An Amnesty issued—Influences affecting the People during the
_Jehad_—Invitation to the Chiefs to visit Sherpur—Leaders exempted
from the Amnesty—The Malcontent Chiefs at Ghazni—Durbar of January
9th—Principal Chiefs present—Padshah Khan—Address by Sir Frederick
Roberts—Loyal Chiefs rewarded—Arrangements for governing
Kohistan—Migration of Hindu Merchants to India—Reasons for the
Movement—Mahomed Jan’s Plans—Proposal to Recall Yakub Khan—Reasons
for such a Course being impossible—Improvement in the Intelligence
Department—News of Abdur Rahman Khan—Additional Fortifications about
Cabul and Sherpur.
_7th January, 1880._
An amnesty has been issued by General Roberts, dated December 26th,
which is so framed that it should convince even the most sceptical
tribesmen that we are anxious to conciliate them rather by fair dealing
than by force of arms. Only five leaders are exempted from the pardon
which is freely offered to all tribes who will send in their
representatives to our cantonments. The losses which the Kohistanis and
other clans suffered by the _jehad_ were so heavy that the pride of
having been able to coop up the British army within Sherpur, must be
mixed with a feeling that the temporary victory was dearly bought, and
that to repeat it would involve still further loss of life. In the
proclamation it is assumed that the mass of ignorant people were misled
by the representation of certain “seditious men,” and rose in rebellion
against us; and our pardon is granted on the further assumption that
this ignorance was generally shared in by the coalition of tribesmen.
This is a very lenient view to take of what was really an outburst of
religious fanaticism, in which even chiefs who were friendly to us
shared; but it is a stroke of policy which may, for a time at least, win
over to us most of the leaders of the tribes. Before carrying fire and
sword into their villages, we invite them to come in and say what it is
they really want, and we guarantee their personal safety, even though
they lately stood arrayed against us. This is not the usual treatment
accorded to rebels; but it is felt, perhaps, that, with our half-hearted
declarations of policy regarding Afghanistan, it would he unwise to
punish, with the severity rebellion merits, the people who have given us
so much trouble. If we had formally annexed the country, we might
certainly punish with death men who rose in arms against our authority;
but all we have done is to declare that, at some unknown date, we shall
“make known our will as to the future permanent arrangements to be made
for the good government of the people.” Where our arms were felt, there
our authority was known and respected; but in the districts beyond, our
power was only nominal. To refuse to obey it was rebellion only in name,
under such circumstances; and, moreover, the abdication of the Amir
Yakub Khan was looked upon by his late subjects as rather compulsory
than otherwise. The ignorant people, whom we are now so ready to
forgive, argued that, if the abdication was voluntary, a successor would
instantly have been placed on the throne; whereas time had gone by, and
nothing had been done to show that our military occupation of the
capital and the districts between Cabul and Peshawur was not to be
permanent. An appeal to their loyalty to the Barakzai dynasty, and a
further appeal to their hatred of Kaffirs, were quite enough to call
them to arms; and they believed themselves strong enough either to drive
us pell-mell from Cabul, or to impose terms of their own making. They
did not succeed in either; and if we followed their own savage custom,
we should kill every man we could lay hands upon who had joined in the
attack upon our army. But, instead of these bloodthirsty reprisals, the
tribesmen find pursuing them messengers bearing offers of pardon if they
will merely visit Sherpur and make their obeisance to the British
General. They are not asked to submit to any conditions; their safety is
assured; and all that is required of them is that they will frankly say
what their opinions are upon the present state of Afghan politics, and
what suggestions they have to make to guide us in dealing with the
people. Some of the tribal chiefs are either in Sherpur, or on their way
thither; and we shall soon have an opportunity of hearing what their
wishes—if they have any—really are. But, whatever views are put forward,
and whatever points may be yielded by men who are in their hearts most
hostile to us, it will not be enough to take shallow promises as
trustworthy in the future. With all the cunning astuteness of Afghans,
the tribal leaders will come in and will try to outwit us, as they have
always tried before. If we accept their promises and leave them to be
carried out by themselves, they may be looked upon as a dead letter.
Rather would it be better to listen to all that they have to urge in
favour of a new order of things: Kohistanis, Wardaks, Logaris, Ghilzais
of all sections giving their views freely; and then to dismiss them to
their homes, warning them that they must rest peacefully until the
_will_ of the British Government is made known to them. Let a fixed date
be declared on which that _will_ shall be publicly proclaimed; and
whether the decision is that Afghanistan is to be annexed, to be split
up into provinces, or left to fall to pieces by internal disorder after
our return to India, let it be clearly understood that, so long as a
British General remains at Cabul, his orders are the law that is alone
to be regarded. These orders, also, must be enforced, when necessary, by
our soldiers, and something more must be done than sending some sirdar,
alone and unprotected, into tribal districts, to carry out our wishes.
The only fear is that the amnesty may be looked upon as a sign of
weakness on our part, meaning that we dread another uprising; but if,
along with our philanthropic forgiveness, we mix the leaven of military
preparations on a large scale, the eyes of the people will be opened to
our real resources and the power we have at hand to crush rebellion. It
must never occur to us again to be shut up in Sherpur for nine days;
such investments are fatal to our prestige, both here and elsewhere. The
memorandum of a Military Secretary in India, who can seek to reassure
the country by the absurd statement that 2,500 men can garrison a
cantonment with over four miles of walls and trenches to man, must not
be allowed to weigh against the ugly facts we have had to face. With
more than 5,000 men available for duty, the work was so terrible and
severe, the constant watch by day and night so trying, that over 800
sick and wounded are now in our hospitals. With these 5,000 we could
repulse assaults, but could not move outside to give battle to the enemy
who flaunted their standards on Siah Sung Heights, and planted others
within 250 yards of our bastions. Never was there a case in which the
motto “fore-warned is fore-armed” was more applicable than now: our
warning has been a rude one, and has cost us many lives; but it has done
this service—that it has shown us how to guard against another such
shock. Ten thousand men in Sherpur and the Bala Hissar can laugh at even
50,000 tribesmen; for, with such a force at our disposal, we could
always spare 3,000 or 4,000 infantry to fight beyond the walls; and our
past experience has shown that we have nothing to fear with brigades of
this strength. It is only when we invite attack by weakness that
hands-ful of our men are overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers. If we
are to continue in the country, and operations are to be extended in the
spring to Ghazni, Charikar, or Balkh, not less than 10,000 men should be
garrisoned in and about Cabul by the end of March. Our power now extends
just as far as our rifles can shoot; for we can no more rely upon the
fidelity of Chiefs who come into Sherpur, than Macnaghten could upon the
promises of Akhbar Khan. Every man’s hand would be against us, if we
again were encompassed about in these cantonments.
In the meantime, the proclamation of an amnesty has brought in most of
the Kohistani chiefs (even those of Istalif and Charikar) and the nearer
Lughman _maliks_. The latter were friendly enough to us before December
14th; but aver that they were forced to join Mahomed Jan, who threatened
to harry their villages if they refused to turn out their armed men. The
Kohistanis have seen Mir Butcha’s villages and forts destroyed within a
week from the dispersion of the investing force; and, true to their old
policy, they have come in and are as peaceable as when first they were
entertained on Siah Sung. Padshah Khan has suddenly grown very anxious
to be on good terms with us again, and his son and uncle are already
here. He himself will shortly put in an appearance, and his explanations
will be interesting to listen to. He forfeited the subsidy promised to
him for the aid he gave us, on our march from Ali Kheyl, by his tribe
sharing in the attack upon the Shutargardan; and he is astute enough to
know that now he has no claim upon our consideration. When General
Roberts has interviewed the chiefs of the various sections, he will be
able to comprehend, in its true light, the reason of the late _jehad_,
and what it is that the tribal leaders require. Upon this he may make
his calculations for a future campaign if they again prefer an appeal to
arms to a peaceful understanding. It must not be forgotten that the five
men exempted from the amnesty are still at large, and are supposed to be
planning a revival of the _jehad_; and doubtless every chief who now
comes in and accepts the pardon offered to him will make a mental
reservation to be guided by the course of events at Ghazni as well as at
Cabul. The five leaders are Mahomed Jan; Mushk-i-Alam, of Charkh; Mir
Butcha, the Kohistani chief, now said to be at Charikar; Samander Khan,
of Logar; and Tahir Khan, son of Mahomed Sharif Khan, the sirdar kept as
a prisoner at Dehra Dun. Tahir Khan was for a long time in our camp with
his brother, Hashim Khan, and was generally supposed to be a harmless
youngster. As he was instrumental in carrying off Musa Jan, and is
active in keeping alive the dying _jehad_ at Ghazni, he has suddenly
become a personage important enough to be severely punished if he is
caught. Mahomed Jan is all-powerful among the Wardak men, the most
restless and impetuous clan near Cabul. He would have been their chief
upon the death of his father, but that he was a General in the Amir’s
service, and could not fulfil both duties. His brother was elected
chief, but has since died, and the Wardaks look upon Mahomed Jan as
their leader. The malcontents at Ghazni have also been joined by the
ex-Governor of Jellalabad. This man, Mahomed Hasan Khan, finding his
friend, Asmatullah Khan, with his Lughmanis, was coming to grief at
Jugdulluck, doubted him, and, following by-paths through the hills north
of Luttabund, reached Deh-i-Sabz in safety. He thought the Safis too
weak to stay with, and passed thence through the Koh-Daman over the
Surkh Kotal until he gained the Ghazni Road below Argandeh. Once on the
southern road, he was safe; and by this time he is probably aiding
Mahomed Jan to get together a new army.
_9th January._
The policy of conciliation which we have so magnanimously adopted after
the ineffectual attempt of the tribesmen to drive us from our
cantonments has been declared in open Durbar to-day, to some 200
Sirdars, Chiefs, and _maliks_. The effect of the amnesty, issued on
December 26th, has been in the main so successful, that many Kohistanis,
Logaris, and Ghilzais have come into Sherpur and made their peace with
Sir F. Roberts—temporarily it may be, for but little reliance is to be
placed upon the promises of Afghans; but still openly, and with no
seeming reservation. What their course of behaviour may be hereafter, in
case the Ghazni malcontents are able to raise a second _jehad_ of
importance, we cannot tell; but they have been given clearly to
understand that our forbearance does not arise from any fear of our own
strength to crush them, but simply because we desire rather to live on
peacable terms with the people, than to be continually harrying them for
their misdeeds. It is almost too much to ask any tribesman to refrain
from joining in a movement which promises him plenty of bloodshed and
unlimited loot; but by first thrashing him and then treating him with
generous forgiveness, we may convince him that it is more to his
interest to be on friendly terms with us than to risk his life and
property by setting our arms at defiance. The Durbar to-day was held
chiefly for the purpose of presenting such of the Kohistani chiefs as
had remained friendly to us with substantial rewards, and of declaring
to the others what our present policy is likely to be. The Logari and
Ghilzai chiefs had also a chance of observing how we reward our friends,
and of being assured that an offer of pardon to such as have chosen to
accept it was not an empty promise, merely to entice them into Sherpur.
A large tent was pitched near head-quarters, and in this were assembled
the chiefs who were to make their salaam to General Roberts. They were
marshalled in due order by Mahomed Hyat Khan, Assistant Political
Officer, and knelt down in the fashion in vogue among Orientals when
serious business has to be gone through. A little square was left vacant
in the middle of the tent, and in this stood four of the 72nd
Highlanders with fixed bayonets, the only sentries among the
closely-packed Sirdars and _maliks_, many of whom were fighting against
our troops but a few days ago. Sir F. Roberts entered, when all had been
duly arranged, and the kneeling figures rose as with one accord, and
made obeisance with that courteous humility which seems to convey so
much, and yet, in reality, means so little. There was no parade of any
kind in the Durbar: General Roberts was attended only by an
Aide-de-Camp, Captain Carew, and Major Hastings, Chief Political
Officer. His native orderlies were of course at hand in case of a
fanatic appearing. The salaaming having come to an end, General Roberts
seated himself to receive the Sirdars as they were presented separately
by Mahomed Hyat Khan. Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan was placed on the
General’s left hand, and from time to time explained the status and
characteristics of the more notable Chiefs. In addition to Wali Mahomed
there were many other members of the Barakzai family present, the chief
of whom were Sirdars Ibrahim Khan (brother of Shere Ali), Ahmed Ali Jan,
Mahomed Hashim Khan, Abdulla Khan, and Mahomed Yusuf Khan. One by one
the Chiefs were presented, and the formal ceremony of the Durbar
proceeded. Many of the Sirdars, and even some of the tribal chiefs, so
far conformed to English custom as to shake hands with the General. It
was a picturesque scene; the dense mass of kneeling figures, clad in
richly-coloured _chogas_, or with long-flowing garments shaped like the
old Roman _toga_. The wild and, in many cases, handsome faces of the
tribal leaders lighted up with interest and expectation as their fellows
stepped out and bowed meekly before the representative of that British
Government they had lately fought against. One incident was the
presentation of Padshah Khan to General Roberts. As his name was called
out, there was something like a titter all round—for even Afghans have a
sense of humour, and they could not help appreciating the shamefacedness
of this Ghilzai chief, who, after aiding the British to reach Cabul, had
striven to drive them out, and had then accepted the forgiveness so
freely offered. Padshah Khan came forward in his usual cringing way, and
on his sunburnt cheeks just a tinge of colour mounted, the nearest
approach to a blush that he could raise. Even General Roberts joined in
the general smile which spread from face to face at the evident
discomfort of the Chief; while the latter, recovering his
self-possession, went back to his place smiling also, as if a great
weight had been lifted from his mind. He must wonder at our generosity,
and, perhaps, be doubtful as to how far it may extend, in the future;
but, so far, he is grateful for our forbearance, as his villages have
not shared the fate of those of Mir Butcha. The Logari and Ghilzai
Chiefs having salaamed, there were presented _en masse_ some thirty-four
Jagri and Besud Hazara Chiefs and _maliks_. These men have remained true
to their promises; and as their country bounds Ghazni on the west, and
also marches with the Wardak districts, they are likely to be useful
allies. Being of the Shiah sect of Mahomedans, they have nothing in
common with the Afghan Sunis, and we shall be able to employ them in
harassing Mahomed Jan’s army if that leader collects a force at Ghazni.
With a column marching up from Candahar, and our own army moving down
the Ghazni Road from Cabul, the insurgents would be held in check
westwards by the Hazaras, and their only road for retreat would be
eastwards towards Khost and the Shutargardan districts. Saftar Ali Khan,
head of the Jagri Hazaras, was unable to attend owing to sickness; but
his son, Ahmed Ali Khan, was present to receive the handsome _khilluts_
bestowed upon his father and himself. The presentations being over, Sir
Frederick Roberts read the following address to the Kohistanis, which
was translated into Persian by Mahomed Hyat Khan:—
“SIRDARS AND MALIKS,
“I am very glad to see that so many of the Kohistan _maliks_
have taken advantage of the amnesty published on the 26th of December
last, and have come to Cabul to pay their respects to the British
Government, and to express their regrets for having taken a part in
the recent disturbances. I trust that those _maliks_ who are still
holding aloof, will follow the good example that has been set them,
and will soon make their appearance at Cabul. I told you, when you
visited me in my camp at Siah Sung, after the arrival of the British
troops at Cabul, that the British Government had nothing but goodwill
towards the people of Afghanistan; that it is their desire to respect
your lives, your property, and your religion, and to molest no one who
would live at peace with them. You have had ample proof of the truth
of what I told you. At the instigation of ill-advised men you came
from your homes in Kohistan to attack the British troops at Sherpur.
All that you succeeded in doing was to plunder your own countrymen who
live in the city of Cabul. You did the British troops but little
injury, and in a few days you were beaten off, and had to return to
your homes with the loss of several hundred killed and wounded. You
brought this punishment upon yourself, and must not blame the British
Government. What that Government did was to offer a pardon to all who
would come in—except the _malik_ who, it is believed, was the main
cause of your being led astray. It was necessary he should be
punished; but, in doing so, every care was taken that no one else
should suffer injury. The British troops marched through your country
as far as Baba Kuch Kar, treating you all as friends, and paying
liberally for everything in the shape of food and forage you were
able, or willing, to provide. I hope the lesson will not be lost upon
you, and that you will not misunderstand the generosity and
forbearance with which you have been treated. It is a great pleasure
to me to find that so many of the more intelligent and well-informed
of the people of Afghanistan took no part in the recent disturbances.
First and foremost I would name Sirdars Wali Mahomed Khan, Ibrahim
Khan, Hashim Khan, Abdulla Khan, Mahomed Yusuf Khan, Mahomed Karim
Khan, Shahbaz Khan, Ahmed Ali Jan, Mahomed Sirwur Khan, Ataullah Khan,
Anitoollah Khan, Habibulla Khan (the Mustaufi), Malik Hamid Khan, and
Khan Mahomed Khan. Then several of your own chiefs remained with me
throughout. General Faiz Mahomed Khan, the son of Naik Aminulla Khan,
of Logar, the family of the Mustaufi Sirdar Habibulla Khan, of Wardak,
the Kizilbashes, and many other influential men in the city of Cabul
refrained from joining the disturbers of peace and order; and I am
glad to have this opportunity of thanking them on the part of the
British Government for the good service they thereby performed. I am
now about to give _khilluts_ to those Kohistanis who remained at
Sherpur with me; after which you are at liberty to return to your
homes. I am sending back with you to Kohistan Sirdar Shahbaz Khan,
whom you have yourselves asked for as your Governor. He will settle
your disputes, and preserve order in the country. Also that I may be
fully informed by yourselves of all that passes, and of all that you
may wish to represent hereafter, I invite you to select certain of
your number who will remain here and act as a medium of communication
between us. They will be treated with consideration, and will have
free access to me. The rest of you may return to your homes, and for
your own sake remember all that has passed.”
Sir Frederick Roberts then presented the _khilluts_, which consisted of
handsome _chogas_ and a certain number of rupees, to the Chiefs who had
remained with us, or faithfully kept their promises. Those who had
merely come in answer to the amnesty were, of course, not rewarded.
Besides the Sirdars mentioned in the speech, who were rewarded for their
loyalty to the British Government, there were eleven Kohistani Chiefs,
twelve Logaris (including Faiz Mahomed Khan, of Ali Musjid celebrity),
and thirty-four Jagri and Besud Hazara Khans and _maliks_. With the
distribution of _khilluts_ the Durbar closed, and the Chiefs were free
to depart.
In the meantime, our indecision has re-acted upon a section of the
citizens of Cabul, who dread another occupation by tribesmen. The Hindu
merchants are beginning to move out with their families and goods, and
are taking the road to Peshawur. I have had many chances of learning
their feeling from one of their number, an intelligent banker, well
versed in local politics. His explanation of the migration is that the
Hindus trusted in the British, and looked to them for protection—which
was promised. But when the rising took place, the British had enough to
do to hold Sherpur, and consequently they were left at the mercy of the
rabble about Mahomed Jan. They will not risk a second occupation, being
convinced that it will take place, as we have not really received any
considerable reinforcements. “Besides,” they add, “no man can say what
you will do next, whether you will go back to India, or occupy Cabul for
ever. We have waited for you to say what is to happen, and nothing has
come of it except loss to ourselves and insult to our women. We will
still wait, but this time in Peshawur, where we shall be safe. If the
Sirkar takes over Cabul, then we will return.” And so they are taking
their departure, and Cabul is losing many of its best citizens;
industrious, peace-loving men, whom we cannot easily replace. It is a
comment upon our “waiting-upon-Providence” policy which is not at all
pleasant. Besides, if these Hindus carry to India the idea that we
cannot protect them in Cabul, and spread this report throughout
Hindustan, the effect upon the minds of our own subjects east of the
Indus may be very serious. Prestige is such a delicate plant in Eastern
soil, that it should be carefully guarded. Our military preparations in
and about Cabul—the building of strong stone towers on the Bala Hissar
Heights and the Asmai Hill, the cutting of military roads to the Cabul
gorge, the re-occupation of the Bala Hissar, the clearing of the country
about Sherpur of forts and walls—do not convey much to these Hindus.
“You want more _men_ if you are to hold Cabul, and keep out your enemy.
What are 10,000 to 50,000? There must be 20,000 here to guard Sherpur
and the city.” They are men of peace, and their criticism of military
matters is weak; but they shrewdly enough ask if, after sickness and
wounds, our fighting men are more numerous now than two months ago. It
may be a small matter, after all, that these terror-stricken Hindus turn
their faces eastwards; but it should be remembered that, all through the
troublous times of the Durani dynasty, their forefathers, and they
themselves, have remained in Cabul, and they are only leaving the city
now, because they do not believe in the power of the British to hold it
against another army of 50,000 Afghans.
Our news from Ghazni still shows that there is energy left in Mahomed
Jan, and that he has held his own against the Jagri and Besud Hazaras,
who have tried to drive him from the neighbourhood. His latest plan to
collect a new army is very ingenious. He has placed Musa Jan solemnly
before his followers, and made the child repeat after him an oath upon
the Koran, by which all true Mahomedans who join in another attack upon
Sherpur shall be exempt from taxation for three years. The bait is a
tempting one to indigent tribesmen; but some of the more wary may refuse
the offer, as they must see how unlikely it is that our army will ever
be expelled by force.
There is not much cantonment news. The force has just experienced a
heavy loss in the death, from pneumonia, of Dr. Porter, principal
medical officer of the division. Dr. Porter was so universal a
favourite, both with his own medical officers and with every soldier in
the Cabul army of occupation, that his loss is a matter of personal
sorrow to all of us. His high professional ability gave him a prominent
place in the first rank of army surgeons.
_17th January._
The malcontents at Ghazni have at last given us an idea of the terms to
which they would be willing to agree: these being nothing short of the
recall of Yakub Khan, and his replacement on the throne. It is
difficult, in the present state of affairs, to gain accurate news from
Ghazni, but from letters which have been received, it would seem that a
secret council of chiefs was held at that place a few days ago, and it
was decided to send Sir Frederick Roberts a kind of diplomatic message.
The purport of this message was that Mahomed Jan and his adherents would
fight to the end unless the ex-Amir was instantly sent back from India,
and once more given charge of Afghanistan as supreme ruler. Young Tahir
Khan is the originator of this new scheme, but it is uncertain how far
it is shared in by Mushk-i-Alam. It is pretty certain that the latter
was sorely displeased by his _jehad_ being perverted into a raid upon
the city of Cabul; and on this point he quarrelled with Mahomed Jan,
even before the investment of Sherpur was at an end. This quarrel was
partly instrumental in causing the rapid dispersion of the tribal
gathering; factions being formed, and discussion running very high. The
more fanatical sided with the _moollah_; while the disorderly element
supported Mahomed Jan. The letter conveying the decision of the Ghazni
council has duly reached us, and we are rather amused at the coolness of
the proposal. The removal of Yakub Khan is in the eyes of many people a
very inadequate punishment for his culpable weakness in allowing an
Envoy to be slaughtered, and we should be stultifying ourselves if we
were even seriously to think of “giving him another chance.” If he were
a strong and capable ruler, able to carry out the terms of an alliance
with us; a leader who had been captured in opposing our armies, and had
been deposed after defeat, there might then enter into our calculations
such a possibility as making him Amir once more. In the old war we so
far sacrificed our pride as to send back Dost Mahomed to Cabul after he
had been deported to India; but Dost Mahomed was a ruler worthy of
respect, and a soldier who could keep his unruly subjects fairly well in
hand. One can almost imagine that a few fanatics are hugging the belief
that, as the Dost was reinstated, so will Yakub Khan be again placed in
power; but such a consummation can never occur. It is doubtful whether
Mushk-i-Alam has accepted the decision of the council. Our first
information was to the effect that the arch-_moollah_ had gone to Ghazni
and harangued a large meeting of the malcontents; but it has since been
reported that he was not present at the consultation. Mahomed Jan’s
movements, too, are difficult to follow. One day he is said to be among
his kinsmen at Wardak; the next that he is stirring up the Zurmut people
east of Ghazni; and then come all sorts of absurd rumours about his
being on the way to Kohistan to see what Mir Butcha is doing.
Our intelligence department is growing at last to be something more than
a name. Before the events of the 11th and 23rd December, the only
reports that were received as trustworthy were those given by paid spies
and followers of the sirdars—followers who are, as a rule, of the purest
type of ruffianism. One always looks upon a sirdar as a past-master in
the art of deception, who would sacrifice the British at any moment if
he could do so with impunity; and the hangers-on of these chiefs are not
a whit better than their masters. The action of the 11th in the Chardeh
Valley proved to demonstration that no trust could be placed in the
reports given by the sirdars: there were found to be 10,000 or 15,000
men within ten miles of Sherpur, whereas we had only heard of 5,000
being at Argandeh. Now there has been established a regular system of
patrols, and a certain number of Kizilbash horsemen are stationed at
various points on the Argandeh Kotal, Surkh Kotal, the Kohistan Road
northwards over the Paen Minar Kotal, and about Charasia. They are under
the command of one responsible native leader in Sherpur, who again is
directly controlled by Lieutenant-Colonel Lockhart, the
Quartermaster-General of the division. As these horsemen are paid, not
by results, but for regular service on patrol work, they are likely to
be more trustworthy than the highly-paid spies hitherto employed. If the
system could be a little more extended on the lines I have before
pointed out in previous letters—viz., regular establishment—it might be
a great aid to us in the guerilla warfare we are engaged in.
Important news has been received that Abdur Rahman Khan has left
Tashkend, and is now probably in Turkistan. If his residence among the
Russians has not thoroughly converted him to their views, he might be a
useful man for us to take up. He is ambitious, and, if we can trust Mr.
Schuyler’s estimate of him, has some ability which might now be turned
to good use. What his influence would be now in the country after so
many years of absence we cannot tell; but to-day, in mentioning his name
to an old Cabuli, and saying that he was possibly already in Turkistan,
my listener’s face lighted up with pleasure, and he eagerly asked if he
would return to Cabul. There are so many possibilities to be weighed in
calculating the chances of settling affairs here on a fairly safe basis,
that Abdur Rahman’s claims may come to be considered. Unless, as I have
said, he has been Russianised, he might fall in with our views, and, at
least as a provincial governor, be trusted with authority.
In the meantime we are making preparations to hold Cabul as well as
Sherpur in case of an attempted repetition of the events of December
11th to 23rd. General Charles Gough’s brigade in the Bala Hissar is busy
at work, cutting a broad road from the Shah Shehr Gate (that facing Siah
Sung) to the gate overlooking the city near Chandaul. The broken places
in the walls have been built up, and improvements made by the Engineers,
so as to give shelter to the garrison if an attack were attempted from
the city. The Sherderwaza Heights immediately above the Bala Hissar are
also to be held in future by one battalion (say 500 or 600 men),
stationed in three strong towers, now in course of construction. The
first and strongest of these is on the spur above the Arsenal; a steep
point completely commanding the Upper Bala Hissar already being crowned
with strong walls, the basement of the tower. The crest of the
Sherderwaza Heights already boasts of a strong wall, part of the Afghan
fortifications; and this position is naturally so strong, the hillside
sloping down almost perpendicularly towards Chardeh Valley, that with
the two towers now being built it could defy assault from any force
destitute of artillery. The ridge running down westwards to the Cabul
gorge would also be held if an enemy menaced the city, and on the Asmai
Heights on the northern side a strong fort is to be built. The military
roads converging upon Dehmazung from Sherpur cantonments unite in
Deh-i-Afghan and pass by the foot of the Asmai Hill, whence they are to
be continued in one broad road until the main Bamian Road through
Chardeh Valley is gained. The towers above mentioned are to be
provisioned and watered, always, for ten days, and are to contain
small-arm ammunition equal to the requirements of a battalion for that
period, calculated on the basis of serious fighting. A road broad enough
for guns will also be made about Cabul itself from Deh-i-Afghan to the
Bala Hissar, in addition to a circular road about Sherpur cantonments.
Another road is to be cut from Bemaru village to the Siah Sung Heights,
with a bridge spanning the Cabul river; and yet another from the 67th
Gateway (near the south-eastern bastion) direct to the Bala Hissar, this
also crossing the river by a new pile bridge. These two roads will
ensure communication between Sherpur and the fortress without our troops
having to pass near the city walls; and will give us alternative bridges
over the Cabul, whereas we formerly had only one bridge, that on the
city road from Sherpur. With regard to the cantonment itself, the clear
space for 1,000 yards about the walls is already partly made, although
the _débris_ of forts and villages destroyed requires much levelling
before it can be said that all cover has been swept away. The blocks of
solid mud and the loose rubbish could be utilized by skirmishers
advancing to attack, and until this accumulation of ruins has been
thoroughly levelled, our rifle-fire will not have a fair chance. On the
eastern point of the Bemaru Heights a very strong tower is now being
rapidly built, and the hill about it is to be scarped for ten yards, so
that to assault it from outside cantonments would be impossible. At the
north-west corner, below the western end of Bemaru Heights, the line of
trenches with their parapet of gun-carriage wheels (described in one of
my letters written during the siege) will also be strengthened by a
broad and deep wet ditch.
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