_Emotions and passions as pleasant and painful, agreeable and
disagreeable. Modifications of these qualities._
It will naturally occur at first view, that a discourse upon the
passions should commence with explaining the qualities now mentioned.
But upon trial, I found this could not be done distinctly, till the
difference were ascertained betwixt an emotion and a passion, and till
their causes were evolved.
Great obscurity may be observed among writers with regard to the present
point. No care, for example, is taken to distinguish agreeable from
pleasant, disagreeable from painful; or rather these terms are deemed
synonymous. This is an error not at all venial in the science of ethics;
as instances can and shall be given, of painful passions that are
agreeable, and of pleasant passions that are disagreeable. These terms,
it is true, are used indifferently in familiar conversations, and in
composition for amusement, where accuracy is not required. But for those
to use them so who profess to explain the passions, is a capital error.
In writing upon the critical art, I would avoid every refinement that
may seem more curious than useful. But the proper meaning of the terms
under consideration must be ascertained, in order to understand the
passions, and some of their effects that are intimately connected with
criticism.
I shall endeavour to explain these terms by familiar examples. Viewing a
fine garden, I perceive it to be beautiful or agreeable; and I consider
the beauty or agreeableness as belonging to the object, or as one of its
qualities. Again, when I turn my thoughts from the garden to what passes
in my mind, I am conscious of a pleasant emotion of which the garden is
the cause. The pleasure here is felt, not as a quality of the garden,
but of the emotion produced by it. I give an opposite example. A rotten
carcass is loathsome and disagreeable, and raises in the spectator a
painful emotion. The disagreeableness is a quality of the object: the
pain is a quality of the emotion produced by it. Agreeable and
disagreeable, then, are qualities of the object we perceive: pleasant
and painful are qualities of the emotions we feel. The former qualities
are perceived as adhering to objects; the latter are felt as existing
within us.
But a passion or emotion, beside being felt, is frequently made an
object of thought or reflection: we examine it; we inquire into its
nature, its cause, and its effects. In this view it partakes the nature
of other objects: it is either agreeable or disagreeable. Hence clearly
appear the different significations of the terms under consideration, as
applied to passion. When a passion is termed _pleasant_ or _painful_, we
refer to the actual feeling: when termed _agreeable_ or _disagreeable_,
it is considered as an object of thought or reflection. A passion is
pleasant or painful to the person in whom it exists: it is agreeable or
disagreeable to the person who makes it a subject of contemplation.
When the terms thus defined are applied to particular emotions and
passions, they do not always coincide. And in order to make this
evident, we must endeavour to ascertain, first, what passions and
emotions are pleasant what painful, and next, what are agreeable what
disagreeable. With respect to both, there are general rules, which, so
far as I gather from induction, admit not any exceptions. The nature of
an emotion or passion as pleasant or painful, depends entirely on its
cause. An agreeable object produceth always a pleasant emotion; and a
disagreeable object produceth always a painful emotion[28]. Thus a lofty
oak, a generous action, a valuable discovery in art or science, are
agreeable objects that unerringly produce pleasant emotions. A stinking
puddle, a treacherous action, an irregular ill-contrived edifice, being
disagreeable objects, produce painful emotions. Selfish passions are
pleasant; for they arise from self, an agreeable object or cause. A
social passion directed upon an agreeable object is always pleasant:
directed upon an object in distress, is painful[29]. Lastly, all
dissocial passions, such as envy, resentment, malice, being caused by
disagreeable objects, cannot fail to be painful.
It requires a greater compass to evolve the general rule that concerns
the agreeableness or disagreeableness of emotions and passions. An
action conformable to the common nature of our species, is perceived by
us to be regular and good[30]; and consequently every such action
appears agreeable to us. The same observation is applicable to passions
and emotions. Every feeling that is conformable to the common nature of
our species, is perceived by us to be regular and as it ought to be; and
upon that account it must appear agreeable. By this general rule we can
ascertain what emotions are agreeable what disagreeable. Every emotion
that is conformable to the common nature of man, ought to appear
agreeable. And that this holds true with respect to pleasant emotions,
will readily be admitted. But why should painful emotions be an
exception, when they are not less natural than the other? The proportion
holds true in both. Thus the painful emotion raised by a monstrous birth
or brutal action, is not less agreeable upon reflection, than the
pleasant emotion raised by a flowing river or a lofty dome. With respect
to passions as opposed to emotions, it will be obvious from the
foregoing proposition, that their agreeableness or disagreeableness,
like the actions of which they are productive, must be regulated
entirely by the moral sense. Every action vicious or improper is
disagreeable to a spectator, and so is the passion that prompts it.
Every action virtuous or proper is agreeable to a spectator, and so is
the passion that prompts it.
This deduction may be carried a great way farther; but to avoid
intricacy and obscurity, I make but one other step. A passion, which, as
aforesaid, becomes an object of thought to a spectator, may have the
effect to produce a passion or emotion in him; for it is natural that a
social being should be affected with the passions of others. Passions or
emotions thus generated, submit, in common with others, to the general
law above mentioned, _viz._ that an agreeable object produces a pleasant
emotion, and a disagreeable object a painful emotion. Thus the passion
of gratitude, being to a spectator an agreeable object, produceth in him
the pleasant passion of love to the grateful person. Thus malice, being
to a spectator a disagreeable object, produceth in him the painful
passion of hatred to the malicious person.
We are now prepared for examples of pleasant passions that are
disagreeable, and of painful passions that are agreeable. Self-love, so
long as confined within just bounds, is a passion both pleasant and
agreeable. In excess it is disagreeable, though it continues to be still
pleasant. Our appetites are precisely in the same condition. Again,
vanity, though pleasant, is disagreeable. Resentment, on the other hand,
is, in every stage of the passion, painful; but is not disagreeable
unless in excess. Pity is always painful, yet always agreeable. But
however distinct these qualities are, they coincide, I acknowledge, in
one class of passions. All vicious passions tending to the hurt of
others, are equally painful and disagreeable.
The foregoing distinctions among passions and emotions, may serve the
common affairs of life, but they are not sufficient for the critical
art. The qualities of pleasant and painful are too familiar to carry us
far into human nature, or to form an accurate judgement in the fine
arts. It is further necessary, that we be made acquainted with the
several modifications of these qualities, with the modifications at
least that make the greatest figure. Even at first view every one is
sensible, that the pleasure or pain of one passion differs from that of
another. How distant the pleasure of revenge from that of love? So
distant, as that we cannot without reluctance admit them to be any way
related. That the same quality of pleasure should be so differently
modified in different passions, will not be surprising, when we reflect
on the boundless variety of pleasant sounds, tastes, and smells, daily
felt. Our discernment reaches differences still more nice, in objects
even of the same sense. We have no difficulty to distinguish different
sweets, different sours, and different bitters. Honey is sweet, and so
is sugar; and yet they never pass the one for the other. Our sense of
smelling is sufficiently acute, to distinguish varieties in
sweet-smelling flowers without end. With respect to passions and
emotions, their different feelings have no limits; for when we attempt
the more delicate modifications, they elude our search, and are scarce
discernible. In this matter, however, there is an analogy betwixt our
internal and external senses. The latter generally are sufficiently
acute for all the useful purposes of life, and so are the former. Some
persons indeed, Nature’s favourites, have a wonderful acuteness of
sense, which to them unfolds many a delightful scene totally hid from
vulgar eyes. But if such refined pleasure be refused to the bulk of
mankind, it is however wisely ordered that they are not sensible of the
defect; and it detracts not from their happiness that others secretly
are more happy. With relation to the fine arts only, this qualification
seems essential; and there it is termed _delicacy of taste_.
Should an author of such a taste attempt to describe all those
differences and shades of pleasant and painful emotions which he himself
feels, he would soon meet an invincible obstacle in the poverty of
language. No known tongue hitherto has reached such perfection, as to
express clearly the more delicate feelings. A people must be thoroughly
refined, before their language become so comprehensive. We must
therefore rest satisfied with an explanation of the more obvious
modifications.
In forming a comparison betwixt pleasant passions of different kinds, we
conceive some of them to be _gross_ some _refined_. Those pleasures of
external sense that are felt as at the organ of sense, are conceived to
be corporeal or gross[31]. The pleasures of the eye and ear are felt to
be internal; and for that reason are conceived to be more pure and
refined.
The social affections are conceived by all to be more refined than the
selfish. Sympathy and humanity are reckoned the finest temper of mind;
and for that reason, the prevalence of the social affections in the
progress of society, is held to be a refinement in our nature. A savage
is unqualified for any pleasure but what is thoroughly or nearly
selfish: therefore a savage is incapable of comparing selfish and social
pleasure. But a man after acquiring a high relish of the latter, loses
not thereby a taste for the former. This man can judge, and he will
give preference to social pleasures as more sweet and refined. In fact
they maintain that character, not only in the direct feeling, but also
when we make them the subject of reflection. The social passions are by
far more agreeable than the selfish, and rise much higher in our esteem.
Refined manners and polite behaviour, must not be deemed altogether
artificial. Men accustomed to the sweets of society, who cultivate
humanity, find an elegant pleasure in preferring others and making them
happy, of which the proud or selfish scarce have a conception.
Ridicule, which chiefly arises from pride, a selfish passion, is at best
but a gross pleasure. A people, it is true, must have emerged out of
barbarity before they can have a taste for ridicule. But it is too rough
an entertainment for those who are highly polished and refined. Ridicule
is banished France, and is losing ground daily in England.
Other modifications of pleasant passions will be occasionally mentioned
hereafter. Particularly the modifications of _high_ and _low_ are
handled in the chapter of grandeur and sublimity; and the modifications
of _dignified_ and _mean_, in the chapter of dignity and meanness.