire, and if the expedition which is to be related had been in
competent hands, the history of South America would have been changed
and England would have had vast dominions in every continent of the
world.
One such was acquired in South Africa in January, 1806, when Cape Town
was rapidly and easily taken from the Dutch. Sir Home Popham commanded
the naval forces while Sir David Baird was Commander-in-Chief. Popham
was an able and restless man, and hearing a few months later from an
American sea-captain that the people of Buenos Aires and Montevideo
were oppressed by the Spanish Government and would welcome the English
as liberators, he resolved to make an attempt in that quarter and
persuaded Baird to lend him a brigade.[45] The flotilla consisted of
five ships of war and five transports, and the little army numbered
1,635 men under the command of that fine soldier, General Beresford.
Popham was disobeying his orders and leaving Cape Town defenceless,
but he knew that the acquisition of a new trade opening would atone
for any technical disobedience in the eyes of the Home Government. The
expedition left Table Bay on the 13th of April, 1806, and reached the
River Plate on June 10th. Very wisely Popham proceeded to Buenos Aires
instead of Montevideo, and on June 25th anchored off Quilmes, which is
15 miles south of the capital, and disembarked the same evening. The
Spanish Viceroy made a very feeble resistance, and the next day the
English force was encamped in the suburb of Barracas. On the 27th of
June Beresford hoisted the English flag on the fort and a city of
72,000 inhabitants had been captured by a weak brigade. The Viceroy
fled to Cordoba, and undoubtedly the feebleness displayed by the
Spanish officials on that occasion helped to prepare the ground for
the subsequent Revolution. The Argentines, indeed, had lost the
qualities of self-help and initiative under the paternal rule of
Spain, but they were ashamed of the surrender to so small a force, and
under their nonchalant attitude there was an eager desire to expel the
foreigners if an opportunity should arise. All that was needed was a
leader, and a leader was found in Jacques Liniers. He was a Frenchman
who had been thirty years in the service of Spain, and at the time of
the invasion he was Governor of Misiones. Seeing that the people were
ripe for an attempt upon the English he made his way to Montevideo and
asked for help from the General in command. This was readily given,
and with a small force he marched to Colonia and thence passed over by
boats to Conchas, 21 miles north of Buenos Aires. Meanwhile Puirredon,
a Creole patriot, had been skirmishing in the neighbourhood, and had
succeeded in capturing a gun from the English. This success, which was
won by Gauchos, greatly emboldened Liniers and gave him confidence in
the abilities of his followers for partisan warfare. His force
amounted to 1,124 men with two large guns and four small pieces. On
August 10th he suddenly entered the northern suburb of Buenos Aires.
The next day he summoned Beresford to surrender, and on his refusal
the attack began. On the 12th the enemy forced their way to the
Cathedral which overlooks the square where the English had their
headquarters, and soon, by annoying street-fighting, compelled them to
abandon all the neighbouring streets. From the square itself Beresford
was forced by artillery fire to retreat, and the situation was soon
seen to be untenable. After 165 had been killed or wounded, the
English force, which had attempted an enterprise for which its numbers
were altogether inadequate, surrendered to General Liniers. He
honourably desired to keep the terms, which were that the soldiers
should be embarked for England and not serve again until exchanged,
but the Spanish authorities maintained that they had surrendered at
discretion and marched them up-country as prisoners of war. Beresford,
it may be added, contrived to escape six months later. The people of
Buenos Aires had learned the lesson that if they desired security they
must depend upon themselves rather than upon Spain. The first step
they took was to depose their faint-hearted Viceroy and set up Liniers
in his place.
Popham had sent home a glowing account of the commercial possibilities
of the new conquest, and English traders made immense preparations to
take advantage of the opportunity which was indeed sufficiently great.
Sir David Baird had sent reinforcements of 1,400 men from the Cape,
which arrived after the surrender, but of course Popham was too weak
to retake the capital. He landed at Maldonado on the left bank and
awaited reinforcements which were soon forthcoming, for the Cabinet
had been greatly elated by the easy initial victory. On October 11th
Admiral Sterling sailed from England in charge of a military force of
4,350 and a month later an expedition of equal strength under General
Crauford followed for Chile. When the news of the disaster to
Beresford reached England a swift ship was despatched after Crauford,
ordering him to sail to the River Plate. Finally there followed
General Whitelocke with additional troops and orders to take command
of the whole expedition. The total armament amounted to twelve
thousand men, eighteen ships of war, and eighty transports--a force
amply sufficient to command success if it were well handled, but
unfortunately it was placed in incompetent hands. The Ministry of All
the Talents failed to justify its title in the planning of expeditions
and the allocation of commanders.
John Whitelocke,[46] the new commander, had served with moderate
success in the West Indies, but he owed his advancement (chiefly in
pacific appointments) to his brother-in-law, Matthew Lewis, the Deputy
Secretary at War, and father of the well-known "Monk" Lewis. But his
appointment to this important command remains a mystery. It appears
from Windham's Diary that he wished to give the command to Sir John
Stuart, while Leveson-Gower was in favour of Whitelocke, and the
annotator to the Diary declares that the Duke of York decided in
favour of Whitelocke. This does not seem very probable, and though
Lord Holland, who was a member of the not very competent Cabinet,
suggests more plausibly that Whitelocke as Inspector-General of
Recruiting was opposed to an important scheme of Windham, who
therefore wished to get rid of him, still this view seems untenable in
face of Windham's positive statement. The appointment can only be
considered as one of the many blunders which sometimes counteract
England's usual good luck; and on this occasion the effect was
complete.
However, until he arrived matters proceeded in brilliant fashion. The
first officer of high rank to appear was Sir Samuel Auchmuty, a loyal
American who had served the King, for whose sake his family had
suffered ruin, in America, India, and Egypt. Although he had expected
merely to assist in the task of completing the conquest of Argentina,
he was not dismayed when he found that the work had to be begun over
again. He promptly began the bombardment of Montevideo and within a
few days, February 3, 1807, the breach was found to be practicable.
The town, strongly fortified as it was, taken by storm with a loss to
the English of six hundred men, and the General acting humanely and
prudently, conciliated the inhabitants and established civil rule.
Many adventurous English merchantmen, whose owners anticipated a boom,
arrived and unloaded, and necessaries and luxuries were sold at prices
hitherto unknown in Argentina.
Whitelocke arrived on May 10th and Crauford on June 15th. It was on
June 28th that the expedition left Montevideo. It consisted of four
brigades, of which three were commanded by Generals Crauford,
Auchmuty, and Lumley, the fourth by Colonel Mahon. The transports left
amidst the cheers of the fleet, and success might well have been
anticipated, for an enterprise was being attempted which a year earlier
had been easily accomplished by less than one-sixth of Whitelocke's
army, which was ten thousand strong. But these proportions hardly
represented the difference between the brother-in-law of Matthew Lewis
and the future victor of Albuera, and, moreover, the spirit of the
colonists had risen, and they rejected both the feeble restrictions of
Spain and the new prosperity offered by England. The first mistake was
made in landing at Ensenada, 48 miles south of Buenos Aires, and the
troops had to make long marches through deep swamps. But Whitelocke
arrived at Quilmes (where he ought to have landed) on July 1st without
having seen an enemy, and all promised to go well.
On that day Liniers attempted to oppose the invaders in force, but
Crauford, with a vigorous charge, beat down all resistance and pursued
the enemy to the suburbs. There is little doubt that Crauford was
correct in his belief that if he had been supported by the main body,
Buenos Aires would have fallen on that very day. But Leveson-Gower,
the second in command, who was as incompetent as Whitelocke and who
was the moving spirit in the whole disaster, recalled the troops and
gave the discouraged Spaniards a welcome delay. On July 2nd Whitelocke
called upon them to surrender, and they refused. He himself was well
aware of the difficulties of an assault. As soon as Crauford arrived
at Montevideo the Commander-in-Chief had taken him round the works,
pointed out the peculiar facilities which the flat-roofed South
American houses afforded for street-fighting, and declared that he
would never expose his troops to the risk of a general assault. In
this resolve Crauford heartily concurred.
The General had two easy and certain means of attaining his object. He
might blockade the town and so starve it into surrender, or he might
bombard it. But unfortunately he was too unstable to persevere in his
previous resolution, and he allowed Leveson-Gower to persuade him to
adopt a preposterous scheme of assault. It was decided that on July
5th the troops should be divided into eight columns, and orders were
actually issued that they should advance with their muskets unloaded,
lest they should be tempted to waste time in returning the enemy's
fire. The columns were to march through the town until each had
arrived at the square nearest the river. Then they were to halt and,
apparently, do nothing, for no further orders were issued.
The attack began at half-past six in the morning. When the English had
entered the town a withering fire was poured upon them from innumerable
houses. But they pushed gallantly on. Auchmuty, who was on the left,
made his way to the Retiro and the Plaza de Toros, where he captured
thirty-two guns and six hundred prisoners. The troops on the right
seized the Residencia. But these successes were of no avail through lack
of a competent guiding mind; the column leaders did not even know the
whereabouts of the Commander-in-Chief, much less what he wished them to
do, and further, the ill-judged scheme had borne its natural fruit in
several serious disasters.
Crauford had seized the Convent of San Domingo, but he was surrounded
by a very large force of the enemy who kept up a deadly fire of
musketry and artillery, and by half-past four in the afternoon he was
compelled to surrender. The same fate befell columns under Colonel
Cadogan and Colonel Duff. In this day's fighting the English lost 70
officers and 1,130 men, killed and wounded, while prisoners amounted
to 120 and 1,500.
Whitelocke and Auchmuty were now besieged in the Retiro. Their army
had suffered severely, but they had still a large and efficient force,
they had command of the sea, and the knowledge that the English
Government would support them with all its available strength. Even if
ordinary skill were out of the question, ordinary resolution would
quickly have retrieved the initial reverses. But it was not to be.
Flushed by his success, General Liniers the next day sent a flag of
truce to Whitelocke proposing to surrender all his prisoners if the
English would evacuate Buenos Aires. He probably hardly expected
anything but rejection of such terms, but the civilian Alzaga seemed
to have had a better appreciation of the character of Whitelocke and
insisted that _Montevideo_ should be added to _Buenos Aires_. Nothing
could be lost by making extravagant demands. The panic-stricken
Whitelocke agreed to everything. At first he seems to have hesitated a
little, but Liniers had added the menace that he could not be
responsible for the safety of the prisoners if the attack were
renewed. In any case such a threat should have been treated with
contempt, but it was, as it happened, perfectly empty, for the life
and property of every inhabitant of Montevideo were in Whitelocke's
power.
Finally, he accepted the terms of surrender without raising the
slightest objection to the inclusion of Montevideo, and taking great
credit to himself for his humanity in yielding to Linier's threat, he
wrote complacently: "Influenced by this consideration, which I knew to
be founded in fact, and reflecting of how little advantage would be
the possession of a country the inhabitants of which were so absolutely
hostile, I resolved to forego the advantages which the bravery of the
troops had obtained, and acceded to a treaty, which I trust will meet
the approbation of his Majesty."
He had signified his willingness to withdraw from Buenos Aires
in forty-eight hours and from Montevideo in two months. As the
Judge-Advocate remarked at the subsequent trial: "He is his own accuser:
he has furnished the strongest testimony against himself." The English
army sailed from Buenos Aires on July 12th, from Montevideo on September
9, 1807.
Seldom has there been such a fine army and such splendid officers
under such a pusillanimous commander. A young officer[47] on the staff
remarks that on many of the street corners in Montevideo was written:
"General Whitelocke is either a coward or a traitor! Perhaps both!" He
also tells us: "All the English merchants are in an uproar. They say
the losses will be immense; that upwards of three millions worth of
property is on its way to this country, and that, if it is given up,
half the merchants in England will be ruined. God knows what will be
the result of this unfortunate affair. It appears to me one of the
most severe blows that England has ever received." Whittingham adds,
with some penetration, that "the period of a revolution" was "not far
distant."
It is some small consolation that the court-martials administered
even-handed justice. The most important tribunal adjudged "that the
said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke be cashiered, and declared totally
unfit and unworthy to serve his Majesty in any military capacity
whatever." On the other hand Popham, who had disobeyed his orders in
initiating the whole scheme, was severely reprimanded, but received a
sword of honour from the City of London and a few months later was
given an important command.
Sir David Baird, who had sanctioned Popham's adventure, was censured
and recalled from the Cape, but he also was given the chief command of
the very same expedition as Popham--that against Copenhagen. It is
certain that public opinion would not have sanctioned any severe
measures against officers who had been zealous in the South American
attempt.
The most noticeable point throughout the whole affair is the eagerness
of the English commercial world, which was dreading the loss of the
Continental markets and was rightly convinced that the discovery of
new outlets was a matter of life and death.
The remarks of the Judge-Advocate condense the whole case: "By this
most unfortunate event all the hopes have been defeated which had been
justly and generally entertained, of discovering new markets for our
manufactures, of giving a wider scope to the spirit and enterprise of
our merchants, of opening new sources of treasure, and new fields for
exertion in supplying either the rude wants of countries emerging from
barbarism, or the artificial and increasing demands of luxury and
refinement, in those remote quarters of the globe. Important as these
objects must be at all times to this country, the state of Europe, and
the attempts that have been daily making to exclude us from our
accustomed intercourse with the Continent, have added to the importance
of these objects, and to the disappointment of these hopes." It is,
perhaps, doubtful whether England could have held any considerable
territory in Argentina, for a revolutionary spirit was rapidly being
wafted into South America from Europe, and though the population was
small the country was vast, and if the population had continued hostile
the difficulty of either conciliating or conquering them would have been
immense. But, doubtless, the retention of Montevideo and the territory
now called Uruguay would have been feasible, and would have been highly
beneficial both to England and South America. To have had one country in
South America governed upon liberal and conservative principles, with an
enlightened system of commerce and complete security for life and
property, would have been an incalculable benefit, and would undoubtedly
been a salutary check upon the wars and revolutions which have
devastated South America since the overthrow of the Spanish dominion.
FOOTNOTES:
[45] "From various informations I have received from different people
of the defenceless state of Monte Video, Buenos Ayres, and their
dependencies, I have deemed it expedient, with the squadron under my
command, assisted by his Majesty's 71st Regiment, to proceed on an
expedition against those places, not doubting in the smallest degree
of such success as will add lustre to his Majesty's arms, distress our
enemies, and open a most beneficial trade for Great Britain" (Popham
to Governor of St. Helena, April 13, 1806).
[46] "All future prospects were marred and rendered hopeless by the
selection of General Whitelocke for the chief command; a man of most
unpopular character, unrecommended by previous services, and void of
all claim or pretension beyond powerful interest" (J. W. Cole,
"Memoirs of British Generals," i. 224).
[47] See "A Memoir of Sir Samuel Ford Whittingham" 24, 25.