SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
[_Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe then read from the document excerpts which were
withdrawn and stricken from the record on 16 August 1946._]
DR. STAHMER: I must object to the use of this document, since I cannot
recognize that it is genuine. I have not yet seen the original, and the
doubts as to its being genuine are due to the fact that expressions are
used which are most unusual in the German language.
GÖRING: I was going to raise the same objection. It is not an original
as it says at the top, “copy,” and there is no original signature, but
only the typewritten words “Sprenger, Gauleiter” at the bottom.
DR. STAHMER: For instance the expression “Gerichtlichkeiten” is used.
This is an expression completely unusual and unknown in the German
language, and I cannot imagine that an official document originating
from a Gauleiter could contain such a word.
GÖRING: I can draw your attention to yet another point showing that this
is evidently not an original document. If there had been an increase in
meat or fat rations, I would have heard something about it. Not a single
word of these two documents is known to me. It does not bear a rubber
stamp either, the whole thing is typewritten, including the signatures.
Therefore, I cannot accept this document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is a file copy which, to the best of my
knowledge, was captured at the office of the Gau Leader. It was sent to
us by the British Army of the Rhine. I shall make inquiries about it,
but it purports to be a file copy and I have put the original document
which we have, which is a file copy, to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I have the original document in my hands
now, together with the certificate of an officer of the British Army
stating that the document was delivered to him in the above capacity, in
the ordinary course of official business, as the original of a document
found in German records of files captured by military forces under the
command of the Supreme Commander. Under these circumstances it is in
exactly the same position as all the other captured documents. The
defense, of course, can bring any evidence which it thinks right, to
criticize the authenticity of the document. The document stands on
exactly the same footing as the other captured documents, subject to any
criticism to support which you may be able to bring evidence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I want you to deal with the sentence in
paragraph 6.
Now, this paragraph is certainly directed to all administrative levels
down to the Kreisleiter, county leaders of the Nazi Party, and it
assumes they knew all about the running of concentration camps. Are you
telling the Tribunal that you, who up to 1943 were the second man in the
Reich, knew nothing about concentration camps?
GÖRING: First of all, I want to say once more that I do not accept this
document, and that its whole wording is unknown to me, and that this
paragraph appears unusual to me. I did not know anything about what took
place and what methods were used in the concentration camps later, when
I was no longer in charge.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me remind you of the evidence that has been
given before this Court, that as far as Auschwitz alone is concerned,
4,000,000 people were exterminated. Do you remember that?
GÖRING: This I have heard as a statement here, but I consider it in no
way proved—that figure, I mean.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you do not consider it proved, let me remind
you of the affidavit of Hoettl, who was Deputy Group Leader of the
Foreign Section, of the Security Section of Amt IV of the RSHA. He says
that approximately 4,000,000 Jews have been killed in the concentration
camps, while an additional 2,000,000 met death in other ways. Assume
that these figures—one is a Russian figure, the other a German—assume
they are even 50 percent correct, assume it was 2,000,000 and 1,000,000,
are you telling this Tribunal that a Minister with your power in the
Reich could remain ignorant that that was going on?
GÖRING: This I maintain, and the reason for this is that these things
were kept secret from me. I might add that in my opinion not even the
Führer knew the extent of what was going on.
This is also explained by the fact that Himmler kept all these matters
very secret. We were never given figures or any other details.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Witness, haven’t you access to the foreign
press, the press department in your ministry, to foreign broadcasts? You
see, there is evidence that altogether, when you take the Jews and other
people, something like 10,000,000 people have been done to death in cold
blood, apart from those killed in battle. Something like 10,000,000
people. Do you say that you never saw or heard from the foreign press,
in broadcasts, that this was going on?
GÖRING: First of all, the figure 10,000,000 is not established in any
way. Secondly, throughout the war I did not read the foreign press,
because I considered it nothing but propaganda. Thirdly, though I had
the right to listen to foreign broadcasts, I never did so, simply
because I did not want to listen to propaganda. Neither did I listen to
home propaganda.
Only during the last 4 days of the war did I—and this I could
prove—listen to a foreign broadcasting station for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told Mr. Justice Jackson yesterday that
there were various representatives in Eastern territories, and you have
seen the films of the concentration camps, haven’t you, since this Trial
started? You knew that there were millions of garments, millions of
shoes, 20,952 kilograms of gold wedding rings, 35 wagons of furs—all
that stuff which these people who were exterminated at Maidanek or
Auschwitz left behind them. Did nobody ever tell you, under the
development of the Four Year Plan, or anyone else, that they were
getting all these amounts of human material? Do you remember we heard
from the Polish Jewish gentleman, who gave evidence, that all he got
back from his family, of his wife and mother and daughter, I think, were
their identity cards? His work was to gather up clothes. He told us that
so thorough were the henchmen of your friend Himmler that it took 5
minutes extra to kill the women because they had to have their hair cut
off as it was to be used for making mattresses. Was nothing ever told
you about this accretion to German material, which came from the effects
of these people who were murdered?
GÖRING: No, and how can you imagine this? I was laying down the broad
outlines for the German economy, and that certainly did not include the
manufacture of mattresses from women’s hair or the utilization of old
shoes and clothes. I leave the figure open. But, also I do want to
object to your reference to my “friend Himmler.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will say, “your enemy Himmler,” or
simply “Himmler” whichever you like. You know whom I mean, don’t you?
GÖRING: Yes, indeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to remind you of one other
point: Exhibit Number USA-228, Document Number 407(V)-PS, “. . . I have
the honor to report to you that it was possible to add 3,638,056 new
foreign workers to the German war economy between April 1st of last year
and March 31st of this year. . . . In addition to the foreign civilian
workers 1,622,929 prisoners of war are employed in the German economy.”
Now, just listen to this, “out of the 5,000,000 foreign workers who have
arrived in Germany, not even 200,000 came voluntarily.” That is from the
minutes of the Central Planning Board on the 1st of March. Do you say
that you, in your position in the State and as the great architect of
German economy, did not know that you were getting for your economy
4,800,000 foreign workers who were forced to come? Do you tell the
Tribunal that?
GÖRING: I never told the Tribunal that. I said that I knew quite well
that these workers were brought in and not always voluntarily, but
whether the figure of 200,000 is correct, that I do not know, and I do
not believe it either. The number of volunteers was greater, but this
does not alter the fact that workers were forced to come to the Reich.
That I have never denied, and have even admitted it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You admit—and I want to put it quite
fairly—that a large number of workers were forced to come to the Reich
and work there?
GÖRING: Yes, certainly.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, would you like to adjourn now?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, sir.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember what you said about the
relations between you and the Führer? May I repeat your words:
“The chief influence on the Führer, if I may mention influence
on the Führer at all, was up to the end of 1941 or the beginning
of 1942, and that influence was I. Then my influence gradually
decreased until 1943, and from 1943 on it decreased speedily.
All in all, apart from myself I do not believe anyone else had
anywhere near the influence on the Führer that I had.”
That is your view on that matter?
GÖRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you told the Tribunal that right up to
the end your loyalty to the Führer was unshaken, is that right?
GÖRING: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you still seek to justify and glorify Hitler
after he had ordered the murder of these 50 young flying officers at
Stalag Luft Number III?
GÖRING: I am here neither to justify the Führer Adolf Hitler nor to
glorify him. I am here only to emphasize that I remained faithful to
him, for I believe in keeping one’s oath not in good times only, but
also in bad times when it is much more difficult.
As to your reference to the 50 airmen, I never opposed the Führer so
clearly and strongly as in this matter, and I gave him my views about
it. After that no conversation between the Führer and myself took place
for months.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Führer, at any rate, must have had full
knowledge of what was happening with regard to concentration camps, the
treatment of the Jews, and the treatment of the workers, must he not?
GÖRING: I already mentioned it as my opinion that the Führer did not
know about details in concentration camps, about atrocities as described
here. As far as I know him, I do not believe he was informed. But
insofar as he . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking about details; I am asking about
the murder of four or five million people. Are you suggesting that
nobody in power in Germany, except Himmler and perhaps Kaltenbrunner,
knew about that?
GÖRING: I am still of the opinion that the Führer did not know about
these figures.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember how Mr. Dahlerus described the
relations between you and Hitler on Page 53 of his book:
“From the very beginning of our conversation, I resented his
manner towards Göring, his most intimate friend and comrade from
the years of struggle. His desire to dominate was explicable,
but to require such obsequious humility as Göring now exhibited,
from his closest collaborator, seemed to me abhorrent and
unprepossessing.”
Is that how you had to behave with Hitler?
GÖRING: I did not have to behave in that way, and I did not behave in
that way. Those are journalistic statements by Dahlerus, made after the
war. If Germany had won the war, this description would certainly have
been very different.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Dahlerus was your witness, though.
GÖRING: Mr. Dahlerus was not asked to give a journalistic account. He
was solely questioned about the matters with which he, as courier
between myself and the British Government, had to deal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on Tuesday of last week, the defendant
called General Bodenschatz, who gave general evidence as to his
character and reputation. He, therefore, in my respectful submission,
makes me entitled to put one document to him which is an account by the
Defendant Raeder of his general character and reputation. In accordance
with the English practice, I make my submission and ask the Court’s
permission to put it in.
DR. STAHMER: I object to the reading of this document. It would be
considerably easier to question Admiral Raeder, as witness, on his
statements, since he is here with us. Then we shall be able to determine
in cross-examination whether and to what extent he still maintains this
alleged statement.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have to put it in cross-examination to give
the defendant the chance of answering it. The Defendant Raeder can give
his explanations when he comes into the witness box.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to look at the document before it
is put in.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the English translation. I will show Dr.
Stahmer the German.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I should like to point out, that the
document bears no date and we do not know when and where it was drawn
up.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is signed by the Defendant Raeder.
DR. STAHMER: When and where was it drawn up? The signature of Raeder is
unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The date is in Raeder’s handwriting as is the
signature; the 27th of July, I think it is 1945. Each page of the
document is signed by the Defendant Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you said the defendant has put his character
in issue through Bodenschatz?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship will remember he was asked by
Doctor Stahmer: “Will you now tell me about the defendant’s social
relations?” And then he proceeded to give an account of his character
and his kindness and other qualities at that time; and I notice that
Doctor Stahmer has just included as an exhibit still further evidence as
to character in the form of a statement by one Hermann Winter.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it not have been appropriate, if the document was
to have been put in evidence, to have put it to Bodenschatz, who was
giving the evidence?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, My Lord, the rule is that if the defendant
puts his character in issue, he is entitled to be cross-examined on his
character and his general reputation, and of course it is permissible to
call a witness to speak as to his general reputation.
DR. STAHMER: May I make the following remark? I did not call
Bodenschatz, neither did I question him as witness for Göring’s
character. I questioned him about certain facts and happenings from
which Bodenschatz subsequently drew certain conclusions. In my opinion,
all these questions should have been put to Bodenschatz when he was
here. These statements could then have been used to prove that it was
Bodenschatz who was not telling the truth, not that Göring had told an
untruth. To prove this the document should have been used during
Bodensehatz’s interrogation. Then we would have been able to question
Bodenschatz about it too.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He may prefer that Bodenschatz be brought back
and it be put to him, but I think I am entitled to put it to the
defendant who called for the evidence as to his character and
reputation.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that at the present stage, this
document cannot be used in cross-examination.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Honor pleases, I understand that Your
Lordship leaves open the question for further argument, whether it can
be used for the Defendant Raeder in the witness box.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am much obliged.
[_Turning to the witness._] Now, Witness, you said before the Tribunal
adjourned, that Hitler, in your opinion, did not know about—broadly—or
was ignorant about, the question of concentration camps and the Jews. I
would like you to look at Document Number D-736. That is an account of a
discussion between the Führer and the Hungarian Regent Horthy on the
17th of April 1943, and if you would look at Page 4, you will see the
passage just after “Nuremberg and Fürth.”
GÖRING: Just a moment. I should like to read through it very quickly to
determine its authenticity.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly.
GÖRING: Page 4.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 4—Exhibit Number GB-283. You see, after
the mention of Nuremberg and Fürth, Hitler goes on:
“The Jews did not even possess organizational value. In spite of
the fears which he, the Führer, had heard repeatedly in Germany,
everything continued to go its normal way without the Jews.
Where the Jews were left to themselves, as for instance in
Poland, the most terrible misery and decay prevailed. They are
just pure parasites. In Poland, this state of affairs had been
fundamentally cleared up. If the Jews there did not want to
work, they were shot. If they could not work, they had to
perish. They had to be treated like tuberculosis bacilli, with
which a healthy body may become infected. This was not cruel—if
one remembers that even innocent creatures of nature, such as
hares and deer, have to be killed so that no harm is caused by
them. Why should the beasts who wanted to bring us Bolshevism be
more preserved? Nations which do not rid themselves of Jews
perish. One of the most famous examples is the downfall of that
people who were once so proud, the Persians, who now lead a
pitiful existence as Armenians.”
And would you look at Exhibit USSR-170, Document Number USSR-170, which
is a conference which you had on the 6th of August 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this document, is there not a
passage higher up that is important? It is about 10 lines down, I think,
in the middle of the line . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Honor is correct.
“To Admiral Horthy’s counterquestion as to what he should do
with the Jews, now that they had been deprived of almost all
possibility of earning their livelihood—he could not kill them
off—the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that the
Jews should be exterminated, or taken to concentration camps.
There was no other possibility.”
GÖRING: I do not know this document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, this is a conference which you had with a
number of people, and on Page 143, if you will turn to it, you get on to
the question of butter. If you will look where it says: “Reich Marshal
Göring: How much butter do you deliver? 30,000 tons?”
Do you see that?
GÖRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then Lohse, who is in the conference, says,
“Yes,” and you say, “Do you also deliver to Wehrmacht units?” and then
Lohse says, “I can answer that too. There are only a few Jews left
alive. Tens of thousands have been disposed of, but I can tell you that
the civilian population gets, on your orders, 15 percent less than the
Germans.” I call your attention to the statement that “there are only a
few Jews left alive, tens of thousands have been disposed of.” Do you
still say, in the face of these two documents, that neither Hitler nor
yourself knew that the Jews were being exterminated?
GÖRING: I beg that the remarks be rightly read. They are quite
incorrectly reproduced. May I read the original text? “Lohse:”—thus not
my remark, but the remark of Lohse—“I can also answer that. The Jews
are left only in small numbers. Thousands have gone.” It does not say
here that they were destroyed. From this remark you cannot conclude that
they were killed. It could also mean that they had gone away—they were
removed. There is nothing here . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: About the preceding remark, I suggest that you
make quite clear what you meant by “there are only a few Jews left
alive, whereas tens of thousands have been disposed of.”
GÖRING: They were “still living there.” That is how you should
understand that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You heard what I read to you about Hitler, what
he said to Horthy and what Ribbentrop said, that the Jews must be
exterminated or taken to concentration camps. Hitler said the Jews must
either work or be shot. That was in April 1943. Do you still say that
neither Hitler nor you knew of this policy to exterminate the Jews?
GÖRING: For the correctness of the document . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please answer my question. Do you still
say neither Hitler nor you knew of the policy to exterminate the Jews?
GÖRING: As far as Hitler is concerned, I have said I do not think so. As
far as I am concerned, I have said that I did not know, even
approximately, to what extent these things were taking place.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not know to what degree, but you knew
there was a policy that aimed at the extermination of the Jews?
GÖRING: No, a policy of emigration, not liquidation of the Jews. I knew
only that there had been isolated cases of such perpetrations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.
GEN. RUDENKO: If I understand you, Defendant Göring, you said that all
the basic decisions concerning foreign, political, and military matters
were taken by Hitler alone? Do I understand you rightly?
GÖRING: Yes, certainly. After all, he was the Führer.
GEN. RUDENKO: Am I to understand that Hitler took these decisions
without listening to the opinions of the experts who studied the
questions, and the intelligence reports on those matters?
GÖRING: It depended upon the circumstances. In certain cases he would
ask for data to be submitted to him, without the experts knowing the
exact reason. In other cases, he would explain to his advisers what he
intended to do, and get from them the data and their opinion. Final
decisions he took himself as Supreme Commander.
GEN. RUDENKO: In that case, do I understand you correctly when you say
that when making important decisions, Hitler used the analysis and
material given to him by his close collaborators, who advised him
according to their speciality. Is that correct?
GÖRING: Given to him partly by his collaborators, partly as in the case
of communication and intelligence, by other members of the departments
concerned?
GEN. RUDENKO: Will you tell me then, who was the closest collaborator of
Hitler as far as the Air Force was concerned?
GÖRING: I was, of course.
GEN. RUDENKO: And on the questions of economics?
GÖRING: In economic matters, it was also I.
GEN. RUDENKO: And on political matters?
GÖRING: It depended on what question came up for discussion, and on
whether the Führer had consulted anybody or asked his opinion.
GEN. RUDENKO: Can you tell me, who were these collaborators and
associates?
GÖRING: The close collaborators of the Führer as I said before were
first I, myself. Another close associate—perhaps it is the wrong
word—with whom he perhaps spoke more than with others was Dr. Goebbels.
Then, of course, you must consider the different periods. It varied
during the 20 years; towards the end, it was Bormann first and foremost.
During the years 1933 and 1934, until shortly before the end, it was
Himmler also, when certain questions were dealt with. And if the Führer
was dealing with certain other specific questions, then he would, of
course, as is the custom in every government, consult the person who
knew most about the question and obtain the information from him.
GEN. RUDENKO: Can you also name which of his collaborators were
associated with him in the field of foreign politics?
GÖRING: As far as foreign policy was concerned, Hitler only consulted
his colleagues more on the, so to speak, purely technical side. The most
important and far-reaching political decisions were taken by himself,
and he then announced them to his collaborators and colleagues as
ready-made conceptions. Only very few people were allowed to discuss
them, myself for instance; and the technical execution of his decisions
in the field of foreign policy, when it came to framing the diplomatic
notes, was done by the Foreign Office and its minister.
GEN. RUDENKO: The Defendant Ribbentrop?
GÖRING: Yes, naturally, he was the foreign minister concerned, but he
did not make foreign policy.
GEN. RUDENKO: And on questions of strategy, who advised Hitler?
GÖRING: There were several people. On purely departmental matters of
strategic importance it was the three commanders-in-chief and their
chiefs of general staff, and to some extent, the Supreme General Staff
which was immediately attached to the Führer.
GEN. RUDENKO: Which of the defendants can be placed in the category of
such consultants?
GÖRING: If he was asked by the Führer, then the adviser on strategic
matters was the Chief of the Operations Staff, General Jodl; and as far
as military administrative questions were concerned, the
commanders-in-chief, that is myself, Admiral Raeder, and later Admiral
Dönitz for the Navy. The other representatives of the Army did not take
part.
GEN. RUDENKO: The next question. If we approach the subject, not
theoretically but functionally, could we conclude that any
recommendations which Hitler’s leading associates might make, would have
had any considerable influence on Hitler’s final decisions?
GÖRING: If I disregard the purely formal point of view and presumably
you are referring to the military sphere, then the position was . . .
GEN. RUDENKO: No, I mean all spheres. All aspects of questions such as
economic questions, home policy, foreign policy, military, and strategic
questions. I mean, if we approach the subject, not theoretically but
functionally, did their recommendations have any considerable influence
on Hitler’s final decisions? That is what I mean.
GÖRING: To a certain extent, yes. Their rejection depended on whether or
not they appeared right to the Führer.
GEN. RUDENKO: You said to a certain extent, did you not?
GÖRING: Yes, of course, if a reasonable proposal was made, and he
considered it to be reasonable, then he certainly made use of it.
GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to stress that all these consultants must
have been closely associated with Hitler. Therefore, they had a certain
influence on Hitler’s final decision. They did not stand quite aloof,
did they?
GÖRING: They did not stand aloof. Their influence was only effective to
the extent that their convictions concurred with those of the Führer.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Let us now pass to the next set of
questions.
When exactly did you start the working out of the plan of action for the
use of the German Luftwaffe against the Soviet Union in connection with
Case Barbarossa?
GÖRING: The deployment of the Luftwaffe for Case Barbarossa was worked
out by my general staff, after the first directive of the Führer’s, that
is, after the November directive.
GEN. RUDENKO: In 1940?
GÖRING: In 1940. But I would add that I had already considered making
preparations not only in anticipation of a possible threat from Russia,
but from all those countries which were not already involved in the war,
but which might eventually be drawn in.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. It was in November 1940, when Germany was
preparing to attack Russia? Plans were already being prepared for this
attack with your participation?
GÖRING: The other day I explained exactly, that at the time a plan for
dealing with the political situation and the potential threat from
Russia had been worked out.
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you to reply to this question briefly, “yes” or
“no.” I think it is possible to reply to the question briefly.
Once more I say, in November 1940, more than half a year before the
attack on the Soviet Union, plans were already prepared, with your
participation, for the attack on the Soviet Union. Can you reply to this
briefly?
GÖRING: Yes, but not in the sense in which you are presenting it.
GEN. RUDENKO: It seems to me that I have put the question quite clearly,
and there is no ambiguity here at all. How much time did it take to
prepare Case Barbarossa?
GÖRING: In which sector, air, land, or sea?
GEN. RUDENKO: If you are acquainted with all phases of the plan, that is
concerning the Air Force, the Army and the Navy, then I would like you
to answer for all phases of Case Barbarossa.
GÖRING: Generally speaking, I can only answer for the air, where it took
a comparatively short time.
GEN. RUDENKO: If you please, just how long did it take to prepare Case
Barbarossa?
GÖRING: After so many years I cannot give you the exact time without
referring to the documents, but I answered your question when I told you
that as far as the Air Force was concerned, it took a comparatively
short time; as for the Army, it probably took longer.
GEN. RUDENKO: Thus, you admit that the attack on the Soviet Union was
planned several months in advance of the attack itself, and that you, as
chief of German Air Force and Reich Marshal, participated directly in
the preparation of the attack.
GÖRING: May I divide your numerous questions. Firstly, that was not
several months . . .
GEN. RUDENKO: There were not too many questions asked at once. It was
only one question. You have admitted that in November 1940 Case
Barbarossa was prepared and developed for the Air Force. I ask you in
your capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the German Luftwaffe.
GÖRING: That is right.
GEN. RUDENKO: You have answered already the first part of my question.
Now the following part: You admit that as chief of the German Air Force
and Reich Marshal you participated in preparations for the attack on the
Soviet Union?
GÖRING: I once more repeat that I prepared for the possibility of an
attack, mainly because of Hitler’s assumption that Soviet Russia was
adopting a dangerous attitude. In the beginning the certainty of an
attack was not discussed, and that is stated clearly in the directive of
November 1940.
Secondly, I want to emphasize that my position as Reich Marshal is of no
importance here. That is a title and a rank.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you do not deny—rather, you agree—that the plan was
already prepared in November 1940?
GÖRING: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: It appears to me that the question has already been
covered in such detail before the Tribunal that we need not talk too
much about Case Barbarossa, which is quite clear. I shall go on to the
next question:
Do you admit that the objectives of the war against the Soviet Union
consisted of invading and seizing Soviet territory up to the Ural
Mountains and joining it to the German Reich, including the Baltic
territories, the Crimea, the Caucasus; also the subjugation by Germany
of the Ukraine, of Bielorussia, and of other regions of the Soviet
Union? Do you admit that such were the objectives of that plan?
GÖRING: That I certainly do not admit.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not admit that! Do you not remember that during the
conference at Hitler’s headquarters on the 16th of June 1941, at which
you were present, as well as Bormann, Keitel, Rosenberg, and others,
Hitler stated the objectives of the attack against the Soviet Union
exactly as I have stated them? This was shown by the document submitted
to the Tribunal. Have you forgotten that document? Have you forgotten
about that?
GÖRING: I can remember the document exactly, and I have a fair
recollection of the discussion at the conference. I said the first time
that this document, as recorded by Bormann, appears to me extremely
exaggerated as far as the demands are concerned. At any rate, at the
beginning of the war, such demands were not discussed; nor had they been
discussed previously.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you do admit that there are minutes of such a
conference?
GÖRING: I admit it because I have seen them. It was a document prepared
by Bormann.
GEN. RUDENKO: You also admit that according to the minutes of this
meeting, you participated in that conference.
GÖRING: I was present at that conference, and for that reason I question
the record.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you remember that in those minutes the tasks were
formulated which were in connection with developing conditions? I shall
remind you of various parts of the minutes. It is not necessary to read
them in full.
GÖRING: May I ask to be shown a copy of that record.
GEN. RUDENKO: You would like a copy of the minutes of the meeting?
GÖRING: I ask to have it.
GEN. RUDENKO: If you please. Would you like to read the document?
GÖRING: No, only where you are going to quote it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Page 2, second paragraph, Point 2, about the Crimea: “We
emphasize”—can you find the place? Do you have it?
GÖRING: Just a moment, I have not found it yet. Yes, I have it.
GEN. RUDENKO: “We emphasize”—states this Point 2—“that we are
bringing freedom to the Crimea. The Crimea must be freed of all
foreigners and populated by the Germans. Also, Austrian Galicia
will become a province of the German Reich.”
Have you found the place?
GÖRING: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: “A province of the Reich,” it says.
GÖRING: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: I want to draw your attention to the end of the minutes.
It says here: “The Führer stresses the fact that the whole of the Baltic
States must become Reich territory.”
Have you found the place, “The Führer stresses the fact”?
GÖRING: You mean the very last bit?
GEN. RUDENKO: That is right.
GÖRING: “Finally, it is ordered . . .”?
GEN. RUDENKO: A little higher up.
GÖRING: “The Führer stresses . . .”?
GEN. RUDENKO: That is right.
“The Führer stresses the fact that the Baltic countries as well
must become Reich territory.” Then it goes on—“Reich territory
must also include the Crimea, with its adjoining regions. These
adjoining regions must be as big as possible.”
The Führer then says something about the Ukrainians . . .
Go on further; skip one paragraph.
“The Führer, furthermore, stresses that the Volga region also
must become Reich territory, as well as the Baku Province, which
must become a military colony of the Reich. Eastern Karelia is
claimed by the Finns.
“The peninsula Kola, however, because of the large supplies of
nickel, should become German territory. Great caution must be
exercised in the incorporation of Finland as a federal state.
The Finns want the surrounding region of Leningrad. The Führer
will level Leningrad to the ground and give it to the Finns
afterwards.”
Have you not found the place where it mentions Leningrad and Finland?
GÖRING: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: These are the minutes of the conference at which you were
present on the 16th of July 1941, 3 weeks after Germany attacked the
Soviet Union. You do not deny that such minutes exist, do you?
It is Document Number L-221.
GÖRING: Just a moment, you are mistaken in the date. You said 3 days;
that is not correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: Three weeks, not 3 days.
GÖRING: Oh, 3 weeks; I see.
GEN. RUDENKO: Three weeks after Germany attacked the Soviet Union on the
22d of June, and the conference took place at Hitler’s headquarters on
the 16th of July at 1500 hours, I think.
Is it correct that such a conference took place?
GÖRING: That is quite right. I have said so all along, but the record of
this is not right.
GEN. RUDENKO: And who took the minutes of the meeting?
GÖRING: Bormann.
GEN. RUDENKO: What was the point of Bormann’s taking the minutes
incorrectly?
GÖRING: In this record Bormann has exaggerated. The Volga territory was
not discussed. As far as the Crimea is concerned, it is correct, that
the Führer . . .
GEN. RUDENKO: Well, let us be a little more precise. Germany wanted the
Crimea to become a Reich territory, correct?
GÖRING: The Führer wanted the Crimea, yes, but that was an aim fixed
before the war. The same applies to the three Baltic States, which had
previously been taken by Russia. They, too, were to go back to Germany.
GEN. RUDENKO: Pardon me. You say that the question of the Crimea arose
even before the war, that is, the question of acquiring the Crimea for
the Reich. How long before the war was that?
GÖRING: No, before the war the Führer had not discussed territorial aims
with us, or, rather which territories he had in mind. At that time, if
you read the record, I myself considered the question premature, and I
confined myself to more practical matters during that conference.
GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to be still more precise. You state that with
regard to the Crimea, there was some question about making the Crimea
Reich territory.
GÖRING: Yes, that was discussed during that conference.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, with regard to the Baltic provinces, there was
talk about those, too?
GÖRING: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. With regard to the Caucasus, there was talk
about annexing the Caucasus also?
GÖRING: It was never a question of its becoming German. We merely spoke
about very strong German economic influence in that sphere.
GEN. RUDENKO: So the Caucasus was to become a concession of the Reich?
GÖRING: Just to what degree obviously could not be discussed until after
a victorious war. You can see from the record what a mad thing it is to
discuss a few days after a war has broken out the things recorded here
by Bormann, when nobody knows what the outcome of that war will be and
what the possibilities are.
GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore by exaggeration you mean that the Volga
territory for instance was not discussed.
GÖRING: The exaggeration lies in the fact that at that time things were
discussed which could not be usefully discussed at all. At the most one
might have talked about territory which one occupied, and its
administration.
GEN. RUDENKO: We are now trying to establish the facts, namely, that
those questions had been discussed, and these questions came up at the
conference. You do not deny that, do you?
GÖRING: There had been some discussion, yes, but not as recorded in
these minutes.
GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to draw just one conclusion. The facts bear
witness that even before this conference, aims to annex foreign
territories had been fixed in accordance with the plan prepared months
ago. That is correct, is it not?
GÖRING: Yes that is correct, but I would like to emphasize that in these
minutes I steered away from these endless discussions, and here the
text, reads:
“The Reich Marshal countered this, that is, the lengthy
discussion of all these things, by stressing the main points
which were of vital importance to us, such as, the securing of
food supplies to the extent necessary for economy, securing of
roads, _et cetera_.”