and ordinary, but it is not accorded to envoys unless they claim it on
some other ground, as, for instance, that they are ministers of state
or senators, or other high officers at a royal court. This title of
excellency is not in common use at the French Court, as it is in Spain,
Italy, and Germany, and the kingdoms of the north, and you will only
find foreigners in France addressing the King’s ministers or other
officers of the court with that title. But foreign negotiators of all
kinds are addressed by that title as a mark of courtesy to the rank
which they hold.
[Sidenote: _Legates, Nuncios, and Internuncios._]
The Court of Rome has three different degrees of titles by which to
mark the rank of her ministers in foreign courts. The first is that of
_Legato a latere_, the second is that of Ordinary or Extraordinary
Nuncio, and the third is the Internuncio. The first of these is always
a cardinal, to whom as a rule the Pope gives very wide powers both
for the affairs of papal diplomacy and for the administration of
dispensations and other privileges of the Holy See. They are received
at all Catholic Courts with extraordinary honours: in France at their
presentation they are attended by the princes of the blood; they
remain seated and covered in audience with the King, whereas both
ambassadors and even papal nuncios speak to him standing. These legates
have a further honour accorded neither to nuncios nor ambassadors in
France, namely the right to eat at the King’s table at the banquet of
reception given by his Majesty in their honour. The Cross is carried
before them to mark their ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which, however,
is strictly limited in France, and is recognised in certain specified
cases for the verification of Papal Bulls at the Parliament of Paris,
to which they must present them before attempting to put them into
force. Nuncios both ordinary and extraordinary are usually prelates of
the rank of archbishop or bishop. They are received and presented by
a prince of the royal blood at their first and final audiences with
the King, no difference being made between the nuncio extraordinary
and the nuncio ordinary except that the former takes precedence of
the latter if there are two present in the same Chamber. None the less
the prelates of the Court of Rome prefer the title of nuncio ordinary
at the Courts of France, Spain, and of the Emperor, because it is a
shorter and a surer road to the cardinal’s hat, which is the goal of
their aspirations. As regards their appointment, when the Pope desires
to send a nuncio ordinary to the French Court, he presents the French
ambassador in Rome with a list of several dignitaries of the Church,
from which the King may exclude those who are not agreeable to him.
The papal nuncios in France give their hand to the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, but not to bishops or archbishops received on
ceremonial visits. They have no ecclesiastical jurisdiction in France
in the sense in which they possess it in Vienna, in Spain, in Portugal,
in Poland, and in many other Catholic states, where they are recognised
as valid judges in various cases, and have the power of dispensation in
the same way as the archbishops or the diocesan bishop. In France they
are only entitled to receive the confession of faith of those whom the
King has nominated to bishoprics and to inquire regarding their life
and habits.
[Sidenote: _Diplomatic Privileges._]
Ambassadors, envoys, and residents all possess the right to exercise
freely the religion of their King, and to admit to such ordinances
their own nationals living in the foreign country. In matters of
law diplomatists of rank are not subject to the jurisdiction of the
judges of that foreign country where they reside, and both they and
their household enjoy what is called extra-territoriality, their
embassy being regarded as it were the house of the King himself, and
as being an asylum for his nationals. But this privilege carries its
corresponding duty. No blame can be too severe for those ministers
abroad who abuse this right of asylum in sheltering under their roof
evilly disposed persons, either those condemned to death for crime, or
those who are engaged upon any business which renders them unworthy of
the protection of the King. The sagacious diplomat will not compromise
the authority of his master for any such odious reason as the attempt
to confer immunity upon a criminal. It must suffice for him that his
own right of asylum is kept inviolate, and he must never employ it
except on extraordinary occasions in his master’s service, and never
indeed for his own private profit. On the other hand, the King must
expressly forbid his judges, bailiffs, or private citizens to violate
the law of nations in the person of a foreign envoy, who is always
recognised as under the protection of international law. And wherever
insult is offered to a foreign envoy, the prince himself must repair it
without fail in the same manner in which he would expect return for a
like insult to his own minister abroad.
[Sidenote: _Abuse of Immunity._]
It sometimes occurs that ministers abuse the right of free passage,
which they possess for their own provisions and the equipment necessary
for their establishment, to carry on a clandestine trade from which
they draw large profits by lending their name to fraud. This kind
of profit is utterly unworthy of the public minister, and makes his
name stink in the nostrils of the King to whom he is sent as well as
to his own prince. A wise minister may be well content to enjoy the
large privileges to which he is entitled in every foreign country
without attempting to abuse them for his own private profit, or by
countenancing any fraud which is committed under the protection of his
name. The Spanish Government was obliged a few years ago severely to
regulate these privileges for all foreign envoys residing in Madrid,
and the Republic of Genoa found it necessary to adopt the same somewhat
humiliating precautions in order to prevent diplomatists from engaging
in illicit traffic. The privileges conferred by the law of nations upon
envoys abroad permit full freedom in their proper duty of labouring to
discover all that passes in the council-chamber of his Majesty, and
to take steps to form close relations with those best able to supply
this information, but they are not to be interpreted as covering any
attempt to form a conspiracy against the public peace; for the same
international right which covers the person of a diplomatist must also
be held to cover the peace and security of the kingdom to which he is
accredited. Therefore the diplomatist will be on his guard against any
action which may seem to lend the authority of his name or office to
revolutionary plots or to other hostile acts against the peace of the
realm. Should he neglect this precaution, he may find himself treated
as an enemy.
[Sidenote: _Henry IV. and the Duke of Savoy._]
Charles Emanuel the first Duke of Savoy maintained certain connections
in France with some of the principal peers at the Court of Henry IV.,
and engaged with them in plots and cabals. He attended the French Court
under the pretext of paying his respects to the King, but in reality
with the intention of spreading his own influence and fortifying
his own designs, which were to prevent Henry IV. from forcing him
to restore the Marquisate of Saluse which he had usurped. The King
discovered the Duke’s intrigue, and held a cabinet meeting on the
matter. The Council was of opinion that the Duke had come under a false
show of friendship in order to disturb the peace of the realm, that the
King was therefore fully within his rights in laying hands upon him
as upon an enemy, that in consequence of his own acts the Duke could
claim no immunity, and that therefore the King would be justified in
preventing him from leaving France until he had restored the marquisate
in question. But the King did not agree with his ministers, but said:
‘The Duke came to visit me on my parole. If he has failed in his duty
I do not wish to imitate so evil an example, and I have so fine a
precedent in my own house that I am compelled to follow it rather than
to follow the Duke.’ In this he spoke of Francis I., who in a similar
case gave the Emperor Charles V. a free passage through France without
insisting that he should relinquish the Duchy of Milan; and although
several of the King’s counsellors at that time were of opinion that
he should profit by the opportunity to compel the Emperor to restore
the duchy, which indeed he had several times promised to do, Francis
I. preferred to maintain his own honour above every other interest.
Henry IV. acted on the same principle; he permitted the Duke of Savoy
to depart unmolested after heaping honours and entertainments upon him,
but the moment the Duke had returned to his own Court the King demanded
the restitution of the Marquisate of Saluse according to his promise.
The Duke refused, whereupon the King invaded Savoy, occupied the whole
duchy, and compelled him to keep his word, not only to the extent of
the marquisate but of several other parts which he was compelled to
cede to the King by a treaty concluded at Lyons, on the 17th January
1601.
[Sidenote: _Reparation for Abuse of Immunity._]
Those who think that one may lay forcible hands upon a sovereign
who has broken his word will easily persuade themselves that in a
similar case no international law can protect the person of a mere
minister; but those who are really well instructed in the law of
nations and in the question of sovereign rights are of opinion that a
foreign envoy being subject to the laws of the country where he lives
it is not possible to put into motion against him the machinery of
domestic justice, that the only redress for wrongs done by him is an
appeal to his master, and that if his master refuses reparation the
responsibility must lie with him and not on his minister abroad who
merely executes his order. This privilege, be it remembered, extends
not merely to the ambassadors themselves but often to their servants,
as is illustrated in the following example.
[Sidenote: _The Merargue Conspiracy._]
King Henry IV., whom one may take as a model for princes, was warned
by the Duke de Guise of the Merargue Conspiracy in which a Provençal
squire named Merargue had entered into an arrangement with Dom
Balthazar de Zuniga, the Spanish ambassador, to hand over the city
of Marseilles to the Spaniards at a moment of profound peace. The
King arrested not only Merargue, but also the private secretary to
the Spanish ambassador, a man named Bruneau. Both were convicted of
conspiracy. Merargue was executed, and the King handed over the private
secretary to his own ambassador, saying that he would be glad to see
Bruneau sent across the frontier, though he himself reserved the right
to demand satisfaction from the Spanish King for Bruneau’s misdemeanour.
[Sidenote: _Immunity a Function of Sovereignty._]
Now if princes had the right to proceed against foreign envoys at their
courts, the latter would never feel themselves secure, because then it
would be easy to get rid of any of them on flimsy pretexts, and the
precedent once set up in a good case would surely be followed in many
cases where nothing but idle suspicion could be brought against the
envoy in question. This indeed would be the end of all diplomacy. Of
course it is true that a minister who breaks faith cannot expect others
to keep faith with him, especially if he is engaged upon conspiracies
or any of those practices against the prince and safety of the realm
of which I have spoken. But even in such a case the wise prince will
not break the law of nations, which should always be respected. He
will rather use his good offices at the court whence the erring envoy
came in order to have him withdrawn. At the same time it is always
permissible to place a watch upon a faithless ambassador, in order to
hinder him in practices which would otherwise do harm to the state,
and of course on the other part a wise ambassador will certainly avoid
falling into such intrigues, for the very protection which he enjoys
under the law of nations is a guarantee of his person and of his good
behaviour. Benefits under it are reciprocal, and the reciprocal duties
which it imposes should be scrupulously observed. If they are not, no
law of nations can guarantee an intriguing ambassador for ever against
the fury of the populace once they are aroused by suspicion.
[Sidenote: _Its Abuse undermines True Diplomacy._]
On all these grounds the minister is to be pitied who receives commands
from his master to form cabals in a foreign state, and he will need all
his skill and courage to carry out such commands without being trapped
in the process. It has been truly said that there is no service which
a prince may not expect from good subjects and faithful ministers, but
such obedience cannot be held to cover any action against the laws of
God or of justice, which do not countenance for one moment attempts
on the life of a prince, or against the security of the state, or any
other unfriendly act committed under cover of the protecting title of
ambassador. A good ambassador will always discourage plans of this
kind, and if his master persists in them he may and should demand his
recall, and retire into obscurity, jealously guarding his sovereign’s
evil secret. In justice to most reigning sovereigns it must be said
that few of them engage in designs of this kind. The vast majority of
intrigues and cabals are made in their name in foreign states, or are
suggested to them by their ministers or by astute diplomatists, who
undertake to carry them out, and through them to confer great benefits
upon the prince himself. But these diplomatists are often the first to
fall into traps set by their own hand, and are then objects of pity to
no man. Numerous examples of this kind can be quoted, and I think no
one will challenge the truth of my observation when I say that in nine
cases out of ten diplomatists who give such advice are actuated more
by personal ambition or petty spite than by the true interests of the
nation they serve.
[Sidenote: _Secret Service No Abuse of Immunity._]
But let me not be misunderstood, there is all the difference between
the attempt to debauch the subjects of a sovereign prince in order to
ensnare them in conspiracy against him, and the legitimate endeavour to
use every opportunity for acquiring information. The latter practice
has always been permissible, and indeed is a necessary part of
diplomacy. No criticism can fall upon a foreign envoy who successfully
adopts the practice; the only culprit in such a case is the citizen of
a foreign state who from corrupt motives sells information abroad.
Apart from considerations of international law the interest of the
public peace demands the preservation of the privileges of foreign
envoys, for otherwise wars would be even more frequent than they
are, because no prince would permit insults to his ministers to go
unavenged. They are rightly resented, and the prince may pay heavily in
his own peace of mind and the repose of his subjects for a moment of
passion. He need do no more, however, than demand satisfaction for the
bad conduct of any foreign envoy, and if he has just cause of complaint
he will probably receive it. In any case the dismissal or recall of an
ambassador will be read as a pointed lesson to all his colleagues in
diplomacy, who will then understand that the price of evil conduct is
the humiliation of dismissal.
[Sidenote: _The Credentials of an Ambassador._]
When an ambassador is sent to a foreign court, his master gives him a
letter addressed to the foreign prince requesting him to give the same
credence to the bearer of the letter as to its writer. This despatch is
called a letter of credence, which thus establishes the identity of its
bearer and stands as the hall-mark of his office. In France there are
two sorts of letters of credence: one called _Lettre de Cachet_, which
is despatched and countersigned by the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, and sometimes also called _Lettre de la Chancellerie_. The
other is written by the hand of one of the royal private secretaries,
and signed by the King himself; it is countersigned by any minister,
and is usually handed direct in private audience to the foreign prince
to whom it is addressed. The former type of letter is presented in
ceremonial public audience. When a negotiator is appointed by his
prince to a free state or an assembly, which for this purpose is
treated as though it were a court, he does not receive letters of
credence, but his character and identity are fully established in his
full powers, which he must exchange with ministers on arriving. The
document known as full powers is an authorisation by the prince to his
representative abroad to undertake all kinds of public business, the
results of which the sovereign himself agrees to accept by the proxy of
his minister; but as a rule in such full powers the particular matter
under discussion is carefully specified, and the authority to act is
confined to it.
[Sidenote: _Full Powers._]
There are two kinds of full powers: one deriving directly from
the sovereign and the other from his deputies, that is to say,
his ministers of state who have sufficient authority to nominate
plenipotentiaries in his absence. Such powers are particularly
desirable where the states lie far apart from one another. In such
negotiations as those between the Court of Madrid and the Low
Countries, or the different Italian states, the advantage of this
procedure is obvious.... Passports are of course merely letters which
establish the identity and good faith of the person as distinct from
the representative of state, and they are given even in time of war in
order to secure a safe passage between countries at war for ministers
engaged upon negotiation which may lead to peace....
[Sidenote: _Instructions._]
The instruction is a written document containing a statement of the
principal intentions of the prince or the state; it is to be regarded
as a general aid to memory and a general guide to conduct. It is
secret and must be retained under the control of him who receives it,
though of course there are occasions on which he will receive the
command to communicate specific portions of it to a foreign minister
or a foreign prince. Such communication is regarded as a rule as a
mark of special confidence, but on the other hand it often happens
that two instructions are given, one the ostensible, that is to say
it is drawn up in such terms that it can be shown to other princes,
and the other secret, which contains the true and final intentions of
the prince himself. But even the latter type of instruction is subject
to alteration by the daily despatches which the negotiator receives
from home, and which ought to be read as so many new instructions
drawn up in accordance with the reports which he has transmitted to
his own court. It follows therefore that the manner of reports which
a negotiator despatches to his home government will have a large
influence upon the type of instruction which he receives from time to
time.
[Sidenote: _Oral Instructions._]
The Minister of Foreign Affairs may prefer not to put the instructions
and intentions of his royal master into writing but to deliver them
orally, because then he has a greater freedom of interpretation
according to circumstances as they arise, than he would have if he
were bound by the written word. There is further a danger that such
instructions when committed to paper may be wittingly or unwittingly
left in the hands of some foreign diplomatist belonging to the opposite
party. The risks thus incurred are too obvious to need any emphasis of
mine. Whereas if the instructions be left in oral form, they can at
least be repudiated if a dangerous situation were to arise from their
being made known to an enemy prince. There are of course occasions
where it is impossible not to commit to writing instructions given to
a plenipotentiary, but it is a good rule in all negotiation to delay
the issue of formal and binding instructions to as late a date in the
negotiations as possible, so that the general lines upon which it is
likely to proceed may be present to the mind of the minister who draws
them up for the guidance of the ambassador.
It is not permissible without a serious violation of the law of nations
to compel a minister to show his instructions in order to prove his
good faith, nor is it permissible for a minister to communicate it in
any form without an express command from his master, for he can fully
rely on his letter of credence to establish both his identity and his
good faith; besides which he is equipped with full powers in which the
business of his negotiation is always fully described.
[Sidenote: _Discretionary Freedom._]
Now such instructions may be as judicious and astute as can be
imagined, but their use will lie in the wise interpretation by
the diplomatist himself; and, as I have pointed out, the really
able negotiator will always know how best to execute his master’s
commands so that the instructions received from him may be drawn up
on information which is both up-to-date and adequate. Thus it is that
while the final responsibility for all success or failure in diplomacy
would seem to rest upon the King and his ministers at home, it is none
the less true that since these ministers can only act upon information
from abroad, the influence which an enlightened diplomatist can
exercise upon the actions and designs of the home government is very
large. Incapable men acting abroad will make nothing even of the most
brilliant instructions; capable men by the accuracy and sagacity of
their reports and suggestions can do much to improve even the most
mediocre instructions, and therefore the responsibility for diplomatic
action is in reality shared in about equal degree between the home
government and its servants abroad. The home government cannot know
when the opportunity for appropriate action will arise, and therefore
the reports on foreign situations which are transmitted in despatches
from diplomats abroad ought to be so designed as to present as far as
possible an intelligent description of events.
[Sidenote: _Value of the Trained Mind._]
What an astonishing diversity and inequality there is in the conduct of
men. No one, not even a minister of state, would think of building a
house without the assistance of the best architect and the best workmen
whom he could find; but it is the commonest occurrence to find that
those who are charged with the transaction of very important state
business, upon which the weal or woe of the whole realm depends, never
think of entrusting it to trained minds, but give it to the first
comer, whether he be a cunning architect or a mere hewer of stone.
Therefore ministers and other persons in authority are culpable in
a high degree if they do not secure for the foreign service of the
state the most capable and sagacious men. For the errors in diplomacy
sometimes bring more calamitous results than mistakes in other walks
of life, and unless the negotiator can intelligently discern the
coming event, he may plunge himself, his master, and his native land in
irretrievable disaster.
[Sidenote: _Incompetence the Parent of Disaster._]
It is a crime against the public safety not to uproot incapacity
wherever it is discovered, or to allow an incompetent diplomatist to
remain one moment longer than necessary in a place where competency
is sorely needed. Faults in domestic policy are often more easily
remedied than mistakes in foreign policy. There are many factors in
foreign affairs which lie beyond the control of the ministers of any
given state, and all foreign action requires greater circumspection,
greater knowledge, and far greater sagacity than is demanded in home
affairs. Therefore the government cannot exercise too great a care in
its choice of men to serve abroad. In making such a choice the Foreign
Minister must set his face like a flint against all family influence
and private pressure, for nepotism is the damnation of diplomacy. He is
in some sense the guarantor to his Majesty of those whom he presents
as diplomatists. Their good success will do him honour, their failure
will fall with redoubled force upon his head, and may require herculean
efforts by him in order to repair the damage it has caused. Hence it
is of the first interest, both for the Foreign Minister himself and
for the well-being of the state, to see that the high public offices
of diplomacy are not filled by the intrigues and personal cabals
which reign at every court, and which often place in the King’s hands
unworthy instruments of his policy.
[Sidenote: _The Diplomatist prepares Himself for a Foreign Mission._]
Now when a diplomatist has been appointed to a foreign post his
first care should be to ask for the despatches of his predecessor
in order that he may inform himself exactly of the state of affairs
with which he will have to deal. He will thus be able to pick up the
thread and to make use both of the knowledge and of the different
personal relationships which have gathered round the embassy during
his predecessor’s term of office. And as all public affairs are like a
great network, one linked with another, it is of the first importance
that a diplomatist proceeding to a foreign post should be a complete
master of recent history both in regard to his own state and in regard
to the relations which exist between the country of his new service
and all neighbouring countries. Therefore, when the newly appointed
diplomatist has read with care the despatches of his predecessor, he
should make notes upon them, endeavouring to foresee the difficulties
which he will meet both in such trivial matters as a novel ceremonial,
or in the more weighty business of state, so that he may be able to
discuss them with his own Foreign Minister, and thus receive what
enlightenment he can.
[Sidenote: _He must study his own Foreign Office._]
Now, no matter how far-seeing a minister may be, it is impossible
for him to foresee everything or to give such ample and at the same
time precise instructions to his negotiators as to guide them in all
circumstances which may arise. It is therefore of the first importance
that the newly appointed diplomatist travelling to a far country should
devote all his time before his departure to the discovery of the real
intentions and designs of his own Foreign Office. In a word, he should
saturate his mind with the thoughts of his master. He should not only
consult those who have discharged diplomatic duties at the foreign
court to which he is about to proceed, but should make it his especial
care to keep touch with those who have lived in the country in any
quality whatsoever, and to acquire from them all the knowledge which
they may possess. Even the humblest of such persons may be able to give
him information which will help him to regulate his conduct abroad.
And before his departure he should certainly strike up an acquaintance
with the ambassador representing the country to which he is about
to proceed, in order that he may get from him private letters of
recommendation, and further, in order that he may persuade him of his
own earnest desire to do all in his power to establish good relations
between the two states. He should let it be known to the foreign
ambassador in question that he will lose no opportunity of bearing
witness to the success of his mission and to the esteem which he has
won at home. In so doing he will be able rapidly to acquire new and
powerful friends in his new sphere of labour. For it is a commonplace
of human experience that men will do as they are done by: reciprocity
is the surest foundation of friendship.
[Sidenote: _Choice of a Staff._]
The careful diplomatist will pay the same attention to the choice
of his domestics as to more important subjects. Those about him
must do him credit. A well-ordered household served by reliable and
well-mannered persons is a good advertisement, both of the ambassador
and of the country whence he comes, and in order that they may have no
excuse for ill-regulated conduct, he should set a high example before
them in his own person. His choice of a private secretary is perhaps
the most important of all, for if he be light-headed, frivolous or
indiscreet, he may do his master irreparable harm; and if he be a
person liable to get into debt, his embarrassment may be the cause
of very serious trouble. Some years ago the private secretary of a
French ambassador sold the private cipher of the embassy for a large
sum in order to wipe out his debts. Thus the ambassador’s despatches
were intercepted and read, with very grave results upon the relations
between the two countries, in spite of the fact that the obvious
interest of both lay in the same direction. The necessity for having
faithful and able men as secretaries has given rise to the belief that
it would be very useful to establish them in rank as a part of the
public service of the King, and thus to restore a custom which was
abolished some time ago in France. It would be a desirable practice,
for thereby a large body of men might be trained in the diplomatic
service of the Crown from whom ambassadors and envoys could be drawn.
This is the practice in several foreign countries, and there is no
doubt that it leads to the improvement of the whole diplomatic service.
For if the secretaries and attachés are selected and paid by the King’s
government they will tend to acquire a careful efficiency and _esprit
de corps_ which will be the best protection for his secrets. And it
is obvious that as long as the choice of such persons is left to the
personal decision of the ambassador alone there is always a risk that
he will not be able to offer a sufficient sum to command the services
of good men. Thus the adequate payment and proper official recognition
of such junior diplomatists is a necessary part of any true reform of
the foreign service, and it would certainly be a great relief to most
ambassadors to take the responsibility of choice off their shoulders
as well as the burden of paying secretaries for their services. The
state will certainly be well repaid if such a policy as I suggest
be adopted, for diplomacy will then become the school in which good
workmen will rapidly learn the use of their tools.
[Sidenote: _First Steps at the Foreign Court._]
On arrival at a foreign court a negotiator should make himself and
his mission known to the proper authorities at the earliest possible
moment, and request a private audience with the prince in order that he
may establish contact immediately, and thus prepare the way for good
relations between his master and the foreign sovereign. When he has
taken the necessary steps for this purpose he should be in no hurry to
embark upon any important steps but should rather study the _terrain_.
For this purpose he should remain a watchful, silent observer of the
habits of the court and of the government, and if he be in a country
where the prince is really the ruler, he should study with the greatest
assiduity the whole life and habits of the latter; for policy is not
merely a matter of high impersonal design, it is a vast complexity in
which the inclinations, the judgments, the virtues and the vices of
the prince himself will play a large part. Occasions will constantly
arise in which the adroit negotiator who has equipped himself with this
knowledge will be able to use it with the highest possible effect.
And he should test his own conclusions by comparing notes discreetly
with other foreign negotiators of the same court, especially if they
have had a long residence there. Up to a certain point co-operation
between foreign ambassadors is not only permissible but desirable
and necessary. And since no prince, not even the most autocratic,
discharges the duties of government entirely by himself without
confiding in one or more favoured ministers, the negotiator should
make it his business to know much of the ministers and confidants
surrounding the King who have his fullest confidence, for in the same
manner as described above personal qualities, opinions, passions,
likes, and dislikes are all relevant subjects of study, and should be
carefully observed by every negotiator who means business.
[Sidenote: _Relations with Colleagues._]
When a foreign envoy arrives at a court and has been received by
the prince, he should inform all the other members of the Corps
Diplomatique either by a squire of his suite or by a secretary. They
will then pay him their first visit, but he will receive no visits
until he has gone through the formality of announcing to each in turn
his own arrival; and at a court where there are ambassadors of several
kings, each on arrival should pay his respects first of all to the
French ambassador, who everywhere takes first rank. The Spaniards,
who adopted every form of chicane for a whole century in order to
avoid the recognition of French precedence, which for that matter is
an immemorial right of the French King, finally recognised it by the
public declaration, made by Philip IV. to his Majesty in 1662 by the
Marquis de la Fuente, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, which arose out
of the violent dispute in London between the Count d’Estrade and the
Baron de Vatville, after which no Spanish ambassador would consent to
be present at any ceremony attended by the French ambassador. Various
other attempts have been made to dispute French supremacy, but with no
result....
[Sidenote: _Report of First Impressions._]
After he has fully informed himself of all such matters and placed
himself in such a position as to know immediately whether the prince
has changed his mind or transferred his confidence from one servant to
another, he should set all these things down faithfully in a despatch
to his home government, presenting a full picture of the court as he
sees it, and at the same time setting down the conclusions which he has
drawn from his observations. He should not fail to indicate the methods
by which he proposes to act, or the means he proposes to use, in order
to carry out the commands which he has received. At the same time he
will not fail to keep his own knowledge up to date, and to use it for
finding and keeping open every possible avenue of approach to the
prince to whom he is accredited, or to his ministers and favourites.
There is no doubt that the surest and best way in which the negotiator
can establish good relations is to prove to both courts that their
union is of great mutual advantage. It is the essential design of
diplomacy to confer such a mutual advantage, and to carry policy to
success by securing the co-operation in it of those who might otherwise
be its opponents. Success won by force or by fraud stands upon a weak
foundation. Diplomatic success, on the other hand, won by methods which
confer reciprocal benefits on both parties, must be regarded not only
as firmly founded, but as the sure promise of other successes to come.
I am not so foolish as to suppose, however, that this method can be
applied in every situation. There are times when it is necessary for
the negotiator to exploit the hatreds, passions, and jealousies of
those with whom he deals, and therefore occasion will arise when it
is easier and more fruitful to appeal to prejudice rather than to any
estimate of the true and permanent interests of those concerned. As we
have observed above, both kings and nations often plunge into reckless
courses of policy under the impulse of passion, and as a rule throw
overboard all consideration of their veritable interests.
[Sidenote: _Character and Whims of the Foreign Prince._]
The high elevation of crowned heads does not prevent them from being
human; and indeed in some ways it lays them open to certain weaknesses
of which lesser men by reason of their position are largely free. There
is a certain pride of position, a certain arrogant self-esteem, which
is only to be found in highly placed persons, and which is most marked
in kings and ministers. On this account, and on account of the actual
power their exalted position puts into their hands, kings are open to
persuasion and flattery in a way in which men of lower degree cannot
be approached. This consideration must ever be in the mind of the good
negotiator, who should therefore strive to divest himself of his own
feelings and prejudices, and place himself in the position of the King
so that he may understand completely the desires and whims which guide
his actions. And when he has done so he should say to himself: ‘Now, if
I were in the place of this prince, wielding his power, subject to his
passions and prejudices, what effect would my mission and my arguments
have upon me?’ The more often he thus puts himself in the position
of others, the more subtle and effective will his arguments be. And
it is of course not only in matters of opinion that this use of the
imagination is valuable, it is more particularly in all those personal
aspects where the power to give pleasure by flattery or any other means
is effective.
[Sidenote: _The Use of Compliments._]
No one will forget that crowned heads, and even their ministers
themselves, are accustomed from birth to the submission of those
around them, to receive their respect and praise. This unbroken
experience of the obedience of others is apt to make them very
sensitive to criticism, and unwilling to listen to contradiction.
There are few princes to whom it is easy to speak the truth, and
since it is not part of the business of the negotiator except on rare
occasions to speak home truths at a foreign court, he will avoid as
far as possible everything which may wound the royal pride which is
the natural result of the manner in which princes are reared. On the
other hand, he will never give empty praise nor applaud a reprehensible
act, and where praise is given as it is deserved, the negotiator must
know how to clothe it in chaste and dignified language. And since
princes are accustomed to hear their praise sung constantly, they
become connoisseurs in praise and good judges of a timely compliment.
It is the higher art of the subtle courtier to know how to deliver
a well-turned compliment to his King, and above all, if the King is
endowed with real intelligence, never to praise him for qualities which
he does not possess. Any fool can earn the esteem of a prince who is
also a fool by indiscriminate praise. Wise men will rely on their own
merits and on the good sense of the King wherever they have the good
fortune to serve a monarch so endowed. To praise a King for those
things which are inherent in his position, such as riches, spacious
mansions, and fine clothes, is merely stupidity. A King who is worth
praising will only value your praise if it is given to qualities which
he knows to be praiseworthy. In this matter the negotiator must be
sufficiently worldly-wise always to remember that the good favour of
the ladies of the court is to be won by different means than that
of his Majesty or the ministers. And since, as I have pointed out
elsewhere, the approach to the King and his ministers may perhaps be
most easily made through feminine influence, the negotiator will study
carefully the character and weaknesses of all the ladies at the court
so as to keep these useful and attractive avenues open for his use.
[Sidenote: _Craft at the Card-table._]
The methods of giving pleasure, as I say, must vary. One of the most
illustrious and sagacious ambassadors of our time, a friend of my
own, neglected nothing, but he used to say that there was no surer
road to the good-will of a sovereign than to allow him to win at the
card-table, and that many a great enterprise had been conducted to
success by the little pile of gold coins which passed from him to his
royal opponent at the gaming-table. My friend used to say in jest that
he had played the fool at foreign card-tables in order to prove that he
was a wise man at home! His jest bore a truth within it which I hope
every negotiator will lay to heart....
[Sidenote: _Common-sense Pleas._]
The pleas which I have set out above are, I believe, applicable in
most situations, but of course there are variations to be observed. It
is not always easy for a negotiator on leaving home to remember how
great a difference there is between his own court and that to which he
proceeds. For whether the foreign country which is his new home stands
on equal terms with his own or whether it be a Power of lower station
in the world, the vast differences in national outlook between them
must be fully understood before the negotiator can make any progress.
It is therefore his first business, whatever be the magnitude and
splendour of the court to which he is accredited, to win the general
favour by showing a genuine and sincere interest in the welfare of his
new associates, and in all the customs of the court and the habits of
the people; and on his arrival he should show himself ready to share
information both with his new colleagues in the Corps Diplomatique,
and with the ministers of the King to whom he is sent. Let me lay some
insistence on this. It will be observed that if a negotiator has the
reputation of speaking freely on many subjects, it is not improbable
that those who have secrets to reveal may speak the more freely to
him. A negotiator of my acquaintance to whom I look with high regard
once said: ‘Diplomacy is like a chain of ten links in which perhaps
only one is missing to make it complete: it is the business of the
diplomat to supply the tenth link.’ This is true, and I believe that
the diplomatist who is least enwrapped in secrecy will most quickly
and surely discover it. It is therefore important that the negotiator,
being well equipped with all kinds of information, should be guided
by a sound judgment in the use of it. He should realise that in all
information there are only one or two items which are of the first
importance, and that therefore the freedom with which he uses the rest
need not in any way imperil his master’s plans. The more freely he can
share such information, and the more carefully he bestows his praise
upon individuals, the more surely will men say of him that he is a
reliable person, and will turn to him in moments of crisis.
[Sidenote: _The Clockmaker’s Patience._]
Every right-minded man desires to stand well in the eyes of those with
whom he transacts business, and therefore he will give some trouble to
all those devices for securing the good-will of men to which I have
referred. If he finds in the course of his work that the prince himself
or any one of his ministers is ill-disposed towards him or intractable
in discussion, he must not on that account allow himself to imitate the
fault, but must redouble his efforts in the contrary direction. Indeed
he must behave as a good watchmaker would when his clock has gone out
of order: he must labour to remove the difficulty, or at all events to
circumvent its results. He must not be led aside by his own feelings.
Prejudice is a great misinterpreter’s house in all public affairs.
[Sidenote: _A High Ideal._]
It might seem that the ideal which I now set up for the negotiator is
one too high for any man to reach. It is true that no man can ever
carry out his instructions without a fault, but unless he has before
him an ideal as a guide he will find himself plunged in the midst of
distracting affairs without any rule for his own conduct. Therefore I
place before him these considerations: that despite all disappointments
and exasperations he must act with _sang-froid_; he must work with
patience to remove all obstacles that lie in his path, whether they are
placed there by accident or act of God or by the evil design of men; he
must preserve a calm and resolute mind when the conjunctures of events
seem to conspire against him; and finally, he must remember that if
once he permit his own personal or outrageous feelings to guide his
conduct in negotiation he is on the sure and straight road to disaster.
In a word, when events and men are unkind he must never despair of
being able to change them, nor again when they smile upon his efforts
must he cherish the illusion that their good favour will endure for
ever.
[Sidenote: _The Negotiator’s Twofold Function._]
The functions of a minister despatched on a mission to a foreign
country fall into two principal categories: the first to conduct
the business of his master, and the second to discover the business
of others. The first of these concerns the prince or his ministers
of state, or at all events those deputies to whom are entrusted
the examination of his proposals. In all these different kinds of
negotiation he must seek success principally by his straightforward
and honest procedure, for if he attempts to succeed by subtlety or by
a sense of superiority over those with whom he is engaged he may very
likely deceive himself. There is no prince or state which does not
possess some shrewd envoy to discern its real interests. And indeed,
even among people who seem to be the least refined, there are often
those who know their own interests best, and follow them with the most
constancy. Therefore the negotiator, no matter how able he may be, must
not attempt to teach such persons their own business, but he should
exhaust all the resources of his mind and wit to prove to them the
great advantage of the proposals which he has to make.
[Sidenote: _Diplomacy a Commerce in Benefits._]
An ancient philosopher once said that friendship between men is
nothing but a commerce in which each seeks his own interest. The
same is true or even truer of the liaisons and treaties which bind
one sovereign to another, for there is no durable treaty which is not
founded on reciprocal advantage, and indeed a treaty which does not
satisfy this condition is no treaty at all, and is apt to contain the
seeds of its own dissolution. Thus the great secret of negotiation is
to bring out prominently the common advantage to both parties of any
proposal, and so to link these advantages that they may appear equally
balanced to both parties. For this purpose when negotiations are on
foot between two sovereigns, one the greater and the other the less,
the more powerful of these two should make the first advance, and even
undertake a large outlay of money to bring about the union of interests
with his lesser neighbour, for his own self-interest will show him
that he has really the greater object and the larger advantages in
view, and that any benefits he may confer or subsidies which he may
grant to his weaker ally will be readily repaid by the success of
his designs. Now, as we have said, the secret of negotiation is to
harmonise the interests of the parties concerned. It is clear that if a
negotiator excludes the honest and straightforward method of reason and
persuasion, and adopts on the contrary a haughty and menacing manner,
then obviously he must be followed by an army ready to invade the
country in which he has put forth such provocative claims. Without such
a display of force his claims will fall to the ground, even though by
advantageous arguments they might have prevailed with the prince whom
he addressed, and who might have accepted them had they been proposed
in a different manner. When a prince or a state is powerful enough to
dictate to his neighbours the art of negotiation loses its value, for
then there is need for nothing but a mere statement of the prince’s
will; but when there is a balance of force an independent prince
will only decide to favour one of the two parties of a dispute if he
discerns advantages to himself and good results to the prosperity of
his realm.
[Sidenote: _Harmony the Ideal State._]
A prince who has no powerful enemies can easily impose tribute on all
neighbouring Powers, but a prince whose aim is self-aggrandisement
and who has powerful enemies must seek allies among the lesser states
in order to increase those friendly to him; and if possible he should
be able to prove his power by the benefits which an alliance with
him can confer upon them. Therefore the principal function of the
negotiator is to bring about a harmonised union between his master and
the sovereign to whom he is sent, or else to maintain and increase
existing alliances by every means in his power. He must labour to
remove misunderstandings, to prevent subjects of dispute from arising,
and generally to maintain in that foreign country the honour and
interests of his prince. This includes the protection and patronage
of his subjects, assistance to their business enterprises, and the
promotion of good relations between them and the subjects of the
foreign prince to whose court he is accredited. He must always assume
that there is no prince nor state in the world which does not desire to
avoid a condition of crisis, and that those princes who love to fish
in troubled waters will never lack the means to stir them up, but that
the storms which such men conjure up are apt to overwhelm them, so that
the wise negotiator will do all he can to avoid giving provocation,
and will conduct himself in such a manner that no one will be able to
impute reckless motives to him.
[Sidenote: _The Search for Information._]
His second function being the discovery of all that is happening at
court and in the cabinet, he should first of all take steps to learn
from his predecessor all that he knows regarding the state of affairs
in the country to which he is about to proceed and to acquire from
him those hints and suggestions which may be of use. He should take
up the friends and acquaintances left behind by his predecessor, and
should add to them by making new ones. It would be no bad practice in
this matter to imitate the established rule of the Venetian Republic,
which obliges an ambassador returning from a foreign court to render a
detailed account in writing of the country, both for the information of
the public and for the instruction of his successor at the embassy. The
diplomatists of Venice have drawn great advantage from this practice,
and it has been often remarked that there are no better instructed
negotiators in Europe than those of Venice.
[Sidenote: _Freemasonry of Diplomacy._]
The discovery of the course of events and the trend of policy in a
foreign country is most natural when one knows both the personnel and
the political habits of the country, and a negotiator for the first
time in such a country must neglect no source of information. In
addition to those mentioned above, he may very probably find that his
colleagues in the Corps Diplomatique will be of use to him, for since
the whole diplomatic body works for the same end, namely to discover
what is happening, there may arise--there often indeed does arise--a
freemasonry of diplomacy by which one colleague informs another of
coming events which a lucky chance has enabled him to discern. Such
collaboration is possible in all cases except those in which their
sovereigns are at variance. As regards the information which can be
drawn from the people of the country itself, the surest and shortest
method is to make a confidant of some one already in the counsels of
the foreign prince, but this must be done only by such means as will
enable the negotiator to keep a check upon his correspondent, and
thus prevent any damage to his master’s plans. This action is very
necessary, for in diplomacy as in war there are such things as double
spies paid by both parties. The cleverest of these will begin by giving
true information and good advice in order the more thoroughly to
deceive the negotiator at a later date. There have even been princes
subtle enough to see the advantage of permitting their confidants to
behave thus, and I know of cases where the confidant of a sovereign,
under the appearance of a secret liaison with a foreign envoy, gave
the latter true and false information at the same time, and thus
effectively masked the designs of his master. An ambassador must always
be on his guard against such deception.
[Sidenote: _The Foolish Dutchman._]
There was in England in 1671 a Dutch ambassador who was so easily
persuaded by certain privy counsellors of King Charles II. that their
master had no intention to go to war with the States General that in
his despatches home he gave the most explicit assurance that there was
nothing to fear from England, treating with ridicule the opinion that
London had resolved to attack them; and we have since learned that
these English counsellors had been deliberately detailed by the King to
play upon the credulity of the Dutch ambassador. There have been in
our time ambassadors of other countries who have done the same.
[Sidenote: _All News must be tested._]
Now the astute negotiator will not likely believe everything he hears,
nor accept advice which he cannot test; he must examine the origin of
information, as well as the interest and the motives of those who offer
it him. He must attempt to discover the means by which they themselves
have acquired it, and he must compare it with other information to see
whether it tallies with that part which he knows to be true. There are
many signs by which a discerning and penetrating mind will be able to
read the truth by placing each link of information in contact with
another. For this purpose no rules can be drawn up for the guidance
of a diplomat in such a matter, for unless a man be born with such
qualities he cannot acquire them, and to those who do not possess them
I might as well speak to the deaf as write these observations.
[Sidenote: _The Flair for Secrets._]
A negotiator can discover national secrets by frequenting the company
of those in authority, and there is not a court in the world where
ministers or others are not open to various kinds of approach, either
because they are indiscreet and often say more than they should, or
because they are discontented and ready to reveal secrets in order
to satisfy their jealousy. And even the most practised and reliable
ministers are not always on their guard. I have seen highly trained and
well-proven statesmen who none the less in the course of conversation,
and by other signs, allowed expressions to escape them which gave
important clues to their policy. And there are courtiers at every court
who, though not members of the King’s Council, know by long practice
how to discover a secret, and who are always prepared to reveal it
in order to show their own importance and their penetration. It is
almost impossible to conceal from an active, observant, and enlightened
negotiator any important design of public policy, for no departure of
state can ever be made without great preparation which entails the
sharing of many secrets by many persons, and this is a danger against
which it is almost impossible to guard even by those who take the
greatest precautions.
[Sidenote: _On the Transmission of Information._]
Now in the transmission of information of this kind the negotiator must
give an exact account of all the circumstances surrounding it, that
is to say, how and by whom he acquired it; and he should accompany it
with his own comments and conjectures in order that the prince may be
fully informed, and may be able to judge whether the conclusions drawn
from all the circumstances are well or ill founded. There are certain
things which a clever minister will discover for himself, and of
which he must give an exact account to his master, for such knowledge
is often a sure clue even to the most secret designs. Thus he can by
his own observation discover the passions and ruling interests of the
prince to whose court he is sent: whether he is ambitious, painstaking,
or observant; whether he is warlike or prefers peace; whether he is
the real ruler of the country, and if not by whom he is ruled; and in
general what are the principal inclinations and the interests of those
who have most influence over him. He must also inform himself exactly
of the state of the military forces both on land and sea, of the number
and strength of fortified places, whether they are always kept in a
high state of efficiency and well supplied with ammunition, of the
condition of the sea-ports, of his vessels of war, and of his arsenals,
of the number of troops which he can put into the field at once, both
of cavalry and of infantry, without stripping his fortresses bare of
their garrisons. He must know the state of public opinion, whether it
is well disposed or discontented; he must keep in his hands the threads
of every great intrigue, knowing all the factions and parties into
which opinion is divided; he must know the leanings of ministers and
other persons in authority in such matters as religion. He should not
even neglect the observation of the King’s personal household, of the
manner in which his domestic affairs are conducted, of his outlay, both
on his household and on his military establishments, of the time spent
in them, etc. He must know the alliances, both offensive and defensive,
concluded with other Powers, especially those which appear hostile in
design; he must be able to describe at any moment the attitude of all
the principal states towards the court to which he is accredited, and
to give an account of the diplomatic relations which exist between them.
[Sidenote: _Action Appropriate to Democratic States._]
He must pay the prince assiduous attention, and thus acquire a
sufficient familiarity with him to be able to see and speak to him
frequently without ceremony, so that he may be always in a position to
know what is going on, and to insinuate into the prince’s mind what is
favourable to his master’s design. If he lives in a democratic state he
must attend the Diet and other popular assemblies. He must keep open
house and a well-garnished table to attract the deputies, and thus both
by his honesty and by his presence gain the ear of the ablest and most
authoritative politicians, who may be able to defeat a hostile design
or support a favourable one. If people of this kind have a freedom of
_entrée_ to the ambassador, a good table will greatly assist in the
discovery of all that is going on, and the expense laid out upon it is
not merely honourable but extraordinarily useful if only the negotiator
himself knows how to profit from it.
[Sidenote: _The Value of Good Cheer._]
Indeed it is in the nature of things that good cheer is a great
conciliator, that it fosters familiarity, and promotes a freedom of
exchange between the guests, while the warmth of wine will often
lead to the discovery of important secrets. There are several other
functions for the employment of public ministers, as for instance
that of informing a prince of good or evil tidings regarding his own
master, or that of conveying compliments or condolences in a similar
case to the prince himself. A negotiator who knows his business will
not neglect even the least of such opportunities, and he will perform
his function in such a manner as to show that his master is truly
interested in all that passes at the foreign court. Indeed the best
negotiator is he who forestalls even the orders of his own master, and
shows himself so apt a negotiator of his intentions that he is able to
act in advance of each event of the kind, and thus present his master’s
sentiments in appropriate language before any other foreign diplomatist
has even begun to consider the matter. And when he actually receives
his master’s orders on the subject, should they turn out to be of a
somewhat different character than the expressions he has already used,
his own adroitness will enable him to bridge the apparent difference.
The diplomatist’s functions cease automatically on the death of his
master or on the death of the prince to whom he is accredited, and are
not revived until new letters of credence are received. They also come
to an end on his withdrawal or upon a declaration of war, but it should
be noted that the privileges attached to the office of ambassador under
the law of nations continue unbroken, notwithstanding any declaration
of war or other interpretation of his functions, and these privileges
remain in force until he reaches his own national territory.
[Sidenote: _The Conduct of Negotiations._]
Diplomacy is a matter for orally conducted and for written
communications. The first is the common method where one is dealing
with a royal court, the second is usual in republics and those states
in which assemblies, such as the Diet of the Empire of Switzerland, are
the repositories of power. It is always the custom where states are
assembled in France to exchange statements of policy in writing. But it
is always more advantageous for the practised diplomatist to negotiate
face to face, because by that means he can discover the true intentions
of those with whom he is dealing. His own skill will then enable him
both to act and to speak in an appropriate and apt fashion. Most men
in handling public affairs pay more attention to what they themselves
say than to what is said to them. Their minds are so full of their
own notions that they can think of nothing but of obtaining the ears
of others for them, and will hardly be prevailed on to listen to the
statements of other people. This fault is peculiar to those lively and
impatient nations like ours, who find it difficult to bridle impetuous
temperaments. It has often been noticed that in ordinary conversation
Frenchmen speak all at one time, and interrupt one another incessantly,
without attempting to hear what each has to say.
[Sidenote: _The Apt Listener._]
One of the most necessary qualities in a good negotiator is to be an
apt listener; to find a skilful yet trivial reply to all questions put
to him, and to be in no hurry to declare either his own policy, still
less his own feelings; and on opening negotiations he should be careful
not to reveal the full extent of his design except in so far as it is
necessary to explore the ground; and he should govern his own conduct
as much by what he observes in the faces of others as by what he hears
from their lips. One of the great secrets of diplomacy is to sift the
real from the trivial, and so to speak, to distil drop by drop into
the minds of your competitors those causes and arguments which you
wish them to adopt. By this means your influence will spread gradually
through their minds almost unawares. In acting thus the negotiator
will bear in mind that the majority of men will never enter upon a
vast undertaking, even though advantageous to themselves, without they
can see beforehand the whole length of the journey upon which they
are asked to embark. Its magnitude will deter them. But if they can
be brought to take successfully one step after another they will find
themselves at the end of the journey almost unawares. Herein is to be
found the importance of not revealing vast designs except to a few
chosen spirits whose minds are properly attuned to them.
[Sidenote: _Diplomacy a Bowling Green._]
A truth of this kind applies to friend and foe alike. Thus in the
approach to difficult negotiations the true dexterity of diplomacy,
like a good bowler using the run of the green, consists in finding the
existing bias of the matter. As Epictetus, the ancient philosopher,
said in his manual: ‘There are in every matter two handles, the one by
which it is easy to carry, the other difficult. Do not take it by the
difficult end, for if you do so you will neither be able to lift it
nor carry it. But if you take it by the right side you will carry it
without trouble.’ Now the easiest way to find the right bias is to make
each proposition which you put forward appear as a statement of the
interests of those with whom you are negotiating, for since diplomacy
is the attempt to find a basis of common action or agreement, it is
obvious that the more the opposing party can be brought to see your
designs in their own light and to accept them thus, the more surely
will their co-operation for any action be fruitful alike to themselves
and to you.
[Sidenote: _The Bias of Human Nature._]
Now, of course there are few men who will entirely divest themselves
of their own sentiments in favour of those of others, or who will
confess that they were wrong, especially if the matter be conducted in
an acrimonious discussion in which the negotiator meets all arguments
freely by contradiction. But none the less the astute diplomatist will
know how to exploit human nature in such a manner as to cause even the
most stiff-necked opponents gradually to relax their hold upon certain
opinions; and this may be most easily attained by abandoning the
approach which caused the original dispute, and taking up the matter
from another aspect. Thus by flattery of his _amour-propre_, or by some
other device which may put him in a good humour, the competitor in a
negotiation may be brought to consider the matter in a new light, and
to accept at the end of the negotiation that which he repudiated with
violence at its commencement. And, however unreasonable the majority of
mankind is, it will always be observed that men retain so much respect
for reason that they will always hope to be judged by the other man
as acting upon reasonable grounds. The negotiator will know how to
exploit this subtle form of intellectual pride. And especially where
there is more than one party to the negotiation the astute diplomatist
will be able to exploit the foibles of each of the other two parties,
and yet to flatter each in turn for his reasonable and statesmanlike
attitude.
[Sidenote: _Ce n’est que le premier pas qui coûte._]
Above all, at the commencement of a negotiation, as I have said, it is
necessary in any long and complicated business to present the matter
in hand in its easiest and most advantageous light, and so to speak to
insinuate all parties into it so that they may be well launched upon
the whole enterprise before they are aware of its magnitude. For this
purpose the negotiator must appear as an agreeable, enlightened, and
far-seeing person; he must beware of trying to pass himself off too
conspicuously as a crafty or adroit manipulator. The essence of skill
lies in concealing it, and the negotiator must ever strive to leave
an impression upon his fellow diplomatists of his sincerity and good
faith. And he should beware of attempting to force a decision, or to
ride roughshod over difficulties that are raised, for if he behaves
thus he will not fail to draw upon himself the aversion of those with
whom he is dealing, and thus to bring prejudice upon his master’s
designs. It would be better for him to pass for less enlightened than
he really is, and he should attempt to carry his own policy to success
by good and solid reasons rather than by pouring contempt upon the
policy of others. The opposite fault is equally to be avoided. The
negotiator must not let himself pass under the influence of other men,
especially of those powerful personalities whose wont it is to sway the
minds of all whom they meet.
[Sidenote: _Diplomacy does not thrive upon Menaces._]
The more powerful the prince, the more suave should his diplomatist
be, for since power of that kind is likely to awaken jealousy in his
neighbours, the diplomat should let it speak for itself, and rather
use his own powers of persuasion by means of moderation to support
the just rights of his prince than to vaunt his power or the extent
of his dominions. Menaces always do harm to negotiation, and they
frequently push one party to extremities to which they would not have
resorted without provocation. It is well known that injured vanity
frequently drives men into courses which a sober estimate of their
own interests would lead them to avoid. Of course when a prince has
real subjects of complaint against another, especially against an
inferior, in circumstances where it is necessary to make an example
of the delinquent, the blow must fall immediately after the threat
is given, so that the delinquent cannot be in a position, either by
the delays of diplomacy or by any other means, to shield himself from
just punishment. The longer the delay is between the threat and its
fulfilment, the more likely it is that the culprit will be able to form
alliances with other Powers, and thus avoid the just chastisement of
the prince whom he has wronged.
[Sidenote: _The Good Christian._]
The wise and enlightened negotiator must of course be a good Christian,
and he must let his character appear in all his speeches, in his way
of living, and must forbid evil and loose-living persons to cross his
threshold. Justice and modesty should govern all his actions; he should
be respectful to princes; affable and approachable with his equals;
considerate to his inferiors, and civil and honest with everybody.
[Sidenote: _At Home in the Foreign Country._]
He must fall into the ways and customs of the country where he lives
without showing repugnance or expressing contempt for them, as is
frequently done by diplomatists who lose no opportunity of praising
their own country and decrying all others. The diplomatist must
bear in mind once for all that he is not authorised to demand that
a whole nation shall conform to his way of living, and that it is
more reasonable, and in the long run greatly to his own comfort, to
accommodate himself to foreign ways of living. He should beware of
criticising the form of government or the personal conduct of the
prince to whom he is accredited. On the contrary he should always
praise that which is praiseworthy without affectation and without
flattery, and if he properly understands his own function he will
quickly discover that there is no nation or state which has not many
good points, excellent laws, charming customs as well as bad ones; and
he will quickly discover that it is easy to single out the good points,
and that there is no profit to be had in denouncing the bad ones, for
the very good reason that nothing the diplomatist can say or do will
alter the domestic habits or laws of the country in which he lives. He
should take a pride in knowing the history of the country, so that he
may be able to give the prince pleasure by praising the great feats
of his ancestors, as well as for his own benefit to interpret current
events in the light of the historical movements of the past. When it
becomes known that the negotiator possesses such knowledge and uses
it aptly, his credit will certainly rise, and if he is adroit enough
to turn his conversations at court to those subjects of which he is a
master, he will find that his diplomatic task is greatly assisted, and
that the pleasure he gives to those around him is amply repaid to him
in the smoothness of negotiation.
[Sidenote: _The Secret of Success._]
The diplomatist must, however, bear constantly in mind both at work
and at play the aims which he is supposed to be serving in the
foreign country, and should subordinate his personal pleasure and
all his occupations to their pursuit. In this matter the two chief
aims which the able negotiator places before himself are, as I have
said, to conduct the affairs of his master to a prosperous issue, and
to spare no pains to discover the designs of others. And since the
means to be employed in both cases are the same, namely by acquiring
the esteem, friendship, and confidence of the prince himself and of
those in authority around him, there is no surer way of employing
them than by becoming personally agreeable. It is marvellous how a
_persona grata_ may contrive to uproot even the deepest suspicions
and wipe out the memory of the gravest insults. If the diplomatist
be looked upon with disfavour at the court he is not a true servant
of his master’s interests; for one who is out of favour will not be
in a position to know what is going on, and will therefore be but a
poor guide to his home government in assisting them to frame their
policy. The responsibility for placing the wrong kind of diplomatist
in a good position rests of course with the minister who appoints him,
but there are many cases in which an ill-fitting appointment has been
redeemed by the dauntless assiduity and unfailing courtesy of the
diplomatist himself; but since this imposes an unnecessary strain upon
the ambassador, the Foreign Minister should ever have a care to appoint
suitable men to all foreign posts.
[Sidenote: _Support from Home._]
I have already described those characteristics which compose
suitability; I will but add here that no diplomatist can succeed in
his foreign task unless he is well supported by his own government
and given every opportunity to understand its policy. By this means
he will be in a position to exploit every situation as far as may
be to advantage, and he will also be able to deny false rumours set
afloat by the enemy. This support from his home government implies
a complimentary application on his part, for it is of the highest
importance that he should keep himself apprised of all contemporary
movements in his own country; that he should know intimately the
personal character both of the sovereign and of his Foreign Minister,
so that in moments of doubt he may be able to guess shrewdly what is
in the mind of those who employ him. Without such knowledge he will
certainly go astray, and without a constant contact with his home
government the conduct of diplomacy cannot possibly prosper in his
hands.
[Sidenote: _Good Faith the Best Weapon._]
As regards the relations which the diplomatist maintains in a foreign
country, we must observe that while his success will partly depend upon
his affability to all men, he must use the utmost discretion in all
his more intimate relationships, and, above all, he should try to form
professional friendships on the basis of mutual advantage and respect.
There is no permanence in a relationship begun by promises which cannot
be redeemed, and therefore, as I have said before, the use of deceit
in diplomacy is of necessity restricted, for there is no curse which
comes quicker to roost than a lie which has been found out. Beyond the
fact that a lie is unworthy of a great minister, it actually does more
harm than good to policy because, though it may confer success to-day,
it will create an atmosphere of suspicion which will make success
impossible to-morrow. No doubt an ambassador will receive a great deal
of information which it is his duty to transmit; but if he is not in
a position to test it he will merely pass it on without comment or
guarantee of its truth. In general it should be the highest aim of
the diplomatist to gain such a reputation for good faith with his own
government and also abroad that they will place reliance both upon his
information and upon the advice which he gives.
[Sidenote: _The Value of a Candid Report._]
In this respect he should take good care in reporting the course
of negotiations to his master from time to time not to hold out
prospects of success before success itself is in his grasp. It is much
better that he should depict the difficulties of the case and the
improbability of success even when he is virtually sure in his own
mind that he will succeed. He will acquire vastly greater credit by
success in an undertaking of which he himself promises little than
he will in one upon which he has reported favourably throughout. It
is always good for the credit of a negotiator if good reports of him
arrive from different sources, for such independent proof of the value
of a diplomatist’s services must be highly prized by every prince, and
will redound to the benefit of the diplomatist himself. It is obvious
that the more successful he is in the relationships which he forms at
a foreign court, the more surely will the diplomatist receive such
independent testimony to his merit. But let him not seek such testimony
by unworthy means. For this purpose he should neither bribe the
servants of others, nor take natives of a foreign court into his own
service. It is too obvious that they will probably be spies.
[Sidenote: _On Accepting Gifts._]
He himself ought never to consent to accept gifts from a foreign court
except with the express knowledge and permission of his master, or
in such cases as are commonly permitted by the usage of the court,
such as those given on the arrival or departure of an ambassador. He
who receives gifts on any other condition may be accused of selling
himself, and therefore of betraying the prince whom he serves. Unless
he preserves his independence he cannot possibly represent his own
master or maintain the high dignity of his office. This dignity must
be kept beyond suspicion. It is indispensable to every ambassador,
though it need not be carried out at all times and at all places,
for the diplomatist will readily understand that at certain times
he can win the good grace of those around him by living in an easy,
affable, and familiar manner among his friends. To wrap oneself in
official dignity at all times is mere preposterous arrogance, and the
diplomatist who behaves thus will repel rather than attract.
[Sidenote: _The Tale of Don Estevan de Gamarre._]
There are many important occasions when the diplomatist will require
all his wit and all his prudence. It will often happen that he has to
tell bad news or give unpalatable advice to a prince accustomed to be
flattered by his ministers, who for various private reasons usually
conceal bad news from him. Let me give an example of what I mean: Don
Estevan de Gamarre had served the King of Spain for many years with
zeal and fidelity both in war and in diplomacy, particularly in the
Low Countries where he had been ambassador for a long time. He had a
relative in the King’s Council fully disposed to put the ambassador’s
services in the best light, and yet he received no reward, while
late-comers of all kinds received advancement to high offices both at
home and abroad. He resolved to go to Madrid to discover the cause of
his evil fortune. He complained to his relative the minister, giving a
number of instances in which important services which he had rendered
had been passed over and forgotten. The minister having heard him,
quietly replied that he had no one to blame but himself, and that if
he had been as good a courtier as he was a brilliant diplomatist and
faithful subject, he would have received the same advancement as those
whose deserts were less, but that his sincerity was an obstacle to his
good fortune, for his despatches were always full of distasteful truths
which set the King’s teeth on edge.
[Sidenote: _The King’s Teeth on Edge._]
For instance, when the French gained a victory he told the story
faithfully and without regard for Spanish feelings in his despatches.
Or if they set siege to a town, he would predict its certain fall
unless help were sent. Or in another case, where an ally had expressed
displeasure because the Spanish Court seemed likely not to keep faith
with it, he insisted that the King should keep his word in language
which was neither diplomatic nor persuasive, and all the while other
Spanish negotiators in other parts of France, with better eye to their
own interests, were informing the King that the French were decadent,
that their armies were undisciplined and quite incapable of effective
campaigning, and so on: to which the minister himself added that the
King in Council could not too highly reward those who sent such good
news, nor too readily forget a man like himself who never wrote
anything but the unpalatable truth.
[Sidenote: _Deceit in Favour in Madrid._]
Thereupon Don Estevan de Gamarre, in his surprise at this picture of
the Court of Spain drawn for him by his relative, replied: ‘Apparently
fortune in Madrid favours the deceiver and the favour of the Court may
be won by mendacity. I have no longer any qualms about my future.’ He
then returned to the Low Countries, where he profited so easily by
the advice of his relative, that, to employ a Spanish term, he won
several _mercedes_, and he saw his own affairs prosper in the measure
in which he succeeded in inventing reasons why the affairs of the
enemy must come to nought. From this one may conclude that the Court
of Spain wished to be deceived, and gave its ambassadors a free rein
to make their own fortunes at the expense of the true interests of the
monarchy. There is a moral here both for ministers at home and for
ambassadors abroad, on which I need not insist. The truth requires two
agents, one to tell and another to hear.
[Sidenote: _On Treaties and their Ratifications._]
Between sovereign states there are many kinds of treaty, the principal
of which are treaties of peace, armistices, commercial treaties, and
those which regulate alliances or guarantee neutrality. There are
both public and secret treaties. There are even contingent treaties,
so called because their success depends upon future events. When the
ministers of two equal Powers sign a treaty they make two copies of it
which are called a double instrument. In each copy the ambassador who
draws it up places the name of his own prince at the head and signs his
in order at the foot, thereby indicating that neither he nor his master
relinquishes his claim to the first place in Europe. And since all new
treaties are based upon the precedent of old ones, and probably refer
to measures taken under previous treaties, they are always drawn up in
the same form, and often in the same number of articles. Now in drawing
up a treaty it is the duty of the enlightened diplomat to see that the
statement of policy contained in the document in hand does not conflict
with or injure some other enterprise of his government. He must also
see that the conditions are laid down so clearly that they cannot be
subject to diverse interpretations. It is obvious from this that the
negotiator must be master of the language in which the negotiation
is conducted, and especially that in which the treaty itself is
written, otherwise he will find himself in endless difficulties and
complications. The meaning of a treaty may easily turn on a single
word, and unless the diplomatist is thoroughly at home in the language
in question he will not be in a position to judge whether the words
proposed to be used are suitable. Ignorance of foreign languages
indeed is perhaps the most serious drawback with which diplomacy
can be afflicted. Now though princes and sovereign states entrust
negotiations to diplomatists armed with full powers, none the less
they never conclude or sign treaties except upon their own explicit
ratification given with their own hand and sealed with their own seal,
and the treaties are never published until they have been ratified, and
cannot take effect until they are published except in cases specially
provided for, where certain articles and sometimes the whole treaty is
deliberately kept secret.
[Sidenote: _On Writing Despatches._]
While the art of handling a foreign court is the principal part of
diplomacy, it is no less important that the diplomatist himself
should be able to give an exact and faithful account in writing of
his own court, both in respect of the negotiations in his charge and
in respect of all other business which arises. The letters which a
diplomatist writes to his prince are called despatches, and should be
stripped of verbiage, preambles, and other vain and useless ornaments.
They should give a complete account of his actions, beginning with
his first _démarche_ on arrival at the foreign court, describing in
detail the manner in which he was received, and thereafter proceeding
to report step by step the ways in which he proposes to arrive at an
understanding of all that goes on around him. Thus the despatches of a
really adept diplomatist will present a picture of the foreign country,
in which he will describe not only the course of the negotiations which
he himself conducts, but a great variety of other matters which form
the essential background and setting of his political action.
[Sidenote: _A Portrait Gallery._]
It will contain the portraits not only of the King himself but of all
his ministers, and indeed of all those persons who have influence upon
the course of public affairs. Thus the able diplomatist can place his
master in command of all the material necessary for a true judgment of
the foreign country, and the more successfully he carries out this part
of his duties, the more surely will he make his master feel as though
he himself had lived abroad and watched the scenes which are described.
In present circumstances all French diplomatists, both ambassadors
and envoys, are permitted the honour of communicating direct with the
King in order to give account of their stewardship abroad, whereas
in previous times they were only allowed to transmit their reports
through a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The latter procedure
undoubtedly caused them to be more circumspect both in the matter and
in the style of their despatches. This is to be regretted, for there is
nothing more important than that the diplomatist living abroad should
feel himself able to write with candour, freedom, and force, in all
his efforts to describe the land in which he lives.
[Sidenote: _Qualities of a Good Despatch._]
The best despatches are those written in a clear and concise manner,
unadorned by useless epithets, or by anything which may becloud the
clarity of the argument. Simplicity is the first essential, and
diplomatists should take the greatest care to avoid all affectations
such as a pretence of wit or the learned overweight of scientific
disquisitions. Facts and events should be set down in their true order,
and in such a manner as to enable the proper deductions to be made from
them. They should be placed in their right setting to indicate both the
circumstances and the motives which guide the action of foreign courts.
Indeed, a despatch which merely recites facts, without discussing them
in the light of the motives and policy of persons in authority, is
nothing more than an empty court chronicle. The right kind of despatch
need not be long, for even the fullest discussion of motive and
circumstance can be presented in a compact form; and the more compact
and clear it is, the more certainly will it carry conviction to the
reader.
[Sidenote: _On Keeping a Diary._]
This leads me to suggest that the diplomatist will find it useful to
make a daily note of the principal points of which he must render an
account, and he should make a special practice of sitting down at his
desk immediately he comes from a royal audience, and writing out
to the best of his recollection exactly what was said, how it was
said, and how it was received. This diary, which is a valuable part
of diplomatic equipment, will greatly assist him in composing his
despatches, and will give him a means of correcting his own memory
at any later date. He should draw up his despatches in the form of
separate short articles, each to a single special point, for if he were
to present his despatch in one unwieldy, unbroken paragraph it might
never be read. A shrewd old negotiator of my acquaintance said with
truth that a despatch written in an orderly fashion and in several
short clear paragraphs was like a palace lighted by many windows so
that there was not a dark corner in it.
[Sidenote: _Orderly Archives._]
Besides his diary, the negotiator should keep an exact minute of
all the despatches which he writes, and should preserve them in
chronological order for easy reference. He should do the same with
those which he receives. A properly organised registry is a good thing
for the negotiator. There are certain negotiators who on sitting at
their desks at night write down everything which they have learnt or
guessed during the day, so that they may always be ready to supply
from this journal the raw material, so to speak, of their judgments
of events. It is sometimes wise to follow the practice of the Roman
Court, and to devote separate letters, separately sealed, to each of
the principal subjects on which despatches are being sent. This is
especially the case where it is necessary to supply an ambassador with
instructions upon several different points, for he may be required
to produce his instructions to the Foreign Minister, and it would be
well that he should be able to do so regarding points at issue without
revealing the instructions he has received on other subjects.
When important negotiations are on hand no expense should be spared in
keeping an efficient service of couriers, though on the other hand the
young diplomatist should beware of sending anything by special courier
which is not of the very first importance....
[Sidenote: _Discretion in Despatch Writing._]
It is for the negotiator himself to make up his mind how freely he
may write regarding the persons and events of a foreign country. It
would be wise for him to make up his mind to the extent to which he
can rely on the good faith either of his own King or of his Foreign
Minister, for it is conceivable that the despatches which he writes may
be shown to the prince or the ministers described in them. In this,
as in many other matters, the diplomatist must know the characters
both of the personage whom he describes and of the personages to whom
his despatches are addressed. As he sits at his desk composing his
despatch he should remember how important a link he is between two
great nations; how much may turn upon the manner in which he presents
his reading of events to his own government, and therefore how vital
and far-reaching are the interests confided to his hands. Remembering
this he will instruct his secretary and the attachés of his embassy to
act as the eyes and ears of his diplomacy, and to imitate his example
by keeping a careful daily record of impressions, events, and persons.
By comparing notes with his subordinates he will be able all the better
to carry out one of his principal duties, which is to distinguish with
care between doubtful and true information.
[Sidenote: _News in its Proper Setting._]
It often happens that news is most uncertain at the moment when it is
most important. He should therefore take care to transmit it in the
proper setting of all its attendant circumstances, so that the prince
may have some material by which to judge whether the advice of his
ambassador is well founded. There is no doubt that in crises of this
kind the habit of private correspondence between the Foreign Minister
and the King and his ministers abroad is of the utmost use, for it
enables them to discuss all questions with a freedom which is denied
to despatches of a more formal kind; and it will often place the home
government in possession of knowledge which will be of the utmost value
to them. And since a true judgment of events in one country will often
depend upon what is happening in others, a diplomatist in foreign parts
will ever keep in touch with his colleagues in other foreign countries,
so that he may be informed of the course of events elsewhere. This
co-operation between ambassadors abroad is one of the most useful
features in diplomacy.
[Sidenote: _Ciphers._]
As secrecy is the very soul of diplomacy, the art of writing letters
in cipher has been invented in order to disguise the written message,
but unless the cipher is unusually clever the industry of men, whose
wits are sharpened by necessity and by self-interest, will not fail to
discover the key to it. Indeed, to such a pitch has this been brought
that there are now men who are known as professional decipherers,
though in all probability, as I believe, their reputation rests
largely upon the ineptitude of poor ciphers rather than upon their
discovery of a good cipher. For as a matter of fact experience shows
that a well-made and well-guarded cipher is practically undiscoverable
except by some betrayal, that is to say, that the wits even of the
cleverest student of ciphers will fail to pierce its secret unless
aided by corruption. It is therefore the duty of the ambassador, having
satisfied himself that the ciphers of his government are adroitly
made, to take all means for their due protection, and especially to
satisfy himself that the staff of his embassy understand not only the
use of the cipher itself, but the extreme importance of guarding it
from unauthorised eyes. And certainly the ambassador ought not to adopt
the indolent practice, of which I have known one or two cases, where
the less important part of a despatch was written _en clair_, and the
ambassador himself added the vital part in cipher. Action of that kind
is a masterpiece of futility, for it leads directly to the compromise
of the cipher itself. For if the letter fall into enemy hands it will
not be difficult for a clever spy to divine the manner of the sentence
in cipher from the context written _en clair_.
In a word, the ambassador and his staff should guard a cipher as they
would the inmost secrets of their own hearts. A really effective cipher
is literally worth far more than its weight in gold.
[Sidenote: _General Duties._]
It is the duty of ministers residing at foreign courts to take steps
to see that nothing is there published contrary to the honour or
reputation of their sovereign, and to take all measures necessary to
prevent the circulation of stories and rumours prejudicial to his
interests. The ambassador must take care to protect the interests of
all his master’s subjects, both in such matters as the free exercise
of their religion, in which he should even offer his embassy as an
asylum for those who are persecuted, and in other matters, acting as a
mediator between his fellow-countrymen on occasions of dispute. At need
he should be ready to assist them and in all ways to live among them on
terms of easy yet dignified friendship. And, on the other hand, persons
of position on visiting a foreign country should never neglect to pay
their respects to their own ambassador, and it is also the ambassador’s
duty to remind them of their duty towards the foreign court itself.
If they are persons of court standing, they will be guilty of a
gross breach of etiquette unless they take the proper steps to make
themselves known to the sovereign. And on all kinds of public festivity
he should make it his especial care to see that the members of his own
national colony take their proper share in them and are accorded their
due rights. The better his relations are with his countrymen living
abroad, the more surely will he discover how large are the reciprocal
benefits to be gained thus, for it will often happen that unofficial
persons receive information as it were by accident which may be of the
utmost importance to the ambassador in his negotiations. Unless good
relations exist between him and them he may remain in ignorance of
important facts.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: _These Precepts the Fruit of Experience._]
In the foregoing observations I have done no more than give a sketch
of the qualities and duties of the diplomatist. Of necessity there is
much that is lacking in these fugitive notes; but I think I may claim
that all diplomatists of experience will approve of the advice I have
given, and will declare that the more my precepts are observed in the
practice of diplomacy, the more surely will success attend the policy
of our nation. If I have laid stress upon the essentials rather than
upon the form and circumstance of diplomatic work, if I have also
spoken with candour, both regarding the duties of the minister at home
and of his agents in foreign parts, it is because I believe that a
knowledge of the truth is the necessary forerunner of fruitful reform.
[Sidenote: _Diplomacy Rich in Opportunity._]
My final word to diplomatists, young and old, is that in normal
times they may reasonably expect that where they have given proof of
sterling merit in negotiation, their services will be recognised and
honours conferred upon them, and in such matters the higher honour is
undoubtedly to find oneself entrusted with ever more important affairs
of state. But if the diplomatist should lack such recognition, he
may find his own recompense in the satisfaction of having faithfully
and efficiently discharged the duties laid upon him. It has often
been said that the public service is an ungrateful task in which a
man must find his chief recompense within himself. If I am held to
agree to this, I cannot allow it to be used as a discouragement to
young men of good birth and ability from entering my own profession.
Disappointment awaits us in all walks of life, but in no profession are
disappointments so amply outweighed by rich opportunities as in the
practice of diplomacy.
Printed by T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to His Majesty at the
Edinburgh University Press