The Force sent to co-operate with Sir Donald Stewart—Strength of General
Ross’s Division—A Force moved out to Charasia—Hasan Khan in
Logar—Abdur Rahman and the Kohistanis—General Ross’s Advance on the
Ghazni Road—Communication opened with Sir Donald Stewart—News of the
Action at Ahmed Khel—Action at Charasia—Colonel Jenkins attacked by
Hasan Khan—The Charasia Force strengthened—Description of the
Action—General Macpherson’s Disposition of the Reinforcements—Defeat
and Dispersion of the Logaris under Hasan Khan—Heavy Losses of the
Afghans—The Leaders of the Attack.
The following extracts from letters will explain General Ross’s movement
towards Ghazni to co-operate with Sir Donald Stewart:—
_17th April, 1880._
Sufficient time having been given to the chiefs who attended the late
Durbar to return to their homes, the force told off to co-operate with
Sir Donald Stewart’s column advancing from Candahar, has started for
Sheikhabad on the Ghazni Road. It left yesterday morning under command
of Major-General John Ross, and took the road to Argandeh, halting for
the night at Kila Kazi, seven or eight miles from the Cabul gorge. Its
numerical strength was nearly 4,000 fighting men of all arms, made up as
follows:—
────────────────────────────────────┬──────────┬───────────────
│Officers. │Rank and File.
────────────────────────────────────┼──────────┼───────────────
6-8, Royal Artillery (4 screw-guns) │ 4│ 131
Hazara Mountain Battery (6 guns) │ 5│ 200
9th Lancers (1 squadron) │ 4│ 100
3rd Punjab Cavalry (2 squadrons) │ 6│ 200
3rd Bengal Cavalry │ 8│ 350
9th Foot ⎛ General C. ⎞ │ 21│ 700
4th Ghoorkas ⎜ Gough’s ⎟ │ 7│ 660
24th Punjab Native ⎝ Brigade ⎠ │ 8│ 660
Infantry │ │
23rd Pioneers │ 8│ 680
3rd Company Sappers and Miners │ 2│ 96
Field Park (Captain Brackenbury) │ 1│ 60
────────────────────────────────────┼──────────┼───────────────
Total │ 74│ 3,837
────────────────────────────────────┴──────────┴───────────────
The officers of the Staff are—General Ross, commanding; Major Boyes,
A.A.G.; Captain Dutton, A.Q.M.G.; and Dr. Macnalty, Staff Surgeon;
Brigadier-General Charles Gough, C.B., V.C.; Major Gerard, Brigade
Major; Major Kinloch and Major Combe, D.A.Q.M.Gs. Captain Ridgeway is
the Political Officer with the Division.
This force is of sufficient strength to hold its own against any force
that can possibly be gathered together on the Ghazni Road, but it seems
unlikely that it will meet with any serious opposition in that quarter.
Mahomed Jan’s faction has been so split up, that he will have difficulty
in raising large bodies of men in future, particularly as the eyes of
the Kohistanis, Cabulis, Logaris, and Safis are all turned northwards,
Abdur Rahman’s movements beyond the Hindu Kush being far more discussed
than any tribal warfare towards Ghazni. To-day heliograms from Argandeh
are to the effect that Mahomed Jan has fled to Narkh, the valley wherein
are Bahadur Khan’s villages visited by us in November last. Two thousand
men under Abdul Gaffur, a local _moollah_ of some importance, are said
to have assembled there; but unless this force is increased tenfold, no
opposition worthy of the name can be shown to General Ross. Mahomed
Jan’s parting shot was a summons to all the Kohistani _maliks_ to raise
their followers and march to Ghazni to resist the Candahar force—a
summons, it is needless to say, which will not be obeyed, as the
Kohistanis are not foolish enough to place themselves in a position
where they would be cut off from their homes. Mahomed Hasan Khan and
General Karim Khan have gone to Logar to get men together. The Ghazni
faction is on the horns of a dilemma, and the next few weeks will
probably see our troops promenading through Wardak and Logar, collecting
revenue and supplies, without any show of resistance to our orders. Of
course, if Abdur Rahman makes a demonstration at Charikar, there may be
another outburst of fanaticism; but, so far as we can judge, that
adventurer is not too anxious to cross the Hindu Kush until matters are
a little more advanced. If he can see his way to secure the Amirship
easily without fighting, he will certainly make overtures to Sir F.
Roberts. The rumour that he is running short of funds is very
significant in itself; he cannot keep an army together unless he has the
means wherewith to pay his sepoys, and he is too shrewd to risk a
failure by pushing his force too far south when our army is within five
marches of Charikar. We are more on the alert now than we have been
since the events of December, and the Kohistanis know this perfectly
well, though, perhaps, they do not know that General Macpherson’s
Brigade is to be held in readiness to move out at an hour’s notice
should local disaffection require such a step.
_22nd April._
General Ross has reached Kila Durani, one march from Sheikhabad, without
serious opposition. For the benefit of all humanitarian critics, I may
state that strict orders have been given under which hostile villages
are only to be punished by the destruction of their towers and fortified
places: the houses of the tribesmen will in all cases be spared. Such
grain and stores as we require will be taken—a very mild way, indeed, of
“living upon the country.” We pay such exorbitant prices for everything
we buy, that the few maunds of corn taken in this way cannot prove any
serious loss to the tribesmen.
In addition to the column co-operating with Sir Donald Stewart, it has
been found advisable to send a small force to Charasia. This is made up
of two guns F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, a wing of the 92nd Highlanders,
and the whole of the Guides, cavalry and infantry. The reason for this
step was that Mahomed Hasan Khan was threatening all villagers who were
sending in supplies to Sherpur from Logar, and the roads had become very
unsafe for all _kafilas_. The case of the Khan of Kushi will show very
clearly the state of Logar at the present moment, and the awkward
position in which _maliks_ friendly to the British are placed. This old
man did all he could to aid our advance when we crossed the Shutargardan
in September, and he has since remained faithful to his promises made to
us. A few days ago he came in to Sherpur, and asked for advice, his case
being that Hasan Khan had ordered him to send all his fighting men to
Baraki Rajan and to furnish supplies for the levies being raised in
Logar. The Khan would not obey the order, and Hasan Khan then threatened
to destroy his villages and seize all his goods. The threat may have
been an idle one, but still it was enough to intimidate the _malik_. He
was told to return to his home and to keep Hasan Khan in play for a few
days, when the advance of General Ross upon Sheikhabad, and General
Stewart’s arrival at Ghazni, would probably cause the dispersion of any
bands under Hasan Khan. In the meantime, to hasten this dispersion, and
to keep the roads from Logar to Cabul open, Colonel Jenkins was ordered
to Charasia, and there he is now encamped waiting for orders. The effect
upon the disorderly spirits in Logar has been most healthy. They dread
an incursion into their valley on both sides, and they are now anxious
to renounce Hasan Khan and all his works. There are always men to be
found in every tribe ripe for adventure and guerilla warfare, and it
seems probable that Hasan Khan still has several hundred of these about,
and intends harassing picquets and rear-guards whenever opportunity
offers. He has always a road of escape open towards Zurmut or the
Shutargardan; and unless the _maliks_ turn him out of their villages, he
will continue to foment discontent in Logar until the Ghazni and
Sheikhabad Forces have united and swept through the valley to Kushi. The
people are willing and, indeed, anxious to send supplies to Cabul, as
the prices paid by us are abnormally high; but until the presence of our
troops frees the headmen from all fear of reprisals by Hasan Khan, the
flow of grain and cattle to Cabul will be sluggish and uncertain.
From the north the news of Abdur Rahman’s movements is still meagre in
the extreme; but the explanation most probably of this is, that he is
waiting for events to be a little more distinctly shaped in Cabul before
he plays his trump card and formally demands the Amirship. He has sent
circulars to all the leading chiefs in Kohistan and the Cabul province,
upon whose goodwill he thinks he can count; and having thus put his
claims forward, he is content to rest upon his arms and make his
position in Turkistan and about Kunduz secure before venturing over the
Hindu Kush. His intentions towards the British may be looked upon as
unformed so far: they will depend upon the spirit in which his claims
are received. If we decline to have anything to say to him—which is
extremely unlikely, as it is rumoured that a Mission is to be sent to
Kunduz from Sherpur—he will either raise a new _jehad_, or will wait
until we have left Cabul, and then quietly swoop down upon any nominee
we have placed on the throne, and try his fortune once more for the
Amirship. If, on the contrary, we make our usual philanthropic offers of
friendship, and invite him to come forward and state his case, leaving
it to the decision of the chiefs and people, he will unquestionably meet
us half-way, and trust to his old popularity gaining him an easy
triumph. His mainstay is Kohistan, whence he looks to receive arms,
money, and men; and, so far as can be judged, the Kohistanis favour his
claims unreservedly. Knowing this, it has been all the more imperative
that we should induce the Kohistani chiefs to come in and make their
wishes known: as, once Abdur Rahman is secured in the interests of the
British, and his claims allowed by the majority of the tribesmen, our
political difficulties would begin to clear away. An agent, Ressalder
Mahomed Afzul of the 11th Bengal Lancers, was sent by us into Kohistan
to confer with the _maliks_, and he has been successful in bringing
between seventy and eighty of these men to Cabul. The chief among these
are Jabbar Khan, Gholam Hyder Khan, and Khwaja Abdul Kadir, and it is no
secret that they are friends of Abdur Rahman. Mr. Lepel Griffin received
them in Durbar yesterday, and took from Gholam Hyder a paper signed not
only by the _maliks_ present, but by Surwar Khan Parwani, Mir Butcha,
and the remainder of the Kohistani chiefs. Under the seals of all these
men Gholam Hyder was appointed their mouthpiece to confer with the
British, against whom all idea of enmity was disavowed. Surwar Khan and
the other absentees promised also that if the _maliks_ reported
favourably upon their reception at Sherpur, they also would come in. The
Durbar was not of the formal kind at which the Wardak and Logar chiefs
were received, it being understood that the Kohistanis should hereafter
formulate their requests, and make them known at a later period. The
behaviour of the _maliks_ was all that could be wished; and Gholam Hyder
in a temperate and respectful speech, thanked Mr. Griffin for the
consideration with which he and his friends had been treated, and
earnestly hoped that a satisfactory arrangement would be come to, and
that perfect friendliness would be established. The chief certainly
seemed sincere enough, and his words were received with marked approval
by his brother _maliks_, who nodded an affirmative as he quietly stated
their desire to aid the British in creating a stable Government in
Cabul. The _maliks_ will remain in Cabul for several days, and it is
probable that in a few days the other chiefs will come in, and then an
answer can be given to their representations, which are shaped in the
form of a request, that Abdur Rahman’s claims to the Amirship be
favourably entertained by the British.
_26th April._
The foraging parties sent out by General Ross were fired at in the Narkh
Valley and on the Bamian Road leading from Maidan, and in consequence of
this the Umur Khel Ghilzais were punished by a force being sent into the
Darra Narkh. They met with no opposition, and having destroyed one of
Bahadur Khan’s towers, they rejoined the main body.
After the punishment of the Umur Khel, General Ross marched from Maidan
and encamped, on 21st April, at Kila Sher Mahomed, more commonly called
Kila Durani, about two miles to the south of the Cabul river, which was
found to be easily fordable. There were the remains of what must once
have been a handsome bridge, but time and neglect had made it a complete
ruin. News were brought in of a combination of all the neighbouring
tribes, and of an intended attack to be made upon three sides. Mahomed
Jan, with a large force of Wardaks, was to appear from the south;
Mahomed Hasan Khan, with the Logaris, was to try a flank attack from the
east; while Bahadur Khan and Abdul Gaffur were to direct the movements
of the Maidanis and the Umur Khel from the hills to the west. The
combination seemed to be one so likely to take place, that every
precaution was taken by General Ross: the camp was made as compact as
possible, entrenchments were thrown up, and the troops were ready to
turn out at the first alarm. A night attack on the 21st was fully
expected, but no alarm was given, and on the following morning the force
marched onwards to Sar-i-Tope, ten miles. This left the Maidan villages
seventeen miles in rear; and it became daily more apparent that the
tribesmen meditated some kind of attack along the road. Parties of men
crowned the hills on the west, and fired at long ranges upon the column;
but such bullets as fell near our men were all spent, and but little
notice was taken of so harmless a demonstration. The road ran through a
valley two or three miles broad, with a gradual ascent the whole way.
Once only a party of men ventured down the hill sides, probably to get
within range of the column, but a shell from the Hazara Mountain Battery
dispersed them, and their comrades were not bold enough to repeat the
manœuvre. At 9 A.M. Sar-i-Tope was reached, the camping ground being
at an elevation of about 8,000 feet, and the Sher-i-Dahan Pass, north of
Ghazni, could be seen. Before noon a heliograph flash was noticed on the
Sher-i-Dahan Kotal, and Lieutenant Whistler Smith’s signallers were soon
in communication with the advanced party of the Candahar column. The
first message which linked the two forces together was sent in the name
of Sir Donald Stewart, and was as follows:—
“On the 19th the division under my command, while marching from
Mushaki, encountered an armed gathering of Andaris, Tarakis, Suleiman
Kheyls and other tribesmen, who numbered some 15,000 men, horse and
foot. Preparation was made to attack the strong position held by the
enemy at Ahmed Khel, twenty-three miles south of Ghazni, when a body
of some 3,000 fanatic swordsmen poured down on our troops, spreading
out beyond either flanks of our line. The fighting lasted one hour,
after which the entire body of the enemy spread broadcast over the
country. The protection of the baggage prevented pursuit by the
cavalry. The division, however, marched forward nine miles to Naui
after the engagement, and the day before yesterday, the 20th, the
advanced cavalry entered Ghazni. Over 1,000 of the enemy’s dead were
counted on the ground, and their loss in killed and wounded is stated
to be 2,000. Casualties on our side: 17 killed and 115 wounded. The
following are the wounded:—Lieutenant Young, 19th Bengal Lancers,
dangerously; Captain Corbet, R.H.A., severely; Lieutenant-Colonel
Lawson, 59th Foot, Colonel Yorke, 19th Bengal Lancers, Lieutenant
Watson, 59th Foot, Lieutenant Stewart, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, all
slightly. No officers killed. All wounded are doing well.”
This good news had scarcely reached Sherpur when the cantonment was
thrown into a state of excitement by a sharp fight at Charasia. The
discontented tribesmen in Logar, foreseeing that in a very short time
they would have in their midst a force which they could not hope to
contend against, made a desperate effort to cut up Colonel Jenkins’s
party at Charasia. Since the anxious days of December, no such
excitement has been felt at Sherpur as that of yesterday morning, when
it became known that the Highlanders and Guides were hotly engaged
beyond the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, and that General Macpherson was
ordered to march to their assistance. The cantonment was all astir, and
the secret orders which had been issued when General Ross moved out were
at once put into execution. The 2nd Brigade, under General Baker, knew
that in the event of General Macpherson’s brigade leaving Sherpur, they
had to take charge of all the posts held by the 92nd Highlanders, 45th
Sikhs, and 28th Punjabees; and between eight and nine o’clock the 72nd
Highlanders, 3rd Sikhs, 5th Ghoorkas, and 5th Punjab Infantry, were all
falling in and being told off to their respective stations. Of the
Europeans 100 went to Fort Siah Sung, 120 to Fort Onslow (the fort on
the eastern end of Bemaru Heights), 100 to the fort on Asmai Heights,
and 250 to the Bemaru Gorge as the reserve, where also two guns of G-3
were placed, commanding the _maidan_ between the gorge and the Wazirabad
Lake. The native regiments also furnished parties for Asmai, Siah Sung,
and the detached forts about it, and manned the block-houses and
defences at the eastern and western ends of the cantonment. The gate
guards were strengthened by small parties held in reserve, and one might
have imagined that Sherpur was on the eve of a second siege. These
precautions were necessary, as our spies had brought in news of 6,000 or
8,000 Kohistanis being in the neighbourhood of Baba Kuch Kar, and
Shahbaz Khan, our Governor of Koh-Daman, had sent in alarming reports of
Mir Butcha’s and Surwar Khan’s intentions. They were said to intend a
sudden attack upon Sherpur; and although Mir Butcha had written in to
say that his intentions were not hostile, and that he would shortly
visit General Roberts to pay his respects, it was deemed wise to take
every precaution, and to be ready to check the Kohistanis if they
crossed the Paen Minar or other _kotals_ to the north of the cantonment.
The picquet of 100 men of the 28th Punjab Infantry were withdrawn from
Paen Minar, and a troop of cavalry sent out to watch the road from
Koh-Dahman. Parties of signallers were stationed on all the commanding
points in our chain of defences, and a sharp look-out was kept in every
direction. From Butkhak and Luttabund all was reported quiet; while
towards Pughman and Argandeh not a sign of any tribesmen being on the
move could be detected. The interest, therefore, was concentrated upon
Charasia, with which we were in heliographic communication, Colonel
Jenkins signalling up to the fort on the Sherderwaza, and the message
being flashed down to the signallers on the General’s gateway. The news
first sent in was that 2,000 to 8,000 tribesmen had opened fire upon the
camp at daybreak, and that their attack had since been developed in
force. At 9.50 Colonel Jenkins heliographed that his loss up to that
time had been three killed and seven wounded, that he was holding his
own well, but that the enemy were being reinforced from the Zahidabad
direction. By this time General Macpherson was on the move, and General
Hugh Gough was also getting together a force to act in support.
General Macpherson took with him the wing of the 92nd Highlanders (278
rifles), still remaining in Sherpur, the whole of the 45th Sikhs (555
rifles), and four guns of Swinley’s mountain battery. A troop of the 3rd
Punjab Cavalry escorting two guns of the screw battery were also ordered
out to join him. The road to Beni Hissar was the route followed by the
Brigadier, and in passing the Bala Hissar he was joined by 104 men of
his old regiment, the 2nd Ghoorkas. Highlanders, Sikhs, and Ghoorkas,
marched along in splendid style, and, making only one halt, they
debouched upon the open ground beyond the Sang-i-Nawishta defile just
after the midday gun had been fired. Two companies of Sikhs were left to
hold the defile. General Hugh Gough followed with four guns of F-A,
Royal Horse Artillery, escorted by a troop of the 9th Lancers, two
squadrons of the 17th Bengal Cavalry, and a wing of the 28th Punjabees.
These were halted at Beni Hissar, ready to move on in support if the
resistance made by the Logaris necessitated such a step. Of the other
troops of the garrison it will be enough to say that the 67th Foot and
the remainder of the 2nd Ghoorkas were holding the Bala Hissar and
Sherderwaza Fort. The heavy battery of 40-pounders was in position in
the Siah Sung Fort.
The force under Colonel Jenkins comprised two guns F-A, a wing of the
92nd Highlanders (266 bayonets), and the Corps of Guides (260 sowars and
614 sepoys). As I mentioned in a previous letter, this party had been
detached from Sherpur to watch the Logar Valley and keep open the road,
as Mahomed Hasan Khan had stopped supplies coming in to Cabul. The
object had been fully gained, and it was intended to move back the
troops to cantonments yesterday. In fact, on Saturday Colonel Jenkins
received instructions from Sir F. Roberts to hold himself in readiness
to move at a minute’s notice, the rumours circulating about the
Kohistanis having given rise to these orders. It was well known that
bands of men had gathered in Logar from the villages about Hisarak, and
on Saturday horsemen were seen some miles away in the direction of our
old camping-ground near Zahidabad. It was not expected, however, that
any attack in force would be made, but Colonel Jenkins was on the alert,
and before daybreak yesterday morning he had his troops under arms, a
few shots fired about five o’clock warning him that the Logaris were
lurking about. His camp was pitched to the east of the Charasia
villages, and was from 1,000 to 1,300 yards distant from the hills which
shut off the Logar river from the Kushi-Cabul Road. In his rear was a
low hill overlooking a _jheel_ on the east, while still further to the
north was “White’s Hill,” which Major White and a company of the 92nd
Highlanders stormed on October 6th. These hills command the road leading
to the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, and might serve as rallying points for a
force hard pressed by an enemy advancing by the south. On Colonel
Jenkins’s right flank were two walled enclosures and the Charasia
orchards; while on his left was a precipitous range of hills, with three
high peaks, distant 1,300 yards from his camp. To the south was open
country, through which the Kushi Road runs, the said road being flanked
by two deep ditches or _nullahs_, affording excellent cover for an
enemy.
The first shots fired into the camp were from the range of hills on
Colonel Jenkins’s left flank, and as the enemy had breech-loading
rifles, the bullets reached their mark without difficulty. Upon the
first alarm the tents were struck, and the baggage-animals loaded up
ready for a move. With daylight it was seen that the three-peaked-range
was lined with men, who had their standards planted, and were plainly
determined to make an attack. Their fire increased from dropping shots
to a brisk fusillade, and the baggage-animals were ordered to retire,
with tents, &c., to the foot of the hill I have mentioned as lying in
advance of White’s Hill. As escort, half a company of the 92nd
Highlanders under Captain Napier, and a company of the Guides, were told
off. Captain Napier occupied the hill, building a _sungar_ for the
protection of his men, and the baggage remained in safety below with a
guard. In front of the camping-ground was a _karez_ (a line of walls
connected by an underground tunnel), and the earth excavated from this
furnished the only cover possible for the infantry, who were extended by
Colonel Jenkins in the shape of a semicircle, so as to hold the enemy on
the hills in check, and also block an advance along the road. Major
White was in command of the Highlanders, and the disposition of the men,
it is almost needless to say, was admirably made. They held the front of
the position. To guard his left flank, Colonel Jenkins extended three
companies of the Guides’ Infantry, and on his right he placed a troop of
cavalry outside the walls of a fort (held by twenty sepoys), ready to
repel any rush that might be made from Charasia direction. When these
dispositions had been completed, his strength of infantry was
practically exhausted; the main body of Highlanders and Guides were
lying along the line of the _karez_, and he had only half a company of
Guides as his reserve. The two guns of F-A took up a position about 400
yards in the rear of the infantry, and the cavalry, again, formed up in
rear of the guns. The troops were debarred from anything but acting on
the defensive, as their baggage would have had to be sacrificed if an
attempt had been made to storm the hills. Besides, as news of the
impending action had been heliographed to the Sherderwaza Fort and
reinforcements been asked for, the main object was to hold the tribesmen
in check until sufficient troops should arrive to sweep them from their
positions.
The enemy were bold enough at first, and gradually worked down the
slopes of the range to within 800 or 900 yards’ range, while at the same
time the more determined of their number, led by ghazis, worked along
the ditches flanking the Kushi Road, and planted their standards within
200 yards of our line of skirmishers. Their numbers were estimated at
first at about 2,000, but some reinforcements began to arrive, and they
pushed their skirmishers into the Charasia orchards, whence a sharp fire
was directed upon the camping ground. The infantry were well protected
by the _karez_ mounds, but the cavalry and guns were exposed to a heavy
cross-fire from the orchards, the hillside, and the ditches in front.
One of the artillery horses having been shot, and several sowars hit, it
was thought well to remove the guns 400 yards nearer the hill occupied
by Captain Napier. This was accordingly done, and the gunners under
Lieutenant Wodehouse found shelter in a ditch, whence they could train
their guns upon the enemy, while quite out of range themselves. The
cavalry could not seek the same protection, as Colonel Jenkins relied
upon them to check any rush by the ghazis attacking him in front. The
sowars and their officers had therefore to remain under a heavy fire for
several hours, 200 or 300 yards in rear of the line of skirmishers, and
their losses were proportionally heavy, both in men and horses. No more
trying position for cavalry can be imagined than waiting helplessly in
the open until their time shall come, and it speaks well for the sowars
that they never flinched, but kept quietly on the move backwards and
forwards until their numbers were sadly thinned. The severity of the
fire can be understood from the fact that three mounted officers, Major
White, Lieutenant Dick Cunyngham (of the 92nd Highlanders), and
Lieutenant Robertson (of the Commissariat Department), who were between
the infantry and cavalry, had all little casualties to report. Major
White’s horse was shot through the cheek, a bullet struck Lieutenant
Dick Cunyngham’s saddle, and Lieutenant Robertson had his coat-sleeve
torn and his field-glasses smashed by a bullet. Colonel Jenkins’s horse
was also shot, and the Guides’ cavalry lost eight horses killed and
twenty-four wounded—one-tenth of their sowars were really put out of
action. I have dwelt thus particularly upon this class of casualties
simply to prove the resolute way in which the tribesmen attacked, and
the mischief they can do with good rifles in their hands. Our
skirmishers they could scarcely touch, and the men were well under
shelter, and exposed themselves as little as possible. The steady
courage of the 92nd Highlanders made light of 2,000 or 3,000 men being
in front, and their picked shots accounted for many of the ghazis, who
tried to advance beyond the shelter of the friendly ditches on their
side of the road. Once or twice it seemed as if a rush were meditated;
the _tom-toms_ were beaten, bugles sounded the advance, and standards
were waved; but this only brought upon the enemy a more rapid fire from
our men, and a few additional shells from our horse-artillery guns. The
movements of the attacking force were directed with some skill, 200 or
300 horsemen keeping up communication with the party on the hill and the
skirmishers in the orchards; and it was believed that, when larger
reinforcements arrived from Logar, an attempt would be made to close
round in the rear of Colonel Jenkins, and cut off his retreat. By noon
this movement was beginning to be very apparent, as the orchards about
Charasia were swarming with men; but the opportunity never really
arrived, for General Macpherson with his reinforcements soon put an end
to the whole affair.
General Macpherson, and with him about 1,000 men (of whom 555 were of
the 45th Sikhs), and four guns now came up; and his first movement was
to clear the orchards. The two companies of the 2nd Ghoorkas under
Captain Hill turned off the road to the right, over the irrigated land,
and made for the Charasia orchards, wherein they were soon hotly
engaged. The wing of the 92nd under Colonel Parker marched on a few
hundred yards further along the road and then also turned off to the
right, so as to prolong the Ghoorka line of skirmishers and enfilade the
enemy’s first line. The Sikhs kept straight on, and, as they advanced,
the 92nd under Major White and the Guides’ infantry rose from the
shelter of the _karez_, and all three regiments went up at the hills
from which the enemy had annoyed Colonel Jenkins for nearly seven hours.
The whole movement was carried out to perfection; our force swept onward
in the shape of a fan, and cleared orchards, hills, and open country of
every armed man. A plucky charge was made by the Ghoorkas: General
Macpherson sent word that he wished a hill cleared of the enemy without
further firing, and Captain Hill telling his men what was expected of
them, the brave little fellows fixed bayonets, gave a cheer and carried
the hill.
The Guides’ Cavalry were sent out into the open over the low
Childukhteran Kotal on the Kushi Road, and succeeded in killing some
thirty stragglers. The main body kept to the near ranges of hills, or
sought refuge in _nullahs_ and ravines intersecting them. The mountain
guns got into action, and made good practice wherever any small groups
of fugitives collected, and by two o’clock the tribesmen were scattered
and were making their way as best they could along the hills out of
reach of our cavalry and artillery. Their loss must have been very
heavy, as over 100 bodies were counted on the ground, and they had
carried off many others during the morning. In the ditches where the
ghazis had planted their standards, within 200 yards of our men, more
than twenty bodies were found, lying just as they had fallen. These were
nearly all men shot through the head, showing the good practice made by
our advanced skirmishers. Our expenditure of Martini and Snider
ammunition was over 70,000 rounds, while the two guns of F-A battery
each fired forty-eight rounds. Our loss in men was severe for such a
skirmish; 92nd Highlanders, one killed, seven wounded (one mortally);
F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, one wounded; Corps of Guides, four killed,
twenty-one wounded; 45th Sikhs, two wounded; total, five killed,
thirty-one wounded. Of the Guides nearly all the casualties were among
the cavalry. When the enemy had been thoroughly cleared off the
ground—the cavalry pursued them four miles—orders were given for the
whole force to return to Sherpur, and the march back was accomplished
without incident, except that the Ghoorkas made prisoners of twelve or
fifteen villagers who had fired upon our troops. General Roberts met
General Macpherson at Beni Hissar and rode back with him to cantonments.
The Kohistanis had remained quiet and undemonstrative during the day;
but it was not thought fit to allow the force to remain out at Charasia
for the night, though our retirement _after_ a successful action is sure
to be misconstrued by the Afghans.
To-day it has been ascertained that the enemy’s losses were 400 or 500,
of whom at least half were killed. The Chardeh villages alone are said
to contain 200 dead. The leaders were Sirdar Mahomed Hasan Khan,
ex-Governor of Jellalabad; General Mahomed Karim Khan; Padshah Khan,
Ghilzai; Mahomed Shah Khan, of Kalunga; and minor _maliks_ of Baraki
Rajan and Charkh. The body of men they commanded was 5,000 strong, and
included Logaris, men of Chardeh, Safis from Tagao, Kohistanis, and
Ghilzais from Padshah Khan’s villages. It seems a pity that a faithless
scoundrel like Padshah Khan cannot meet with his deserts. He was
forgiven for fighting against us in December, and now he coolly breaks
his word with us again, and collects his men and attacks our troops as
if he had never received any subsidy from us. Hasan Khan’s followers
were well armed, many with Sniders and Enfields, and a few with Martini
rifles, bullets from the latter being picked up by some of our officers.
To-day (Monday) all is quiet again, but our picquets are still stationed
on Asmai and the Bemaru Heights.
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