The Probabilities of the Revival of the _Jehad_—Insincerity of Native
Chiefs—The Need of further Reinforcements—The Difficulties of
Warfare in Afghanistan—Return of General Baker from Baba Kuch
Kar—Recovery of the Bodies of Lieutenants Hardie and Forbes—Review
of the _Jehad_—The Attitude of the Tribes on the Line of
Communications—Asmatullah Khan’s Position—Failure to check our
Reinforcements—The Importance of the Luttabund Post—Attack upon
Jugdulluck—Repulse of the Lughmanis—Deportation of Daoud Shah to
India—Military Executions.
_1st January, 1880._
The New Year has come upon us so suddenly that we have had no time to
cast vain regrets upon worn-out months, which have witnessed the making
of important pages of history, and given us a new starting-point in our
relations with Afghanistan. A month ago we were dying of weary
inactivity, but this feeling was swept away by the stirring events of
the Mohurrum, and we have not yet sunk back into our old state of
lassitude. Our losses have been so heavy, that it behoves us to take
precautions to prevent a repetition of the late investment; and we are
bestirring ourselves right heartily to give the ghazi-_log_ a reception
worthy of their impetuous nature, if they keep their promise to return
in March. Musa Jan, Yakub Khan’s son, is now with Mushk-i-Alam (that
unsavoury _moollah_, whose title means “Scent of the Universe”) at Bad
Mushk, twelve miles from Ghazni; and when the _jehad_ is revived, all
true Afghans will be called upon to rally round their rightful
sovereign. The waverers will be wrought upon by promises of endless
loot; the fanatical by opportunities of future bliss after they have
died as ghazis; and the mass of the tribesmen by an appeal to their
warlike instincts which lead them to fight for the sake of bloodshed. It
was a grave mistake which left Musa Jan, with the women of Yakub Khan’s
household, in Cabul; for now a status is given to the leaders of the
up-rising which they lacked before. We have Wali Mahomed with us still;
and if we so far modify our policy as to make him Governor of Cabul and
the districts about,—and all things are possible in the see-saw of
politics,—we could make a counter-appeal and declare Musa Jan to be
merely a puppet in the hands of mischief-makers. Whether this appeal
would be disregarded, one cannot say; but if it were backed by a strong
display of force, say 12,000 men holding Sherpur and every post down to
Jellalabad well garrisoned, it might have some effect. No faith can be
put in Afghan promises; we have learned that by the falling away of
Padshah Khan, if we did not already know it from past experience; and
our safety from constant attack must lie in the completeness of our own
preparations, rather than in contracts made with sirdars who will only
serve us so long as fair weather lasts. Padshah Khan is said to have
remained faithful at least until the 14th of December. When he learned
that the British had been obliged to withdraw within the walls of
Sherpur, and had lost two mountain guns in the day’s fighting, he may
have thought that a disaster was impending, and so joined Mahomed Jan
with as many Ghilzais as he could collect together. He now affirms that
he was more a spectator than an active participator in the siege; and
that this was so evident to the other chiefs that, after assigning him a
post in the fore-front of the attack, they withdrew him from his command
at the last moment, so great was their mistrust of his sincerity.
The Khyber Force will relieve us of all garrison work at Luttabund,
which sets free 800 men and two guns for duty here; so that with the
1,400 men General Charles Gough brought with him we shall be over 2,000
stronger. But our losses have been heavy, and there are now 800 men on
the sick list, many of whom must be sent back to India. The present
campaign cannot be brought to a successful conclusion without a much
greater display of force than we have hitherto made; and I believe every
effort is now being put forth to collect further supplies, so that, if
necessary, 15,000 or 20,000 men could be fed during February and March
preparatory to our resuming the offensive in the spring. The warning of
Sir Henry Durand, in his criticism of the old war, must have recurred to
our leaders when contemplating a new accession of strength to the force
now here. He wrote:—“Everything in the expedition was a matter of the
greatest uncertainty, even to the feeding of the troops; for Afghanistan
merited the character given to Spain by Henry IV. of France: 'Invade
with a large force, and you are destroyed by starvation; invade with a
small one, and you are overwhelmed by a hostile people.'” We have tried
the latter alternative, and, after being shut in by 50,000 Afghans (for
such it is now said was the numerical strength of Mahomed Jan’s
following), we have no wish to repeat the experiment. To avoid it, we
must have a large and handy force ready to cope with the enemy before he
can reach Cabul; and here the starvation difficulty crops up. After
paying fabulously high prices for everything—from a sheep to an onion—we
had laid in stores sufficient for the consumption of our original
division until the spring; but these will not suffice when they are
drawn upon by the troops which have since joined us (9th Foot, Guides,
2nd and 4th Ghoorkas, Hazara Mountain Battery, and Sappers), apart from
any others that may yet come up. The Khyber transport is not strong
enough for much reliance to be placed upon it in the matter of bringing
up supplies from Peshawur, and we shall probably have to requisition the
country and force the people to sell their hidden stores at our own
prices. We cannot starve, and the military exigencies of the position
render it imperative that we should have Sherpur not only well
garrisoned, but a movable force of sufficient strength to disperse all
Cabul gatherings, and regiments stationed along our line of
communication, equal either to punishing chiefs like Asmatullah, or
moving westward to Cabul if a second _jehad_ brings about another great
combination of the people. Our latest reinforcement, which arrived here
on the 24th, under General Gough, is now garrisoning the Bala Hissar;
while the Guides have been attached to General Macpherson’s Brigade, and
will remain in cantonments. They have done good service since their
arrival, and well deserve to be attached to the army which captured
Cabul single-handed.
General Baker returned yesterday from his excursion to Baba Kuch Kar,
where he destroyed the forts and villages belonging to Mir Butcha. This
place was demolished by Sale on the 8th of October, 1840. It was
considered at that time a stronghold which would have given an army
without a battering-train much trouble; but now the fortified enclosures
were less formidable. They were not defended, Mir Butcha and his
retainers have fled northward to Charikar when he saw how quickly we
were following him after his retreat from Sherpur on the 3rd December.
No opposition on the road to, or from, Baba Kuch Kar was offered to
General Baker, who was only away five days. The snow-covered roads and
hills were very trying to the soldiers and followers; and it was
conclusively proved that camping out in this weather is likely to sow
the seeds of much sickness among our men. The country visited was not
Kohistan proper, which lies north of Istalif, but the Koh-Daman (“Skirt
of the Hills”). The valleys were found to be marvellously fertile, the
orchards and vineyards on the hill-slopes stretching away on either side
for miles. Cabul is said to draw most of its delicious fruit from the
Koh-Daman, the fertility of which we had every opportunity of observing.
In the spring the district must be the most beautiful spot in
Afghanistan, the Chardeh Valley sinking into insignificance before it.
Great difficulty would be experienced by an army marching through in the
face of determined opposition. Sunken roads, irrigated tracts, walled
fields, and innumerable watercourses form such a network of obstruction,
that if the forts and villages, with their acres of orchards and
vineyards, were defended, progress would be laborious and dangerous in
the extreme. For miles there is admirable cover for skirmishers to
harass an army with all its impedimenta of baggage and followers; and
every fort would have to be stormed, as mountain guns would make no
impression on the mud walls. General Baker not only looted and levelled
to the ground all forts and villages owned by Mir Butcha, but cut down
his vineyards, and set the Ghoorkas to work to “ring” all the fruit
trees. This will he a heavy loss to the villages, which mainly derive
their local influence from the return yielded by their orchards and
vineyards. Baba Kuch Kar is a little over twenty miles from Sherpur; and
from it Istalif could be seen, with its white walls gleaming out on the
hillsides, surrounded by orchards extending as far as the eye could
reach. Istalif is about ten miles further north, and the country between
is all under cultivation. Arrangements were made with local headmen to
bring in supplies, and large quantities of grain and _bhoosa_ are
expected to reach us from the Koh-Daman.
The quickness with which we resumed the offensive after being besieged
in Sherpur has favourably impressed all the country about. Such chiefs
as were hostile to us now see that they are not safe from reprisals; and
within easy marches of Sherpur many villages which turned out their
fighting men during the _jehad_, are now being punished. One village in
Chardeh was said to contain the bodies of Lieutenants Hardie and Forbes,
who fell in the cavalry action on the 11th of December. On our troops
visiting it, the _maliks_ denied that the bodies had been seen. Two of
the headmen were tied up and flogged, but still refused to speak; but
upon a third being seized, he offered to show the officers’ graves. The
bodies were exhumed, and were found to be unmutilated. The village has
been destroyed on account of the contumacy of the _maliks_, and also
because our troops were fired upon from its walls when the guns were
lost. Several other missing bodies of Lancers have been found; and on
New Year’s Day an impressive funeral of the bodies of Captain Spens,
Lieutenant Hardie, Lieutenant Forbes, and a non-commissioned officer
took place at the foot of the north-western slope of the Bemaru Heights.
We have lost twelve officers killed and fourteen wounded since December
10th, which shows the severity of the fighting; while of the rank and
file and camp-followers, ninety-eight have been killed and 238 wounded.
_4th January._
One feature of the late investment of Sherpur cantonment which deserves
considerable attention is the part played by the powerful Ghilzai tribes
between Cabul and Jellalabad. Their attitude, from the 14th of December,
was the same as that taken up in the war of 1841-42, and they no doubt
looked for a similar result. It might have been foretold with absolute
certainty that once a British army was besieged at Cabul, the tribesmen
on the route to India would rise to a man and try to block the road
along which reinforcements must pass. The _jehad_ which Mushk-i-Alam
headed had its origin far from the rocky barrier which shuts in the
Cabul plain on the east: its birth was at Ghazni, and its growth
extended on the north to Kohistan, and on the south to Logar, the two
districts which furnished at the outset its principal strength. The
Safis of Tagao were drawn within its influence by their close
neighbourhood to Kohistan; but the Ghilzais of Tezin and the valleys
about, as well as the more distant Lughmanis, held aloof at first by
reason of their position between the two British forces. If Mahomed Jan
had failed in his march upon Cabul, and had been driven back upon the
Ghazni Road, we should probably have heard little of the hostility of
the tribes westward of Butkhak; the preaching of the _moollahs_, which
had for weeks before fallen upon the ears of the Ghilzais as the
prediction of a great triumph over the Kaffir army, would have borne no
fruit beyond an occasional raid upon our convoys. The local clans would
have felt that, if a powerful combination, such as that which had
gathered about the Ghazni priest, had failed to drive back the British
army, they themselves were powerless to do so. But once the vast host of
50,000 men had occupied Cabul and the Bala Hissar, and had made it
impossible for the garrison of Sherpur to move beyond its defences, the
Ghilzais felt that the appeal to their fanaticism was a safe lead to
follow, and they began to muster in strength. The messengers from
Mahomed Jan were welcomed, and our evacuation of Butkhak proved that his
promise to surround and cut to pieces the small army which had captured
Cabul was not widely removed from the possible, as our leaders were
concentrating their force to resist an attack. If we had not needed
every man at Sherpur, why should we hurry away from our first outpost
under cover of darkness? This was the argument which went home to the
hearts of the men in the hills about Khurd Cabul and Tezin; and all the
local chiefs, with one exception, turned out their fighting men, and
thought of the slaughter of our army in the terrible defile of 1842.
Padshah Khan, in his villages nearer the Shutargardan, was carried away
by the same reasoning; and, with customary treachery, he hastened to
Cabul to fight against the men he had pledged himself to support. His
contingent was more needed there than that of the chiefs along our line
of communications, who had a similar mission to perform to that so
successfully carried out nearly forty years ago—to block all outlets of
escape; and in addition, to drive back our reinforcements to Jellalabad.
In the first flush of success it may have occurred to Mahomed Jan that
he was destined to become a second Akhbar Khan, and that a siege of
Jellalabad would follow the annihilation of the force at Cabul. To carry
out the programme with success, it was needful that all posts west of
Jellalabad should be swept away; and this work he entrusted to
Asmatullah Khan, of Lughman, a chief, perhaps, more powerful than any
other single tribal leader in North-Eastern Afghanistan. Asmatullah
accepted the part assigned to him, and the Lughmanis were soon actively
at work: the telegraph line west of Gundamak was destroyed, and then, in
full confidence, the troops at Jugdulluck were attacked. But though it
was easy enough in theory to lay down plans on the old lines, the
Lughmanis found that, with superior weapons, our soldiers were able
without difficulty to hold their own against twentyfold odds. The road
might be made unsafe, and all convoys stopped; but when it came to
turning out enemies snugly entrenched, and armed with breech-loaders, it
was a very different story. While Mahomed Jan fondly imagined that for
two or three months the Ghilzais would hold the Passes, and check the
movement of a relieving force, Asmatullah Khan was not equal to keeping
back the stream of men which set westwards from Gundamak, and could not
even dispossess the solitary native regiment which held Jugdulluck when
the small brigade under General Charles Gough had started for Sherpur.
The Ghilzais of Tezin had also found themselves non-plussed by the
abandonment of the old route of the Khurd Cabul, which was no longer
followed either to or from Sherpur. Although Maizullah Khan and every
local chief, with the exception of Mahomed Shah Khan, of Hisarak, were
in arms, their tactics were so faulty that, beyond menacing Luttabund,
they did nothing to harass our reinforcements. The mere fact of our
being able to hold the Luttabund Kotal was so strong an evidence that
the end had not yet come, that they hesitated to occupy the road between
that post and the Jugdulluck defile, fearing that they might be caught
between two fires. Then was demonstrated the full value of the decision
arrived at by Sir F. Roberts—to hold Luttabund at all hazards until its
garrison could be picked up by the column moving to his relief. The
flash of the heliograph from Sherpur to the _kotal_ where Colonel
Hudson, with less than 1,000 men, was watching for the reinforcements
from our eastern posts, told the tribes that the force in Sherpur,
though beleaguered by an army larger than Cabul had ever seen, was still
linked to its supports, and was by no means in the straits Mahomed Jan
had promised. Sitting on the hills about Luttabund, the Ghilzais were
too faint-hearted to attack in earnest, and Mahomed Jan was not General
enough to detach one-fifth of his force to sweep away the handful of men
forming our solitary outpost. Forty Sikhs of the 23rd Pioneers were
enough to scatter the bands which gathered about Luttabund; and so
little did the followers of Maizullah Khan prove worthy of the trust
confided to them by Mahomed Jan, that from Jugdulluck to Butkhak
scarcely a shot was fired upon General Charles Gough’s brigade. Mahomed
Jan, holding Cabul and the Bala Hissar in his grasp, must have felt that
his plans were falling to pieces when the Ghilzais were unequal to
breaking up the force passing through their midst; and once our
reinforcements had entered upon the Cabul plain, those plans ceased to
exist. In desperation the assault upon Sherpur was decided upon, and its
failure was the signal for the collapse of the _jehad_. Twenty-four
hours after the signal light blazed upon the summit of the Asmai hill,
not 1,000 men of the 50,000 who had held Cabul could be found within ten
miles of the city.
I have tried to explain the course of action taken by the Ghilzais of
Lughman and the Passes, and they have always been a bugbear when an
advance upon Cabul was made from Gundamak. It has been clearly proved
that they lack organization, and have not the resolute courage to attack
entrenched positions held by even small bodies of our men. Asmatullah
Khan, it is true, made a demonstration against Jugdulluck on the 29th of
December, six days after Mahomed Jan’s flight; but he was beaten back
with a loss, on our side, of one officer (Lieutenant Wright, 11-9th
Battery), and a native gunner killed, and one man of the 51st Regiment
slightly wounded. This was after eight hours’ fighting, and proves how
paltry a force Lughman can send out. As this was probably Asmatullah
Khan’s last attempt before withdrawing to Lughman again, I will give
Colonel Norman’s (24th Punjab Infantry) account of the affair. Writing
on the evening of the 29th, he said:—“At 10 A.M. to-day a party I had
sent out to reconnoitre on the hills to the south was attacked in force
by Asmatullah Khan. The party held its own until reinforced; but as the
enemy were in great strength, I had to send out nearly all my men. One
hundred and sixty of the 29th were on the _kotal_, and holding points on
the Pass to cover the advance of the 45th Sikhs, then marching up to
join me. About noon I received a telegram, saying that three companies
of the 51st Foot, 360 men of the 45th Sikhs, and four guns of 11-9th
Battery, were on the way up. I accordingly waited for the arrival of
these troops, to enable me to act more vigorously; but it was 4 P.M.
before they arrived, and before this I had driven the enemy back. The
reinforcements, directly they had arrived, took up a position in
prolongation of my right, to enfilade the enemy. Just as 11-9th Battery
came into action, I regret to say that Lieutenant Wright was killed by a
rifle bullet. The enemy had completely retired before sunset. The
practice of Anderson’s guns (Hazara Mountain Battery) was splendid.
Asmatullah Khan has most of the Lughman chiefs with him, and the
Governor of Jellalabad Mahomed Hasan Khan.” Colonel Norman also reported
that with the force at his command, he could not hope thoroughly to
disperse the Lughmanis, who retired from one range of hills to another.
These are the usual tactics of Afghan guerilla warfare, the tribesmen
returning as soon as the pursuit is over. The punishment of Asmatullah
Khan will be directed from another quarter. A flying column from
Jellalabad will enter his country and devastate it, dispersing any force
he may attempt to keep together. The news of this proposed expedition
has doubtless hastened his steps back to his own fertile valley. The
Ghilzais south of Jugdulluck will also be visited by a flying column
from Gundamak, which will penetrate as far as Hisarak, and punish
Maizullah Khan and the other chiefs who joined him. Each of these
columns will be made up of 1,500 infantry, four mountain guns, and a
squadron of cavalry, and they are to be kept always ready to move out at
short notice, apart from the regular garrison of Jellalabad and
Gundamak.[37]
-----
Footnote 37:
I may here state that both these expeditions were afterwards carried
out, and their object attained.
-----
Another prisoner of some importance has been deported to India: Daoud
Shah, the ex-Commander-in-Chief of the Amir’s army, was sent down the
line a few days ago. His honesty, which for a long time many of us
believed in, seems to have been tried, and found wanting. The story that
a letter was intercepted, incriminating him in the rising, is untrue;
but that communications of some kind passed between him and the hostile
chiefs is said to have been pretty conclusively established. The exact
relations between him and Mahomed Jan may never be known; but they were
probably on the basis that, if Daoud Shah would desert the British, a
high command should be his under the new Amir, Musa Jan. His military
experience would also have been invaluable in directing such an army as
that within Cabul, and his knowledge of our cantonment and its weak
points would have made him a leader whom the tribesmen would have
confidently followed.
The Military Commission has had before it many of the prisoners taken
after December 23rd, and five men condemned to death were hanged
yesterday. Four of these were villagers of Baghwana, near which place
the four Horse Artillery guns were lost on December 11th. Captain
Guinness, of the 72nd Highlanders, has taken the place of Major Morgan,
9th foot, on the Commission, which, it will be remembered, originally
consisted at Siah Sung Camp of General Massy, Major Moriarty, and
Captain Guinness. Very few prisoners are now left for trial.
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