Changes in the Northern Afghanistan Force—Completion of the Chain of
Forts about Cabul—Composition of the Force on March 22nd—Arrival of
Mr. Lepel Griffin at Sherpur—Declaration of the Government
Policy—Candahar and Herat to be separated from Cabul—Discontent
among the Barakzai Sirdars—The Future of Herat—Advantages of the
Khyber Route—Arguments in favour of the Annexation of the Jellalabad
Valley—The Mustaufi’s Mission to the Ghazni Malcontents—His Partial
Success—Assembly of the Chiefs at Maidan—The Durbar in Sherpur on
April 13th—Speeches by Sir Frederick Roberts and Mr. Lepel
Griffin—The Policy of the Government explained—Annexation
deprecated—Approval of the Policy in Camp—The Exigency of Party
Politics in England—Abdur Rahman’s Movements at Kunduz.
With the near approach of spring there was a recasting of the commands
between Cabul and Peshawur, the following being the order of the
Commander-in-Chief directing the changes:—
1. The Second Division of the Cabul Field Force, hitherto under the
command of Major-General Bright, C.B., will be broken up.
2. The Reserve Division, under Major-General Ross, C.B., will also be
broken up, and absorbed into the Line of Communications.
3. The Force in Cabul, under Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, will
be divided into two divisions. 1st Division under Sir F. Roberts’s
immediate command, and the 2nd Division under Major General Ross, C.B.
4. Major-General Bright, C.B., is appointed Inspector-General of the
Line of communications, and will command all troops thereon
stationery, in movable columns, or passing along the line.
Major-General Bright will report direct to Army Head-Quarters.
5. The Peshawur District will be temporarily commanded by
Brigadier-General Hankin, 4th Bengal Cavalry, hitherto in command of
the Cavalry Brigade Reserve Division.
6. The line of communications will be divided into three sections:—
1st.—From Jumrood to Busawul inclusive, under Brigadier-General Gib.
2nd.—From Busawul to Sufed Sang, but not inclusive of either, under
Brigadier-General Doran, C.B.
3rd.—From Sufed Sang to Butkhak inclusive, under Brigadier-General
Hill.
7. The General Staff for Major-General Bright’s command will consist
of:—
Colonel Wemyss, Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General;
Major Thompson, Assistant Adjutant-General;
Major Creagh, Assistant Quartermaster-General;
Lieutenant Maisey, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
8. The Divisional Staff under Major-General Ross, C.B., will consist
of:—
Major Boyes, Assistant Adjutant-General;
Captain the Honourable C. Dutton, Assistant Quartermaster-General;
and a Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, to be detailed by
Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts.
9. Colonel Evans, Commanding Royal Artillery on Line of
communications, will proceed with the Staff to Cabul as commanding
Royal Artillery, 2nd Division.
Lieutenant-Colonel Purvis, Royal Artillery, taking up the duties of
Commanding Royal Artillery, under Major-General Bright.
Lieutenant-Colonel Limond will proceed to Cabul as Commanding Royal
Engineers, 2nd Division, and Major Hill will assume the duties of
Commanding Royal Engineer to Major-General Bright.
10. Brigadier-General Roberts (5th Fusiliers) will proceed to Cabul to
command a brigade in the 2nd Division.
11. Brigadier-General Arbuthnot, C.B., will command the movable
columns at Jellalabad and Sufed Sang.
12. The Force under Sir F. Roberts in Cabul will be styled the Cabul
Field Force, and the Force under Major-General Bright will be styled
the Khyber Line Force.
These arrangements were all carried out; and the following extracts from
letters written in March will indicate what was occurring in and about
Cabul:—
SHERPUR, _March 3rd, 1880_.
Brigadier-General Dunham Massy left for Peshawur a few days ago, where
he will meet the Commander-in-Chief, and offer certain explanations of
his course of action on December 11th, which, it is not too much to say,
may modify the harsh step of recalling him from Cabul. The greatest
sympathy is felt for General Massy in the force here; and the decision
to be given on what is purely a question for military critics will be
anxiously looked for.[38] Brigadier-General Hugh Gough has taken over
charge of the Cavalry Brigade, his duties as Road Commandant being
performed by Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Heathcote.
-----
Footnote 38:
I have not gone at length into the question of General Massy’s recall,
as there were too many points involved for the case to be treated in a
work of this kind, which is only a diary of the war. I may state,
however, that General Massy was given a brigade command in India,
which he still retains.
-----
There is no relaxation of the preparations for defending Sherpur and
Cabul against all-comers. Certainly there is not now a weak point in the
cantonment: the gap at the north-west corner, defended during the siege
by a trench and a parapet made out of Cabuli gun-wheels, has now been
closed by a wall six feet high on the inner side of the old barrier; the
bastion at the corner, partially destroyed when the mutinous regiments
blew up their magazine on October 7th, has been put in thorough order; a
zigzag wall, with traverses, is also being built up on the western slope
of the Bemaru hills; and, in addition to the block-house on the top, a
platform has been made for guns, guarded by a semi-circular wall, which
will eventually be joined to the zig-zag running up the hillside.
Looking at these new defences, and also at the block-houses upon the
Asmai and Sherderwaza Heights—to say nothing of the strong fort upon
Siah Sung—one is tempted to ask, “What will be the fate of all these
works when we retire?” We have made Sherpur practically impregnable now
against any attack unsupported by heavy guns: shall we leave it so, or
shall we order up a few tons of gun-cotton from an Indian arsenal, and
have everything in readiness to blow its walls down when it has to be
abandoned? Perhaps, as we shall inevitably be forced to annex Cabul in a
few years, we may leave the cantonment intact, though it would be
cruelty to expect our men to capture it, say in 1883, unless it had been
well-pounded by a battery of 40-pounders from Siah Sung. But, for all
outsiders may know, there may be a plan lying cut and dry in some secret
drawer of our Chief Engineer’s despatch-box, in which the fate of
Sherpur and its surroundings has been once for all decided. Colonel
Perkins has certainly been indefatigable in creating new defences;
perhaps he may show equal energy in destroying the work of his own hand
when the time comes.[39]
-----
Footnote 39:
At Abdur Rahman’s request all the forts, &c., were left intact when
Sir Donald Stewart left Cabul in August.
-----
_March 21st._
The garrison of Cabul has been largely reinforced, and we have at last
nearly 12,000 troops here. The 45th Sikhs and the 27th Punjabees, who
marched in from Butkhak on Friday, are now encamped on the Siah Sung
Ridge, and are holding the new fort built thereon. The 45th Sikhs have,
for the time being, been attached to General Macpherson’s Brigade, and
the 27th Punjab Infantry to General Charles Gough’s. The various forts
we have built upon Asmai and Sherderwaza Heights have had their
garrisons told off to them, and are at present held by half the number
of men assigned to guard them in case of a new outbreak. Each fort is
being stored with seven days’ provisions and water, and a liberal
quantity of ammunition; and the garrisons are warned against using any
of the reserve stores until necessity arises. The fort on Asmai is
practically impregnable; even our artillery could not hope to make any
impression upon it. The walls are twelve feet thick; and to carry it by
assault, if at all well defended, would be impossible. Our cavalry are
also showing themselves in the country about, to convince the people
that we are on the alert, and also to enable the 3rd Bengal Cavalry and
the Guides to become thoroughly acquainted with the nature of the ground
they may have to act over. Last week all the available troopers and
sowars in cantonment went out into Chardeh and over the ground where the
9th Lancers and 14th Bengal Lancers made their gallant charge on
December 11th. Our infantry are also marched out occasionally, to get
the men a little into condition, and they go swinging along over the
dusty roads in the same grand style they have shown since they left Ali
Kheyl six months ago. Drafts for the 9th and 72nd are now on their way
up from Peshawur, and soon we shall have each regiment mustering about
900 banquets. All the men here are very fit and hardy after the winter,
and are quite ready for another bout of fighting to relieve the
monotony, which is now becoming rather trying. No. 1 Mountain Battery is
to be relieved by the 6-8th, the screw-gun battery which did such good
service in the Zaimukht country with General Tytler; and the 3rd Punjab
Cavalry and 17th Bengal Cavalry are to come up to make our cavalry
brigade complete. The strength of the Cabul garrison (including the
outpost at Butkhak) was yesterday about 11,500 officers and men. The
details of the force are:—
BUTKHAK.
─────────────────────────┬──────────┬──────────
│ Officers.│ Men.
─────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
2-9th Foot │ 3│ 101
5th Punjab Infantry │ 1│ 83
17th Bengal Cavalry │ 1│ 133
SHERPUR
─────────────────────────┬──────────┬──────────
│ Officers.│ Men.
─────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
F-A, Royal Horse │ 6│ 162
Artillery │ │
G-3, Royal Artillery │ 6│ 178
No. 1 Mountain Battery │ 4│ 138
No. 2 Mountain Battery │ 5│ 201
Hazara Mountain Battery │ 4│ 151
9th Lancers │ 17│ 287
3rd Bengal Cavalry │ 8│ 372
Guides’ Cavalry │ 4│ 275
2-9th Foot │ 15│ 442
67th Foot │ 25│ 721
72nd Foot │ 19│ 691
92nd Foot │ 20│ 681
23rd Pioneers │ 8│ 759
28th Punjab Infantry │ 8│ 651
3rd Sikhs │ 10│ 634
5th Punjab Infantry │ 7│ 476
5th Ghoorkas │ 8│ 636
2nd Ghoorkas │ 7│ 532
4th Ghoorkas │ 7│ 692
24th Punjab Infantry │ 8│ 717
5th Sikhs │ 8│ 670
Guides’ Infantry │ 6│ 607
─────────────────────────┴──────────┴──────────
The two companies of sappers and miners which belong to this division,
but are now at Luttabund, are about 150 strong. Staff and departmental
officers number 90. The draft for the 9th Foot is 320 men, and for the
72nd Highlanders about 200. The artillery musters twelve 9-pounders and
fourteen 7-pounders. I give the details of our strength here, so that,
in case of any further operations, the force at General Roberts’s
disposal may be estimated at its proper value.
On Friday Sir F. Roberts met Mr. Lepel Griffin on the road to Luttabund,
and the General and his new Political Officer rode on to Sherpur
together in the afternoon. Sir F. Roberts ordered a guard of honour (one
company of the 5th Punjab Infantry) to escort Mr. Lepel Griffin from
Siah Sung to the cantonment. This unusual honour was paid to the
Political Officer in order that the local sirdars might be duly
impressed with a sense of his dignity. The said sirdars turned out in
great force, with their usual tag-rag of followers, and formed a
picturesque _queue_ in rear of the General.
_25th March._
Mr. Lepel Griffin has made known to the Barakzai sirdars here what is to
be the future of Afghanistan; and although many details of the scheme
sanctioned by the Government of India cannot, of course, yet be settled,
the outline is distinct enough. As to the difficulties to be overcome
before the new arrangements mature, they are incidental to our position
as conquerors of Cabul, and will be dealt with either diplomatically, or
by force of arms, according to the temper of the tribal chiefs and
others. As Mr. Griffin’s short speech to Wali Mahomed Khan, Hashim Khan,
and the other Barakzai sirdars was of an informal kind—though
necessarily carrying weight as an exposition of Government policy—I am
only able to give its general purport, about which there can he no
manner of doubt. It was to the effect that certain wrong impressions had
got abroad concerning Yakub Khan and his possible return to Cabul. Such
return the Government had decided could under no conditions take place;
tribal chiefs and their followers had believed that if a sufficient
turmoil were kept up, and turbulent demands made persistently for Yakub
Khan’s return, that end might be gained. This was a total mistake. The
ex-Amir would never be allowed to resume the power he had forfeited, and
all disturbances with that object would be unavailing. It had also been
found that during three generations the Durani sovereigns of Cabul had
been unable, or unwilling, to carry out treaty obligations with India,
and it had now been decided that their power should be curtailed and
certain subdivisions made of Afghanistan. While the British Government
had no desire to annex the country, they were resolved that Candahar and
Herat must henceforth no longer appertain to the sovereign of
Afghanistan. They would be separate and distinct, and the future ruler
of Cabul would have to look upon them as removed from his
jurisdiction.[40] It had also been determined that the army of
occupation should remain in Afghanistan until a new ruler had been
appointed strong enough to accept and carry out the obligations to be
imposed upon him, and such a ruler would have to be found. He must be
strong enough to ensure the protection of such Afghans as were the
friends of the British, in order that, when the army withdrew, there
might not be a risk of such men suffering for their fidelity to us. Our
friends must be the friends of any ruler placed in power, and he must be
prepared to protect them.
-----
Footnote 40:
This was the policy Lord Lytton intended to carry out.
-----
Such is the distinct enunciation of what is to happen here, and, as
might have been expected, it is not altogether palatable to the Barakzai
sirdars. One and all are glad that Yakub Khan is not to return; he has
never been a favourite with his kinsmen since Shere Ali’s death, and
they would look upon his re-assumption of power as fatal to all their
hopes. But they feel, and it is only right they should feel, keenly
enough, the curtailment of the power hitherto vested in the hands of the
Amir. Hashim Khan, who has been buoyed up with the idea that his chance
of the Amirship was a very good one—though I must add, in justice to all
our officials, that he has never received even a hint from them of what
might be in store for him—showed considerable sullenness when he heard
upon what terms the next Amir would have to accept power at our hands.
He did not scruple to say openly that it would be impossible to
guarantee the safety of any faction friendly to the British when our
army had marched back to India. No doubt he holds this view as honestly
as an Afghan can be said to have honesty at all; but he might modify it
when he sees that such a condition will be insisted upon, and no
half-hearted promise accepted. Hashim Khan has further said that, in
freeing Candahar and Herat from their suzerainty to Cabul, we are
reducing the Amir from the status of a king to that of a Nawab. Herat
has always been considered the key of Turkistan and of Southern
Afghanistan, and to surrender it either to Persia or to an independent
ruler would be a severe blow to the Durani dynasty. Again, Hashim Khan
says that to expect a Durani sovereign in Cabul to hold his own against
the turbulent tribes in the immediate district, when he has been
deprived of the great support he receives from the strong Durani
factions about Candahar, is an impossibility. It is true that the
Duranis are most numerous in Southern Afghanistan, and at first sight
the objection seems tenable enough; but Hashim Khan has forgotten that,
by our occupation of Candahar, any Amir of Cabul will receive our
countenance and support from that quarter, and this will be as well
known to the turbulent spirits of Kohistan, Logar, and Wardak, as to the
Durani faction itself. Hashim Khan’s sullenness would be of no
importance were it not that he is the only man with a spark of ability
among the Barakzais now with us in Cabul; and as I have said in previous
letters, he has been favourably thought of in our plans for settling the
country on a firm basis. If he will not accept our terms, he will
inevitably be passed over, as far as the Amirship is concerned, for the
work now before us has to be done so thoroughly that all danger of
another _fiasco_, such as the treaty of Gundamak proved, must be guarded
against.
Taking the broad lines laid down by Mr. Lepel Griffin, a forecast of
what is likely to happen in Afghanistan—putting aside purely military
complications, which I will turn to afterwards—may fairly be given. That
such a forecast must be tinged with conjecture is, of course,
unavoidable; but still, perhaps, a fair estimate of the situation may be
given. Candahar will be retained in our possession, but Herat will not
yet be annexed. Its future will more probably be that of an independent
city, with an important mission to fulfil in Central Asian politics.
History is full of instances of cities maintaining their independence,
and rising in course of time to the rank of Great Powers. Witness
Venice, once one of the first maritime Powers in Europe. Herat is
self-supporting, and is situated in so fertile a district that its
wealth of produce is a proverb among Asiatics. Its strength as a
military post is greater than that of any city in Afghanistan; it could
be defended against great odds with almost a certainty of coming out
victorious from the struggle. If we were to declare that it is to be
independent, and to guarantee such independence against all-comers, its
future would be assured. That this may be done is within the bounds of
possibility, and we should give it a Governor who could be trusted to
carry out our wishes. Being our nominee, and relying upon us for support
in time of need, he would jealously guard against encroachments on his
privileges; and would scarcely dare to risk loss of authority by
disobeying any wishes we might make known to him. To do so would be
madness with a British army at Candahar drawing its reinforcements by
railway from India; and the Heratis themselves finding security and
enormously-increased trade resulting from their new position of
independence, would probably be on the alert to check intrigues against
their autonomy. So far as regards Southern and Western Afghanistan:
there remain the eastern and northern provinces to be dealt with, and
here conjecture must be indulged in. Cabul will be freed from the
presence of our army when a new Afghan Government has been created; but
that our forces will retire behind Lundi Kotal is most improbable. By
general consent, the Khyber route seems to be recognized as that most
adapted for communication, hostile or otherwise, with Cabul; the Kurram
route is worthless during several months of the year, and Thull as a
base has not a single advantage. It then remains for consideration
whether Lundi Kotal is sufficiently advanced for our purpose. To enable
our influence to be supreme at Cabul, we must put ourselves in such a
position that our army shall always be within hail of the city. Lundi
Kotal certainly does not give such a position; Jellalabad is much
better, but its climate is so great a drawback that it also drops out of
consideration as an advanced post—such a post being on the plan of a
large fortified camp, holding a force fully equipped in the matter of
ammunition, supplies, and _transport_, and ready to move at the shortest
notice. Gundamak, or a position on the hills near, would unquestionably
give the site for the new outpost on the north-west frontier of India,
and its connection with Peshawur might be _not_ by Jellalabad, but by
the valleys along the northern slopes of the Safed Koh, viz., _viâ_
Maizena and Peshbolak. The Lughman route would involve a strong garrison
at Jellalabad, which is to be avoided if possible. Besides, Lughman
cannot compare with the fertile valleys in the shadow of the Safed Koh,
wherein grain, forage, fuel, and water are abundant. I can speak from
personal experience of Maizena and Peshbolak, having visited them during
the last campaign; and if the pacification of the Shinwaris were once
assured, the route would teem with advantages which cannot be found on
the Jellalabad Road. It would not be a task more difficult to reduce the
Shinwaris to a state of quietude than it was to convince the Afridis of
the uselessness of molesting us in the Khyber. As there is always a
great outcry against annexation, it might be worth while to abandon
Kurram, merely taking a _quid pro quo_ in the Jellalabad Valley. That
this will absolutely be done, is very problematical; but it is to be
hoped that the Government will be strong enough to disregard any
non-annexation outcry if the preponderance of opinion, both among our
military and political experts, is in favour of the holding of
Gundamak.[41]
-----
Footnote 41:
The Afghans cannot, of course, be expected to understand the principle
of party-government at home; the defeat of the Conservative party and
the recall of Lord Lytton put an end to such ideas as the retention of
Candahar and the maintenance of the scientific frontier. Our change of
policy was misunderstood generally in Afghanistan, where, to this day,
it is believed we were too weak to carry out our original plans.
-----
_6th April._
The Mustaufi, Habibulla Khan, who was sent by General Roberts some weeks
ago to negotiate with the Ghazni malcontents, and induce them to state
what their demands really were, has returned to Sherpur and reported
that he has the majority of the chiefs now at Maidan, and they are
willing to attend a Durbar. Young Musa Khan has, however, been left at
Ghazni with Mushk-i-Alam. When General Roberts first proposed to
Habibulla Khan to go to Ghazni, and sound the temper of the malcontent
leaders, with a view to arrange some basis upon which the settlement of
Afghanistan could be carried out, the answer was that it would be
useless—the irreconcilables would not listen to him. There the matter
ended for the time being, but some weeks afterwards the Mustaufi
voluntarily visited the General, and said that he was willing to go to
his home in Wardak, whence he could judge if it were possible to gather
the tribal chiefs together for purposes of consultation. He accordingly
set out, and for the past two months we have heard strange rumours of
what was happening in Wardak and Ghazni. The Mustaufi now reports that,
on arriving at his home in Wardak, he fell ill, and for some time was
unable to do anything in the way of negotiation. Upon recovering, he
began to sound the various Wardak chiefs as to their views, and was
careful to point out the folly of resistance, now that the British had
received large reinforcements and had strengthened Sherpur and the
heights above Cabul. At first, no one would listen to him, so he
proceeded to Ghazni to interview Mahomed Jan, young Tahir Khan
(half-brother of Hashim Khan), and finally Mushk-i-Alam. Here also he
met with but little success: Mahomed Jan would not adopt his views, but
talked of a new _jehad_, and the driving of the British out of the
country: the success of the first few weeks of December was to be
repeated on a larger scale, and every tribesman was to rise from Ghazni
to Jellalabad. Against such tall talk the Mustaufi could only urge that
the _jehad_ would come to as bitter and humiliating an end as the
previous one had done on December 23rd, when the force sent to attack
Sherpur had been beaten off with great loss. Then Mahomed Jan veered
round slightly, and said he would abandon all idea of fighting if Yakub
Khan were reinstated, or Musa Khan created Amir. The former scheme, he
was told, was impossible; the latter might possibly be considered. The
Mustaufi was much hindered in his work by young Tahir Khan, who had Musa
Khan in his keeping. This young sirdar cordially hates his half-brother,
Hashim Khan; and as he knew Habibulla was working solely in the latter’s
interest, he tried to thwart him in every way. This game of
cross-purposes would have been most interesting to an outsider if all
the intricacies of the intrigues could have been understood; but it must
sorely have tried the temper of the Mustaufi, who had everything to gain
by bringing the malcontents to look at matters from his point of view.
He was, however, more than a match for a drunken debauchee, such as
Mahomed Jan and an inexperienced youth like Tahir Khan. Turning his
attention to Mushk-i-Alam, he used different arguments to those employed
with the military leaders of the disaffected. He showed to the old
_moollah_ that the only way of getting rid of the infidels (whom he
hated just as much as any reckless fanatic) was by negotiation, and not
by resistance: the former course might put Cabul once more into a
position of importance; the latter only could result in disaster to
Afghanistan, as the British forces were daily growing in strength, and
it was fully intended to capture Ghazni from the Candahar direction, and
punish every tribe showing overt hostility. The _moollah_ was
half-convinced, and was left in such a frame of mind that good results
might be looked for. Then Habibulla Khan turned his attention to the
powerful chiefs of his own tribe, and by means which we are ignorant of,
won them all over to his side. They, perhaps, scented future rewards and
great power in the direction of the State when their kinsman should be
Finance Minister of a new Amir, and they announced themselves as
prepared to consult with the British upon the subject of a future
Government. The example of the Wardak chiefs was contagious, and soon
the Logar _maliks_ made common cause with them. Mahomed Jan thus saw
himself being deserted by the tribes upon whom he had mainly relied, and
he at last promised to accompany the Mustaufi to Maidan to take part in
a great tribal Durbar, although he refrained from pledging himself to
any fixed decision. Just about this time the Hazaras raided upon Nani,
south of Ghazni, and the Mustaufi was in fear that all his arrangements
would be upset, as Mahomed Jan started to repel the raiders. From that
point much uncertainty as to what was really occurring was felt in
Sherpur; and as it was known that Mr. Lepel Griffin’s declaration of the
partition of Afghanistan had been sullenly received even by Hashim Khan,
it was not unnaturally supposed that the Mustaufi would be left in the
lurch by the chiefs who had pledged themselves to follow his
instructions.
Yesterday Habibulla Khan rode from Maidan to Sherpur, and all doubts, so
far as regards the chiefs being at Maidan, are set at rest. He reports
that he left there all the headmen of Wardak, Logar, Ahmadzai Ghilzais,
and Zurmut (the district east of Ghazni towards Khost), together with
Mahomed Jan, Mir Butcha, Kohistani; Mahomed Hasan Khan, ex-Governor of
Jellalabad; Sirdars Tahir Khan, Alim Khan, Surwar Khan, and other
notables, including Generals Aslam Khan, Gholam Jan, and Kurrim Khan,
who fought against us at Charasia.
The news that General Sir Donald Stewart with a large force left
Candahar a week ago for Ghazni has undoubtedly had an effect upon these
men. It is difficult to see what our own policy will be hereafter, as
the change of Government at home may bring about quite a new departure.
All General Roberts and Mr. Lepel Griffin can do is to endeavour to gain
the ear of the chiefs, and to obtain a knowledge of their wishes in the
matter of a settled Government. The chiefs now at Maidan will be asked
to attend a Durbar, shortly to be held in Sherpur. Mr. A. C. Lyall,
Foreign Secretary, has paid a flying visit to Cabul, and is now on his
way back to India.
_14th April._
The Durbar for the reception of such of the chiefs as chose to come in
has, at last, been held, and the fullest declaration yet made of the
intentions of the Government of India has been listened to by the Cabul
sirdars and the men whom the Mustaufi has induced to visit Sherpur. It
may be as well, once for all, to state that the chiefs represented only
a minority of the tribesmen, although a paper of requests which they
have presented was signed by nearly all the Wardak, Logar, and Southern
Ghilzai _maliks_. The Mustaufi’s personal interest in Wardak was
sufficiently strong to bring many of his kinsmen in; but Mahomed Jan’s
brother, who is head of the clan, would not accompany the rest,
considering his signature quite enough for all practical purposes.
Mahomed Jan himself would have come in willingly if a _khillut_ had been
promised and certain honours paid to him as a successful General; but
this we very sensibly declined to do, and he is now out in the cold.
Mahomed Hasan Khan, ex-Governor of Jellalabad, also declined at the last
moment, as he will have no one but Yakub Khan as Amir; while Mir Butcha
and Surwar Khan, Purwani, are too busy, levying men in Kohistan for
Abdur Rahman’s army, to think of wasting their time at Sherpur. We had
then, really, at the Durbar representatives of the Wardak, Logar,
Zurmut, and Koh-Dahman people, or sections of the people, and also all
the Barakzai sirdars with us in Cabul, as well as the three
Sirdars—Surwar Khan, Tahir Khan, and Alim Khan—who have been taking care
of young Musa Jan, at Ghazni, in the hope that he might some day be made
Amir by the British.
The Durbar was held in a large tent pitched near the Engineers’ Park in
Sherpur. The sirdars and _maliks_ rode into Sherpur from the city at
eleven o’clock, and spent their time until three o’clock in discussing
current events and admiring each other’s wonderful raiment. They were
marshalled in due order in the Durbar tent before four o’clock, Wali
Mahomed, Governor of the city, being placed on the right of the seats
assigned to Sir F. Roberts and Mr. Lepel Griffin, the Mustaufi and the
Nawab Gholam Hussain being just in rear; while Sirdar Hashim Khan,
Abdulla Khan, and the other loyal Barakzai princes were given chairs on
the right. The tribal chiefs squatted on the ground just within the
shadow of the tent, while such British officers as chose to attend were
seated on the General’s left. General Ross, commanding the 2nd Division,
and the Brigadiers, with the exception of General Baker, who is lying
ill from an attack of fever, were among the British officers present. A
guard of honour of 100 men of the 72nd Highlanders, with their band,
were drawn up—bayonets fixed, and ball ammunition in their pouches—on
the road leading from the General’s gateway; while small parties of the
3rd Sikhs and 5th Ghoorkas were stationed in rear of the tent as an
extra precaution. Afghan fanaticism takes, at times, such determined
shape that even in a Durbar a ghazi might declare himself; and it was
therefore only wise to be ready for an emergency. It would have fared
ill with any fanatic who might have attempted to amuse himself
preparatory to entering Paradise, for the Highlanders, Sikhs, and
Ghoorkas are too old soldiers to care for a knife-cut when their
bayonets are ready for use. Sir Frederick Roberts, with his personal
Staff, and Mr. Lepel Griffin, Chief Political Officer, walked from the
head-quarters to the tent; and as the General entered after the usual
honours from the guard outside, the sirdars and _maliks_ rose to their
feet and made obeisance with true Oriental humility. The scene was
picturesque enough, and yet there was a grim touch of irony in the
surroundings; for, preceding the General, came eight Highlanders with
the inevitable fixed bayonets, who opened out on either hand in the
tent, and stood to attention in the space between the chiefs and the
British officers. Sir Frederick Roberts’s native orderlies, two
long-limbed Sikhs, two wiry Pathans, and a pair of fierce little
Ghoorkas, who are always to be found at the General’s heels, took up
their places behind him, their bayonets shining out among the gold-laced
caps of the Staff and the undress uniforms of the officers of the
garrison whom curiosity had prompted to be present. After the
preliminary shuffling and gathering up of robes, the Afghan notables
followed the General’s example and quietly sat down, the _maliks_
falling upon their knees and folding their hands in an attitude of great
attention. There was not much to attract notice either in their faces or
demeanour: they were merely commonplace men, waiting respectfully upon
the General’s pleasure; but there was presently a stir among them when
the names of Surwar Khan, Tahir Khan, and Alim Khan were called out.
These three sirdars were presented to the General by Mr. Griffin, and
after shaking hands and making respectful bows they returned to their
places. Tahir Khan is a young man of nineteen or twenty, with a sullen
expression of face, and with none of the dignity of a prince: he might,
with a little trouble, be made to look like a decent Cabuli _syce_; but
even then he would be a poor figure among his compeers of the stable.
Sir Frederick Roberts did not receive any of the tribal chiefs, whose
position, indeed, would not have warranted such an attention, but
immediately opened the Durbar by a short speech, greatly to the purpose.
He said:—
“SIRDARS AND MALIKS,
“I am very glad to meet you here to-day, especially those who
through the good offices of the Mustaufi have been induced to come
into Cabul to make their wishes known to me. I trust this Durbar is
the beginning of the end, and that it will now be possible for us to
enter into such an arrangement with the people of Afghanistan as will
ensure an honourable peace and lasting friendship between them and the
British. Some of you, I understand, hesitated to accompany the
Mustaufi, fearing your treatment and reception by us might not be such
as we had promised you, and that some evil might befall you. You need
never have any such fear when your safety has been assured on the word
of a British officer. The British do not say one thing and mean
another. You who have come in have been honourably treated, and after
this Durbar you are all at liberty to depart. I trust, when you leave
Cabul, you will carry away with you a more friendly feeling towards us
than some of you hitherto entertained; and that those of your party
who are still holding aloof will be wise enough to follow the good
example you have set them, and will accept our invitation to come into
Cabul. Mr. Lepel Griffin, Chief Political Officer in North and Eastern
Afghanistan, with whom you have already become acquainted, will now,
on the part of the Government of India, answer the request you have
made.”
This speech having been translated into Persian, Mr. Lepel Griffin
addressed the chiefs. His speech, delivered in Persian, was to the
following effect:—
“SIRDARS, KHANS, AND MALIKS OF CABUL,
“It has been my wish, for some time past, to meet you all in
Durbar, and to explain to you collectively and publicly, as I have
already done privately, the intentions of the British Government with
regard to the settlement of Afghanistan. This is a favourable
opportunity, when replies have been given to the request of certain
chiefs and _maliks_ in the neighbourhood of Ghazni who have been long
hostile, but who have, at last, listened to the advice of the Mustaufi
whom Sir Frederick Roberts sent to reassure them, and have deputed
many of their number to place their requests respectfully before the
Government. It is to be regretted that the more important of the
leaders have not come in person. When the Government promised them a
safe-conduct, there was no reason for even those who had been most
opposed to it, to fear for their lives, or their liberty. The British
Government bears no ill-will to those who have fought fairly against
it, and those of the representatives who have come to Cabul are free
to leave when they wish; during their stay they will be treated as
friends and guests. But those chiefs who have remained behind at
Maidan, must not think their signatures on the paper of requests will
be considered as equivalent to their presence; the more so as we know
that the reason why some of them have not come is that they have
secretly abandoned the cause they profess to support, and have made
promises to others. When you return to Maidan, ask Generals Gholam
Hyder and Mahomed Jan when they are going to desert you.
“_Maliks_ of Ghazni, Maidan, and Logar, and Chiefs of the Ghilzai,
Wardak, and other tribes in their neighbourhood,—I have met you more
than once in private interview, and have discussed with you, in a
friendly way, your requests; and I now only wish to say publicly, and
for the information of the sirdars and the people of the city and
neighbourhood of Cabul, whom it concerns as closely as it does you,
what I have already said to you. You have first asked that the former
friendship of the Government of the Queen-Empress of Hindustan should
be restored, that the Amir Yakub Khan should be released and
reinstated, and that the British Army should retire from Afghanistan.
I reply, I would first remind you that the breach in our mutual
friendship was made by the Amir Shere Ali Khan. The British Government
not only always desired and still desires friendship with Afghanistan,
but will not appoint any one as Amir who does not profess friendship;
nor will it allow him to continue Amir unless he plainly shows himself
the friend of the friends of the British Government, and the enemy of
its enemies. For this reason, the Viceroy has decided that Yakub Khan
shall not return to Afghanistan. You know whether he observed the
promises he had made to the British Government; you know he rewarded
those who opposed us in the first campaign; while those who had
assisted us he turned out of their lands and appointments. You have
told me privately that if Yakub Khan be not allowed to return, you are
willing to accept as Amir any one whom the British Government may
choose to select. This expression of the wish of a large number of
respectable _maliks_ will be at a proper time laid before His
Excellency the Viceroy, together with that of others who may wish to
support the candidature of Wali Mahomed, Hashim Khan, Musa Khan, Ayub
Khan, or any other member of the ruling family who may be approved by
a large number of the people. Government has no intention of annexing
Afghanistan, and will occupy no more of it than may be necessary for
the safety of its own frontier. But the province of Candahar will not
remain united to Cabul: it will be placed under the independent rule
of a Barakzai prince. For the administration of those provinces that
remain attached to Cabul, the Government is anxious to appoint an Amir
who shall be strong enough to govern his people and be steadfast in
his friendship to the British: and if only these qualifications be
secured, the Government is willing and anxious to recognize the wish
of the Afghan people and of their tribal chiefs, and to nominate an
Amir of their choice. But no decision can be given at present. You who
have assembled here represent but a small part of the people, and it
is necessary to ascertain the views and wishes of many other chiefs
and sirdars who are absent from Cabul. But your votes in favour of
Yakub Khan’s immediate family will be remembered and considered, if,
until, the decision of the Government be given, you absolutely abstain
from all hostile action; otherwise do not expect that the Government
will consider him likely to be a friendly Amir whose friends are its
persistent enemies. The armies of the Queen-Empress will withdraw from
Afghanistan, when the Government considers that the proper time has
come. As they did not enter Afghanistan with your permission, so they
will not withdraw at your request. When the country is again peaceful,
and when a friendly Amir has been selected, the Government has no wish
to remain in Afghanistan. The army came to Cabul to inflict punishment
for the murder of its Envoy in time of peace, which some of you have
called a regrettable accident, but which the British Government
considers an atrocious crime. It will remain until some satisfactory
settlement can be made.
“You have been told that an army from Candahar is now marching on
Ghazni, while another from Bombay has taken its place at Candahar. A
third army is in Kurrum, a fourth at Cabul, a fifth at Jellalabad, in
the Khyber, and at Peshawur. The General has ordered a strong force to
march from Cabul in three days towards Maidan, to co-operate with the
Candahar army. If you are wise, you will do everything to assist this
force, which is not sent against you, nor will it molest you, if only
the conduct of the people is friendly. If, on the contrary, you listen
to leaders who only deceive you for their own advantage, and commit
and excite hostility against the Government, punishment will quickly
and certainly follow. The Khugiani tribe three weeks ago attacked the
British Fort near Gundamak, at night; they have since had to pay a
fine of Rs. 10,000 and five of their towers have been blown up. The
Hisarak people have been committing outrages on the road and carrying
off men and cattle. A large force has been sent by the General into
Hisarak, and a fine of Rs. 15,000 has been imposed.
“The Government is quite willing to be friends with you and to treat
you as its friends; but it is also resolved to be obeyed, so long as
its armies are in the country, and to punish severely any open
opposition. You have a proverb that force and money are the only
powers in Afghanistan. It is for you to choose which you wish.
Government intends to keep the sword for its enemies and the money for
its friends; and if you are wise you will count yourselves as our
friends. Those people deceive you who preach a _jehad_, and say the
English are the enemies of Islam. In India fifty million Mahomedans
enjoy under the government of the Queen greater liberty, happiness,
and security than in any country of the world; and it is the British
Government which has many times, by a great expenditure of men and
treasure, guarded and preserved the empire of the Sultan of Turkey
against his enemies. Government is the friend and protector of Islam,
and not its destroyer. As to your own requests for the appointment of
a Mahomedan agent at Cabul, and a grant of assistance in money and
material to the new Amir, I can only say that these requests have been
made by you in ignorance, for they are matters which will be decided,
by the Government of India, with the chief whom they agree to appoint
as Amir. It is not fitting for small persons to discuss them. Of this
only be assured, that he whom the Viceroy of India may select will be
supported by the Government in every possible way, so long as he shows
friendly intentions towards it.”
The chiefs listened silently and with the phlegmatic attention they
always show in Durbar, and they clearly understood the speeches. Mr.
Griffin spoke in Persian, and a Pushtu translation was also read out for
the benefit of such as were imperfectly acquainted with Persian. Such of
the British officers as could speak neither language were in the dark as
to the Political Officer’s declaration, but camp gossip soon furnished
them with a fairly-correct translation. The firmness of the language and
the uncompromising terms in which the sirdars and chiefs were told of
our intentions has been approved in camp in the fullest way. Our great
hope is that no exigencies of party politics at home will cause a
modification; it would be fatal to our prestige if we had to withdraw
from resolutions now made public. The Cabul chiefs had already been told
what they had to expect; and the Barakzai sirdars now learned what
decision the Government of India had arrived at—Candahar to be the fief
of an independent prince; an Amir to be elected by the voice of the
people, who should be friendly to the British; and the withdrawal of our
army when such a man had been found—these were the main points. Herat
was not mentioned, and this is the more significant as it was fully
known that the separation of Herat from the Durani kingdom was a sore
point, even with our friends in Cabul. The future of that district may
well be allowed to drop out of sight for the present, as until it
becomes clear who the new Amir is to be, we cannot possibly undertake to
say what shall become of Herat. If he is a man equal to holding
Turkistan and Herat as well as Cabul, and to be true, at the same time,
to his friendship to us, we might so strengthen his hands that he could
defy rebellion and intrigue and make his government all-powerful from
our north-western frontier to the borders of Persia. The allusion to
Turkey was certainly not a happy one; we may, it is true, have gone to
war several times to maintain that Mahomedan kingdom, but our late
desertion of the Sultan cannot recommend our policy to such fanatical
Mussulmans as the Afghans. Abdur Rahman’s name, too, was not mentioned;
and as he is already knocking at our gates, it might have been wiser to
make some allusions to him.
The result of the Durbar has been satisfactory enough as far as the
Cabul sirdars are concerned, who fully believe that one of their number
will yet be Amir. Sirdars Wali Mahomed Khan and Hashim Khan have
accepted the mediation of the Mustaufi, and have pledged themselves to
act in concert, if either of them is placed on the throne. They both
dread the advent of Abdur Rahman and the possible encouragement he may
receive from the British, if he comes as a friend, and they are very
anxious to show that their combined party would be strong enough to keep
the Durani kingdom together. They have, as yet, received no distinct
promises from us, and it is not too much to say that we are inclined to
treat their claims with contempt until we learn more of Abdur Rahman’s
intentions. The tribal chiefs, too, are not of sufficient importance to
justify us in believing that any arrangement made with them would be of
a lasting kind; and though we have so far respected their feelings as
not to send our force out to Maidan to-day, we still intend to move
4,000 men under General John Ross to Sheikhabad, on the Ghazni Road,
there to join hands with Sir Donald Stewart. News from Kunduz is to the
effect that Abdur Rahman Khan is collecting men and raising money, and
that his agents have been well received in Kohistan.
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