[Sidenote: _The Art of Negotiation._]
The art of negotiation with princes is so important that the fate
of the greatest states often depends upon the good or bad conduct
of negotiations and upon the degree of capacity in the negotiators
employed. Thus monarchs and their ministers of state cannot examine
with too great care the natural or acquired qualities of those citizens
whom they despatch on missions to foreign states to entertain there
good relations with their masters, to make treaties of peace, of
alliance, of commerce or of other kinds, or to hinder other Powers
from concluding such treaties to the prejudice of their own master;
and generally, to take charge of those interests which may be affected
by the diverse conjunctures of events. Every Christian prince must
take as his chief maxim not to employ arms to support or vindicate his
rights until he has employed and exhausted the way of reason and of
persuasion. It is to his interest also, to add to reason and persuasion
the influence of benefits conferred, which indeed is one of the surest
ways to make his own power secure, and to increase it. But above all
he must employ good labourers in his service, such indeed as know how
to employ all these methods for the best, and how to gain the hearts
and wills of men, for it is in this that the science of negotiation
principally consists.
[Sidenote: _French Neglect of Diplomacy._]
Our nation is so warlike that we can hardly conceive of any other
kind of glory or of honour than those won in the profession of arms.
Hence it is that the greater number of Frenchmen of good birth apply
themselves with zeal to the profession of arms in order that they may
gain advancement therein, but they neglect the study of the various
interests which divide Europe and which are a source of frequent wars.
This inclination and natural application in our people result in a rich
supply of good general officers, and we need have no surprise that it
is considered that no gentleman of quality can receive a high command
in the armies of the King who has not already passed through all these
stages by which a soldier may equip himself for war.
But, alas, it is not the same with our negotiators. They are indeed
rare among us because there has been in general no discipline nor
fixed rules of the foreign service of his Majesty by which good
citizens destined to become negotiators might instruct themselves in
the knowledge necessary for this kind of employment. And indeed we
find that instead of gradual promotion by degrees and by the evidence
of proved capacity and experience, as is the case in the usages of
war, one may see often men who have never left their own country, who
have never applied themselves to the study of public affairs, being
of meagre intelligence, appointed so to speak over-night to important
embassies in countries of which they know neither the interests, the
laws, the customs, the language, nor even the geographical situation.
And yet I may hazard a guess that there is perhaps no employment in
all his Majesty’s service more difficult to discharge than that of
negotiation. It demands all the penetration, all the dexterity, all
the suppleness which a man can well possess. It requires a widespread
understanding and knowledge, and above all a correct and piercing
discernment.
[Sidenote: _Diplomacy an Expert Craft._]
It causes me no surprise that men who have embarked on this career for
the sake of titles and emoluments, having not the least idea of the
real duties of their post, have occasioned grave harm to the public
interest during their apprenticeship to this service. These novices
in negotiation become easily intoxicated with honours done in their
person to the dignity of their royal master. They are like the ass in
the fable who received for himself all the incense burned before the
statue of the goddess which he bore on his back. This happens above
all to those who are employed by a great monarch on missions to princes
of a lower order, for they are apt to place in their addresses the
most odious comparisons, as well as veiled threats, which are really
only a mark of weakness. Such ambassadors do not fail to bring upon
themselves the aversion of the court to which they are accredited, and
they resemble heralds of arms rather than ambassadors whose principal
aim is ever to maintain a good correspondence between their master
and the princes to whom they are accredited. In all cases they should
represent the power of their own sovereign as a means of maintaining
and increasing that of the foreign court, instead of using it as an
odious comparison designed to humiliate and contemn. These misfortunes
and many others, which are the result of the lack of capacity and
of the foolish conduct of many citizens employed by princes to deal
with public affairs abroad, occasioned in me the belief that it is by
no means impertinent to set down some observations on the manner of
negotiating with sovereigns and with their ministers, on the qualities
necessary for those who mean to adopt the profession of diplomacy,
and on the means which wise princes will take to secure a good choice
of men well adapted at once to the profession of negotiation and to
the different countries where they may be sent. But before I take my
subject in detail it is perhaps well that I should explain the use and
the necessity for princes to maintain continual negotiation in the
form of permanent embassies to all great states, both in neighbouring
countries and in those more distant, in war as well as in peace.
[Sidenote: _The Usefulness of Negotiation._]
To understand the permanent use of diplomacy and the necessity for
continual negotiations, we must think of the states of which Europe is
composed as being joined together by all kinds of necessary commerce,
in such a way that they may be regarded as members of one Republic
and that no considerable change can take place in any one of them
without affecting the condition, or disturbing the peace, of all the
others. The blunder of the smallest of sovereigns may indeed cast an
apple of discord among all the greatest Powers, because there is no
state so great which does not find it useful to have relations with
the lesser states and to seek friends among the different parties of
which even the smallest state is composed. History teems with the
results of these conflicts which often have their beginnings in small
events, easy to control or suppress at their birth, but which when
grown in magnitude became the causes of long and bloody wars which have
ravaged the principal states of Christendom. Now these actions and
reactions between one state and another oblige the sagacious monarch
and his ministers to maintain a continual process of diplomacy in all
such states for the purpose of recording events as they occur and of
reading their true meaning with diligence and exactitude. One may say
that knowledge of this kind is one of the most important and necessary
features of good government, because indeed the domestic peace of the
state depends largely upon appropriate measures taken in its foreign
service to make friends among well-disposed states, and by timely
action to resist those who cherish hostile designs. There is indeed no
prince so powerful that he can afford to neglect the assistance offered
by a good alliance, in resisting the forces of hostile powers which are
prompted by jealousy of his property to unite in a hostile coalition.
[Sidenote: _The Diplomat: An Agent of High Policy._]
Now, the enlightened and assiduous negotiator serves not only to
discover all projects and cabals by which coalitions may arise against
his prince in the country where he is sent to negotiate, but also to
dissipate their very beginnings by giving timely advice. It is easy to
destroy even the greatest enterprises at their birth; and as they often
require several springs to give them motion, it can hardly be possible
for a hostile intrigue to ripen without knowledge of it coming to the
ears of an attentive negotiator living in the place where it is being
hatched. The able negotiator will know how to profit by the various
dispositions and changes which arise in the country where he lives,
not merely in order to frustrate designs hostile to the interests of
his master, but also for the positive and fruitful purpose of bringing
to an apt result those other designs which may work to his advantage.
By his industry and application he may himself produce changes of
opinion favourable to the office which he has to discharge; indeed,
if he do but once in an apt moment catch the tide at the flood he may
confer a benefit on his prince a hundredfold greater than any expense
in treasure or personal effort which he may have put forth. Now if
a monarch should wait, before sending his envoys to countries near
and far, until important events occur--as for instance, until it is
a question of hindering the conclusion of some treaty which confers
advantage on an enemy Power, or a declaration of war against an ally
which would deprive the monarch himself of the assistance of that very
ally for other purposes--it will be found that the negotiators, sent
thus at the eleventh hour on urgent occasions, have no time to explore
the terrain or to study the habits of mind of the foreign court or to
create the necessary liaisons or to change the course of events already
in full flood, unless indeed they bring with them enormous sums whose
disbursement must weigh heavily on the treasury of their master, and
which run the risk, in truth, of being paid too late.
[Sidenote: _Cardinal Richelieu._]
Cardinal Richelieu, whom I set before me as the model for all
statesmen, to whom France owes a very great debt, maintained a system
of unbroken diplomacy in all manner of countries, and beyond question
he thus drew enormous advantage for his master. He bears witness to
this truth in his own political testament, speaking thus:--
‘The states of Europe enjoy all the advantages of continual negotiation
in the measure in which they are conducted with prudence. No one could
believe how great these advantages are who has not had experience of
them. I confess that it was not till I had had five or six years’
experience of the management of high affairs that I realised this
truth, but I am now so firmly persuaded of it that I will boldly say
that the service which a regular and unbroken system of diplomacy,
conducted both in public and in secret in all countries, even where
no immediate fruit can be gathered, is one of the first necessities
for the health and welfare of the state. I can say with truth that in
my time I have seen the face of affairs in France and in Christendom
completely changed because under the authority of his Majesty I have
been enabled to practise this principle which till my time had been
absolutely neglected by the ministers of this kingdom.’ The Cardinal
says further: ‘The light of nature teaches each of us in his private
life to maintain relations with his neighbours because as their near
presence enables them to injure so it also enables them to do us
service, just as the surroundings of a city either hinder or facilitate
the approach to it.’ And he adds: ‘The meaner sort of men confine their
outlook within the cities where they were born. But those to whom God
has given a greater light will neglect no means of improvement whether
it come from near or from far.’ The evidence of this great genius
demands all the greater consideration because the high services which
he rendered to his King by means of negotiation convincingly prove that
he speaks the truth. No considerable event occurred in Europe during
his ministry in which he did not play a great part, and he was often
the principal agent in the great movements of his time. He it was who
designed the revolution in Portugal in 1640, by which the legitimate
heir to the Crown resumed the throne. He profited by the discontent of
the Catalans who rose in revolt in that same year. He did not hesitate
to encourage negotiations even with the African Moors. Previously he
brought his labours to success in the north by persuading Gustavus
Adolphus, King of Sweden, to invade Germany, and thus to deliver her
from slavery to the House of Austria which then reigned despotically,
dethroning her princes and disposing of their states and their titles
to its own court minions. Rumour even attributes the revolution in
Bohemia to the action of Cardinal Richelieu. He formed and maintained
several leagues; he won for France many great allies who contributed
to the success of his high designs, in which the abasement of the
prodigious power of the House of Austria was always the chief; and
throughout all these designs we can trace the unbroken thread of a
well-maintained system of diplomacy, acting as the obedient and capable
agent of the great minister himself, whose profound capacity and vast
genius thus found a favourable field of action.
[Sidenote: _Value of Diplomacy._]
It is not necessary to turn far back into the past in order to
understand what can be achieved by negotiation. We see daily around us
its definite effects in sudden revolutions favourable to this great
design of state or that, in the use of sedition in fermenting the
hatreds between nations, in causing jealous rivals to arm against one
another so that the _tertius gaudens_ may profit, in the formation of
leagues and other treaties of various kinds between monarchs whose
interests might otherwise clash, in the dissolution by crafty means
of the closest unions between states: in a word, one may say that the
art of negotiation, according as its conduct is good or evil, gives
form to great affairs and may turn a host of lesser events into a
useful influence upon the course of the greater. Indeed, we can see
in diplomacy thus conducted a greater influence in many ways upon
the conduct and fortunes of mankind than even in the laws which they
themselves have designed, for the reason that, however scrupulous
private man may be in obedience to the law, misunderstandings and
conflicts of ambition easily arise between nations, and cannot be
settled by a process of law but only by a convention between the
contending parties. It is on the occasion of such conventions that
diplomacy plays a decisive part.
It is thus easy to conclude that a small number of well-chosen
negotiators posted in the different states in Europe may render to
their sovereign and their state the greatest services; that a single
word or act may do more than the invasion of whole armies because the
crafty negotiator will know how to set in motion various forces native
to the country in which he is negotiating, and thus may spare his
master the vast expense of a campaign. Nothing can be more useful than
a timely diversion thus set on foot.
It is also of high interest to all great princes that their negotiators
should be of such character and standing as to act appropriately as
mediators in the disputes between other sovereigns and to produce
peace by the authority of their intervention. Nothing can contribute
more to the reputation, the power, and the universal respect of a
monarch, than to be served by those who themselves inspire respect
and confidence. A powerful prince who maintains a constant system of
diplomacy served by wise and instructed negotiators in the different
states of Europe, and who thus cultivates well-chosen friendships and
maintains useful sources of information, is in a position to influence
the destiny of neighbouring foreign states, to maintain peace between
all states, or to pursue war where it is favourable to his design. In
all these concerns the prosperity of his plans and the greatness of
his name depend first and last on the conduct and qualities of the
negotiators to whom he entrusts his services. So now we examine in
detail the qualities necessary for a good negotiator.
[Sidenote: _Personal Qualities of the Good Negotiator._]
God having endowed men with diverse talents, the best advice that one
can give is to take counsel with themselves before choosing their
profession. Thus he who would enter the profession of diplomacy must
examine himself to see whether he was born with the qualities necessary
for success. These qualities are an observant mind, a spirit of
application which refuses to be distracted by pleasures or frivolous
amusements, a sound judgment which takes the measure of things as
they are, and which goes straight to its goal by the shortest and
most natural paths without wandering into useless refinements and
subtleties which as a rule only succeed in repelling those with whom
one is dealing. The negotiator must further possess that penetration
which enables him to discover the thoughts of men and to know by the
least movement of their countenances what passions are stirring within,
for such movements are often betrayed even by the most practised
negotiator. He must also have a mind so fertile in expedients as easily
to smooth away the difficulties which he meets in the course of his
duty; he must have presence of mind to find a quick and pregnant reply
even to unforeseen surprises, and by such judicious replies he must be
able to recover himself when his foot has slipped. An equable humour, a
tranquil and patient nature, always ready to listen with attention to
those whom he meets; an address always open, genial, civil, agreeable,
with easy and ingratiating manners which assist largely in making a
favourable impression upon those around him--these things are the
indispensable adjuncts to the negotiator’s profession. Their opposite,
the grave and cold air, a melancholy or rough exterior, may create
a first impression which is not easily removed. Above all the good
negotiator must have sufficient control over himself to resist the
longing to speak before he has really thought what he shall say. He
should not endeavour to gain the reputation of being able to reply
immediately and without premeditation to every proposition which is
made, and he should take a special care not to fall into the error of
one famous foreign ambassador of our time who so loved an argument that
each time he warmed up in controversy he revealed important secrets in
order to support his opinion.
[Sidenote: _The Air of Mystery._]
But indeed there is another fault of which the negotiator must beware:
he must not fall into the error of supposing that an air of mystery, in
which secrets are made out of nothing and in which the merest bagatelle
is exalted into a great matter of state, is anything but a mark of
smallness of mind and betokens an incapacity to take the true measure
either of men or of things. Indeed, the more the negotiator clothes
himself in mystery, the less he will have means of discovering what
is happening and of acquiring the confidence of those with whom he
deals. A continual reserve is like the lock on a door which is never
turned and becomes so rusty that in the end no man can open it. The
able negotiator will of course not permit his secret to be drawn from
him except at his own time, and he should be able to disguise from
his competitor the fact that he has any secret to reveal; but in all
other matters he must remember that open dealing is the foundation of
confidence and that everything which he is not compelled by duty to
withhold ought to be freely shared with those around him. He will thus
gradually establish terms of confidence with his neighbours, from which
he may draw immense profit, for it may not infrequently happen that in
exchange for some trivial information given by himself, the negotiator
may, as it were by accident, receive important news from his colleague
in another embassy. The practised negotiator will know how to employ
the circumstances of his life and of the lives of those around him
in such a manner as to lead them naturally and without restraint to
talk of the conditions and affairs of their own country, and the more
extended his view and the wider his knowledge the more surely will he
thus gather important news every day of his life.
[Sidenote: _Dignity._]
Let it not be supposed, however, that the good negotiator requires only
the light of a high intellect, dexterity, and other fine qualities
of the mind. He must show that the ordinary sentiments of the human
heart move in him, for there is no kind of employment in which at the
same time elevation and nobility of spirit and a kindly courtesy in
little things are more necessary. An ambassador indeed resembles in a
certain sense the actor placed before the eyes of the public in order
that he may play a great part, for his profession raises him above the
ordinary condition of mankind and makes him in some sort the equal of
the masters of the earth by that right of representation which attaches
to his service, and by the special relations which his office gives
him with the mighty ones of the earth. He must therefore be able to
simulate a dignity even if he possess it not; but this obligation is
the rock upon which many an astute negotiator has perished because
he did not know in what dignity consisted. No negotiation was ever
assisted by open or veiled menaces merely for their own sake, and
negotiators too often confuse a proud and arrogant bearing with
that careful dignity which ought to clothe their office. To advance
pretensions or to demand excessive privileges is merely the sign of
pride and of a desire to extract from the privileged position of an
ambassador a personal and unworthy advantage, in the doing of which
an ambitious negotiator may easily and utterly compromise the whole
authority of his master. No man who enters diplomacy in a spirit of
avarice or with a desire to seek interests other than those of his
service, or merely with the desire to earn the applause of the crowd,
or to attract esteem and recompense from his master, will ever make
success in negotiation. And even if some important duty may be well
discharged in his hands, it is only to be attributed to some happy
conjuncture of events which in itself smoothed away all difficulties.
[Sidenote: _Influence of Women._]
To maintain the dignity of diplomacy the negotiator must clothe himself
in liberality and generosity of heart, even in magnificence, but all
with care and a frugality of design so that the trappings of his
office do not by their display outshine the sterling merits of his own
character and person. Let clean linen and appointments and delicacy
reign at his table. Let him frequently give banquets and diversions in
honour of the principal persons of the court in which he lives, and
even in the honour of the prince himself, if he so cares to take part.
Let him also enter into the spirit of the same diversions offered by
others, but always in a light, unconstrained, and agreeable manner,
and always with an open, good-natured, straightforward air, and with
a continual desire to give pleasure to others. If the custom of the
country in which he serves permits freedom of conversation with the
ladies of the court, he must on no account neglect any opportunity
of placing himself and his master in a favourable light in the eyes
of these ladies, for it is well known that the power of feminine
charm often extends to cover the weightiest resolutions of state. The
greatest events have sometimes followed the toss of a fan or the nod of
a head. But let him beware! Let him do all things in his power, by the
magnificence of his display, by the polish, attraction, and gallantry
of his person, to engage their pleasure, but let him beware lest he
engage his own heart. He must never forget that Love’s companions are
Indiscretion and Imprudence, and that the moment he becomes pledged to
the whim of a favoured woman, no matter how wise he may be, he runs a
grave risk of being no longer master of his own secrets. We have often
seen terrible results follow from this kind of weakness into which even
the greatest ministers are liable to fall, and we need go no further
than our own time for remarkable examples and warnings.
[Sidenote: _Power of the Purse._]
Now, as the surest way of gaining the good-will of a prince is to
gain the good graces of those who have most influence upon his mind,
a good negotiator must reinforce his own good manners, his insight of
character, and attraction of person by certain expenses which will
largely assist in opening his road before him. But these expenses must
be laid out in the proper measure. They must be made by a careful
design; and wherever large gifts are offered, the giver must take care
beforehand to know that they will be received in the right spirit and
above all that they will not be refused. I do not mean that there are
not countries where no great art is needed in the matter of giving
gifts. In such a country they are no longer gifts but bribes; but
it is always to be remembered that there is a certain delicacy to
be observed in all commerce of this kind, and that a gift presented
in the right spirit, at the right moment, by the right person, may
act with tenfold power upon him who receives it. There are various
established customs in different countries by which occasion arises
for making small presents. This kind of expense, though it occasions
but a small outlay of money, may contribute largely to the esteem in
which an ambassador is held and acquire for him friends at the court to
which he is accredited. And, indeed, the manner in which this little
custom is carried out may have an important bearing upon high policy.
And, of course, in such a matter the practised negotiator will soon
be aware that at every court there are certain persons of greater
wit than fortune who will not refuse a small gratification or secret
subsidy which may bring in large results, for the wit of these persons
enables them to maintain a confidential position at court without that
personal splendour which the rich nobleman can display. Such persons
I say may be of great use to the clever negotiator. Among amusements,
for instance, the dancers, who by the fact of their profession have
an _entrée_ less formal and in some degree more intimate with the
prince than any ambassador can perhaps possess, are often to be found
valuable agents in negotiation. Or again, it happens that a monarch
has around him certain officers of low rank entrusted with duties
which bring them in close contact both with their master and with his
minister’s mind, and a timely present aptly given may reveal important
secrets. And finally, even great ministers of state themselves may not
be inaccessible by the same means.
[Sidenote: _Secret Service._]
It frequently happens in negotiation as in war that well-chosen spies
contribute more than any other agency to the success of great plans,
and indeed it is clear that there is nothing so well adapted to upset
the best design as the sudden and premature revelation of an important
secret upon which it depends. And as there is no expense better
designed nor more necessary than that which is laid out upon a secret
service, it would be inexcusable for a minister of state to neglect it.
The general will say with truth that he would sooner have one regiment
the less than a poorly equipped system of espionage, and that he would
perhaps even forgo reinforcements if he could be accurately informed
of the disposition and numbers of the enemy armies. Similarly let an
ambassador retrench all superfluous expense in order that he may have
the funds at his disposal to maintain a secret service which will
inform him of all that happens in the foreign country of his service.
Yet despite the universal acknowledged truth of what I say, most
negotiators will more readily spend vast sums on a great show of horses
and carriages, on rows of useless flunkeys, than on the payment of a
few well-chosen agents who could keep them supplied with news. In this
matter we should learn a lesson from the Spaniards, who never neglect
their secret agents--a fact which I am sure has contributed largely
to the success of their ministers in many important negotiations.
It is doubtless the success of Spanish agents which has led to the
establishment of the wise custom of the Spanish Court to give Spanish
ambassadors an extraordinary fund called _Gastos Secretos_.
[Sidenote: _The Honourable Spy._]
The ambassador has sometimes been called an honourable spy because
one of his principal occupations is to discover great secrets; and he
fails in the discharge of his duty if he does not know how to lay out
the necessary sums for this purpose. Therefore an ambassador should
be a man born with a liberal hand ready to undertake willingly large
expenses of this kind; and he must be even prepared to do it at his
own charges when the emoluments of his master are insufficient. For
as his principal aim must be to succeed, that interest should eclipse
all others in any man truly devoted to his profession and capable of
succeeding in it. But, on the other hand, the sagacious prince will
not neglect the equipment of his negotiators with every possible means
for acquiring friends and secret agents in all countries where his
interests are at stake, for these expenses well laid out bring back a
large return with usury to the prince who makes them, and do much to
smooth away the difficulties which lie in the path of his designs. And
he will soon be aware that if he does not employ this expedient his
ministers can indeed make but little progress in their negotiations. He
will win no new allies but risk losing old ones.
[Sidenote: _Courage._]
Courage is a most necessary quality in a negotiator; for, though the
law of nations should give him ample security, there are many occasions
in which he will find himself in danger, where he will have to rely
upon his own courage and resource to escape from a perilous position
without compromising the negotiation on which he is engaged. Thus no
timid man can hope to conduct secret designs to success: unforeseen
accidents will shake his faith, and in a moment of fear he may too
easily give away his secrets even by the passing expression of his
countenance and by the manner of his speech. And indeed a too great
concern for his personal safety may lead him to take measures highly
prejudicial to the duties he has to discharge. And at times when the
honour of his master is attacked his timidity may prevent him from
maintaining with the necessary vigour the dignity of his office and the
prestige of his King. A prelate who was an ambassador at Rome from King
Francis I. brought disgrace on his master because he failed to defend
him in the Consistory, where the Emperor, Charles V., attempted to cast
upon the French King the whole responsibility for the continuation of
the war, boasting falsely that he had offered to end it by a single
combat with François himself, and that the French King had refused. The
King was so furious that he gave the Emperor the lie in public, and
made known to the world his displeasure with his own ambassador for
failing to uphold the dignity of France. François there and then took
the resolution never to employ any man as French ambassador who was not
a practised swordsman, and thus he hoped to uphold the honour of his
house.
[Sidenote: _Firmness in Dispute._]
A good negotiator must not only be courageous in danger but firm in
debate. There are many men who are naturally brave, but cannot maintain
an opinion in dispute. The kind of firmness that is needed is that
which, having carefully and fully examined the matter, consents to
no compromise but pursues with constancy a resolution once adopted
till it is carried into effect. Compromise is the easy refuge of
the irresolute spirit. The lack of firmness of which I speak here
is a common fault of those who have a lively imagination for every
kind of accident which may befall, and hinders them from determining
with vigour and despatch the means by which action should be taken.
They will look at a matter on so many sides that they forget in which
direction they are travelling. This irresolution is most prejudicial
to the conduct of great affairs which demand a decisive spirit, acting
upon a careful balance of advantage and disadvantage, and pursuing the
main purpose without abatement. It is said that Cardinal Richelieu,
who perhaps took wider views than any man of his time, was somewhat
irresolute when he came to action, and that Father Joseph, the
Capuchin, a much narrower intelligence than the Cardinal, was of the
greatest value to him because, once a decision was taken, he pursued it
tenaciously, and often assisted the Cardinal in dismissing designs of
compromise by which crafty persons hoped to destroy the original plan.
[Sidenote: _Genius no Substitute for Good Manners._]
There are some geniuses born with such an elevation of character and
superiority of mind that they have a natural ascendancy over all whom
they meet. But a negotiator of this kind must take good care not to
rely too much on his own judgment in order to voice that superiority
which he has over other men, for it may earn for him a reputation for
arrogance and hardness; and just on account of his very elevation above
the level of common humanity, events may escape him, and he may be the
dupe of his own self-confidence. He must sometimes consent to meet
smaller men on their own ground.
[Sidenote: _Value of Good Faith._]
The good negotiator, moreover, will never found the success of his
mission on promises which he cannot redeem or on bad faith. It is a
capital error, which prevails widely, that a clever negotiator must
be a master of the art of deceit. Deceit indeed is but a measure of
the smallness of mind of him who employs it, and simply shows that
his intelligence is too meagrely equipped to enable him to arrive at
his ends by just and reasonable methods. No doubt the art of lying
has been practised with success in diplomacy; but unlike that honesty
which here as elsewhere is the best policy, a lie always leaves a drop
of poison behind, and even the most dazzling diplomatic success gained
by dishonesty stands on an insecure foundation, for it awakes in the
defeated party a sense of aggravation, a desire for vengeance, and a
hatred which must always be a menace to his foe. Even if deceit were
not as despicable to every right-minded man as it is, the negotiator
will perhaps bear in mind that he will be engaged throughout life upon
the affairs of diplomacy, and that it is therefore his interest to
establish a reputation for plain and fair dealing so that men may know
that they can rely upon him; for one negotiation successfully carried
through by the honesty and high intelligence of a diplomatist will give
him a great advantage in other enterprises on which he embarks in the
future. In every country where he goes he will be received with esteem
and pleasure, and men will say of him and of his master that their
cause is too good to be served by evil means. For if the negotiator
is obliged to observe with faithfulness all the promises which he has
made, it will be at once seen that both he himself and the prince whom
he serves are to be relied on.
[Sidenote: _Perils of Deceit._]
This is surely a well-known truth and so indispensable a duty that
it would appear superfluous to recommend it. At the same time many
negotiators have been so corrupted by converse usages that they
have forgotten the uses of truth--upon which I shall make but one
observation, which is, that the prince or minister who has been
deceived by his own negotiator probably began by teaching that
negotiator the lesson of deception; or, if he did not, he suffers
because he has made the choice of a bad servant. It is not enough to
choose a clever and well-instructed man for the discharge of high
political duties. The agent in such affairs must be a man of probity
and one who loves truth, for otherwise there can be no confidence in
him. It is true that this probity is not often found joined to that
capacity for taking wide views which is so necessary to a diplomatist,
nor is it always found in a man well stored with all the necessary
knowledge which we have already described as the equipment of a good
negotiator. I may be reminded that a prince is often obliged to use
diverse instruments in order to accomplish his ends, and that there
have been men of little virtue who proved themselves great negotiators
and in whose hands high affairs of state have prospered, and that men
of this type being restrained by no scruples have more often succeeded
in delicate negotiations than have the right men who have employed none
but honest means.
[Sidenote: _Monsieur de Faber rebukes Cardinal Mazarin._]
But let it be remarked that the prince who entrusts his negotiations to
this type of diplomatist cannot count upon their good services except
as long as he himself is prosperous. In difficult times, or at moments
when disgrace seems to have fallen upon him, these master-rogues will
be the first to betray him and to take service on the side of the
strong. Here then we find the final recommendation of the necessity
of employing honest men. I am reminded of the fine reply of Monsieur
de Faber, who was Marshal of France, to Cardinal Mazarin when this
great minister wished to bring over a man of substance, who shall be
nameless, to his own party. He entrusted the delicate duty to Monsieur
de Faber, charging him to offer great promises which he admitted he was
not in a position to redeem. Monsieur de Faber refused the commission
in these words: ‘Monseigneur, you will find many men ready to carry
false messages; but you have some need of honest men to speak the
truth. I beg of you to retain me for the latter service.’
[Sidenote: _Loose Livers make Bad Negotiators._]
Finally, it is in a high degree dangerous to entrust an important
negotiation to a man of irregular life whose domestic and personal
habits are disorderly. How can one expect of such a man a greater
degree of order and of decency in public affairs than that which
he shows in his own private concerns, which ought indeed to be the
constant gauge of his capacity. If he is too fond of the gaming-table,
of the wine-glass, and of frivolous amusements, he is not to be
entrusted with the discharge of high diplomatic duty, for he will be
so unreliable that at moments when he seeks the satisfaction of his
ill-regulated desires he will be prepared to sell the highest secrets
of his master.
[Sidenote: _The Cool Head._]
A man who is naturally violent and easily carried away is ill fitted
for the conduct of negotiations; it is almost impossible for him to be
master of himself at those critical moments and unforeseen occasions
when the command of one’s temper is of importance, especially at the
acute moments of diplomatic controversy when a choleric word may poison
the minds of those with whom negotiations are in progress. It is also
difficult for any man who is easily irritated to remain master of his
own secret; for, when his anger is aroused, he will allow words to
escape him from which an adroit hearer will easily divine the essence
of his thought, and thus lead to the ruin of his plans.
Before his elevation to the cardinalate, Cardinal Mazarin was sent on
an important mission to the Duke of Feria, Governor of Milan. He was
charged to discover the true feelings of the Duke on a certain matter,
and he had the cunning to inflame the Duke’s anger and thus to discover
what he would never have known if the Duke himself had maintained a
wise hold over his feelings. The Cardinal indeed had made himself
absolute master of all the outward effects which passion usually
produces, so much so that neither in his speech nor by the least change
in his countenance could one discover his real thought; and this
quality which he possessed in so high a degree contributed largely to
make him one of the greatest negotiators of his time.
[Sidenote: _Spanish and Italian Characters._]
A man who is master of himself and always acts with _sang-froid_ has
a great advantage over him who is of a lively and easily inflamed
nature. One may say indeed that they do not fight with equal arms;
for in order to succeed in this kind of work, one must rather listen
than speak; and the phlegmatic temper, self-restraint, a faultless
discretion and a patience which no trial can break down--these are
the servants of success. Indeed the last of these qualities, namely
patience, is one of the advantages which the Spanish nation has over
our own; for we are naturally lively, and have hardly embarked on one
affair before we desire the end in order to embark on another, thus
betraying a restlessness which continually seeks new aims. Whereas it
has been remarked that a Spanish diplomatist never acts with haste,
that he never thinks of bringing a negotiation to an end simply from
_ennui_, but to finish it with advantage and to profit from all the
favourable conjunctures which present themselves, amongst which our
impatience is his advantage. Italy has also produced a large number of
excellent negotiators who have contributed much to the high prestige
and temporal power of the Court of Rome, even to the point at which
we now see it. And we ourselves have the same superiority in the art
of negotiation over other northern nations which the Spaniards and
Italians have over us, from which it might appear that the degree
of intelligence varies in Europe with the degree of warmth of its
different climates. Now from all this it follows that a man who by
nature is strange, inconstant, and ruled by his own humours and
passions, should not enter the profession of diplomacy, but should go
to the wars. For as war destroys a great number of those who engage in
it, she is not so delicate in the choice of her subjects; she resembles
those good stomachs which can digest and assimilate with equal ease
every kind of nourishment that is given them--not indeed that a man
must not have high and excellent qualities before he can become a good
general, but because there are so many degrees of capacity in the army
that he who has not sufficient intelligence to arrive at the highest
remains half-way and may become a good subaltern or other officer whose
service is useful in his own sphere. But it is not the same with a
negotiator--if he is not adapted to his function he will often ruin
everything that is put under his charge and stain the good name of his
master with irreparable prejudice.
[Sidenote: _Adaptability._]
Not only must the negotiator be free from wayward humours and
fantasies, but he must know how to suffer fools gladly, how to
accommodate himself to the changing humours of others. He must indeed
be like Proteus of the fable, always ready to take a different figure
and posture according to occasion and need. Let him be gay and
agreeable with young princes still in the full enjoyment of daily
pleasures; let him be sage and full of counsel with those of more
serious years, and in everything let all his attention and care, all
his zeal and even his enjoyments and diversions, tend to the one sole
aim, which is to bring to success the great business in his charge.
Thus it will not always be enough that he should execute the exact
letter of his instruction; his zeal and intelligence should combine how
he may profit from all favoured conjunctures that present themselves,
and even should be able to create such favourable moments by which the
advantage of his prince may be served. There are even pressing and
important occasions where he is compelled to make a decision on the
spot, to undertake certain _démarches_ without waiting for the orders
of his master which could not arrive in time. But then he must have
sufficient penetration to foresee all the results of his own action,
and it were well also if he had acquired beforehand that degree of
confidence from his own prince which is commonly founded on a proved
capacity of good services. He may thus assure himself in moments of
sudden decision that he retains the confidence of his prince and that
his past success will plead in favour of his present actions. In the
absence of such conditions he would be a bold negotiator indeed who
entered into engagements in his master’s name without express order on
his master’s part. But on a pressing occasion he can hold such a thing
as eventually to be concluded with advantage to his prince, or at least
he may be able to prevent the matter in question from turning to his
disadvantage until he shall have received orders from him.
[Sidenote: _Wealth, Birth and Breeding._]
It is well that with all these qualities a negotiator, and especially
one who bears the title of ambassador, should be rich in order to be
able to maintain the necessary expenses of his office; but a wise
prince will not fall into the fault common to many princes, namely
that of regarding wealth as the first and most necessary quality in
an ambassador. Indeed he will serve his own interests much better by
choosing an able negotiator of mediocre fortune than one endowed with
all the wealth of the Indies but possessing a small intelligence, for
it is obvious that the rich man may not know the true use of riches,
whereas the able man will assuredly know how to employ his own ability.
And the prince should further remember that it is within his power to
equip the able man with all the necessary means, but that it is not in
his power to endow with intelligence one who does not possess it.
It is also desirable that an ambassador should be a man of birth and
breeding, especially if he is employed in any of the principal courts
of Europe, and it is by no means a negligible factor that he should
have a noble presence and a handsome face, which undoubtedly are among
the means which easily please mankind. An evil-looking person, as
General Philopoemen said, will receive many insults and suffer much
trouble, like the man who was made to hew wood and draw water because
he looked like a slave. There are of course missions sent on special
occasions where nothing is needed but a great name and the prestige
of high birth--as, for instance, in the ceremonial occasions of a
marriage, or baptism, or the offer of good wishes on the accession of
a sovereign to the throne; but when the negotiation concerns important
affairs it must be entrusted to a man, not to a gaudy image, unless
indeed the image be a puppet in the hands of some crafty colleague
who, while possessing the whole secret of negotiation and keeping in
his hands all the threads of its designs, leaves the actual public
appearance to the ignorant but high-born gentleman whose sole trouble
is to maintain a fine table and a magnificent equipage.
[Sidenote: _The Knowledge Necessary to a Negotiator._]
A man born to diplomacy and feeling himself called to the practice
of negotiation must commence his studies by a careful examination of
the position of various European states, of the principal interests
which govern their action, which divide them from one another, of the
diverse forms of government which prevail in different parts, and of
the character of those princes, soldiers, and ministers who stand in
positions of authority. In order to master the detail of such knowledge
he must have an understanding of the material power, the revenues, and
the whole dominion of each prince or each republic. He must understand
the limits of territorial sovereignty; he must inform himself of
the manner in which the government was originally established; of
the claims which each sovereign makes upon parts which he does not
possess; for these ambitions are the very material of negotiation on
those occasions when a favourable turn of events prompts the ambitious
sovereign to hope that a long-cherished desire may be realised; and,
finally, the negotiator must be able to make a clear distinction
between the rights and claims which are founded on treaty obligation
and those which rest upon pure force alone. For his own instruction
he must read with the most attentive care all public treaties, both
general and particular, which have been made between the princes and
states of Europe and in our time; he should consider the treaties
concluded between France and the House of Austria as those which
offer the principal form and model for the conduct of all the public
affairs of Christendom on account of the network of liaisons with other
sovereigns which surrounds these two great Powers. And since their
disputes took their origin in the relations and treaties existing
between the King Louis XI. and Charles, the last Duke of Burgundy, from
whom the House of Austria descends, it is vital that the negotiator of
our time should be well acquainted with all the treaties made at that
period and since; but especially all those which have been concluded
between the principal Powers of Europe beginning with the Treaty of
Westphalia right up to the present time.
[Sidenote: _Europe is his Province._]
Let him also study with understanding and open eye the modern history
of Europe. Let him read the memoirs of great men, the instructions and
despatches of all our ablest negotiators, both those which are printed
in public books and those which are stored in manuscripts in our Office
of Public Records, for these documents treat of great affairs, and
the reading of them will convey not only facts which are important
for the making of history, but also a sense of the true atmosphere
of negotiation, and will thus help to form the mind of him who reads
them and give him some clue to guide him in similar occasions on his
own career. One of the most profitable readings that I know for this
purpose is the despatch of Cardinal d’Ossat, of whose letters I make
bold to say, for a man entering upon negotiation, what Horace said to
the poets of his time regarding the works of Homer: That he should
have them in his hands night and day if he desires perfection in his
own art. In a simple and modest manner the despatches of this Cardinal
reveal the force and the address which were his great merit, and which,
in spite of the antiquity of his style, still give keen pleasure to
those who have a taste for good diplomatic writing. One may see thus
how by his ability alone, without the assistance of noble birth,
title, or other character than that of agent of his queen, Louise de
Vaudemont, widow of King Henry III., he was able gradually to conduct
the high enterprise of reconciling King Henry the Great with the Holy
See after the most famous ambassadors of the time had failed in it;
with what dexterity he escaped all the pitfalls laid for him by the
Roman Court, and all the traps which the House of Austria, then at
the height of its power, devised for his undoing. The reader will
marvel, as he turns each page, how nothing escaped his penetrating eye.
He will find even the least movements of Pope Clement VIII. and his
nephew the Cardinal recorded with care. He will see how Monseigneur
d’Ossat profited by everything, how he is firm as a rock when necessity
demands, supple as a willow at another moment, and how he possessed the
supreme art of making every man offer him as a gift that which it was
his chief design to secure.
[Sidenote: _The Study of Famous Despatches._]
Then again in the collection of manuscript despatches regarding
the negotiations of Münster, as well as in the memoirs of Cardinal
Mazarin, we may read the instructions to the French plenipotentiary,
which are indeed masterpieces of their kind, for in them the Cardinal
examines the interests of each European Power. He suggests overtures
and expedients for adjusting their differences with a capacity and
a clearness of view which is altogether surprising, and that in a
language which was not his own. His despatches on the Peace of the
Pyrenees, by means of which he conveyed to the King the results of his
conferences with Don Louis Dharo, Prime Minister of Spain, have also a
beauty of their own. We recognise in them also the superiority of his
genius and the easy ascendancy which he had gained over the spirit of
the Spanish minister with whom he was dealing. There are also other
manuscript despatches which deserve recognition. They are to be found
in great numbers in the Royal Library and in other collections of
books, as, for instance, those of De Noailles, Bishop of Acs, and of
Montluc, Bishop of Valence, in which one may also read the authentic
account of two noble and able men. We have, too, the letters of
President Jeannin, a man of great common sense and solid judgment, who
contributed largely to the consolidation of the young Republic of the
United Provinces by the twelve years’ truce which he prepared, and by
the wise counsels which he gave touching all matters of government in
that Republic. The reading of such letters as his is well designed to
form the judgment of him who will consent to read with intelligent care.
[Sidenote: _Dynastic Liaisons._]
In order to understand the principal interest of European princes, the
negotiator must add to the knowledge which we have just been describing
that of dynastic genealogies, so that he may know all the connections
and alliances, by marriage and otherwise, between different princes,
for these liaisons are often found to be the principal causes of
conflict and even of war. He must also know the laws and established
customs of the different countries, especially in all matters relating
to the succession to the throne and the prevailing habits of the court.
The study of the form of government existing in each country is very
necessary to the diplomatist, and he should not wait until his arrival
in a foreign country to study these questions; he should prepare
himself beforehand, for, unless he is equipped with a certain measure
of this knowledge, he will be like a man at sea without a compass. Our
own negotiators, who have never travelled before taking up some foreign
post and who therefore know nothing of these questions, are usually
so saturated in our own national customs and habits as to think that
those of all other nations must resemble them; the truth being that the
authority which one king has within his kingdom in no way resembles
that of the neighbouring monarch, although the superficial likeness
between royalty in every country is obvious to every eye.
[Sidenote: _England and Poland._]
There are, for instance, countries where it is not enough to be in
agreement with the prince and his ministers, because there are other
parties who share the national sovereignty with him and who have the
power to resist his decisions or to make him change them. Of this state
of affairs we have an excellent example in England, where the authority
of Parliament frequently obliges the King to make peace or war against
his own wish; or again in Poland, where the general Diets have an even
more extended power, in which one single vote in the Diet may bring to
nought the all but unanimous resolution of the assembly itself, and
thus not only defeat the deliberations of that assembly but bring to
nought the policy of the King and of the Senate. Therefore the good
negotiator in such a country will know where to find the balance of
domestic power in order to profit by it when occasion offers.
Besides the general public interests of the state there are private
and personal interests and ruling passions in princes and in their
ministers or favourites, which often play a determining part in
the direction of public policy. It is therefore necessary for the
negotiator to inform himself of the nature of these private interests
and passions influencing the spirits of those with whom he has to
negotiate, in order that he may guide his action by this knowledge
either in flattering their passions, which is the easiest way, or by
somehow finding means to deflect such personages from their original
intentions and engagements and cause them to adopt a new line of
policy. Such an enterprise carried to success would indeed be a
masterpiece of negotiation.
[Sidenote: _Testimony of the Duc de Rohan._]
That great man, the Duc de Rohan, tells us in the treatise which he
wrote upon the interests of European sovereigns, that the sovereigns
rule the people and that interest rules the sovereign; but we may add
that the passions of princes and of their ministers often overrule
their interests. We have seen many cases in which monarchs have entered
engagements most prejudicial to themselves and their state under the
influence of passion. There need be no surprise on this account, for
the nations themselves are not free from this error, and are prepared
to ruin themselves in order to satisfy hatred, vengeance, and jealousy,
the satisfaction of which is often antagonistic to their veritable
interests. Without recourse to ancient history it would be easy to
prove by modern examples that men do not act upon firm and stable
maxims of conduct; that as a rule they are governed by passion and
temperament more than by reason. The bearing of this knowledge upon
diplomacy is that since the passion and caprice of men in authority so
largely influence the destiny of their subjects, it is the duty of the
able negotiator to inform himself as accurately as possible regarding
the inclination, state of mind, and the plans of men in authority
in order that this information may be placed at the service of his
master’s interests. And we may be sure that a negotiator who has not
laboured to acquire a fund of this general and particular information
will reason falsely regarding events, affairs of state, and men, and
is liable to make false estimates and give dangerous advice to the
prince who employs him. Such knowledge is not to be found in books
alone; it is more easily to be gathered by personal communication with
those engaged in public service and by foreign travel, for, however
profoundly one may have studied the customs, the policy, or the
passions of those who govern in foreign states, everything will appear
differently when examined close at hand, and it is impossible to form
a just notion of the true character of things except by first-hand
acquaintance.
[Sidenote: _Importance of Foreign Travel._]
It is therefore desirable that before entering the profession of
diplomacy the young man should have travelled to the principal courts
of Europe, not merely like those young persons who on leaving the
academy or college go to Rome to see the beautiful palaces and the
ancient ruins, or to Venice to enjoy the opera and the courtesans; he
should indeed embark on his travels at a somewhat riper age when he is
more capable of reflection and of appreciating the form and spirit of
government in each country, and of studying the merits and faults of
princes and ministers--doing all this with the deliberate design of
returning to these countries at a future day with profit to himself
and his master. Travel conducted on these lines obliges the traveller
to keep a vigilant eye upon everything that comes under his notice. It
would be well that in certain cases they should accompany the King’s
ambassadors or envoys as travelling companions after the manner of the
Spaniards and the Italians, who regard it as an honour to accompany the
ministers of the Crown on their diplomatic journeys. There is nothing
better calculated for instruction upon the manner of events in foreign
countries or for the training of a young man to represent his own
country abroad.
[Sidenote: _Foreign Languages Indispensable._]
It is highly desirable that such novices in diplomacy should learn
foreign languages, for thus they will be protected from the bad faith
or the ignorance of interpreters, and from the grave embarrassment of
having to use them for the purpose of audiences with the sovereign.
It is obvious, too, that an interpreter may be a betrayer of secrets.
_Every one_ who enters the profession of diplomacy should know the
German, Italian, and Spanish languages as well as the Latin, ignorance
of which would be a disgrace and a shame to any public man, for it is
the common language of all Christian nations. It is also very useful
and fitting for the diplomat, on whom grave national responsibility
rests, to have such a general knowledge of science as may tend to
the development of his understanding, but he must be master of his
scientific knowledge and must not be consumed by it. He must give
science the place which it deserves, and must not merely consider it
as a reason for pride or for contempt of those who do not possess it.
While devoting himself to this study with care and attention he must
not become engrossed in it, for he who enters the public service of his
King must consider that he is destined for action and not for academic
study in his closet; and his principal care must be to instruct himself
regarding all that may affect the lives of living men rather than the
study of the dead. His professional aim is to penetrate the secrets and
hearts of men; to learn the art of handling them in such a manner as to
make them serve the great ends of his royal master.
[Sidenote: _A Rule for the Diplomatic Service._]
If one could establish a rule in France that no one should be employed
in negotiation until he had passed some such apprenticeship as this,
and had shown his capacity to profit by study and travel in rendering
a good account of the countries which he had seen; and, further, if
one could also establish the rule in the same manner that no high
command in the army can be entrusted to an officer who has not made
many campaigns, we should be more confident that the King would be well
served in his negotiations, and that by these means he would be able
to raise up around him a large number of reliable negotiators. This is
a most desirable end, for as we have seen there are many actions in
which the perfect practice of the art of negotiation is not less useful
than that of war, and that in France at the present time the art of war
stands far above that of diplomacy in public esteem.
[Sidenote: _Rewards for Service._]
But as men are not yet perfect enough to serve without hope of reward,
it is desirable that there should be in France a higher degree of
honour and fortune for those who have deserved well of their country
in diplomacy, as indeed there are in many other courts in Europe where
the King’s subjects have gained high distinction in that branch of the
public service. There are indeed countries in which the distinguished
diplomatist may hope to reach the highest place and most exalted
dignities in the realm, by which means we in France may learn to raise
the profession of diplomacy to that degree of public recognition which
it deserves, and from which the service of the King and the greatness
of the kingdom must certainly profit.
[Sidenote: _On the Choice of Diplomatists._]
The right choice of negotiators depends upon their personal quality,
their training, and to some extent their fortune, and as the endowments
of mankind vary in a wide degree, so it is found that one kind will
fit better into the office of diplomacy than another. At the same time
there are men of such wide capacity that they can be safely employed
in very different enterprises, and even in very different countries.
Such men by their adaptability, by the receptiveness of their nature,
and the pliancy of their character are well fitted for the province
of diplomacy, and quickly accommodate themselves to new surroundings.
It should be the aim of all governments to develop a whole race of
such men from whose ranks they may draw their diplomatic agents. It is
true that in any one generation there will only be a few geniuses of
the first order, and that the rank and file of the diplomatic service
will be composed of persons of a more limited type, in which case it
is all the more incumbent upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs to
exercise the greatest care in assigning ambassadors to foreign posts.
He must therefore be well acquainted with the whole service in order
to know where to lay his hand upon the appropriate person for any given
enterprise.
[Sidenote: _The Three Professions._]
There are, broadly speaking, three principal human professions. The
first is the Ecclesiastical; the second is that of the Gentlemen of
the Sword, which besides those actually serving in the army includes
courtiers and squires and other ranks of gentlemen in his Majesty’s
service; and the third is the profession of the Law, whose devotees
in France are called ‘Gentlemen of the Cloth.’ There are not many
countries where ecclesiastics can be employed in diplomacy, for one
cannot properly send them to heretical or infidel countries. At Rome,
which appears to be their home, their attachment to the Pope, and their
desire to receive honours from him as well as other benefits which
depend upon service at his Court, undoubtedly places them under the
suspicion of following too closely the Jesuitical maxims which rule
papal policy, and often operate to the prejudice of the temporal power
of other kings.
[Sidenote: _The Example of Venice._]
The Republic of Venice has shown much wisdom in this matter, for she is
so convinced of the partiality of Venetian prelates towards the Holy
See that not only does she exclude them from all diplomatic offices in
connection with the Court of Rome, but she actually excludes them from
all discussion of the political relation between Venice and Rome. It
is obvious indeed to all that a dignitary of the Church owes a divided
allegiance, and it seems probable that where his loyalty to the Church
conflicts with his loyalty to his sovereign, the former is likely to
prevail. Indeed, the more closely one examines the proper duties of a
bishop, for instance, the more firmly convinced does one become that
these duties are not compatible with those of an ambassador; for on
the one hand it is not fitting that a minister of religion should
run about the world and thus neglect those duties which should have
first claim upon him, and on the other, as we have seen, political
and ecclesiastical allegiance may come into collision with disastrous
results. And surely a state must be poorly endowed with men if it can
find nowhere but in the Church a sufficiency of adept diplomatists. I
am the last to dispute the great services which certain prelates have
rendered to the French state in the past, but I consider it useful to
be guided as a general rule by the foregoing considerations.
[Sidenote: _The Ambassador a Man of Peace._]
The best diplomatist will usually be found to be a man of good birth,
sometimes a knight trained to the profession of arms, and it has
occasionally been found that a good general officer has served with
success as an ambassador, especially at a time when the military
affairs of either state were prominent subjects of negotiation. But
diplomacy is not to be regarded as linked with war, for, although war
arises out of policy, it is to be regarded as nothing more than a means
to an end in itself. Therefore the ambassador should be a man of peace;
for in most cases, and certainly wherever the foreign court is inclined
towards peace, it is best to send a diplomatist who works by persuasion
and is an adept in winning the good graces of those around him. In
either case it will be observed that the public interests will be best
served by appointing a professional diplomatist who by long experience
has acquired a high aptitude for the peculiar office of diplomacy.
Neither the soldier nor the courtier can hope to discharge the duties
of diplomacy with success unless they have taken pains to instruct
themselves in public policy, and in all that region of knowledge which
I have already described as necessary for the negotiator.
[Sidenote: _Lawyer Diplomats._]
It is true that sometimes a lawyer diplomat has made a great success
of negotiation, especially in countries where the final responsibility
for public policy lay with public assemblies which could be moved by
adroit speech, but in general the training of a lawyer breeds habits
and dispositions of mind which are not favourable to the practice
of diplomacy. And though it be true that success in the law-courts
depends largely upon a knowledge of human nature and an ability to
exploit it--both of which are factors in diplomacy--it is none the less
true that the occupation of the lawyer, which is to split hairs about
nothing, is not a good preparation for the treatment of grave public
affairs in the region of diplomacy. If this be true of the advocate or
barrister, it is still more true of the magistrate and judge. The habit
of mind engendered by presiding over a court of law, in which the judge
himself is supreme, tends to exclude those faculties of suppleness and
adaptability which are necessary in diplomacy, and the almost ludicrous
assumption of dignity by a judge would certainly appear as arrogance in
diplomatic circles. I do not say that there have not been great lawyers
and great judges who were endowed with high diplomatic qualities, but
again I place these considerations before my readers in the belief that
the more closely they are observed the more surely will they lead to
efficiency in the diplomatic profession.
[Sidenote: _Diplomacy demands Professional Training._]
Let me further emphasise my conviction, which, alas, is not yet shared
even by ministers of state in France, that diplomacy is a profession by
itself which deserves the same preparation and assiduity of attention
that men give to other recognised professions. The qualities of a
diplomatist and the knowledge necessary to him cannot, indeed, all
be acquired. The diplomatic genius is born, not made. But there are
many qualities which may be developed with practice, and the greater
part of the necessary knowledge can only be acquired by constant
application to the subject. In this sense diplomacy is certainly a
profession itself capable of occupying a man’s whole career, and those
who think to embark upon a diplomatic mission as a pleasant diversion
from their common task only prepare disappointment for themselves and
disaster for the cause which they serve. The veriest fool would not
entrust the command of an army to a man whose sole badge of merit was
his successful eloquence in a court of law or his adroit practice of
the courtier’s art in the palace. All are agreed that military command
must be earned by long service in the army. In the same manner it
should be regarded as folly to entrust the conduct of negotiations to
an untrained amateur unless he has conspicuously shown in some other
walk of life the qualities and knowledge necessary for the practice of
diplomacy.
[Sidenote: _Fatality of Bad Appointments._]
It often happens that there are men in public life who have won a
reputation for themselves without earning it. That is possible in the
political world, which has many camp followers and hangers-on of all
kinds, and there is always a risk that a minister in search of an
ambassador for a foreign post will use the occasion to pay an old
debt to some powerful patrician family or to some blackmailer behind
the scenes. Those who take the responsibility of appointing to high
diplomatic offices persons of this character are responsible before
God and man for all the injuries which may thereby accrue to the
public interest. It cannot be too plainly stated that, while in many
cases where trouble has arisen the negotiator himself is to blame,
the true responsibility must rest with the minister at home, who not
only devises the policy itself but chooses the instruments of it. It
is therefore one of the highest maxims of good government that the
public interest must be supreme, and that therefore both the prince
himself and his ministers must steel themselves to resist the pressure
of friends and relations who seek employment for unworthy persons.
In diplomacy, above all things, since peace and war and the welfare
of nations depend upon it, the best minds, the most sagacious and
instructed of public servants should be appointed to the principal
foreign posts regardless of the personal affairs of the prince himself
or the party attachments of the chosen ambassadors.
[Sidenote: ‘_We have fools in Florence, but we do not export them._’]
Nothing should stand in the way of the creation of a vigilant,
sagacious, and high-minded diplomatic service. Men of small minds
should content themselves with employment at home, where their errors
may easily be repaired, for errors committed abroad are too often
irreparable. The late Duke of Tuscany, who was a remarkably wise and
enlightened prince, once complained to the Venetian ambassador, who
stayed over-night with him on his journey to Rome, that the Republic
of Venice had sent as resident at his court a person of no value,
possessing neither judgment nor knowledge, nor even any attractive
personal quality. ‘I am not surprised,’ said the ambassador in reply;
‘we have many fools in Venice.’ Whereupon the Grand Duke retorted: ‘We
also have fools in Florence, but we take care not to export them.’
The Duke’s remarks show how important it is in every respect to choose
the right man for the diplomatic service, and, in order to give the
Foreign Minister an adequate freedom of choice, his diplomatic service
should contain men of different characters and a wide variety of
accomplishments. Thus he will not be compelled to send an unsuitable
man merely because he was the only one available. He should have
most careful regard in this choice to the type of government and the
religion which prevails in the foreign country in question. There used
to be a jest current in Paris on this very subject. The French King had
sent a bishop to Constantinople and an heretic to Rome, and it was said
that the one had gone to convert the Grand Turk and the other to be
converted by the Pope!
[Sidenote: _The Persona Ingrata._]
Apart from any higher consideration, it is a mere measure of prudence
to avoid sending an envoy who may be presumed to be a _persona ingrata_
at the foreign court, for he will certainly, whether he will or not,
create a prejudice against his own country and will be quite unable to
meet his competitors in diplomacy on equal terms, for he will start
with the handicap of unpopularity. The Foreign Minister, therefore,
should not wait until matters go wrong at a foreign capital, but should
be in a position, when each appointment is made, to know the character
of the new ambassador, and thus to veto a bad appointment. This, alas,
is not by any means always the case. I do not need to enter upon a
minute examination of the faults to avoid and the virtues to encourage
in the complete diplomat. I have already said enough to show where
my opinion lies in a general way. I will only add one or two further
considerations. I said a few moments ago that loose living is a great
handicap in diplomacy; but, since there is no rule which has not some
exception, let me point out that a too abstemious negotiator will miss
many opportunities of finding out what is going on. Especially in the
northern countries the diplomat who loves a glass will quickly make
friends among ministers, though, to be sure, he should drink in such a
manner as not to lose control of his own faculties while endeavouring
to loosen the self-control of others.
[Sidenote: _The Nation judged by its Servants._]
In diplomacy a nation is judged by its ministers, and its whole
reputation may rest upon the popularity or unpopularity of an
ambassador. In this respect the personal conduct of the ambassador
and his staff is almost as important as the policy with which he is
charged, for the success of the policy will depend largely upon the
actual relations which exist between the two nations. The ambassador
is, as it were, the very embodiment of these relations, and if a
proper adept in his profession will know how to turn every occasion to
advantage. I need not repeat my tale of the qualities and practices
by which such advantage may be drawn from the current of events, but
I may perhaps point out that obviously men of birth and breeding are
better able to discharge the kind of function which I have described.
Their rank will command a certain respect, and the qualities usually
inherited by those of good birth should stand them in good stead at a
foreign court. At the same time such qualities must not be regarded as
more than a foundation. They cannot in themselves equip a diplomatist
for his office. He must by assiduous application acquire the other
necessary qualities, for there is no man more liable to suspicion than
he who plumes himself on an experience which he does not possess.
Further, it is usually unwise to entrust important negotiations
to young men, who are commonly presumptuous and vain as well as
indiscreet. Old age is equally inappropriate. The best time of life is
its prime, in which you find experience, discretion, and moderation,
combined with vigour.
[Sidenote: _Men of Letters._]
Other things being equal, I prefer a man of letters before one who has
not made a habit of study, for his reading will give him a certain
equipment which he might otherwise lack. It will adorn his conversation
and supply him with the necessary historic setting in which to
place his own negotiations; whereas an ignorant man will be able to
quote nothing but the will of his master, and will thus present his
argument in a naked and unattractive form. It must be obvious that the
knowledge gained in a lifetime of reading is an important adjunct in
diplomacy, and above all, the reading of history is to be preferred,
for without it the negotiator will be unable to understand the meaning
of historical allusions made by other diplomatists, and may thus miss
the whole point at some important turn in negotiations. And since it is
not enough to think aright, the diplomatist must be able to translate
his thoughts into the right language, and conversely he must be able to
pierce behind the language of others to their true thoughts. It may
often happen that an historical allusion will reveal the purpose of a
minister’s mind far better than any direct argument. Herein lies the
importance of culture in diplomacy. The name of orator has sometimes
been given to ambassadors because in certain past times they have
been in the habit of delivering their instructions in the form of an
eloquent address; but diplomatic eloquence is a very different thing
from that of Parliament or the Bar. An ambassador’s speeches should
contain more sense than words, and he should studiously avoid every
affectation. His aim should be to arouse the minds of his hearers by a
sympathetic touch, after which it will be easy to deliver his message
in an appropriate way. He should therefore at the outset think rather
of what is in their minds than of immediately expressing what is in his
own. It is in this that true eloquence consists, and indeed the words I
have just used are the beginning and end of all diplomacy.
[Sidenote: _The Fitting Mode of Address._]
In general his mode of address, whether he speak to the sovereign or
to his ministers, should be moderate and reserved. He should not raise
his voice but should maintain the ordinary conversational tone, at
once simple and dignified, revealing an innate respect both for his
own high office and for the person whom he is addressing. He should,
above all things, avoid the prolix, pompous approach which is natural
to princes who attach more importance to ceremonial than to the essence
of any matter. But if the ambassador be called upon to deliver his
message to a Senate or a Parliament, he will bear in mind that the
means for gaining the good graces of an individual and of an assembly
are by no means the same. In such public speech he may permit himself a
certain freedom of rhetoric, but even here he must beware of prolonging
his speech beyond a tolerable limit. The reply of the Spartans to
ambassadors from the Isle of Samos stands as a warning for all times
against prolixity: ‘We have forgotten the beginning of your harangue;
we paid no heed to the middle of it, and nothing has given us pleasure
in it except the end.’ God forbid that any French negotiator should
receive so damning a rebuff!
[Sidenote: _The Well-Stored Mind._]
Even at the best of times a man of good sense will not rely entirely on
his native wit. He will find that knowledge of historical precedents
will often act as a lever with which to remove obstacles from his
path. Such knowledge of history, and particularly the true aptitude
in applying it to current events, cannot be learned except by long
experience. Even in those cases where success has attended the
efforts of an amateur diplomatist, the example must be regarded as an
exception, for it is a commonplace of human experience that skilled
work requires a skilled workman. The more important the business on
hand, the more vital it is that ministers of state should ensure for
themselves the services of trained men. I am well aware that even the
greatest courts sometimes neglect this vital precaution, and fill their
embassies with improper persons, mainly because the minister or the
prince had not sufficient strength of mind to resist appeals made on
illegitimate grounds such as that of family influence. It will usually
be found that the real expert does not push himself or his claims, and
that the superior minds in diplomacy, as in other walks of life, are
not found crying their wares at every street corner, but must be sought
out with care in their own closets. It is also to be observed that in
previous times the profession of diplomacy stood too low in public
esteem to attract the services of first-class men--partly because
higher emoluments were to be earned elsewhere, and partly on account of
the prolonged absence from home which diplomatic service entails.
[Sidenote: _Diplomacy an Honourable Exile._]
If diplomacy be a labour in exile, the state should see to it that
it is at least an honourable exile. To counteract this drawback, the
home government should so reform the system of diplomacy that it may
offer attractions to the most ambitious as well as to the most refined
spirits. There is no reason why not merely honour but adequate daily
recompense for his services should not be offered to the diplomatists
from the very beginning of their career. Having regard to the expenses
which fall upon the diplomatists of all ranks in their service abroad,
and in maintaining the honour of their own profession and their
country, the prince will be well advised to pay good salaries and in
other ways to mark his esteem of the diplomatic profession. Thus and
thus alone can a prince gather round him a diplomatic bodyguard worthy
of the name. If he follows this advice, his diplomatic service will
quickly outstrip all others and a deeper mutual confidence will arise
between himself and his diplomatic agents upon which the success of all
his negotiations will rest secure. No diplomatist is less to be envied
than he who finds himself at a foreign court bereft of the confidence
of his own.
[Sidenote: _Value of a Well-Equipped Service._]
Now the equipment of the state in diplomacy will be incomplete unless
the diplomatic service contains within its ranks so large a number of
practised and seasoned diplomatists that the King may be able to retain
several of them at his side as special advisers in foreign affairs. In
every campaign the true commander will take as much trouble for his
reserves as for his first line of attack, and similarly the position
of reserves in diplomacy has a great importance, for it means not only
that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will have at his elbow a number
of skilled diplomatists to assist him in a moment of crisis, but also
that when one of the embassies abroad suddenly falls vacant his choice
of a successor will not be too narrowly restricted. He thus will be
able to avoid the fatal practice, which has prevailed too often in
recent French history, of having to choose an ambassador haphazard at
the last moment from among the courtiers and hangers-on at the palace.
[Sidenote: _The Right Man in the Right Place._]
The nature of the business on hand must largely govern the choice of
the ambassador who is appointed to carry it out, and if the diplomatic
service be large enough and varied enough it will certainly contain
within its ranks many different characters showing a wide variety of
aptitude. Thus in all those secret negotiations which are so necessary
in order to prepare the ground for treaties it is often found that the
ambassador himself is not the best person to employ. It may be highly
embarrassing for him to attempt to combine such secret negotiations
with the ordinary duties of his office, and therefore a clever man who
is not yet clothed with the prestige of high office is a more proper
agent for this kind of secret traffic. The very fact that the high
public position of an ambassador is apt to make the court and the
general public familiar with his person and his face is certainly a
drawback to his employment on more secret affairs, and though it is
true, as we have said, that part of the business of an ambassador is
that of an honourable spy, he should beware of doing any of the spying
himself. Most of the great events in recent diplomatic history have
been prepared by ministers sent in secret. The Peace of Münster, one
of the most intricate negotiations I have ever known, was not really
the work of that vast concourse of ambassadors and envoys which met
there and appended their signatures to the document. The essential
clauses of that treaty were discussed and drawn up by a secret agent of
Duke Maximilian of Bavaria sitting at a table in Paris with Cardinal
Mazarin. In a similar fashion the Peace of the Pyrenees was concluded
as the result of secret negotiations at Lyons between Cardinal Mazarin
and Pimentel, the secret envoy of the Spanish King; and finally, the
Peace of Ryswick, to which I was a party throughout the negotiation,
was devised by the same secret diplomacy before its public ratification
in Holland in the year 1697.
[Sidenote: _Each Embassy a Miniature of the Whole Service._]
Now the bearing of these considerations upon the organisation of
diplomacy is fairly clear. If it is only a question of maintaining
good relations between one state and another and of rendering a more
or less correct account of all that happens at a foreign court, a
diplomatist with a couple of secretaries will suffice, and indeed
in ordinary times it is undoubtedly better not to have more than one
diplomatist of the same rank at any foreign court. But it is equally
obvious that there are occasions when it is of the highest advantage to
maintain a more elaborately equipped mission at a foreign court, and
even to send two or three diplomatists of higher rank to assist in the
conduct of negotiations and in the other activities of diplomacy. This
is of course true whenever a peace conference is about to meet, for
negotiations of that character require great preparation beforehand,
and it would be impossible for a single diplomatist to overtake all
the work which is necessary in such circumstances together with the
manifold duties of his own office. In a certain sense the embassy
itself should be a reproduction in miniature of the whole diplomatic
service.
[Sidenote: _Variety of Talent._]
There is undoubtedly room in all the larger embassies for a great
variety of talent, which will find an appropriate field of action if
the head of the mission is wise enough to give the younger men their
chance. For instance, it sometimes happens that an embassy will find
it is in a country distracted by civil war, and then the best practice
of the ambassador will be severely tested. If he has encouraged his
juniors to form relationships of various kinds with different parties
in the country for the purpose of acquiring information, he will find
that on the outbreak even of so distracting a commotion as civil war he
has the means within his own embassy of keeping touch with both sides
in the dispute. Naturally he will find it a difficult and delicate task
not to be embroiled with either side; but he will certainly find all
his previous trouble amply repaid by the fulness of the information
which he receives from both sides. On no account should he allow
prejudice regarding social rank or political opinion to stand in the
way of the formation of useful relations between members of his staff
and different parties in the country. He himself is debarred from
such action, and indeed if he were alone with nothing but one or two
secretaries to assist him, it would be quite impossible for him to
know what was passing in either camp, and he would have to rely on
second-hand information which he was not in a position to test. Still
worse would be his case if, having become the personal friend of the
chief of one of the parties, he should find the other party coming into
power, and thereafter treating him as an enemy.
[Sidenote: _Merit the only Standard._]
Such considerations must ever be borne in mind by the Minister for
Foreign Affairs. But least of all men should he be influenced by
regard for rank, social station, or political opinion in his choice of
attachés and other persons in any rank in diplomacy. Especially where
he is about to despatch an embassy to a state under popular government,
he will remember that the ambassador will require many agents to keep
him in touch with all the different parties. It is therefore to be
observed that those embassies which are sent to popularly governed
states must be chosen with greater care and equipped with a more varied
staff than those despatched to a foreign court where the government
rests entirely in the hands of the King.
[Sidenote: _The Diplomatic Hierarchy: Ambassadors._]
Before discussing in detail the duties of negotiators, I shall
describe the different titles which they receive, and the functions
and privileges attached to their office. Negotiators are of two
kinds: of the first and second order. Those of the first order are
Ambassadors Extraordinary and Ambassadors Ordinary. Those of the second
are Envoys Extraordinary and Residents. Ambassadors extraordinary
receive certain honours and distinctions not accorded to ambassadors
ordinary. The ambassadors extraordinary of crowned heads are lodged
and entertained in France for three days, by order of the King, in
residences set aside for them, while ambassadors ordinary are not so
entertained by the King, though in other respects they enjoy the same
honour and privileges as the former. These privileges consist in the
enjoyment under international law of immunity and security, in the
right to remain covered before the King in public audiences because
they represent their masters, in the privilege of being borne in the
King’s coach, and of driving their own coaches into the inner court of
the Louvre. They have still their own dais in the audience-chamber,
while their wives have a seat by the Queen; and they are permitted to
drape the driving seat of their coaches with a special saddle cloth. In
France the ambassadors of the Dukes of Savoy enjoyed the same honours
as those of the crowned heads of Europe. Abroad the King’s ambassadors
enjoy different ceremonial rights according to the customs established
in different courts. The French ambassador in Rome, for instance,
gives his hand to the ambassadors of certain crowned heads and of
Venice, but there are certain ambassadors of other sovereigns who do
not receive this courtesy, though at other courts it is accorded to
them by the French ambassador. The French ambassador takes first rank
in all ceremonies in Rome after the ambassador of the Emperor. These
two ambassadors receive the same salary, and are treated otherwise on
a footing of equality. There are several courts at which the French
ambassadors give their hand to certain princes of equality in the
country: in Spain, for instance, we find the Grandees; in London, the
Peers of the Realm; in Sweden and in Poland the Senators and Grand
Officers; but to the negotiators of the rank of envoy this courtesy is
not accorded. The King does not send an ambassador to the Electorates
of Germany, but conducts his negotiation with them merely by means of
envoys.
[Sidenote: _Envoys Extraordinary._]
Envoys extraordinary are public ministers who do not possess the right
of presentation which attaches alone to the title of ambassador, but
they enjoy the same security and immunity under the law of nations.
They do not make a state entry into a foreign capital in the manner
of ambassadors, but are presented in audiences to the King by the
diplomatic usher, who fetches them from their private residence in
one of the King’s coaches; they speak to his Majesty standing and
uncovered, the King himself being seated and covered. The Emperor on
the other hand receives the envoys of the King standing and covered,
and remains in this condition throughout the entire audience, the
envoy alone of all those present standing uncovered.... The title of
plenipotentiary is sometimes given to envoys as well as to ambassadors
according to the occasion. For instance, the ministers whom the King
maintains at the Diet of Ratisbon receive the title of plenipotentiary
although they are not ambassadors. Residents are also public ministers,
but this title has been somewhat degraded since the distinction was
drawn both at the French Court and at the Court of the Emperor between
them and envoys, with the result that nearly all foreign negotiators in
France who bore the title of resident have relinquished it by order of
their masters, and have assumed that of envoy extraordinary. None the
less the title is still found in Rome and in other courts and republics
where the residents are treated as envoys.
[Sidenote: _Secret Envoys._]
There are certain secret envoys who are only received in private
audiences but enjoy the same immunity as public envoys, and from the
moment in which they present their credentials are recognised as public
ministers. There are also secretaries and agents attached to the court
for various forms of public business, but they are not received in
audience by the King in France; they do all their business with the
Secretary of State or the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and though
themselves not recorded as ministers have also enjoyed the protection
and immunity under international law which is accorded to foreign
ambassadors. No subject of the King can be received as minister or
representative of a foreign prince, nor can they conduct his affairs in
France except as agents of the Secretary of State, the only exception
being the ambassador from Malta, who is usually a French Member of
the Order, and to whom the King accords the right to remain covered in
public audience as representative of the Grand Master of the Order, who
himself is recognised as possessing sovereign rights.
[Sidenote: _Agents of Small States._]
Only princes and sovereign states have the right to clothe their
messengers with the character of ambassador, envoy, or resident. The
agents of small states or of the free states are called deputies; they
are not public ministers, and they are subject to the jurisdiction of
the country like any private citizen; they do not enjoy immunity under
the law of nations, though by custom deputies from provinces and from
free cities are accorded immunity and security in practice during their
deputation as a proof of the good faith of the prince in negotiation.
In the same manner private citizens provided with passports may travel
free from molestation. There are certain states in Italy which, though
neither sovereign Powers nor subject to another sovereign, have yet
conserved the right to send deputies with the title of ambassador to
the sovereign under whose sway they live. These are the cities of
Bologna and Ferrara, which send diplomatic deputations to the Pope
in this manner, and the city of Messina, which retained the right of
sending ambassadors to the King of Spain before the last rising. There
are similarly several Spanish cities which do not now retain this
right. These ambassadors of states or subject provinces resemble in
some manner those whom the Roman people used to receive from their own
free provinces, from the cities and colonies subject to Roman rule,
to whom the name of _Legati_ was given, a name which still occurs in
all Latin diplomatic documents. There are certain free cities, such as
Hamburg and Lübeck, which send commissaries to certain princes; but as
a rule they are merely commercial agents engaged upon such matters of
business as the purchase and sale of merchandise and the conditions of
letters of exchange.
[Sidenote: _Precedence._]
Now although the position of an ambassador extraordinary is something
more honourable than that of the ambassador ordinary they are
practically treated alike if there is an equality between the princes
whom they represent. The title of extraordinary gives no other
superiority over the ambassador ordinary except in pure matters of
precedence. Envoys extraordinary and residents stand in somewhat of the
same relation, that is to say, that the resident of a prince of higher
rank takes precedence over an envoy extraordinary of a prince of lesser
rank. It is not, however, the same between ambassadors and envoys.
The envoy of a crowned head must yield the place of honour to the
ambassador of a lesser sovereign as in the following example. An envoy
of the Emperor at the French Court some years ago took his seat at a
public entertainment in the place which was reserved for the ambassador
ordinary of the Duke of Savoy, and asserted his right to it on the
ground of the difference in rank between their respective masters; but
the dispute was decided in favour of the ambassador as holding superior
rank without regard to the difference in the rank of their respective
princes; and the envoy of the Emperor was obliged to leave the position
which he had taken and yield it to the ambassador of Savoy.
[Sidenote: _The Title of Excellency._]