I just wanted to reduce the whole thing to a practical basis.

GEN. RUDENKO: Just so. You have contradicted yourself, inasmuch as in

your opinion, the most important thing was the food supply. All the

other things could follow later. It says so in the minutes. Your

contradiction does not lie in your objection to the plan itself but in

the sequence of its execution. First of all you wanted food and later

territory. Is that correct?

GÖRING: No, it is exactly as I have read it out, and there is no

sequence of aims. There is no secret.

GEN. RUDENKO: Please read it once more and tell me just where you

disagreed.

GÖRING: “After the lengthy discussion about persons and matters

concerning annexation, _et cetera_, opposing this, the Reich

Marshal stressed the main points which might be the decisive

factors for us: Securing of food supplies to the extent

necessary for economy, securing of roads, _et

cetera_—communications.”

At the time I mentioned railways, _et cetera_, that is, I wanted to

bring this extravagant talk—such as might take place in the first flush

of victory—back to the purely practical things which must be done.

GEN. RUDENKO: It is understandable that the securing of food supplies

plays an important part. However, the objection you just gave does not

mean that you objected to the annexation of the Crimea or the annexation

of other regions, is that not correct?

GÖRING: If you spoke German, then, from the sentence which says,

“opposing that, the Reich Marshal emphasized . . .” you would understand

everything that is implied. In other words, I did not say here, “I

protest against the annexation of the Crimea,” or, “I protest against

the annexation of the Baltic States.” I had no reason to do so. Had we

been victorious, then after the signing of peace we would in any case

have decided how far annexation would serve our purpose. At the moment

we had not finished the war, we had not won the war yet, and

consequently I personally confined myself to practical problems.

GEN. RUDENKO: I understand you. In that case, you considered the

annexation of these regions a step to come later. As you said yourself,

after the war was won you would have seized these provinces and annexed

them. In principle you have not protested.

GÖRING: Not in principle. As an old hunter, I acted according to the

principle of not dividing the bear’s skin before the bear was shot.

GEN. RUDENKO: I understand. And the bear’s skin should be divided only

when the territories were seized completely, is that correct?

GÖRING: Just what to do with the skin could be decided definitely only

after the bear was shot.

GEN. RUDENKO: Luckily, this did not happen.

GÖRING: Luckily for you.

GEN. RUDENKO: And so, summing this up on the basis of the replies which

you gave to my question, it has become quite clear, and I think you will

agree, that the war aims were aggressive.

GÖRING: The one and only decisive war aim was to eliminate the danger

which Russia represented to Germany.

GEN. RUDENKO: And to seize the Russian territories.

GÖRING: I have tried repeatedly to make this point clear, namely, that

before the war started this was not discussed. The answer is that the

Führer saw in the attitude of Russia, and in the lining up of troops on

our frontier, a mortal threat to Germany, and he wanted to eliminate

that threat. He felt that to be his duty. What might have been done in

peace, after a victorious war, is quite another question, which at that

time was not discussed in any way. But to reply to your question, by

that I do not mean to say that after a victorious war in the East we

would have had no thoughts of annexation.

GEN. RUDENKO: I do not wish to occupy the time of the Court in returning

to the question of the so-called preventive war, but nevertheless, since

you touched on the subject, I should like to ask you the following:

You remember the testimony of Field Marshal Milch, who stated that

neither Göring nor he wanted war with Russia. Do you remember that

testimony of your witness, Field Marshal Milch?

GÖRING: Yes, perfectly.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do remember. In that case why did you not want war

with Russia, when you saw the so-called Russian threat?

GÖRING: Firstly, I have said already that it was the Führer who saw the

danger to be so great and so imminent. Secondly, in connection with the

question put by my counsel, I stated clearly and exactly the reasons why

I believed that the danger had not yet become so imminent, and that we

should take other preparatory measures first. That was my firm

conviction.

GEN. RUDENKO: But you do not deny the testimony of your witness Milch?

GÖRING: Milch held a somewhat different opinion from mine. He considered

it a serious danger to Germany because it would mean a war on two

fronts. He was not so much of the opinion that Russia did not represent

a danger, but he held that in spite of that danger one should take the

risk and not use attack as a preventive measure against that danger. I

too held the same opinion, but of course at a different time.

GEN. RUDENKO: On the basis of your replies to questions during several

sessions, it appears there was no country on earth which you did not

regard as a threat.

GÖRING: Most of the other countries did not represent a danger to

Germany, but I personally, from 1933 on, always saw in Russia the

greatest threat.

GEN. RUDENKO: Well, of course, by “the other countries” you mean your

allies, is that right?

GÖRING: No, I am thinking of most of the other countries. If you ask me

again I would say that the danger to Germany lay, in my opinion, in

Russia’s drive towards the West. Naturally, I also saw a certain danger

in the two western countries, England and France, and in this

connection, in the event of Germany being involved in a war, I regarded

the United States to be a threat as well. As far as the other countries

were concerned, I did not consider them to be a direct threat to

Germany. In the case of the small countries, they would only constitute

a direct threat, if they were used by the large countries, as bases in a

war against Germany.

GEN. RUDENKO: Naturally the small countries did not represent the same

threat because Germany already occupied them. That has often enough been

established by the Tribunal.

GÖRING: No, a small country as such does not represent a threat, but if

another large country uses the small one against me, then the small

country too can become a danger.

GEN. RUDENKO: I do not want to discuss the thing further as it does not

relate to the question. The basic question here is Germany’s intentions

with regard to the territory of the Soviet Union, and to that you have

already answered quite affirmatively and decisively. So I will not ask

you any more questions on this subject. I shall go on to the next

question.

Do you admit that as the Delegate for the Four Year Plan you were in

full charge of the working out of the plans for the economic

exploitation of all the occupied territories, as well as the realization

of these plans?

GÖRING: I have already admitted that I assumed responsibility for the

economic policy in the occupied territories, and the directions which I

had given for the exploitation of those territories.

GEN. RUDENKO: Can you tell me how many million tons of grain and other

products were exported from the Soviet Union to Germany during the war?

GÖRING: I cannot give you the figures. How could I know that from

memory? But I am sure it is by no means as large as it was stated here.

GEN. RUDENKO: On the basis of your own documents I have the figures, but

we will pass on to that question later.

I would like to return to the same conference which has already been

mentioned. You remember the document submitted by the Soviet

Prosecution, concerning the conference of the 6th of August 1942,

Exhibit Number USSR-170, Document Number USSR-170? On 6 August 1942,

there was a conference of commissioners of the occupied regions and of

the representatives of the military command. This conference took place

under your direction. You spoke at this conference—and I would like to

remind you of some of the things you said.

GÖRING: May I have a look at these minutes?

GEN. RUDENKO: You want to see the minutes of the meeting? Certainly. It

is quite a long document. I do not intend to read the whole thing, but

only the relevant passages. I will ask you to look only at Page 111 of

this stenographic record—the place is marked with pencil—especially

the citations which I am going to quote here. On Page 111, it states:

“Gentlemen: The Führer has given me general powers on a scale

such as he has never given hitherto under the Four Year Plan. He

has also empowered me . . .”

GÖRING: Just one moment. Are you not omitting “under the Four Year

Plan”?

GEN. RUDENKO: Evidently the translation has not reached you. I mentioned

the Four Year Plan.

“He has given me additional powers under the Four Year Plan

reaching into every branch of our economic structure, whether

within the State, the Party, or the Armed Forces.”

Is it correct you were given such exclusive rights and prerogatives as

mentioned in the citation?

GÖRING: When the Four Year Plan was formulated I received extraordinary

general powers. For the first time unlimited powers were given in the

economic sphere, I received authority to issue directives and

instructions to the highest Reich departments, to the higher offices of

the Armed Forces and the Party. During the war these powers were

extended to the economic structure of the occupied countries.

GEN. RUDENKO: In that case I have stated and interpreted, correctly,

what you stated at the conference.

GÖRING: Absolutely, in spite of its being wrongly translated into

German.

GEN. RUDENKO: With regard to your special prerogatives and rights, I am

going to cite the instructions which you gave, as well as the orders you

issued to some of the members who took part in a conference held on the

16th of August, and which were binding upon them.

GÖRING: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: In that case, when you used such expressions as “squeeze

out,” “get everything possible out of the occupied territories,” such

sentences in the directives issued became orders for your subordinates,

is that not correct?

GÖRING: Naturally, they were then put into their proper form. These were

the words used in direct speech, and the language was not so polite.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand.

GÖRING: You are referring to the passage—may I repeat it:

“You certainly are not sent there to work for the welfare of the

population . . .”

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.

GÖRING: Do you mean that passage?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, Page 112. It states here, I shall read it:

“You are sent there not to work for the welfare of the

population, but for the purpose of extracting everything

possible out of these territories. That is what I expect from

you.”

GÖRING: You have left out a sentence, “. . . so that the German nation

may live . . .”

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, that is right.

GÖRING: One minute—“. . . extracting everything, so that the German

nation may live. That is what I expect from you.”

Before that it states, however, and this is the sentence I would like to

read:

“In each of the occupied territories I see the people stuffed

with food, while our own people starve.”

The sentence follows then.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny that these are your own words:

“You are sent there not to work for the welfare of the

population, but to extract everything possible . . .”

GÖRING: You have to read that in connection with the preceding part. I

do not deny that I said that.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you deny your own words as stated here?

GÖRING: No, I am telling you that I did say that. What I do object to is

the way you pick out certain things, whereas they should be taken with

their context.

GEN. RUDENKO: These phrases in the document are very expressive. They

require no comment.

I draw your attention to the following extract on Page 113, which is

also underlined. Here are some of your orders:

“One thing I will do. I will get what I demand of you, and if

you cannot do it, I will set up agencies which will get it from

you, whether you like it or not.”

Do you see that extract? Is it correct that this is what you said at the

conference?

GÖRING: That quotation has not been translated by the interpreter as it

is written down here in the original. The interpreter who is translating

your words into German is using many strong expressions which are not

contained in this document. Squeeze out . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: Please read your original.

GÖRING: It says here “to get from and obtain.” Between “to get from and

obtain,” and “to squeeze out,” there is a vast difference in German.

GEN. RUDENKO: To “get out” and to “squeeze out” is about the same thing.

And what about the phrase, “I will set up agencies, which will squeeze

it out of you.” What have you got?

GÖRING: “Get from” and not “squeeze out of.”

GEN. RUDENKO: “Get from”? Did you have any cause not to trust the Reich

commissioners? You refer to them as “special agencies.”

GÖRING: Not only were the Reich commissioners of the Eastern territories

present, but also the commissioners of all territories. It was a

question of the contribution in foodstuffs which the separate countries

had to make, to enable us to deal with the whole food question in all

those areas in Europe occupied by us. Before the conference I had been

told that it was to be expected, as is always the case in such a

situation, that everyone would hold back and get the other fellow to

deliver first. In other words, I did not want these fellows to let me

down. I knew they would offer me only half and I demanded 100 percent.

We could then meet somewhere half way.

GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you—these demands which you made to those present

at the conference, did they not mean a ruthless plundering of the

occupied territories?

GÖRING: No, the main question at this conference was more food.

GEN. RUDENKO: But I am talking about plunder. Plunder can mean

plundering of food from the occupied territories?

GÖRING: I have just said I was responsible for the feeding of

practically the whole territory. Some of it was territory which had to

be provided with food, and some had a surplus, and it had to be

equalized.

At this meeting the contribution to be made by each Reich commissioner

was for the most part fixed at 90 percent, and I in no way deny that in

making my demands at the meeting I was worked up and used strong words.

Later on the exact figures for the deliveries were laid down, and this

was the net result of the meeting.

GEN. RUDENKO: I want to draw your attention to Page 118 Here it states

as follows, I quote your words, Page 118, please; have you found the

place?

GÖRING: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Here it says:

“It seemed to me to be a relatively simple matter in former

days. It used to be called plundering. It was up to the party in

question to carry off what had been conquered. But today things

have become more humane. In spite of that, I intend to plunder

and to do it thoroughly.”

Have you found the sentence?

GÖRING: Yes, I have found it, and that was exactly what I said at that

conference. I emphasize that again.

GEN. RUDENKO: I just wanted to ascertain that you really said that.

GÖRING: I did say that, and now I should like to give you the reason. In

making that statement I meant that in former times war fed on war. Today

you call it something different, but in practice it remains the same.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. I draw your attention to Page 119. There,

addressing those present at the meeting you state:

“Whenever you come across anything that may be needed by the

German people, you must be after it like a bloodhound. It must

be taken out of store and brought to Germany.”

Have you found that place?

GÖRING: Yes, I have found it.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you say that?

GÖRING: I certainly assume that I did say it; yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You did say that. This sentence is the natural logical

conclusion of your directions “to plunder and do it thoroughly.”

GÖRING: No, it is not. Just after that I said that I had issued a decree

authorizing the soldiers to buy up what they wanted, as much as they

wanted, and as much as they could carry. Just buy up everything.

GEN. RUDENKO: You mention soldiers. I wanted to remind you of this too,

and as you have quoted it, I will refer to that sentence again. You

said, “Soldiers may purchase as much as they want, what they want, and

what they can carry away.”

GÖRING: As much as they can carry away, yes, and that was necessary

because the custom authorities had issued a restrictive order whereby a

soldier could take only a small parcel. It seemed wrong to me, that a

soldier, who had fought should benefit the least from victory.

GEN. RUDENKO: So that you do not deny that the extract which has just

been read is what you really said in your speech of 6 August 1942.

GÖRING: I do not deny that at all.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Let us go to the next question. Do you admit

that as Delegate for the Four Year Plan you directed the deportation to

forced labor of millions of citizens from the occupied territories, and

that the Defendant Sauckel was your immediate subordinate in this

activity? Do you admit that?

GÖRING: On paper he was my subordinate, but he was actually directly

subordinate to the Führer. I have already emphasized that to the extent

that I was informed, I will take my part of the responsibility; and of

course I knew about these statements.

GEN. RUDENKO: I want to draw your attention to your other remarks at the

same conference. You will find that on Pages 141 and 142.

GÖRING: That has already been read to the Tribunal.

GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to ask you now if you have found the place?

GÖRING: I have found it.

GEN. RUDENKO: You have found it. You said at this conference:

“I do not want to praise Gauleiter Sauckel, he does not need it.

But what he has accomplished in such a short time and with such

speed for the recruitment of manpower from all over Europe and

setting them to work in our industries, is a unique

achievement.”

Further, on Page 142, you say—you were speaking of Koch:

“Koch, they are not only Ukrainians. Your ridiculous 500,000

people! How many has he brought in? Nearly two million! Where

did he get the others?”

Did you find the place?

GÖRING: Yes; it does not read quite like that here.

GEN. RUDENKO: It was not explicit. Make it more precise.

GÖRING: Koch is trying to assert that he alone supplied all these people

for Sauckel. Whereupon, I replied that for the whole Sauckel program

2,000,000 workers had been supplied and that he, Koch, could lay claim

to have supplied only 500,000, at most. In other words, Koch was

claiming that he himself had supplied the total number.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you think that 500,000 from the Ukraine was a small

number?

GÖRING: No, that is not the point. I have just explained. Of these

2,000,000 which represent the total supplied by Sauckel in the past,

500,000 came from the whole of the Ukraine, so that Koch did not produce

the whole number as he was trying to assert. That is the meaning of the

quotation.

GEN. RUDENKO: But you do not deny the underlying meaning that you were

speaking here of millions of people who were carried off forcibly to

Germany for slave labor.

GÖRING: I do not deny that I was speaking of 2,000,000 workers who had

been called up, but whether they were all brought to Germany I cannot

say at the moment. At any rate, they were used for the German economy.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny that this was forced labor, slavery?

GÖRING: Slavery, that I deny. Forced labor did of course partly come

into it, and the reason for that I have already stated.

GEN. RUDENKO: But they were forcibly taken out of their countries and

sent to Germany?

GÖRING: To a certain extent deported forcibly, and I have already

explained why.

GEN. RUDENKO: You heard, Defendant Göring, that a series of German

documents have been read which make it clear that these people from the

occupied territories were sent forcibly to Germany; that they were

rounded up, taken in the street, and from the cinemas, loaded into

trains and sent to Germany under military guard. If they refused to go

to Germany, or tried to evade mobilization, the peaceful inhabitants

were shot and submitted to tortures of various nature. You have heard of

these documents which describe these methods.

GÖRING: Yes, but may I ask you to look at those documents again. These

show that recruitment was not ordered, but that registration even for

forced labor was regulated by decrees and other orders. If I had been

given an absolute guarantee, particularly in the East, that all these

people would be peaceful and peace-loving people, that they would never

take part in partisan activities or carry out sabotage, then I probably

would have put a larger number to work on the spot. But for security

reasons, both in the East and West—particularly in the West—where

young age groups were reaching the age of military service—we were

compelled to draft these men into labor and bring them to Germany.

GEN. RUDENKO: They were taken to Germany only in the interest of

security and safety?

GÖRING: There were two reasons. I have already explained them in detail.

Firstly, for security reasons. Secondly, because it was necessary to

find labor.

GEN. RUDENKO: And for that reason—let us take the second, the necessity

of finding labor—people were forcibly taken from their country and sent

to slavery in Germany. Is that correct?

GÖRING: Not to slavery; they were sent to Germany to work, but I must

repeat that not all of those who were taken away from the East and are

missing there today, were brought in to work. For instance, in the case

of Poland already 1,680,000 Poles and Ukrainians had been taken by the

Soviet Union from the territory which the Russians occupied at that

time, and transported to the East—the Far East.

GEN. RUDENKO: I do not think you had better touch on the question of the

Soviet territories. Just answer the question which I am asking you,

which concerns the deportation to Germany of the peaceful population

from the occupied territories. I am asking you once more: You said in

answer to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe’s question that of the 5,000,000

persons who were sent to Germany, approximately 200,000 were volunteers,

while the rest were taken to Germany forcibly. Is that not so?

GÖRING: First of all, I must correct that. I did not say that to Sir

David at all, but he asked me.

GEN. RUDENKO: And you admitted it?

GÖRING: Just a moment. That is to say, he mentioned the figure 5,000,000

of which he said not more than 200,000 were volunteers. He questioned me

on the strength of the minutes of the Central Planning Board, allegedly

a statement by Sauckel. I did not agree and answered that the figure of

volunteers was much higher, and that there must be a mistake in the

figures.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. You affirm that the number of volunteers was

considerably larger, but you do not deny the fact that millions were

sent to Germany against their will. You do not deny that.

GÖRING: Without wanting to tie myself down to a figure, the fact that

workers were forcibly put to work is something I have never denied, and

I answered accordingly.

GEN. RUDENKO: Let us go to another question: Tell me, what procedure was

there for sending on the orders and directives of the OKW to various

other government agencies and organs.

GÖRING: I did not understand the meaning of that question as it came

through in translation.

GEN. RUDENKO: I would like you to describe the procedure which existed

for sending the directives of the OKW to the various units and

departments of the Air Force and other organs. How were they

distributed?

GÖRING: If I have understood the question correctly, the procedure was

as follows: If an order came from the OKW, addressed to the Air Force,

it went through the following channels: If it was a direct order from

the Führer and signed by the Führer, the order had to be sent directly

to me, the Commander-in-Chief. If it was an order—not actually signed

by the Führer, but beginning with the words, “By order of the Führer,”

or “On the instructions of the Führer”—such an order, according to its

importance, would go to the Chief of the General Staff of my Air Force,

who, according to the purport and whether it was important, would report

it to me verbally. If, however, it dealt with current and departmental

matters the order would go immediately and directly to the lower

departments concerned without passing through the High Command. It would

have been impossible to work otherwise, owing to the very large number

of such orders.

GEN. RUDENKO: I understand. In connection with this I would like to ask

the following: In 1941 the OKW drew up a series of instructions and

orders with regard to the conduct of the troops in the East and how they

were to treat the Soviet population. These dealt specifically with

military jurisdiction in the Barbarossa region—Document C-50, which has

already been submitted to the Tribunal. According to these instructions,

the German officers had the right to shoot any person suspected of a

hostile attitude towards the Germans, without bringing that person to

court. This directive also stated that the German soldiers could not be

punished for crimes which they committed against the local population.

Directives of this nature must have been submitted to you?

GÖRING: I would have to see that from the distribution chart. May I see

the document please?

GEN. RUDENKO: You would like to see the exhibit?

GÖRING: I want to see whether that document went straight to me, or only

to my departments.

GEN. RUDENKO: Please look at the date, 13 May 1941.

GÖRING: Actually it did not go straight to me. It says on the

distribution chart, “Ob. d. L., Air Force Operations Staff, Senior

General Staff officer.” Actually as far as my troops were concerned, I

issued very severe disciplinary orders. That is the reason why I have

asked for the senior Judge of the Air Force to be called as a witness,

and have now sent him an interrogatory which deals with these very

questions.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do know about this order, however?

GÖRING: I have seen it here, and consequently asked for the witnesses,

since this order did not go directly to the Commander-in-Chief, but to

the department which I have just mentioned. Nevertheless, if this

department acted on this order, then I do of course formally share the

responsibility. But we are here concerned with an order from the Führer

and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, which could not be questioned

by the troops.

GEN. RUDENKO: But you do agree that you must have known about this

document because of its importance?

GÖRING: No, if so, it would have come directly to me, the

Commander-in-Chief, and not be sent to the Air Force Operations Staff,

and the General Staff officers’ department. It depended then on whether

this department considered the importance of the document to be such as

to require my personal orders and directives. But this was not the case

here, since the document did not affect us as much as it did the Army.

GEN. RUDENKO: But the document was sent to your department and

circulated there.

GÖRING: I have just said it was sent to two offices.

GEN. RUDENKO: But this document should have been reported to you.

GÖRING: No, it did not have to be reported to me. I explained a little

earlier that if every order and every instruction which came through in

the shape of an order, but which did not require my intervention, would

have had to be reported to me, I should have been drowned in a sea of

papers; and that is the reason why only the most important matters were

brought to me and reported to me.

I cannot swear upon my oath that this document was not reported to me

verbally. It is possible. And I formally take responsibility also for my

departments.

GEN. RUDENKO: I would like you to be more precise about it. You say that

the most important things were usually reported to you; correct?

GÖRING: That is correct.

GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to draw your attention to the document before

you, to the third and fourth paragraphs of the order. The third

paragraph says:

“Actions of hostile civilians against the German troops or

various troop units, as well as against service personnel, must

be suppressed on the spot by the most severe measures, even the

extermination of the attackers.”

Paragraph 4: “Thus, no time should be lost . . .”

GÖRING: Just a moment.

GEN. RUDENKO: The fourth paragraph . . .

GÖRING: You have sent me three documents, and I am trying to find out

which one; I am trying to sort them out.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right, sort them out.

GÖRING: I shall repeat Paragraph 3 because it has been transmitted quite

erroneously in the German.

“Also in the case of all other attacks by hostile civilians

against the Armed Forces, their members and service personnel,

extreme measures to suppress them must be taken by the troops on

the spot, even to the extent of annihilating the attackers.”

GEN. RUDENKO: And Paragraph 4?

GÖRING: Then we come to Number 4, and it is, if I understand you

correctly, the paragraph where it says: “Where measures of this kind

have been omitted or were not practicable at the moment, the suspected

elements will be taken at once to an officer who will decide whether

they are to be shot.” That is probably what you meant, is it not?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes. That is what I had in mind. Could it be assumed that

this document, from your point of view, was important enough to have

been reported to you?

GÖRING: Actually it was important, but it was not absolutely necessary

for it to be reported, because the order of the Führer had made it so

clear that a subordinate commander, and even a commander-in-chief of one

of the services could not alter a clear and strict order of that kind.

GEN. RUDENKO: I draw your attention once more to the date in the

right-hand corner. It states there, Führer headquarters, 13 May 1941.

GÖRING: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore, it means that this was a month before the

German attack on the Soviet Union? Already, then, directives were

formulated about military jurisdiction within the regions covered by

Case Barbarossa, and you did not know about this document?

GÖRING: When a plan for mobilization is laid, provision must be made for

certain eventualities. From his experience, the Führer believed that a

serious threat would immediately arise in the East, and in this document

measures are laid down for dealing with any action by the resistance,

and fighting behind the lines. It was therefore a precautionary order in

case of such happenings. Such measures have to be taken always and at

all times.

GEN. RUDENKO: And the officers were given the right to shoot civilians

without bringing them to trial?

GÖRING: An officer could hold a court martial on the spot, but,

according to this paragraph, he could also, if he thought fit and had

evidence that the opponent was making attacks from the rear, have him

shot on the spot. That has always been done.

GEN. RUDENKO: You think that the officer can hold a court martial on the

spot?

GÖRING: That is laid down in the articles of war. Every officer

commanding an independent unit can hold a court martial at any time.

GEN. RUDENKO: But you do agree that there is no question of any court

here? It states that he alone can decide what to do with the civilian.

GÖRING: He could act alone or through a court martial, which was on the

spot. All he needed to do was to call just two more people, and he could

reach a decision, in 2 or 5 minutes if evidence of the attack was given.

GEN. RUDENKO: In 5 minutes or 2 minutes, you say, and then he could

shoot the person?

GÖRING: If I catch a man in the act of shooting at my troops from a

house in the rear, then the matter can be settled very swiftly by a

court martial. But where there is no evidence at all, you cannot do

that. Here, however, we are dealing with an immediate attack and with

the means of putting an end to it.

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Göring, let us leave this question. I would only

like to point out once more that this directive was issued by the High

Command of the Armed Forces on 13 May 1941, and that this order gives an

officer the right to shoot a man without a trial. I suppose you will not

deny this. Let us go on.

GÖRING: Yes, but I deny that emphatically. There is nothing here which

says that an officer has the right to shoot a man right away. Let us get

this right. It says here—and I repeat it—“Attacks by hostile civilians

against the Armed Forces,” and then it says, “Where measures of this

kind are not practicable at the moment, the suspected elements

. . .”—and here is meant “suspected elements” only—are to be brought

before the highest officer of the formation there present and he will

decide the matter. In other words, it does not say that every officer

can decide the fate of any civilian.

GEN. RUDENKO: But the resolution is to shoot. It is quite clear. The

second document which I would like to submit now and question you about

is that dated 16 September 1941. It has been submitted to the Court as

Exhibit Number R-98.

GÖRING: Just a moment. What was the date you mentioned?

GEN. RUDENKO: 16 September 1941 is the date of the document. Point B of

the document. I will not quote it. I am merely calling it to your mind.

It states that as a general rule the death of one German soldier must be

paid for by the lives of 50 to 100 Communists. That means that this rule

was to serve as a deterrent. I am not going to question you about the

main purport of the document. That is quite clear and needs no

clarification. What I am interested in is whether this document was

likewise unknown to you.

GÖRING: It was not directed to me. Here again it merely went to some

office. The Air Force had very little to do with such matters.

GEN. RUDENKO: And these offices did not report to you about such

documents?

GÖRING: In a general way I knew about these reprisals, but not to this

extent. I learned only later—I mean during the war, not here—that the

order originally mentioned 5 to 10 and that the Führer personally made

it 50 to a 100. The question is whether you have any evidence that the

Air Force really made use of the order anywhere, and they did not. That

is all I can tell you.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do not put questions to me. I am asking you. Did your

administrative office ever report to you about this document?

GÖRING: No, but later on I heard about this document. At a later date.

GEN. RUDENKO: What do you mean by a “later date”? Please be more

precise.

GÖRING: I cannot tell you at the moment. It was sometime during the war

that I heard that a figure which originally stood at from 5 to 10 had

been altered by the Führer personally to 50 to 100. That is what I

heard.

GEN. RUDENKO: For one German?

GÖRING: I have just explained to you. That is what I heard. The number

was originally 5 to 10 and the Führer personally added on a zero. It was

through that fact being once discussed that I learned about the whole

matter.

GEN. RUDENKO: You mean the Führer added the zeros?

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, do you think it is really necessary to

go through these documents in such detail? The documents, after all,

speak for themselves, and they have already been presented to the

Tribunal.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am finishing with this document, Mr. President.

Do you know anything about the directives of the OKW with regard to the

treatment of Soviet prisoners of war?

GÖRING: I shall have to see them.

GEN. RUDENKO: If you please, Mr. President, the document has already

been submitted to the Tribunal, as 338-PS.

Please look at Point A, Paragraph 3, which states that there is a broad

directive concerning the use of arms against Soviet prisoners of war.

The use of weapons must be considered permissible and in any incidents

involved the guards are not bound to report on the matter.

This document also speaks for itself. I do not want . . .

GÖRING: Just a moment, I must read it first; there is some ambiguity in

here.

GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to refresh your memory with still another

subject, that is, a short comment. It is taken from an order concerning

the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. Here it is said that prisoners

of war who are trying to escape should be shot without warning. The same

subject is also mentioned in the memorandum concerning the treatment of

the Russian prisoners of war.

GÖRING: The trouble here was the language difficulty; hence the guards

were instructed to use their arms immediately against persons attempting

escape. That is more or less the meaning of it, and that errors might

occur in this connection can be understood.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am not talking about the purport of the document which

speaks for itself. I want to know whether you knew about this document.

GÖRING: This is a document dealing with the treatment of prisoners of

war, and it was passed directly to my department which was concerned

with prisoners of war. I did not know of this document, neither did I

know of the one which contains the opinion of the Foreign Intelligence

Department on the matter.

GEN. RUDENKO: You did not know about this document? Very well. Now one

other, Number 884-PS, already submitted. It deals with the extermination

of political leaders and other political personalities. This is a

document . . .

GÖRING: In explanation of this, I should like to point out that the Air

Force did not have any camps for Soviet prisoners of war. The Air Force

had only six camps in which the air force personnel of other powers were

confined; but it had no camps under it with Soviet prisoners of war.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have asked you these questions and shown you these

documents because as the second man in Germany, you could not possibly

have been unaware of these things.

GÖRING: I apologize if I contradict you. The higher the office I held,

the less would I be concerned with orders dealing with prisoners of war.

From their very nature, these were departmental orders and not orders of

the highest political or military significance. If I had held a much

lower rank, then I might have had more knowledge of these orders. I am

now looking at the document which you submitted to me—Department of

Home Defense. It says on the left, “Reference: Treatment of Captured

Political and Military Russian Functionaries.” That is the document I am

looking at.

GEN. RUDENKO: Please look at the date of the document—12 May 1941,

Führer’s Headquarters.

GÖRING: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Look at Paragraph 3 of the document.

“Political leaders among the troops are not to be considered

prisoners of war and must be exterminated at the latest in the

transit camps. They must never be transported to the rear.”

Did you know about this directive?

GÖRING: May I point out that this is in no way a directive, but that it

bears the heading, “Memorandum,” and is signed Warlimont. Also the

distribution chart does not show any other department than the Home

Defense Department, which I have mentioned. In other words, this is a

memorandum.

GEN. RUDENKO: You mean to say then that you did not know about this

document?

GÖRING: I say once more, this is a memorandum from the Operations Staff

of the OKW; and it is not an order or a directive, but a memorandum.

THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. You are telling us

what it was, not whether you knew of it.

GÖRING: No; I did not. It had been put before me as an order, and I

wanted to point out that it is not an order.

GEN. RUDENKO: Let us go on. The directives regarding the treatment of

Soviet prisoners of war must have been executed also by the units of the

Luftwaffe?

GÖRING: If ordered by the Führer, yes; or if ordered by me, also.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you remember your own directives with regard to the

treatment of Soviet prisoners of war?

GÖRING: No.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not remember them?

GÖRING: The Air Force had no camps with Soviet prisoners of war.

GEN. RUDENKO: Tell me, the majority of these criminal orders and

directives of the OKW, were they not issued even before the beginning of

the war against the Soviet Union and as part of the preparations for

that war? Does this not show that the German Government and the OKW

already had a prepared plan for exterminating the Soviet population?

GÖRING: No. It does not prove it at all. It only shows that we

considered a struggle with the Soviet Union would be an extremely bitter

one, and that it would be conducted according to other rules as there

were no conventions.

GEN. RUDENKO: These rules of warfare are well known to us. Please tell

me, do you know about Himmler’s directives given in 1941 about the

extermination of 30 million Slavs? You heard about it from the witness

Von dem Bach-Zelewski here in court. Do you remember that?

GÖRING: Yes. First of all it was not an order but a speech. Secondly, it

was an assertion by Zelewski. And thirdly, in all speeches that Himmler

made to subordinate leaders, he insisted on the strictest secrecy. In

other words, this is a statement from a witness about what he had heard,

and not an order. Consequently, I have no knowledge of this nonsense.

GEN. RUDENKO: You did not know about it. Very well. Tell me, in the

German totalitarian state was there not a governing center, which meant

Hitler and his immediate entourage, in which you acted as deputy? These

directives must have concerned Keitel and Himmler also. Could Himmler of

his own volition have issued directives for the extermination of 30

million Slavs without being empowered by Hitler or by you?

GÖRING: Himmler gave no order for the extermination of 30 million Slavs.

The witness said that he made a speech in which he said that 30 million

Slavs must be exterminated. Had Himmler issued such an order _de facto_,

if he kept to regulations, he would have had to ask the Führer—not me,

but the Führer—and the latter would probably have told him at once that

it was impossible.

GEN. RUDENKO: I did not say it was an order; I said it was a directive

from Himmler. You therefore admit, or you state rather, that Himmler

could have issued instructions without discussing them with Hitler?

GÖRING: I emphasize that such instructions could not have been given by

Himmler, and I know of no instructions; also no directive has been

mentioned here.

GEN. RUDENKO: I shall repeat the question once more: Is it not true that

the directives and the orders of the OKW with regard to the treatment of

the civilian population and prisoners of war in the occupied Soviet

territories were part of the general directives for the extermination of

the Slavs? That is what I want to know.

GÖRING: Not at all. At no time has there been a directive from the

Führer, or anybody I know of, concerning the extermination of the Slavs.

GEN. RUDENKO: You must have known about the mass extermination of the

Soviet citizens from the occupied territories of the Soviet Union with

the help of the SD and the Security Police. Is it not true that the

Einsatz Kommandos and their activities were the result of the plan

prepared in advance for the extermination of Jews and other groups of

Soviet citizens?

GÖRING: No. Einsatz Kommandos were an internal organ which was kept very

secret.

GEN. RUDENKO: I shall have several other questions. Perhaps it is better

to adjourn now.

THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take, General Rudenko?

GEN. RUDENKO: I think not more than another hour.

THE PRESIDENT: All these documents which you have been putting to the

witness, as I have pointed out to you, are documents which have already

been put in evidence and documents which seem to me to speak for

themselves. I hope, therefore, that you will make your cross-examination

as short as you can. The Tribunal will now adjourn.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 22 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]

EIGHTY-EIGHTH DAY

Friday, 22 March 1946

_Morning Session_

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, yesterday I received the translation of

Document D-728. It is the document which was objected to yesterday as

being incorrect.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. SERVATIUS: I request to have this retranslated, since this

translation is considerably different from the original wording and, in

particular, fails to make clear where the mistakes are which led to the

objection against the document. On the first page of that document there

are about 20 to 30 objections to be made. The translator, since he could

not realize the importance of the document, translated it quickly

without emphasizing the decisive points. A careful translation ought to

be made, which would enable us to get an idea of the original document.

I am fully aware of what the difficulties are.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, the translation shall be checked by a

different translator, or, if you like, by two different translators.

DR. SERVATIUS: May I ask to have a new translation made for comparison,

since the version which we have here is also evidence of the fact that

the original already contains considerable mistakes.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, it shall be checked and retranslated.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then, I request further that the opinion of an expert on

the German language be obtained. This opinion will ascertain that the

author of this document does not have full control of the German

language and that it must have been drawn up by someone who was a

foreigner. I do not want to give detailed reasons, but I would like to

make this motion in writing.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you must certainly make a written application

about that.

DR. SERVATIUS: I shall submit it in writing.

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Göring, in your statement you said that the

attack on Poland was perpetrated after the bloody happenings in the town

of Bromberg.

GÖRING: I said that the date for the attack was set due to the bloody

events which included, in addition to many other incidents, also the

Bloody Sunday at Bromberg.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know that these events happened on 3 September

1939?

GÖRING: I might have made a mistake regarding the date of Bromberg; I

would have to see the documents about that. I merely quoted that as one

example among a lot of others.

GEN. RUDENKO: It is understandable. The attack was perpetrated on 1

September, and the events in the town of Bromberg, which you just

mentioned to the Tribunal, happened on 3 September 1939. I submit to the

Tribunal the document evidence issued by the High Commission for the

Investigation of German Crimes in Poland, which is duly certified in

accordance with Article 21 of the Charter. From this testimony it is

clear that the events about which the Defendant Göring is testifying

here happened on 3 September 1939, that is to say, on the third day

after the attack by Germany on Poland.

THE PRESIDENT: You can put the document to the witness, if you want.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have no German text. I have it in English and in

Russian. I just received this document. It is dated 19 March, and I will

submit it to the Tribunal as conclusive evidence to prove this fact.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think this is the appropriate time to put in

documents in that way.

Very well, you can put in the document now if you like.

GEN. RUDENKO: Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: It must be translated into German, of course.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have no German translation of this document.

THE PRESIDENT: It has to be translated into German in order that

defendant’s counsel may see it.

GEN. RUDENKO: We will do that without fail.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, may I ask to have the document read now? It

is only a short memorandum; so we can hear immediately what it contains.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Will you read it into the record, General

Rudenko?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, Sir. It is very short:

“Certificate Based on the Investigation Performed by the Polish

Legal Authority.

“The High Commission for the Investigation of German Crimes in

Poland certifies that the so-called Bloody Sunday in the town of

Bromberg took place on 3 September 1939, that is to say, 3 days

after the time when Poland was subjected to the German attack.

“On 3 September 1939, at 1015 in the morning, German Fifth

Columnists attacked Polish troop units retreating from Bromberg.

During the fighting 238 Polish soldiers and 223 German Fifth

Columnists were killed. As a consequence of the events after the

entrance of the German troops into the town of Bromberg, they

began mass executions, arrests, and deportations of Polish

citizens to concentration camps, which were performed by the

German authorities, the SS, and the Gestapo. There were 10,500

murdered, and 13,000 exterminated in the camps.

“This certificate is an official document of the Polish

Government and is submitted to the International Military

Tribunal in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter of 8

August 1945.

“Stefan Kurovsky, member of the High Commission for the

Investigation of German Crimes in Poland.”

I should like to prove by this document that the events regarding which

the Defendant Göring gave testimony happened after the attack by Germany

on Poland.

GÖRING: I am not sure whether we are both referring to the same event.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am speaking about the events in the town of Bromberg.

You spoke about them.

GÖRING: Perhaps two different events took place in Bromberg.

GEN. RUDENKO: It is quite possible.

I pass on to the following question: It is known to you that there was

an order by the OKW regarding the branding of Soviet prisoners of war,

and what do you think about that?

GÖRING: That order is not known to me, and no representative of the Air

Force was present at this preliminary discussion as I have ascertained

here from the records.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am interested as to whether you knew about this or not.

The orders are quite clear.

GÖRING: No.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know that the German High Command ordered that

Soviet war prisoners and Soviet citizens had to be used for clearing

mine fields and transporting bombs that had not exploded, _et cetera_?

Do you know about that?

GÖRING: I know that Russian prisoners of war who were engineers had to

clear the mines which they had laid. To what extent the civilian

population was employed for that purpose I do not know, but it was

possible.

GEN. RUDENKO: It is quite clear.

Do you know about an order regarding the destruction of the towns of

Leningrad, Moscow, and other towns of the Soviet Union?

GÖRING: In my presence the destruction of Leningrad was discussed only

in the document which was mentioned yesterday, in the sense that the

Finns, in case of the capture of Leningrad, would have no use for such a

big city. Of the destruction of Moscow I know nothing at all.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you remember the minutes of the meeting? This document

was presented to you yesterday—the minutes of the meeting of 16 July

1941. You were present at this meeting. They state that the Führer

declared . . .

GÖRING: I have just mentioned and confirmed that.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you speak about this same document? But, besides this

statement, there were also official orders.

GÖRING: Would you be good enough to put them before me, then I would be

able to ascertain whether they are correct and whether they were known

to me.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have no intention of submitting these documents to you.

They have already been submitted to the Tribunal. I am interested only

as to whether you were aware of these orders.

GÖRING: I received no order to destroy Leningrad or Moscow in the sense

which you have indicated.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. You were told only about the important

happenings. But orders for the destruction of cities, and murder of

millions of men, _et cetera_, went through so-called service channels.

GÖRING: If a town was to have been destroyed by bombing, then that order

would have been given by me directly.

GEN. RUDENKO: On 8 March, here in the Tribunal, your witness Bodenschatz

stated that you told him in March 1945 that many Jews were killed and

that for that you will have to pay dearly. Do you remember this

testimony of your witness?

GÖRING: This testimony, in the form in which it was translated now, I do

not recollect at all. The witness Bodenschatz never said it that way. I

ask that the record of the session be brought in.

GEN. RUDENKO: How did Bodenschatz say that? Do you remember?

GÖRING: That if we lost the war we would have to pay dearly.

GEN. RUDENKO: Why? For the murders which you had perpetrated?

GÖRING: No, quite generally, and after all, we have experienced just

that.

GEN. RUDENKO: Quite generally. I have a few concluding questions to put

to you. First of all, regarding the so-called theory of the master race.

I should like to put to you only one question in this connection and I

should like you to reply directly to it. Were you in accord with this

principle of the master race and education of the German people in the

spirit of it, or were you not in accord with it?

GÖRING: No, and I have also stated that I have never used that

expression either in writing or orally. I definitely acknowledge the

differences between races.

GEN. RUDENKO: But do I understand you correctly that you are not in

accord with this theory?

GÖRING: I have never expressed my agreement with the theory that one

race should be considered as a master race, superior to the others, but

I have emphasized the difference between races.

GEN. RUDENKO: You can answer this question; it seems, you do not

consider it right?

GÖRING: I personally do not consider it right.

GEN. RUDENKO: The next question: You have stated here to the Tribunal

that you did not agree with Hitler regarding the question of the

annexation of Czechoslovakia, the Jewish question, the question of war

with the Soviet Union, the value of the theory of the master race, and

the question of the shooting of the British airmen who were prisoners of

war. How would you explain that, having such serious differences, you

still thought it possible to collaborate with Hitler and to carry out

his policy?

GÖRING: That was not the way I worded my answers. Here, too, we must

consider separately various periods of time. As to the attack against

Russia, there were no basic differences but differences as to the date.

GEN. RUDENKO: You have told that already. Excuse me; I do not want you

to be lengthy on this theme. Will you reply directly?

GÖRING: All right. I may have a different opinion from that of my

Supreme Commander, and I may also express my opinion clearly. If the

Supreme Commander insists on his opinion and I have sworn allegiance to

him, then the discussion comes to an end, just as it is the case

elsewhere. I do not think I need to elaborate on that.

GEN. RUDENKO: You are not just a simple soldier, as you stated here; but

you have presented yourself also as a statesman?

GÖRING: There you are right. I am not only a simple soldier, and just

because I am not a simple soldier but occupied such a prominent

position, I had to set an example for the ordinary soldier by my own

attitude as to how the oath of allegiance should be adhered to strictly.

GEN. RUDENKO: In other words, you thought it possible, even with the

presence of these differences, to collaborate with Hitler?

GÖRING: I have emphasized it and I maintain that it is true; My oath

does not hold good only in good times but also in bad times, although

the Führer never threatened me and never told me that he was afraid for

my health.

GEN. RUDENKO: If you thought it possible to co-operate with Hitler, do

you recognize that, as the second man in Germany, you are responsible

for the organizing on a national, scale of murders of millions of

innocent people, independently of whether you knew about those facts or

not? Tell me briefly, “yes” or “no.”

GÖRING: No, because I did not know anything about them and did not cause

them.

GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to underline again, “whether you were

informed of these facts or not.”

GÖRING: If I actually do not know them, then I cannot be held

responsible for them.

GEN. RUDENKO: It was your duty to know about these facts.

GÖRING: I shall go into that.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am questioning you. Reply to this question: Was it your

duty to know about these facts?

GÖRING: In what way my duty? Either I know the fact or I do not know it.

You can ask me only whether I was negligent in failing to obtain

knowledge.

GEN. RUDENKO: You ought to know yourself better. Millions of Germans

knew about the crimes which were being perpetrated, and you did not know

about them?

GÖRING: Neither did millions of Germans know about them. That is a

statement which has in no way been proved.

GEN. RUDENKO: The last two questions: You stated to the Tribunal that

Hitler’s Government brought great prosperity to Germany. Are you still

sure that that is so?

GÖRING: Definitely until the beginning of the war. The collapse was due

only to the war’s being lost.

GEN. RUDENKO: As a consequence of which, you brought Germany, as a

result of your politics, to military and political destruction. I have

no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Chief Prosecutor for France wish to

cross-examine?

M. AUGUSTE CHAMPETIER DE RIBES (Chief Prosecutor for the French

Republic): I ask the Tribunal for permission to make one very short

statement to fulfill the desire expressed by the Tribunal and to

abbreviate as much as possible the discussions at this Trial. The French

Prosecution has come to an agreement with Mr. Justice Jackson and with

Sir David that the questions put to the Defendant Göring as a witness

should be only those which are considered pertinent.

The questions have been asked and we have heard the answers of the

defendant, as far as it was possible to obtain from him anything except

propaganda speeches.

I think the Defense will not be able to complain that its freedom has

been curtailed. It has been able to use its freedom abundantly in the

past 12 sessions without having been able in any way to weaken the

Prosecution’s overwhelming accusations, without having been noticeably

able to convince anyone that the second man in the German Reich was in

no way responsible for launching the war or that he knew nothing of the

atrocities committed by the men whom he was so proud to command.

THE PRESIDENT: You will no doubt have the opportunity later to comment,

but the question that I ask you now is whether you wish to ask the

witness definite questions.

M. CHAMPETIER DE RIBES: Mr. President, I have finished; I have said all

that I wanted to say, that is to say, after all these long discussions,

the French Prosecution feels that nothing has been changed in the

crushing accusation which we brought forth. Consequently, I have no

further questions to ask the defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer?

DR. STAHMER: The British Prosecution has stated that you issued direct

orders to the Hermann Göring Division during its employment in Italy

referring to the fight against the partisans. Is that statement correct?

GÖRING: No. The Hermann Göring Division was a ground division and was

part of the operational task force of an army and army group.

Consequently, it could never have received orders for its tactical

employment from me, from Berlin or from my headquarters, which were not

on the scene. Therefore I could not have given it any orders as to

whether and how it was to be employed in the partisan war. Only such

orders are in question as referred exclusively to matters of personnel

and equipment or which concerned the internal administration of justice

with regard to officers; nor did the division submit to me daily reports

but only . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did not catch that. I am sorry, My Lord, I

should have spoken earlier. I gather that these questions are directed

to the Hermann Göring Division. The defendant never dealt with that

point when he was being examined in chief; and, therefore, I never dealt

with it in cross-examination, because the point had not been raised. It

is therefore my submission that it is quite inadmissible for the matter

to be raised in re-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: You must remember, Sir David, that the practice in

foreign countries is not the same as the practice in the United States

and in England; and although it is perfectly true that Dr. Stahmer,

according to the rules of England at any rate, would not be able to

raise this point in re-examination, we are directed by the Charter not

to deal technically with any question of evidence. It may be you would

have to ask him some questions thereafter in cross-examination, although

I hope that will not be necessary, in view of the evidence of the

witness Kesselring.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I considered that point, but I wanted only to

make it clear that the Prosecution has not dealt with this point at all,

because it had not been raised previously.

THE PRESIDENT: No; either in the examination or in the

cross-examination.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Or in the cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I had already noticed the point that the

question had not been raised in the evidence of Hermann Göring.

DR. STAHMER: May I, in explanation, assert that I received the document

only yesterday and consequently could not take any attitude earlier

toward this question, which has been dealt with already by the

Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: But, if my recollection is correct, the witness, Field

Marshal Kesselring, raised this very point himself, and therefore the

point was obvious and could have been raised in examination in chief, in

which case it would have been dealt with by the Defendant Göring. It

does not depend upon any particular document; it depends upon the

evidence of the Field Marshal Kesselring, who said that he was

bypassed—I think the word as it was translated was that he was bypassed

between the Hermann Göring Division and the Defendant Göring, although

the Hermann Göring Division was under his command. So it has nothing to

do with any document.

DR. STAHMER: May the witness continue, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

GÖRING: The division was under my command only as far as personnel,

commissioning of officers, and equipment was concerned but not as to its

employment. I did not receive reports daily, but at intervals, regarding

events, losses, replacements. That, on the whole, was all the connection

I had with that division. I could not give any orders for its

employment, since it was under the command of parts of the Army.

DR. STAHMER: Did you receive a report regarding the events at Civitella?

GÖRING: No, I did not receive that report. I have learned of it for the

first time here from the affidavit of an Army general who was in command

of that division and who was also responsible for these matters, and who

apparently is trying now to shift that responsibility to the division

and, because of the name of the division, on to me.

DR. STAHMER: Your relation to Hitler and your influence upon him has

again been touched upon during cross-examination. Will you please

summarize the facts briefly by particular periods, which are necessary

to form an opinion on that relation?

GÖRING: Already during the cross-examination I have pointed out that a

very long period is involved here. In 1923, when I was an SA leader, my

relation was normal. Then there is a long interval—1931 . . .

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal. It seems to me in the

interests of time highly objectionable to allow the witness now to

summarize. He was given the advantage of answering any questions he

wanted as he went along. It seems to me that when he has covered a

subject at least once—and as a matter of fact he covered this one four

or five times in an address at nearly every question that would

permit—that that at least should bring us to the end of that subject.

It was exhausted.

The matter of time here is a grave matter. By our calculation—a careful

calculation—of the witnesses which have been allowed, this Trial will

now project into August. It does not seem that we should allow him to

play this game both ways, to make his speeches during the

cross-examination and then to sum them up again afterwards.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal has allowed you to ask

questions which, strictly speaking, are not admissible in re-examination

and I want to make it clear to you what questions are admissible in

re-examination—only these which arise out of the cross-examination. As

to this particular question, the Defendant Göring was allowed to make

what were really speeches in his examination in chief without any

interruption whatever; and he went over the whole history of the Nazi

regime from its inception until the end of the war and the Tribunal does

not consider that he ought to be at liberty to go over the same ground

again in re-examination.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I had merely asked that question because up

to now it had not been dealt with comprehensively and I think it

necessary, in order to form an opinion of the defendant and his attitude

during that time, to have a comprehensive and coherent account of this

matter which in my opinion is so important for the decision to be made

in this Trial. If, however, the Tribunal objects to this question, I

must submit to that decision and withdraw the question.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I have another question. During your

examination, you stated, regarding certain accusations, that you want to

assume responsibility for them. How is that to be understood?

GÖRING: As to responsibility, one must discern between formal and actual

responsibility. Formally, I bear responsibility for that which was done

by those departments and offices which were under my command. Although I

could not possibly have seen or known beforehand everything that was

issued or discussed by them, I must nevertheless assume formal

responsibility, particularly where we are concerned with the carrying

out of general directives given by me. Actual responsibility I see in

those cases in which I personally issued orders or directives, including

in particular all acts and facts which I signed personally or issued

authentically, but I mean these facts only and not so much general words

and statements which were made during those 25 years here and there in

small circles. In particular, I want to say the following very clearly

about responsibility: The Führer, Adolf Hitler, is dead. I was regarded

as his successor in leading the German Reich. Consequently I must

declare, with reference to my responsibility, that it was my aim . . .

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would wish that you should not make

speeches. The Tribunal is perfectly well able to understand the

difference between formal responsibility and actual responsibility for

orders given by you.

GÖRING: I acknowledge my responsibility for having done everything to

carry out the preparations for the seizure of power, and to have made

the power firm in order to make Germany free and great. I did everything

to avoid this war. But after it had started, it was my duty to do

everything to win it.

THE PRESIDENT: We have already heard you say that more than once and we

do not wish to hear it again.

GÖRING: On the question of labor: During the war, the inhabitants of the

occupied territories were brought in to work in Germany and their

countries were exploited economically.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, you are supposed to be asking questions of

the witness. Now, what question is that in answer to?

DR. STAHMER: I had asked him about his responsibility . . .

THE PRESIDENT: You can ask him questions, but you cannot ask him general

questions which invite speeches. If you have any particular questions to

ask him which arise out of the cross-examination, now is the time to ask

them.

DR. STAHMER: I put this question: To what extent does he consider

himself responsible for the points mentioned here in the

cross-examination regarding the deportation of workers . . .

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I object to this question being put.

THE PRESIDENT: He has already told us about that. He answered that

question more than once.

DR. STAHMER: In that case, I have no further questions to ask.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the defendant can retire.

[_The defendant left the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Stahmer.

DR. STAHMER: May I first of all give a short review of the present stage

of the Trial so that the Tribunal can see what the list of witnesses

still granted to me is like now. I was going to forego Dr. Lohse.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lohse, did you say?

DR. STAHMER: Yes, I abstain from calling Dr. Lohse, because the

defendant has in my opinion already made sufficient statements on that

subject. Furthermore, I had been granted Ambassador Dr. Paul Schmidt as

a witness. That witness, of whom I want to ask a few questions only, I

should like to hear later, subsequent to his examination by the

Defendant Ribbentrop, because he will have to answer a wide range of

questions during that examination, and it appears to me appropriate if I

ask him subsequent to that—which is also in accord with the wish of Dr.

Horn—if the Tribunal will agree to that procedure, the witness Koller

. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

DR. STAHMER: The witness Koller, as it has now been ascertained, is in

Belgium, and not in Germany. His hearing was provided in case he was in

Germany. Consequently, I shall have to submit an interrogatory to that

witness. That has been done, but the interrogatory has not yet been

returned.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: Furthermore, I have received permission to submit

interrogatories to the witnesses Ondarza, Freiherr Von Hammerstein,

Kammhuber, Student, and Bunjes. The interrogatories have been submitted

but have not been returned yet. The situation is that the addresses of

Ondarza and Kammhuber have since been ascertained; as to the other three

witnesses, inquiries are still being made, so that also here I cannot

yet submit anything. Then there are interrogatories of Uiberreither,

Lord Halifax, and Forbes; from Halifax and Forbes the interrogatories

have been received, and I am going to read them; from Uiberreither there

is a written statement as well. Then it concerns . . .

THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by “a written statement as well”? You

said there are the interrogatories from Lord Halifax and Sir George

Ogilvie-Forbes.

DR. STAHMER: Interrogatories have been received from Lord Halifax and

Forbes. There is a written affidavit from Uiberreither and I assume that

that may take the place of an interrogatory.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I understand.

DR. STAHMER: Furthermore, there is the Katyn case, Mr. President. Five

witnesses are involved. I am still making inquiries regarding their

addresses. I am therefore not in a position to have these witnesses

called before the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Stahmer. Was that all that you wished to say at

this stage?

DR. STAHMER: Yes, upon the question of these witnesses; in addition I

must present what I have in the way of documents and then I shall have

completed my case for the time being. I have put down in writing what I

have to say about the documents.

THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment.

DR. STAHMER: Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal approves of the course

which you suggest.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I, in the interest of time, make a suggestion,

Your Honor, that these documents which Dr. Stahmer proposes to offer, I

understand, have been translated into all four languages, so that the

reason for reading them in open court does not sustain. I cannot speak

for my colleagues since I have not consulted them, but so far as the

United States is concerned, we will not raise a question of relevancy;

we spend no time arguing points of relevancy. I suggest that the reading

of a whole document book seems a waste of time of the Trial Court since

the documents are available in all four languages.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, before we consider that course which has

been suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson, we should like to hear whether

any of the other Chief Prosecutors have anything to add to it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I respectfully submit that it is an excellent

suggestion and I want to make it clear to the Defense Counsel that I

feel that it will, on the one side, avoid arguments of relevancy on

comparatively small points and, on the other side, the Defense Counsel

will be able to use any of the excerpts in their final speeches with

more effect and probably with more help to the Tribunal than merely by

reading them at this stage. I respectfully support it and consider that

it will improve the general condition.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir David. We will hear you in a moment, Dr.

Stahmer, but I do not want you to go away; I want you to be able to

hear. I want to hear General Rudenko too.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am fully in agreement with the suggestion of Mr. Justice

Jackson and that of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe and I also consider that the

Tribunal accept these documents which have been translated in four

languages. This does not exclude the premise, namely that the Defense

has no right to submit documents that have nothing to do with the

present case. In particular I have a definite objection against

submitting as exhibits the extracts from documents of the so-called

_White Book_ which are being submitted by Dr. Stahmer in the document

book. These extracts have nothing to do with the present case and they

should not be submitted.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the French Chief Prosecutor wish to add anything to

what has been said?

M. CHAMPETIER DE RIBES: The French Prosecution has laid before the

Tribunal a note requesting rejection of Document Number Göring-26. It

concerns indeed an extract from a note from the German Government to the

French Government regarding the treatment of German prisoners of war in

France. This extract refers to a secret order from the headquarters of

the general commanding the 9th French Army. This extract says that the

general commanding the 9th French Army published an order; this order

was not given to us. We are dealing only with an assertion of the German

Government, which is the government of the defendant. The extract which

is offered to us has therefore no relevancy and we ask the Tribunal to

reject it.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, at the moment, is not considering the

question of relevancy of particular documents. They are considering only

the general question of method as to whether all these documents have to

be read out to the Tribunal or whether they can be laid before the

Tribunal for the Tribunal’s consideration. If they have got to be read

out in full it will take a very considerable time, and therefore Mr.

Justice Jackson has suggested that instead of all these documents being

read out in full, which will take a very long time, as they have been

translated, the reason for that no longer exists as it did exist in the

case of the documents put in by the Prosecution which had not been

translated. But that does not mean that the question of relevancy of

individual documents or particular passages in the documents is decided

by the document books being presented for the consideration of the

Tribunal. Such questions as that may, in important cases, have to be

considered after argument, but as a general rule and for the purpose of

avoiding delay, the suggestion of Mr. Justice Jackson appears to have a

very great deal to recommend it.

M. CHAMPETIER DE RIBES: The matter which is before us today is to find

out whether all of the documents which have been submitted are relevant,

and that is why I asked that the Tribunal reject one of the documents as

irrelevant. If it is understood, that this question may be brought up

later when the document is produced then I see no objection to

postponing my explanation. I wish to state concerning Document Number

Göring-26 only that the quotation read by Dr. Stahmer is mutilated and I

shall ask the Tribunal to hear this document read in full.

THE PRESIDENT: We would like to consider this matter, but before doing

so we would like to know whether you have any objection to the

suggestion that has been made. You understand what Mr. Justice Jackson’s

suggestion is?

DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President, I understand. It touches upon a

fundamental question of the defense, and I should like to discuss this

question briefly with the other Defense Counsel. I should like to

suggest that the Court take a short recess now so that there will be an

opportunity to discuss the matter. I would then make my statement

afterwards. I should like to point out now that at the time we were

willing to forego the reading of the Indictment, and its being read was

not due to our objections. The gentlemen probably were of the opinion

that it had to be read as a matter of principle. I shall clarify the

question and report immediately.

THE PRESIDENT: What do you say about the reading of the Indictment? Are

you making a complaint because the Indictment had been read?

DR. STAHMER: No, no, no.

THE PRESIDENT; The matter stands upon a different footing. The Charter,

which is the document which governs the actions of the Tribunal,

provided that the Indictment must be read. It does not follow that what

is now being suggested is not provided for in the Charter. The only

reason why we ruled that every document which the Prosecution wished to

rely upon be read in open court was because the Prosecution, at that

time, had not found it possible to translate into four different

languages every document which it wished to put in evidence and for the

convenience and in fairness to the defendants and their counsel. We

ordered, as you remember at an earlier stage, that every sentence in a

document upon which the Prosecution relied and which we could consider

as evidence should be read into the microphone so that it could come to

you in German and would appear in the record, in the transcript. That

principle no longer applies to the documents which are now put in

because they have been translated into four different languages by the

Prosecution’s Translation Division. Therefore, in the interest of time,

which must be almost equally important to the Defense as well as to

everyone else concerned, it seems to the Tribunal that the suggestion

which Mr. Justice Jackson has made is a very sound one and you will, of

course, be able to comment in any way you think right during the course

of your final speeches upon the documents on which you rely, subject to

any question of relevancy which may be of real importance. There may be

certain documents which may be objected to by the Prosecution, but, as

Mr. Justice Jackson said, he will not now raise any question of

relevancy, and he is ready to have all these documents referred to in

your document book considered by the Tribunal. Remember also, when we

approved your documents, we expressly reserved any question of relevancy

of particular passages in these documents which you might want to use.

Perhaps it will be appropriate for us to adjourn now and you can discuss

the question with your colleagues.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. DIX: Gentlemen of the Tribunal: I was, of course, not in a position

to have a vote taken among my colleagues of the Defense on the proposal

of Mr. Justice Jackson, for the reason alone that not all Defense

Counsel are present here. But I have been able to convince myself that

the majority of the Defense Counsel agree with the reasons for what I am

going to say, and I have no doubt that all Defense Counsel support the

application which I am about to make to the effect that the suggestion

of Mr. Justice Jackson should be rejected. But to be correct and loyal I

feel obliged to emphasize that naturally every one of the gentlemen is

entitled to present his point of view on this question for himself and

within the scope of his own subject matter.

And now to the matter itself. The suggestion of Mr. Justice Jackson,

especially if it is followed in principle with regard to all the

documents which are to be submitted by the Defense, would aim at the

introduction of a tremendous volume of documents as subject matter in

the Trial without their being made known by oral presentation in open

session to the public and thus to the whole world, which is passionately

and wholeheartedly interested in this Trial.

I abstain from quoting, with judicial dialectics, provisions, for

instance from the Charter set up for this Trial, which could be used to

conduct a polemic against Mr. Justice Jackson’s proposal. I will start

with the principle about the unconditional and absolute importance of

which there will certainly be no difference of opinion between the

Tribunal and us or between the Prosecution and us: namely, the principle

that this whole Trial must be subject to the absolute postulate of

justice and fairness. These are exactly the motives which prompted the

authors of the Charter to give Part IV of the Charter a very pronounced

heading. It says: “Fair Trial for Defendants.”

But I cannot consider it just and I cannot consider it fair if the

Prosecution had the right, for months, not only once but sometimes

repeatedly and often, to bring their evidence to the knowledge of the

public and of the world by reading it into the microphone; and in this

regard it should be noted that when these documents were presented often

only parts of documents were read which, in the opinion of the

Prosecution, were incriminating to the defendants, while those parts

were omitted which, in our opinion, were exonerating for the defendants.

It must therefore be considered an injustice that a defendant should not

also have the opportunity to bring to the knowledge of the world through

his defense, those matters which, in his opinion and the opinion of his

counsel, speak in his favor, when the Prosecution had previously had the

right and the opportunity to apply that procedure to the incriminating

documents.

May I draw attention to this fact—and I have pointed it out

repeatedly—that certain incriminating points have not only been brought

to the knowledge of the world public by reading the documentary

evidence, but were repeated in the form of representation to the

defendants when they were examined as witnesses, and thereby they have

been drilled into the ears of the listening world again and again. I am

asking you urgently and implore Your Honors in the interest of just

proceedings, which I am sure are desired by you as well as by the

authors of the Charter, to give the same opportunity to the defendants.

In support of his suggestion Mr. Justice Jackson has furthermore even

emphasized formally the point of view that the Trial would be shortened.

The Defense does in no way deny the necessity of limiting this Trial to

the time necessary. But perhaps I may in this connection draw your

attention to a statement made by the president of the court at the

Belsen trial in reply to press criticism about the allegedly too lengthy

duration of the trial; the gist of which was that no duration however

long was to be regretted as long as it helped to reveal the truth in the

end. I ask you to put this principle before the necessity of saving time

in this Trial as well.

And finally, may I—without assuming authority to criticize the measures

decided upon and carried out by the Prosecution in accordance with their

duties—may I point out that the duration of the Trial thus far, should

anyone consider it too long—I do not think it is too long—was at any

rate not brought about by the Defense. I think I can say with a clear

conscience that so far we have not done anything, said anything, or

caused anything which could be used in justly reproaching us for

delaying the Trial unnecessarily.

If, furthermore, as your Lordship has pointed out, the reason no longer

exists which caused the Tribunal duly to order that those parts of

documents which were to become the subject matter of the Trial should be

presented orally, then I should like to point out that the vast majority

of the documents which were produced at the time and accordingly also

presented verbally in part were already at that time available in

fourfold translation.

Furthermore, I should like to point out that this documentary evidence,

if it is to be comprehensible to the Tribunal and if it is to serve the

purpose of establishing the truth, without doubt in many cases calls for

explanatory comments by the Defense Counsel. The possibility of such

comment would be removed if we are instructed to submit these documents

to the Tribunal _in toto_.

As far as I have been able to ascertain, without wanting to prejudice

anybody, my colleagues have by no means any intention of quoting the

entire contents of the document books. As far as I understand it, they

have in most cases rather the intention of presenting excerpts which

they are going to designate, and the relevancy of which may then be

discussed if occasion arises. Even such selection of those parts of the

documents which are considered to be really relevant would not be

possible if the Tribunal followed Mr. Justice Jackson’s suggestion.

Likewise, as I said before, it would not be possible to point out, in

documents already read by the Prosecution, those parts which have not

been read but which are exonerating for the defendant.

If it has been said—and your Lordship has pointed it out—that the

Defense Counsel have an opportunity to quote these parts of the

documents during their address, then I believe I agree with the Judges

that the address should, if possible, be a coherent and terse summary,

evaluating the entire substance of the Trial. If we are now instructed

to refer to parts of documents during the address and quote explicitly

once more those to which we attach importance as evidence, but which we

would not mention at all or only incidentally or summarily in connection

with a comprehensive evaluation, then the danger arises that the

coherence or, let us say, the bold outline of our address would suffer

by a recital of the subject matter in detail. And the further danger

arises that the time which Mr. Justice Jackson wishes to save through

his suggestion will be lost again because the final address will take so

much longer, which need not be if it is strictly a summary, an over-all

evaluation, in accordance with its purpose.

I consider it even possible that later on, if possibly in the confines

of our address a difference of opinion as to the relevancy of an

individual document might arise, there might be considerable delay and

disturbance in the proceedings, whereas, if one can submit the document

in its essential parts at this time, together with statements to explain

and connect them, one would have an immediate opportunity to state just

why one considers the part presented as relevant, so that the Tribunal

would have an opportunity to make a decision as to relevancy now.

In my opinion there are many points which speak against Mr. Justice

Jackson’s suggestion. I summarize: As far as I am concerned, the most

important point of view is that of fairness and justice. The Defense

Counsel, as I have ascertained beyond any doubt by conversations during

the recess, must and would consider it a severe and intolerable

limitation of the Defense, if, contrary to the procedure exercised so

far by the Prosecution, it were deprived of the possibility of

presenting, in its turn, at least the relevant parts of its own

documentary evidence to the Tribunal verbally and with comments. I am of

the opinion, that it is a simple postulate of fairness in the forensic

engagement between Prosecution and Defense that now the Defense, too,

should be given the same opportunity. And this is not meant to be

criticism either but merely a statement of fact, of which the

Prosecution have availed themselves to a considerable and sometimes

cumulative extent.

May I request, therefore, and I think my request is supported by the

entire Defense that the suggestion of Mr. Justice Jackson be rejected.

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. You began your address by saying that you

would not refer to the Charter. On what Article of the Charter do you

rely for your argument that all documents which are presented must now

be read?

DR. DIX: I said that I would not refer to individual provisions of the

Charter as a basis for my application. As a basis for my application I

have merely mentioned the heading of Part IV of the Charter which says,

“Fair Trial for Defendants,” and I have explained and need not repeat

that I would not consider it a fair trial if Mr. Justice Jackson’s

suggestion were followed. However, I have deliberately—although my

attention was drawn to specific provisions of the Charter which,

directly or indirectly, might be used as a legal construction to support

my application—I have refrained deliberately from doing so, since these

individual rules in my opinion are not convincing.

The principle of justice and fairness however is sufficiently strong in

my opinion, and so are the other arguments of practicability and

feasibility which I took the liberty to present to the Tribunal. I think

there must be a misunderstanding.

THE PRESIDENT: But you will not have omitted to notice that Article 24

deals expressly with the course of the Trial. Do you rely upon any part

of Article 24?

DR. DIX: No, no. I have deliberately not referred to any part of Article

24, since that article gives considerable powers of discretion to the

Tribunal, regarding the general rules of procedure which, in my opinion,

have nothing to do with the question under discussion at present. This

is merely a question of justice and fairness, and, if I may add this, it

is a fundamental rule of oral trial. We now have an oral trial, we now

have a trial in open session. It is in existence here. I am not sure

whether or not the open session is prescribed by the Charter, but it

exists. Since it is in existence, we must proceed in accordance with

these principles and therefore, in my opinion, the defendant has also

the right to present to the public of the world what is in his favor

after the Prosecution have presented to the public of the world what is

not in his favor.

THE PRESIDENT: I want to ask you another question: Are you suggesting

that the Defense should be able to quote, to read documents, more than

once?

DR. DIX: I am not suggesting that in any way. As far as I am concerned,

my documents of course will be read only in part and certainly not

twice. I have merely said that the Prosecution have done so, that is,

have read documents twice; sometimes even three times, I am told. But it

is not my task to criticize that conduct of the Prosecution; that is the

Prosecution’s business. I am not here to make criticism; that is up to

the Tribunal and the Prosecution. I have merely stated the fact.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal would like to put a

further question to Dr. Dix before they hear you, and also . . .

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I would like to make a simple statement of fact

. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Please do.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: . . . which I think will clarify this situation

some in justice to the United States of America.

As to the fairness, I call the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that we

have printed, mimeographed, 250 copies of Dr. Stahmer’s entire document

book, and it is in the press room waiting for delivery to the press when

it is received by this Tribunal, so that we have done everything that we

could, everything that we did for ourselves, to make public his

documents.

In the second place, we have gone so far as to print even things that

the Court ruled out, rather than to have controversy with them.

In the third place, it is not the function of the Tribunal, under the

Charter, to spread propaganda. A large part of this is stuff that is 20

years old and is in every good library and will not be used by

newspapers and constitutes a waste of our money. We have tried to do

everything in order to make this Trial completely fair to these people,

and now that I have discovered that we are printing documents that the

Court have already ruled out, I must say that I shall stop it. I think

we have been imposed upon, and this document book will show it. There

are documents after documents that the Tribunal have already ruled

irrelevant, and we have gone to the expense of printing them in order to

be more than fair.

DR. DIX: May I answer to that very briefly? As far as the point of view

of propaganda is concerned, I regret that my suggestion has not been

followed, according to which the public and the world would hear only

those parts of our document books which have been recognized as relevant

by the Tribunal, and then presented by us. If the contents of the

document book do produce certain propaganda effects, which is unknown to

me and which would be entirely against our intentions, then it is merely

due to the fact that the contents of these document books have been

submitted to the press not through legal and normal channels or let us

say not by due procedure, that is, from the sessions’ records; instead

these document books of the Defense were placed at the disposal of the

press without our knowledge, and therefore also such things were

communicated to the press and the world public which, in the opinion of

the Tribunal, circumstances permitting, may be irrelevant or perhaps

biased. Please do not misunderstand me. I am not saying that they are; I

am merely talking in the abstract. But if you want to avoid just what

Mr. Justice Jackson wishes to avoid, namely, that political propaganda

is made by means of this Trial, then you must follow my suggestion; I

want only that to be presented and brought to the knowledge of the world

which has here been considered relevant by the Tribunal and admitted for

presentation.

Due to the excitement in Court it is very difficult to understand every

word correctly through the earphones, but if Mr. Justice Jackson meant

that we are trying to obtain a propaganda effect here, that is not the

case. If he further mentions the point of fairness insofar as the

Prosecution had done everything to inform the world public by placing at

its disposal all the document books, then I have no criticism to offer

in that respect. Far be it from me to call that unfair. But here we are

in Court, having proper proceedings. We are not making press propaganda;

rather the press is to gather information and report to the world about

this Trial from this courtroom. The Defense are only grateful if their

efforts to carry through proper proceedings with full information to the

press are supported by the Tribunal.

But this is not the crucial point. I have not accused anybody of being

unfair. I have merely emphasized that it is a requirement of fairness to

let the Defense do the same things which have continually and repeatedly

been done by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Dix, will you tell me this: What suggestion do

you have for shortening the Trial? You must recollect in the criticism

that you have been making of the Prosecution’s case with reference to

their documents, that their case has been based almost entirely upon

documents. They have called—I do not know how many witnesses, but very

few witnesses. You and the other defendants’ counsel are proposing to

call a very great number of witnesses, and what I would ask you is: How

do you propose that the Trial should be shortened so that it may not

last until the end of July or August?

DR. DIX: If I make a suggestion, then I can of course do so only for

myself and for the case I have to defend. May I suggest, Your Lordship,

that we begin with producing the documentary evidence, and I would ask

you to realize that, if I am not mistaken, none of the Defense Counsel

intends to read his entire document book here before the Tribunal.

Whomever I have asked, at any rate the majority, certainly did not

intend to do that. Those with whom I have spoken want to quote excerpts

only, and in the choice of these excerpts and in the discussion of

whether their presentation would be relevant, a measure could be applied

which would, of course, take into consideration the necessity of the

matter as well as the question of time. I do not think that the

presentation of the documents will take a very long time. My colleague,

Dr. Stahmer, for instance, has told me that although he has an enormous

and important case to defend, he believes that he will probably complete

his case in about 2 hours or maybe in even less than 2 hours. I am not a

prophet, but I think the Tribunal is considering the matter as more

hazardous than it is in fact. Please give us a chance. You may certainly

assume that all of us are anxious not to delay the proceedings. Also we

are quite willing to take advice if the Court says, “We do not consider

this or that important,” or, “This or that we consider already

demonstrated,” or “We presume this or that,” _et cetera_. That way we

will make fast progress. May I, therefore, suggest not to lay down now

any obligatory abstract rule for the procedure to be followed but to go

to work with us now in a practical manner and to accept our assurances

that we want to assist in shortening the Trial and, to begin with, start

from the standpoint that we may present what we consider relevant. If it

should turn out that too much time is being taken up—which, as I have

said, I do not believe—then we could still discuss that matter once

more and after all, the Tribunal is at liberty to make its decisions.

All I ask is that it not be done now because I am afraid that the

Tribunal, on the strength of the experience with the documentary

evidence of the Prosecution, is overestimating the time required for the

presentation of our documentary evidence, in which connection I again

repeat that this is neither reproach nor criticism. I know that the

Prosecution have based their case mostly on documents, and therefore

naturally had to take more time.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Dr. Dix. The Tribunal would like to hear—of

course, they cannot hear all the defendants’ counsel on this matter, but

they would like to hear one other representative of Counsel.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I draw the attention of the Tribunal back to the

legal aspect of the matter?

The Tribunal quite rightly raised the question: What does the Charter

say regarding evidence? The difficulty is caused by the fact that

specific rules on this matter are not contained in the Charter.

Regarding the procedure, we have Article 24. This Article 24 refers to

the session—the session, which, according to the legal language used in

all kinds of criminal procedure, can mean nothing but the oral hearing

and the verbal debate. What is lacking in Article 24 is a paragraph

which concerns specifically the taking of documentary evidence. But may

I draw your attention to subparagraph (e). There the rebuttal of

evidence given by witnesses is discussed, the rebuttal, which of course,

is concerned not only with the presentation of witnesses but also with

the submission of documents.

It is specifically provided there that the evidence should be taken. At

any rate, based on the German text and German usage of language, it

would not be permissible at all if this evidence taken in the

presentation were not produced now during Court sessions but if that

evidence, on the basis of the presented extensive written material, were

dealt with in the separate rooms of the Judges.

It is a particularly important principle of a colleague-like Tribunal,

of a Tribunal which consists of several Judges, that the impression

which is to be conveyed to the Tribunal should be coherent and direct.

That can be achieved only if the material is presented and discussed in

oral proceedings.

May I ask you to consider also that we have already acquired some

experience in that respect during this Trial. I am sure that everyone

who has presented a document has been very grateful to the President of

the Tribunal when he interfered during the quotation of the document by

limiting here or extending there, and, by doing so, let the Prosecution

or the Defense Counsel, who were quoting the document, know the opinion

of the Tribunal as to what is relevant. Our experience has been that

this guidance by the Tribunal had favorable results later on.

As for the legal aspect, may I draw your attention to Article 21, which

contains a special provision, a special provision regarding those facts

which are of common knowledge and do not require any discussion. This

special provision of Article 21 clearly reveals the difference between

these facts and those which may be and need to be discussed. Everything

that may be and needs to be discussed must be presented in court in some

way so that the Tribunal has the possibility to intervene here also and

to make explanatory and guiding comments. That is what I have to say as

to the legal aspect of the matter.

Apart from that, I believe that I understood Mr. Justice Jackson’s

suggestion somewhat differently. First of all, I think Mr. Justice

Jackson’s suggestion has been somewhat enlarged during the debate. I

think his suggestion was that we, as Defense Counsel, should impose

certain restrictions upon ourselves not to present the submitted

documentary material indiscriminately, but to confine ourselves to

choosing those parts which are really worth mentioning and which call

for presentation at the present stage of the Trial.

To undergo such a restriction is certainly in line with the practical

duty of the Defense Counsel. Nothing is more fatal to the Defense or the

Prosecution than going into detail, that is, elaborating on irrelevant

facts.

Particularly under firm and strict guidance of the procedure, every

Defense Counsel will soon notice whether he is on the wrong track,

whether he is presenting superfluous material and, by presenting

superfluous material is achieving an effect which he in no case wishes

to obtain.

I therefore believe that, as my colleague, Dr. Dix, just said, the

self-control of the Defense Counsel and a well-concerned interest in his

case and in his client will automatically impose on him the necessary

limitation in his presentation.

[_Dr. Seidl approached the lectern._]

THE PRESIDENT: I said on behalf of the Tribunal that we wished to hear

two counsel.

DR. SEIDL: I wanted to add only very briefly some remarks to what my two

colleagues have already said—very briefly.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but then it may be possible that every one of the 20

or more counsel who are present wish to add something.

DR. SEIDL: I do not know, but I do not think so.

THE PRESIDENT: I said two counsel, and I meant two counsel.

DR. SEIDL: Very well.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal would like to know

whether you have anything to add in reply to what has been said.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think nothing. I thought I was saving time. I

begin to doubt it.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, I think the Tribunal would like to

know exactly how far your suggestion went. Were you really making any

further suggestion than this: That the defendants’ counsel should not

think it necessary to read every document in their document book in the

course of the presentation of their defense, or were you intending to

move the Tribunal to order that they should not be allowed to read any

document in their document book at this stage?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I thought their document book should be directed to

be filed as an exhibit at this stage of the case, without reading. I

would not be particular about it if they have passages they think are of

particular importance which they want to call to your attention, but

this document book consists of speeches made 15 years ago and published

in the press in every complete library in the country, largely, together

with a good deal that has been excluded. It would seem to me that they

should go in, so they are available to them, and that if there are

matters in them which particular countries wish to object to, they might

raise the question by motion to strike or raise it now if they desire.

As far as the United States is concerned, we have no objection to any of

it. I think some of it is highly objectionable on the ground of

relevancy, but it would take longer to argue it and it goes to certain

large questions of reprisals and things of that character that will have

to be settled in larger ways than questions of admission of evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you, on behalf of the Chief Prosecutors, have any

objection or think it inadvisable to adopt the suggestion which Dr. Dix

made that we should see how far the defendants’ counsel were prepared to

limit the amount of the documents which they read at this stage and see

how long it takes and see whether it is necessary to make any further

ruling in order to accelerate the Trial?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am quite willing to experiment, but I do

suggest that we are now handed a document book containing a number of

documents that the Court has passed upon, and, as I recall, Your Honor

called Dr. Stahmer’s attention to this at the opening of his case. I do

not have so much faith, perhaps, as I ought to have.

THE PRESIDENT: I think it is very likely that documents have got into

Dr. Stahmer’s book by mistake, owing to the fact that he, being for the

first defendant, there were some difficulties in preparation for

instance, and I have already drawn attention to it. I think there is in

Dr. Stahmer’s book—I am not quite sure—a speech of Mr. Paul Boncour

which has been expressly denied by the Tribunal, and those are the sort

of documents to which you are referring, no doubt. And I had to draw

attention also in the case of one other counsel, I think, or one other

witness to a document being put to him which the Tribunal had expressly

denied. But of course, that is very wrong that any document should be

put into a document book which the Tribunal has expressly denied, but as

I say, I think that is very likely due to some mistake.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am quite ready, and I am sure my colleagues are,

to experiment with this and see how it goes.

It is—and I think I should say this for all of us—it is a difficult

thing where we come from different systems and do not always understand

what the other man is driving at; it is a difficult thing to reconcile

these different procedures, and I am quite willing to be patient and

forbearing about it and see how it works.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

You must quite understand, Dr. Stahmer, that I am not making any ruling

on behalf of the Tribunal at this moment as to whether or not Dr. Dix’s

suggestion will be adopted, because the Tribunal will proceed now to

consider the matter, and then the ruling will be made.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, may I make just a personal explanation? The

inclusion in my document book of the documents which had been denied is

due to the following facts: At the request of the Translation Division

the document book had already been handed to that division before the

Tribunal had made its negative decision, and that accounts for the

inclusion. I was put under considerable pressure at the time to hand the

book over so that it might be submitted to the Court in translated form.

That is how it happened.

THE PRESIDENT: I thought it was probably that, Dr. Stahmer.

The Tribunal will adjourn now until 2:30.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1430 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: In considering the matters which have been raised this

morning, the Tribunal has had in mind the necessity for a fair trial and

at the same time for an expeditious trial, and the Tribunal has decided

that for the present it will proceed under rules heretofore announced;

that is to say:

First, documents translated into the four languages may be introduced

without being read but in introducing them counsel may summarize them,

or otherwise call their relevance to the attention of the Court, and may

read such brief passages as are strictly relevant and are deemed

important.

Second; when a document is offered, the Tribunal will hear any

objections that may be offered to it and in this connection, I would

refer to the rule which the Tribunal made on the 8th of March 1946,

which reads as follows:

“To avoid unnecessary translations, Defense Counsel shall

indicate to the Prosecution the exact passages in all documents

which they propose to use in order that the Prosecution may have

an opportunity to object to irrelevant passages. In the event of

disagreement between the Prosecution and the Defense as to the

relevancy of any particular passage, the Tribunal will decide

what passages are sufficiently relevant to be translated. Only

the cited passages need to be translated, unless the Prosecution

requires the translation of the entire document.”

The Tribunal has allowed the Defendant Göring, who has given evidence

first of the defendants and who has proclaimed himself to be responsible

as the second leader of Nazi Germany, to give his evidence without any

interruption whatever, and he has covered the whole history of the Nazi

regime from its inception to the defeat of Germany.

The Tribunal does not propose to allow any of the other defendants to go

over the same ground in their evidence except insofar as it is necessary

for their own defense.

Defense Counsel are advised that the Tribunal will not ordinarily regard

as competent evidence, extracts from books or articles expressing the

opinions of particular authors on matters of ethics, history, or

particular events.

Now, as to tomorrow’s business, the Tribunal will sit in open session

for the purpose of hearing applications for witnesses and documents,

supplementary applications; and after sitting in that open session, the

Tribunal will adjourn into a closed session.

Now, Dr. Stahmer, are you going to refer us to book Number 1? Which is

your book? Or are you referring us to your trial brief?

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I shall refer to the trial brief, Page 5. As

far as I am informed, the translations show the same numbers as the

original German text: Page 5, Paragraph II. Since this book is

translated into the three languages, and the document book, I am

informed, is also translated, I can limit myself to referring to them

briefly to present only what I consider essential.

At the beginning of my presentation from this book I pointed out that

Germany had renounced the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact, and

that this renunciation as such was justified. After this renunciation

had taken place, Germany could proceed to rearm and also to reintroduce

general conscription.

Moreover, rearmament and the reintroduction of military conscription

were ordered by Hitler only after he had previously and repeatedly

submitted, without success, offers of disarmament to the powers

concerned. Therefore the conclusion cannot be drawn from that fact alone

that at that time the intention existed to prepare or to plan German

wars of aggression. In this connection I draw your attention to the fact

that also in foreign countries rearmament took place to a considerable

degree from 1936 on, and as evidence for this fact I have submitted the

speeches and essays which are contained in Churchill’s book _Step by

Step_. The individual excerpts have been designated by me. I am

referring to the following in particular. On Page 5 of this book it says

. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, you must offer these things in evidence as a

matter of formality.

DR. STAHMER: Yes, of course. I have the book here with me. I shall

submit it immediately; I also have the individual excerpts here which

are included in the document book. It is Document Book 2, Page 44, the

first excerpt in Volume 2, Page 44.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to number your exhibit in some way?

DR. STAHMER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You have numbered it 40 I see, is that right?

DR. STAHMER: Yes. That is the number in this book. I have numbered these

books right through.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but whatever number you propose to use you must say

what the number is when you offer it in evidence, so that it will go

into the transcript.

DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President.

The quotation is from Document Book Number 2 and it is Number 40 on Page

9:

“On 18 June the Anglo-German Naval Treaty was signed, which

released Germany from the Versailles naval restrictions. That

meant in effect condonation of the breach of the military

clauses.”

On Page 35:

“The Air Force is in the process of being almost trebled. This

is a colossal expansion which is making the most prodigious

demands on our production potentialities. But quite apart from

these immediate needs, there is the far greater task of so

organizing England’s home industries that they will be ready to

direct the whole of their enormous and elastic capacity into the

channels of war production as soon as a serious necessity for

that should arise.”

From the article “In the Waters of the Mediterranean” dated 13 November

1936, I quote, on Page 86, where it says literally:

“But it is no longer thus. England has begun to rearm on a large

scale. Her wealth and her credit, the solidarity of her

organization, her vast resources and connections, all contribute

to this revival. The British fleet is still by far the mightiest

in Europe. Enormous yearly expenditure on it is under

consideration for the future.”

Furthermore, I wish to produce evidence of the fact that the Defendant

Göring particularly, at various times, beginning after the seizure of

power, consistently emphasized his serious desire to maintain peace and

to avoid a war. He has also repeatedly stated clearly that the measures

taken by Germany were not to serve purposes of aggression. As evidence

of this I refer to several speeches made by the Defendant Göring, and to

begin with I cite a speech of 4 December 1934, which he made at the

Krupp works in Essen, and which is contained in the book _Hermann

Göring’s Speeches and Compositions_, Pages 174 to 176, and is reprinted

in Document Book Number 1, Page 18.

From this excerpt I wish to quote only the following:

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think the shorthand writer has yet heard what

the exhibit number is.

DR. STAHMER: I beg your pardon. It is Exhibit Number 6. I quote—and it

is the last sentence of the first paragraph:

“Today we want to secure this peace, and we want the world to

understand this always: That a respected Germany only is a

guarantor of world peace. Only a free German nation will keep

this peace and will know how to preserve this peace.

“Therefore we demand for ourselves the same rights as others

possess.”

And on the following page, I quote the last paragraph:

“We do not want war, but we want our honor. We will not discuss

this honor with anybody in the world; that remains, for it is

the foundation for the reconstruction of the entire nation. Only

he who has a sharp sword at his side is unmolested and has

peace.”

Sir Nevile Henderson emphasizes Göring’s love of peace in various

passages of his book _Failure of a Mission_. The passages are quoted

again in Document Book Number 1, Page 63, and I offer it as Document

Number 23, Exhibit Number Göring-2. I quote from Page 78 of the book.

“I”—that is, Henderson—“was inclined to believe in the

sincerity of his”—that is, Göring’s—“personal desire for peace

and good relation with England.”

On Page 83 of the book, it says:

“I would like to express here my belief that the Field Marshal,

if it had depended on him, would not have gambled on war, as

Hitler did in 1939. As will be related in due course, he took a

decisive stand for peace in September 1938.”

On Page 273, which is the next page, there is the following sentence

which I quote:

“I saw the Polish Ambassador at 2 a.m. on 31 August 1939, gave

him an objective, and studiously moderate account of my

conversation with Ribbentrop, mentioned the cession of Danzig

and the plebiscite in the Corridor as the two main points in the

German proposals, stated that so far as I could gather they were

not on the whole too unreasonable, and suggested to him that we

recommend to his Government that they should propose at once a

meeting between the Field Marshals Smigly-Rydz and Göring.”

On Page 276 of the book, you will find the following sentences which I

quote from the last paragraph:

“Nevertheless, the Field Marshal seemed in earnest when after

having been called to the telephone, he returned to tell us that

M. Lipski was on his way to see Ribbentrop. He seemed relieved

and to hope that, provided contact could only be established,

war might, after all, be avoided.”

In February of 1937, the Defendant Göring, on the occasion of an

international meeting of war veterans in Berlin, made the following

speech, which is contained in the book _Hermann Göring, the Man and His

Work_, on Page 265, and which is contained in Document Book 2, Page 42,

which is Exhibit Number 39, and from which I quote the following

sentences:

“There are no better defenders of peace than the old war

veterans. I am convinced that they, above all others, have a

right to ask for peace and to shape it. I recognize that those

men who, weapon in hand, went through 4 hard years of the hell

of the World War, have the primary right to shape the life of

the nations, and I know that the war veterans more than anybody

else will take care to preserve the blessings of peace for their

countries.”