THE SPANISH COLONIAL SYSTEM
Colonies were one of the many new things which were introduced to
Europe at the end of the fifteenth century. Of them mediæval Europe
had known nothing since the dissolution of the Roman Empire; the means
of communication were too bad, the Asiatic races were too powerful,
and the Western world itself was too thinly populated to allow of
distant excursions. The planting of settlements was familiar to both
Greece and Rome. The Greek system was the simpler of the two, for the
city state merely propagated itself by colonies as a plant propagates
itself by seeds, and two cities existed instead of one, each independent
of the other. But a Roman colony was incorporated as a subordinate and
inferior part of the mother state. Greek history and literature were
almost unknown in the Middle Ages, and even after the Renaissance they
remained much less familiar than Latin. On the other hand, many European
States, and especially Spain, inherited their law and their municipal
systems from Rome, Latin was the international language, and the Church,
by far the most powerful mediæval institution, was Roman. It is,
therefore, not surprising that Spain followed the Roman colonial system,
but all the circumstances were so different that beyond the mere
incorporation and inferiority of the new dominions there was little
other resemblance.
The main difference and the main characteristic of the Spanish
colonial system was this--the colonies were the private property of
the King of Spain. This, then, is the keystone of the edifice--that
the dominions were vested in the Crown, not in the nation. The
derivation of this theory is doubtless from the fact that in the early
exploring days the Spanish and Portuguese kings were, really or
apparently, private adventurers, and, in fact, the adventurers always
assumed that they were stewards of royal estates rather than officers
of a kingdom. Thus the colonies were the property of the King of Spain
for the time being. Ferdinand had, in 1511, established a tribunal to
manage his new property. This was the Council of the Indies, which
made laws for the colonies and distributed all the appointments and
acted as a Court of Appeal from the Audiencia in America. The King
made all grants of land, and allowed the colonists only local
liberties; the Spanish nation had no concern whatever in the matter. A
modern parallel is the Congo Free State as it was a year or two ago.
It is probable that the New World had little to complain of except in
the matter of trade and commerce, but here the system was illiberal
and short-sighted. The fifth share of the King in the produce of all
the gold and silver mines was a small matter in comparison with the
multitude of harassing restrictions,[38] which Spain never had the
wisdom to cancel till it was too late. No colony was allowed to trade
with any country except Spain; all the exports, whatever their
destination, had first to go to the mother country, and the navigation
laws were conceived in a similar spirit. The most glaring instance of
stupidity was the prohibition of import trade laid upon Buenos Aires. No
Atlantic colonial port might receive goods from Spain except Nombre de
Dios. When Argentina purchased goods from Spain they were despatched
across the Atlantic to Nombre de Dios, carried by mule across the
Isthmus, transhipped to Callao, and then taken over innumerable
mountains into the River Plate country. Merely to state such a system is
to condemn it, but there was no possibility of altering it, because the
whole shipping trade of Spain was in the hands of a syndicate of Cadiz
merchants, and they were all-powerful.
As is well known, no foreign State was allowed to trade with Spanish
America, nor was any foreigner even allowed to enter it without
special permission. Various manufactures were forbidden, and even the
cultivation of the vine and olive was placed under restrictions, as it
was feared that their produce might compete with the produce of Spain.
In fact, the ideal of the home-staying Spaniard was that the colonies
should be mere mining-camps. Gold and silver were regarded as the
whole of wealth, and it was considered the height of commercial wisdom
to drain the whole produce of the mines of America into Spanish ports
without allowing a fraction to be diverted elsewhere.
Thus legitimate trade was made extremely difficult, for the Spaniards
even discouraged colonial exports from the fear that precious metals
might be concealed among them. Accordingly, in 1599, the Governor of
Buenos Aires was commanded to forbid exportation and importation alike
under penalty of death. But the stringency of the various laws and
regulations defeated their own objects, a gigantic contraband trade grew
up, and all the officials, from the Governor downward, were implicated
in it. Bribes accompanied almost every business transaction.[39] The
manufactures of Europe were surreptitiously landed at Buenos Aires, and
of course ruined the sale of the goods that had come over oceans,
Isthmus, and mountains. This contraband trade was chiefly carried on by
the English and the Dutch, and, as Professor Seeley has frequently
pointed out, the power to trade with the New World formed for some two
hundred years the chief bone of contention in the foreign politics of
European countries. The practice of smuggling has had two marked and
very pernicious effects upon Spanish-American character; it has fostered
contempt of law and the preference of Government service to profitable
industry. As the Argentines despised the laws of contraband, so they
came to despise all laws, and during their independent history the
shackles of the law have been cobwebs light as air to restrain
individuals or communities from disturbing the public peace. In a word,
out of the contraband trade sprang one of the worst features of South
America--lawlessness and turbulence. It is obvious that it also fostered
an almost equally injurious spirit--the craving of office. It was easier
and more profitable to take bribes from the smugglers than to engage
actively in smuggling, and so the tradition has descended to prefer the
certain emoluments (direct and indirect) of office to the uncertain
gains of trade. In Spanish America it is better to be the nephew of a
President than of a successful trader. Of course, it would be absurd to
attribute these two evils solely to the contraband trade, but the first
has been undoubtedly encouraged, and the second, to a considerable
extent, caused by the practice which was forced upon the Spanish
colonies by an absurd fiscal system. The economic condition, therefore,
of these countries appears to us very sombre. It must, however, be
remembered that such treatment of "plantations" was the accepted policy
of the age, and probably the reason why Spain was more unfortunate with
her foreign possessions than other nations is rather to be found in the
indolent character of her sons and her foreign embarrassments than in
any particular set of restrictions.
Till the middle of the eighteenth century the principles of the
Spanish colonial system were considered the last words of commercial
policy by all nations and practically all individuals.[40] That great
statesman, Lord Chatham, was fully convinced of the wisdom of these
principles. He remarked: "Let the sovereign authority of this country
over the colonies be asserted in as strong terms as can be devised,
and be made to extend to every point of legislation whatsoever. That
we may bind their _trade_, confine their _manufactures_, and exercise
every _power_ whatsoever, except that of taking money out of their
pocket without their consent."[41] Indeed, the general commercial and
colonial policy of Spain was at least as liberal as that of England,
and was, during the half century preceding the Revolution, infinitely
more liberal, and if we make allowance for the enlargement of the
human mind in a hundred and fifty years, it must be admitted that the
present commercial policy of the South American Republics compares
unfavourably with the Spanish system. There was at least material
prosperity. Adam Smith,[42] while censuring the Spanish system of
government and considering it inferior to that obtaining in English
colonies, recognised that great progress was being made. He says:
"The Spanish colonies are under a government in many respects less
favourable to agriculture, improvement, and population, than that of the
English colonies. They seem, however, to be advancing in all these much
more rapidly than any country in Europe. In a fertile soil and happy
climate the great abundance and cheapness of land, a circumstance common
to all new colonies, is, it seems, so great an advantage as to
compensate many defects in civil government." It is impossible to put
down the failure of Spain to anything but defect of character--the grand
defect of _mañana_, of putting off every exertion till to-morrow, or
rather for ever. But it cannot be denied that a hundred years ago the
ill-starred country had to face a series of misfortunes which might well
have disheartened a more energetic people. The revolutionary spirit
which had spread all over the globe was at first wonderfully impotent in
the Spanish settlements owing to the rigid disciplinary system which had
been in force for upwards of two hundred years. Yet that of itself would
have been enough to have taxed all the energies of an ancient and
absolute monarchy. Further, Spain contrived to change sides in such a
way during the war as to get all the hardships of defeat and none of the
fruits of victory. When she was in alliance with France her fleet was
destroyed by the English, and when she was in alliance with England her
territory was overrun by the French. At this crisis also she was
afflicted by the feeblest king of a feeble line and probably the worst
queen and minister that ever lived. Under these circumstances it can
hardly be a matter for wonder that she lost her colonies.
And yet if her general policy towards them be considered, it must be
acknowledged that she deserved her fate less than any colonial power
then existing. The Spanish merchants did indeed greatly hamper the
development of South America, but they acted in obedience to a theory
which was considered axiomatic and which was rigorously put into
practice by every other nation. The King and the high officials always
exerted their influence in favour of humane treatment of the Indians.
Irala was conspicuous for his humanity, and the protective regulations
which he put forward on their behalf and at the beginning of the
seventeenth century, when reports reached Spain that the Indians in
Tucuman were being ill-treated, it was ordered that Don Francisco de
Alfaro, Auditor of the Supreme Court of Peru, should go to Paraguay
and investigate the whole matter. The result was the Ordinances of
Alfaro in 1612, which abolished both the forcible subjection of
Indians and slavery, and substituted a small capitation tax. As we
have seen, the Court of Madrid warmly seconded the early efforts of
the Jesuits. The treatment, then, of subject races was as benevolent
as circumstances and theories would permit, nor were the colonists in
practice subject to any considerable severity. The commercial
regulations were easily evaded, and the Argentina steadily advanced in
prosperity.
The latter days of Spanish rule were extremely creditable to the
sagacity and liberality of the Crown and its advisers. In 1764 a line
of vessels was established to run between Corunna and various South
American ports, with permission to carry Spanish merchandise and bring
back in return the products of the colonies, and in 1774 the colonies
were allowed intercommunication and trade. In 1778 a new commercial code
was drawn up for the benefit of the Spanish Indies, and this was
surprisingly liberal for those days. Nine ports in Spain and twenty-four
in the colonies were declared "ports of entry," and goods, for the most
part, were allowed to pass in and out freely. The general duty was
nominally 3 per cent. on Spanish goods and 7 per cent. on foreign goods;
but as the latter had to be shipped from Spain, the duty upon them was
really 40 or 50 per cent. If we compare this scale with that now in
force, we shall see how greatly South America has retrograded since the
removal of the control of Spain. It is interesting to remember that
these beneficent regulations were framed while Smith was publishing the
"Wealth of Nations," and that therefore backward Spain anticipated both
Pitt and Huskisson.
After this Argentina advanced by leaps and bounds. The average export
of hides had been 150,000; they soon rose to 800,000, and in one
particular year the figure was 1,400,000. At least seventy ships
sailed to Spain every year, and the population of Buenos Aires rose
from 37,000 in 1778, to 72,000 in 1800. Buenos Aires became openly
what she had long been struggling to be--the _entrepôt_ for wine and
brandy from Cuzo, hides from Tucuman, tobacco, _yerba maté_, and wood
from Paraguay, and gold, silver, copper, rice, sugar, and cocoa from
the distant interior. Had the fate of Spain been happier, and the
character of her sons stronger, South America would have had a very
different destiny, for everything pointed to a period of peaceful
development, and the people had a government which was exactly suited
to them. The Revolution substituted for the mild rule of Spain a
preposterous democracy which was only effective or tolerable when
metamorphosed into a dictatorship, and for more than two centuries of
comparative peace an indefinitely long period of disorder and
bloodshed.
Before closing this brief sketch of a period which has been both
neglected and misunderstood (for it is usually passed over with a few
reflections upon the perversity and tyranny of Spanish rule) it is
desirable to indicate briefly the machinery of government, which
underwent substantial alteration only in the last generation of the
Spanish dominion. The King had a special body of advisers to help him
in the administration of his oversea territory, and this was called
the Council of the Indies. There were only two Viceroys--who, of
course, were subject to the home authorities--they were the Viceroy
of Mexico and the Viceroy of Peru. The latter ruled over the whole of
South America. When a new colony was founded it was put under the
charge of an Adelantado, or Governor, who was nominally subject to the
Viceroy, but in practice he was independent and answerable only to the
King. When he vacated office his acts were subject to a review, and he
was liable to punishment if found guilty of misconduct, but in the
nature of things there was little effective check upon him by the Home
Government, and he was really a military ruler with almost despotic
powers. However, the Spaniards, following the Roman tradition, always
strongly favoured municipal government, and provisions were made which
modified the arbitrary character of the system, although, as was
inevitable, there were loud complaints that the claims of the
Creoles--those born in the country--were neglected, and that the good
posts were given to Spaniards from over the seas. Even to the last
this grievance remained.[43]
The system of local government, which modified this exclusiveness and
gave the children of the soil a considerable share in the management
of their own affairs, is a most important feature in the history of
Argentina.
To begin with, the Governor made grants of land to each white
settler. The recipients of the grants became Encomenderos, who
received also in fief several Indian villages and took tribute from
the inhabitants in return for protection and Christian teaching. The
Encomenderos swore "to defend, enrich, and ennoble the kingdom and
care for the Indians," and they appear to have discharged their trust
with tolerable fidelity.
But the Spaniards are city-dwelling people, and the history of
Argentina chiefly centres in the towns where the governing body was
the Cabildo, or town council. The Cabildo consisted of from six to
twelve members, and although they had bought their offices of the King
and held them for life, they imparted no insignificant popular element
into the system of government, and when the Revolution came the
Cabildos had sufficient vitality to act as the rallying-point for the
revolutionists in every district. In Buenos Aires the Cabildo had
great power, and the Governor could not easily override it, while in
every city in the provinces the little town councils represented
Creole and local interests. This system lent itself to particularism
and was unfavourable to representative government, which accordingly has
not been a success in Argentina, partly owing to this cause and partly
to the natural incapacity of the people. It has been always very
difficult to obtain a national assembly even for the decision of the
most momentous questions and legislation, elections and administrations
are controlled by functionaries rather than by electors and deputies.
Under Spanish rule the Cabildo system worked extremely well. In the
thinly populated districts the great proprietors ruled in patriarchal
fashion.
Inefficiency and indolence were the chief grievances which the
inhabitants of the Plate district could have reasonably urged against
their rulers. The commercial regulations, as we have seen, were so bad
that they were perpetually evaded, and the Governor and other
officials took bribes and connived at the evasions. Thus grew up the
evil tradition that official and political careers are above all
others desirable, and that the productive classes are fair game for
every kind of official exaction. But, in spite of all defects, the
settlements steadily prospered, there were few serious Indian wars,
comparatively little fighting even with the Portuguese or other
foreign nations, and civil tumults were few and far between. If we
make allowance for the natural progress that all nations must make in
the face of all adverse circumstances, we cannot deny that even
Argentina has lost ground in the nineteenth century, as compared with
her position in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Another institution which exerted great influence upon the history of
Spanish America was the Consulado, or Chamber of Commerce. In 1543 the
first of these bodies was founded at Seville, and its principal object
was to regulate trade with the Indies. The Consulado of Cadiz became
eventually by far the most influential and gained an unenviable
notoriety for its commerce-destroying enactments; but it was following
the accepted commercial principles of the age, and there can be no
doubt that the Consulados at Mexico and Lima were beneficial. Their
business was to adjudge commercial suits and carry on the entire trade
in their respective Viceroyalties, and in general they undertook the
commercial development of the settlements. Their policy was cautious
and conservative.
Such, then, were the institutions which tempered the rigours of
personal or despotic rule, modifying either the unlimited power of the
Crown or the absolute military sway of the Governor. But in theory the
royal authority was as complete as that of the Roman Emperor. Just as
in later days Queen Victoria took the title of Empress of India as the
successor of the Mogul Emperor, so the King of Spain was Emperor of
the Indies in succession to Montezuma in Mexico and the Incas in Peru.
The King's will was the source of law; legislation was carried out by
means of Cédulas Reales, or Royal Decrees, which were issued by the
Council of the Indies in his name, and, as was natural, the attempt
was made at regulation on far too complete a scale, and matters which
ought to have been settled by local authorities were the subject of
decrees, and thus these enactments increased with alarming rapidity.
The principles of these Cédulas soon fell into confusion; it is said
that their codification, ordered in 1635, was not carried into effect
until 1680, by which time it had become obsolete. It does not appear,
however, that the rulers troubled themselves much about the confusion
of the law; they would probably have been much more uneasy had all the
decrees become effective, for it was obviously impossible to carry on
all legislation at such a distance, and travellers and annalists
agreed that the Governors and their subordinates usually neglected the
law and governed according to equity. The result was not unsatisfactory.
Current ideas about history are very often wrong; they are often the
repetition at third or fourth hand of an extremely indifferent
authority. An American traveller may have come with the preconceived
belief that all republics are free and all monarchies grinding
tyrannies, and having accordingly stated that the condition of South
America under Spanish rule was miserable, his statement has been
echoed by all his successors. Or, again, another writer notices that
the commercial regulations were absurd and vexatious, and he declares
that the colonies were paralysed by the blight of Spanish rule. A
third has no difficulty in discovering instances of atrocities
committed against the Indians who worked in the Peruvian mines, and he
enlarges upon the greed and inhumanity of the Spaniards. Thus the
whole history, which possesses few striking incidents to tempt
investigators, is distorted by prejudice and the three hundred years
of Spanish rule are summarily dismissed as a barren period, fruitful
in nothing but misery.
In fact, from first to last the Spanish colonies enjoyed a more
liberal trade policy than did those of England. The reason that the
abuses of the Spanish colonies were so much more prominent was that
the Spanish trade was incomparably more valuable than the North
American. Again, apart from the mines, the Spanish treatment of the
Indians was considerably in advance of the standards of the time in
humanity, nor would it be easy to find any body of men in the three
centuries who pursued a wiser and juster policy towards inferior and
conquered races. And, further, such cruelty as was perpetrated was the
work of private exploiters or, at worst, of disobedient officials. The
King of Spain and the ecclesiastics of Spain made every effort to
redress the instances of ill-treatment which came to their ears. It
was Charles III. who encouraged the Jesuits to proceed upon their
mission of mercy, and if he had had the power he would have restrained
the cruelty of the Portuguese Paulistas. The condition of the River
Plate settlements under Spanish rule compares favourably with that of
most civilised nations during the same period.
A recent writer,[44] summing up the general subject, makes some
remarks which deserve quotation: "In discussing the often-repeated
accusation of Spanish oppression, it is necessary to define what sort
of oppression is meant: whether oppression of the Indians by the
whites, or oppression of the whites by the Spanish Government. If the
former is meant, then the Creoles were as guilty as the Europeans, and
both were more guilty than the Spanish Government and its immediate
representatives. If the latter, the restraint of the whites was in fact
the measure of protection enjoyed by the natives; free immigration
and large autonomy granted to European settlers would have meant
extermination or enslavement. But the theory of a universal control
which should foster both 'commonwealths' and protect the weaker was
largely ineffective; and in this failure lay the troubles of the
Indians....
"The usual exclusion of Creoles from the highest posts was a
grievance; but both its extent and its significance were much
exaggerated during the struggle for independence, since a very large
number of subordinate posts, some of them commanding large influence
and dignity, were usually held by Creoles. In fact, almost all the
revolutionary leaders were connected with the royal service through
posts held either by themselves or by their fathers....
"Here was an empire which, by the testimony of its own administrators,
was honeycombed with continuous decay in all directions; yet this
empire survived repeated external shocks, continually extended its
influence, and after three centuries evoked the admiration of foreign
observers. This vitality is not explained by the theoretic system of
administration, nor yet by the practical neglect of that system.
Perhaps the explanation may partly be found in personal character....
Examples constantly recur of admirable and loyal service, which has
something Oriental in its simplicity and self-abandonment; in
emergencies the presence of one capable leader counterbalances all
vices. Again, the undefinable Spanish quality of _hidalguía_, which
animated the better part of the community, especially in New Spain,
showed itself in a noble charity and hospitality, a liberal and
careless use of wealth, indifference to material results, and an
old-fashioned, uncalculating loyalty, sometimes almost fantastic."
The Spaniards had not the constructive genius of the Romans, and both in
the mechanical contrivances of civilisation and in the moral force which
founds laws and institutions they were far inferior. But they played
very much the same part in South America which the Romans did in Europe.
France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy are not more distinctively Roman than
Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Colombia are Spanish. As Spain was in
language and institutions the most completely Romanised of all European
countries, so she has left her mark upon the West more distinctively
than any other colonising Power. For good or evil, Buenos Aires, Lima,
and the rest are Spanish cities, and there seems no reason to believe
that they will ever be anything else, and the Spanish influence seems
likely to be as permanent as the Roman in Southern Europe. Nor will any
candid student of the history of the continent be unwilling to
acknowledge that it was no small achievement for a nation to build up
and administer such an empire, and he will regret that ignorance and
prejudice have prevented the world from giving the praise due to a vast
political and religious experiment which, in spite of extraordinary
difficulties, was successful as far as its own character was concerned,
and which, when it broke down by reason of the weakness of the mother
country, left behind it all its institutions, political, religious, and
social. Governors became Dictators or Presidents, but everything remains
substantially Spanish.
FOOTNOTES:
[38] The following is a typical example. "In 1602 a custom-house was
established at Cordoba for the purpose of levying duties equivalent to
50 per cent. of the value of all commodities passing between Peru and
the River Plate. It was not till 1665 that this irritating restraint
on commercial business was relaxed" (C. E. Akers, "A History of South
America," p. 11).
[39] "The commerce between Peru and Buenos Aires is chiefly for cattle
and mules; such as are concerned in the former, go first to the
Governor, and ask his leave to drive a herd of cattle into Peru, which
is never refused when backed by a present of some thousand pieces of
eight" ("An Account of the Spanish Settlements in America (1762)"
331).
[40] "In the trade to America every nation endeavours to engross as
much as possible the whole market of its own colonies, by fairly
excluding all other nations from any direct trade to them" (Adam
Smith, "Wealth of Nations," ii. 129).
[41] Thackeray, "A History of William Pitt," ii. 73, 74.
[42] "Wealth of Nations," i. 203.
[43] Writing of the time of Galvez, Funes (iii. 225) says: "Civil and
military appointments were never before distributed with such complete
partiality to the European Spaniards. In general, the native-born were
shut out; they were not esteemed worthy to be appointed door-keepers
of the offices." He also remarks that there was similar exclusiveness
in the distribution of ecclesiastical preferment.
[44] A. F. Kirkpatrick, "Cambridge Modern History," x. 277-9.