_Interrupted existence of emotions and passions.---- Their growth and
decay._
Were emotions of the same nature with colour and figure, to continue in
their present state till varied by some operating cause, the condition
of man would be deplorable. It is ordered wisely, that emotions should
more resemble another attribute of matter, _viz._ motion, which requires
the constant exertion of an operating cause, and ceases when the cause
is withdrawn. An emotion may subsist while its cause is present; and
when its cause is removed, may subsist by means of an idea, though in a
fainter degree. But the moment another thought breaks in and occupies
the mind, so as to exclude not only this cause, but also its idea, the
emotion is gone: it is no longer felt. If it return with its cause or
idea, it again vanisheth with them when other thoughts crowd in. This
observation is applicable to emotions and passions of every kind. And
these accordingly are connected with perceptions and ideas, so
intimately as not to have any independent existence. A strong passion,
it is true, hath a mighty influence to detain its object in the mind;
but not so as to detain it for ever. A succession of perceptions or
ideas is unavoidable[32]: the object of the passion may be often
recalled; but however interesting, it must by intervals yield to other
objects. For this reason, a passion rarely continues long with an equal
degree of vigour. It is felt strong and moderate, in a pretty quick
succession. The same object makes not always the same impression;
because the mind, being of a limited capacity, cannot, at the same
instant, give great attention to a plurality of objects. The strength of
a passion depends on the impression made by its cause; and a cause
makes its strongest impression, when happening to be the single
interesting object, it attracts our whole attention[33]. Its impression
is slighter when our attention is divided betwixt it and other objects;
and at that time the passion is slighter in proportion.
When emotions and passions are felt thus by intervals and have not a
continued existence, it may be thought a nice problem, to ascertain
their identity, and to determine when they are the same when different.
In a strict philosophic view, every single impression made even by the
same object, is distinguishable from what have gone before, and from
what succeed. Neither is an emotion raised by an idea the same with what
is raised by a sight of the object. But such accuracy is not found in
common apprehension, nor is necessary in common language. The emotions
raised by a fine landscape in its successive appearances, are not
distinguished from each other, nor even from those raised by successive
ideas of the object: all of them are held to be the same. A passion also
is always reckoned the same, so long as it is fixed upon the same
object. Thus love and hatred may continue the same for life. Nay, so
loose are we in this way of thinking, that many passions are reckoned
the same even after a change of object. This is the case of all passions
that proceed from some peculiar propensity. Envy, for example, is
considered to be the same passion, not only while it is directed upon
the same person, but even where it comprehends many persons at once.
Pride and malice are in the same condition. So much was necessary to be
said upon the identity of a passion and emotion, in order to prepare for
examining their growth and decay.
The growth and decay of passions and emotions, is a subject too
extensive to be exhausted in an undertaking like the present. I pretend
only to give a cursory view of it, so far as necessary for the purposes
of criticism. Some emotions are produced in their utmost perfection, and
have a very short endurance. This is the case of surprise, of wonder,
and sometimes of terror. Emotions raised by insensible objects, such as
trees, rivers, buildings, pictures, arrive at perfection almost
instantaneously, and have a long endurance: a second view produceth
nearly the same pleasure with the first. Love, hatred, and some other
passions, increase gradually to a certain pitch, and thereafter decay
gradually. Envy, malice, pride, scarce ever decay. Again, some passions,
such as gratitude and revenge, are often exhausted by a single act of
gratification. Other passions, such as pride, malice, envy, love,
hatred, are not so exhausted; but having a long continuance, demand
frequent gratification.
In order to explain these differences, it would be an endless work to
examine every emotion and passion in particular. We must be satisfied at
present with some general views. And with respect to emotions, which are
quiescent and not productive of desire, their growth and decay are
easily explained. An emotion caused by an external object, cannot
naturally take longer time to arrive at perfection, than is necessary
for a leisurely survey. Such emotion also must continue long
stationary, without any sensible decay; a second or third view of the
object being nearly as agreeable as the first. This is the case of an
emotion produced by a fine prospect, an impetuous river, or a towering
hill. While a man remains the same, such objects ought to have the same
effect upon him. Familiarity, however, hath an influence here, as it
hath every where. Frequency of view, after short intervals especially,
weans the mind gradually from the object, which at last loses all
relish. The noblest object in the material world, a clear and serene
sky, is quite disregarded, unless perhaps after a course of bad weather.
An emotion raised by human virtues, qualities, or actions, may grow
imperceptibly by reiterated views of the object, till it become so
vigorous as to generate desire. In this condition it must be handled as
a passion.
As to passion, I observe first, that when nature requires a passion to
be sudden, it is commonly produced in perfection. This is frequently the
case of fear and of anger. Wonder and surprise are always produced in
perfection. Reiterated impressions made by their cause, exhaust these
passions in place of inflaming them. This will be explained
afterward[34].
In the next place, when a passion hath for its foundation an original
propensity peculiar to some men, it generally comes soon to perfection.
The propensity, upon representing a proper object, is immediately
enlivened into a passion. This is the case of pride, of envy, and of
malice.
In the third place, love and hatred have often a slow growth. The good
qualities or kind offices of a person, raise in me pleasant emotions;
which, by reiterated views, are swelled into a passion involving desire
of that person’s happiness. This desire being often put in exercise,
works gradually a change internally; and at last produceth in me a
settled habit of affection for that person, now my friend. Affection
thus produced, operates precisely like an original propensity. To
enliven it into a passion, no more is required but the real or ideal
presence of the object. The habit of aversion or hatred is brought on
in the same manner. And here I must observe by the way, that love and
hatred signify commonly affection, not passion. The bulk indeed of our
passions, are these affections inflamed into a passion by different
circumstances. The affection of love I bear to my son, is inflamed into
the passion of fear, when he is in danger; becomes hope, when he hath a
prospect of good fortune; becomes admiration, when he performs a
laudable action; and shame, when he commits any wrong. Aversion, again,
becomes fear when there is a prospect of good fortune to my enemy;
becomes hope when he is in danger; becomes joy when he is in distress;
and sorrow when a laudable action is performed by him.
Fourthly, the growth of some passions depends often on occasional
circumstances. Obstacles to gratification never fail to augment and
inflame a passion. A constant endeavour to remove the obstacle,
preserves the object of the passion ever in view, which swells the
passion by impressions frequently reiterated. Thus the restraint of
conscience, when an obstacle to love, agitates the mind and inflames
the passion:
Quod licet, ingratum est: quod non licet, acrius urit.
Si nunquam Danaën habuisset ahenea turris,
Non esset Danaë de Jove facta parens.
_Ovid. Amor. l. 2._
At the same time, the mind distressed with the obstacle, is disposed to
indulge its distress by magnifying the pleasure of gratification; which
naturally inflames desire. Shakespear expresses this observation finely:
All impediments in fancy’s course,
Are motives of more fancy.
We need no better example than a lover who hath many rivals. Even the
caprices of a mistress have the effect to inflame love. These
occasioning uncertainty of success, tend naturally to make the anxious
lover overvalue the happiness of fruition.
So much upon the growth of passions. Their continuance and decay come
next under consideration. And first, it is a general law of nature,
that things sudden in their growth, are equally sudden in their decay.
This is commonly the case of anger; and with respect to wonder and
surprise, another reason concurs, that their causes are of short
duration. Novelty soon degenerates into familiarity; and the
unexpectedness of an object, is soon sunk in the pleasure which the
object affords us. Fear, which is a passion of greater importance as
tending to self-preservation, is often instantaneous, and yet is of
equal duration with its cause. Nay it frequently subsists after the
cause is removed.
In the next place, a passion founded on a peculiar propensity, subsists
generally for ever. This is the case of pride, envy, and malice. Objects
are never wanting, to inflame the propensity into a passion.
Thirdly, it may be laid down as a general law of nature, that every
passion ceases upon attaining its ultimate end. To explain this law, we
must distinguish betwixt a particular and a general end. I call a
particular end what may be accomplished by a single act. A general end,
on the contrary, admits acts without number; because it cannot be said
that a general end is ever fully accomplished while the object of the
passion subsists. Gratitude and revenge are examples of the first kind.
The ends they aim at may be accomplished by a single act; and when this
act is performed, the passions are necessarily at an end. Love and
hatred are examples of the other kind. The desire of doing good or of
doing mischief to an individual, is a general end, which admits acts
without number, and which seldom is fully accomplished. Therefore these
passions have frequently the same duration with their objects.
Lastly, it will afford us another general view, to consider the
difference betwixt an original propensity and an affection produced by
custom. The former adheres too close to the constitution ever to be
eradicated; and for that reason the passions to which it gives birth,
endure during life with no remarkable diminution of strength. The
latter, which owes its birth and increment to time, owes its decay to
the same cause. Affection decays gradually as it grew. Hence long
absence extinguisheth hatred as well as love. Affection wears out more
gradually betwixt persons, who, living together, are objects to each
other of mutual good-will and kindness. But here habit comes in luckily,
to supply decayed affection. It makes these persons necessary to the
happiness of each other, by the pain of separation[35]. Affection to
children hath a long endurance, longer perhaps than any other affection.
Its growth keeps pace with that of its objects. They display new
beauties and qualifications daily, to feed and augment the affection.
But whenever the affection becomes stationary, it must begin to decay;
with a slow pace indeed, in proportion to its increment. In short, man
with respect to this life, is a temporary being. He grows, becomes
stationary, decays; and so must all his powers and passions.