you if those are not photographs taken by the Luftwaffe, following the
attack on Poland.
[_Photographs were shown to the witness._]
GÖRING: To answer the first question, whether the pictures had actually
been taken by the German Air Force, I regret I cannot give a positive
answer for there is no indication that these were made by the German Air
Force. Four out of the five pictures were, if you observe them closely,
taken from an oblique angle, as though they had been taken from a church
steeple rather than from an airplane, from which generally only vertical
pictures are taken because of the built-in camera.
The picture showing the destruction of parts of Warsaw can be regarded
technically as such an aerial photo. The date is lacking here. But none
of these pictures give any proof that they were taken by the Luftwaffe.
However, let us assume that they were taken by the Luftwaffe, so that
further questions will be facilitated.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You say you will assume they were by the Luftwaffe?
GÖRING: Yes, although I doubt it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not want you to give away anything here. If
you think they were not taken by the Luftwaffe, I do not want you to
admit it.
GÖRING: I said there is no proof. I did not take the pictures, I do not
recognize them, they were not submitted to me as Luftwaffe pictures and
from a purely technical point of view they could only have been taken
from a plane with a private camera from a very oblique angle. They are
not true aerial pictures, that is vertical pictures as taken by the Air
Force.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we will pass them then and go to something
else.
Let us take up Document 638-PS, Exhibit Number USA-788, about which you
have been interrogated and which, as I recall, you authenticated.
[_Document 638-PS was submitted to the witness._]
This is the document which was signed by Dr. Joel and I ask you to
follow me.
“From the Reich Marshal’s plans of 24 September 1942.
“First: The Reich Marshal is looking for daring fellows who will
be employed in the East as Sonderkommandos and who will be able
to carry out the task of creating confusion behind the lines.
They are to be formed into bands under leadership, and with
interpreters assigned to them. For this purpose the Reich
Marshal is considering convicts who are first offenders, who
have committed not particularly heinous offenses for which there
can be some human understanding.
“The Reich Marshal first of all mentioned persons convicted of
poaching. He knew, of course, that the Reichsführer SS had
picked out the so-called poachers, and they were already in his
hands. He requests, however, that the question be re-examined.
The only suitable men are those with a passion for hunting, who
have poached for love of the trophy, not men who have laid
snares and traps. The Reich Marshal also mentioned fanatical
members of smuggling gangs, who take part in gun battles on the
frontiers and whose passion it is to outwit the customs at the
risk of their own lives, but not men who attempt to bring
articles over the frontier in an express train or by similar
means.
“The Reich Marshal leaves it to us to consider whether still
another category of convicts can be assigned to these bands or
pursuit commands.
“In the regions assigned for their operations, these bands,
whose first task should be to destroy the communications of the
partisan groups, could murder, burn and ravish; in Germany they
would once again come under strict supervision.
“Signed: Dr. Joel, 24 September 1942.”
Do you wish to make an explanation of that document to the Tribunal?
GÖRING: Yes, with the same that I made once before. The first two
paragraphs clearly show that I wanted only those people who had
committed no offenses involving laws of honor, such as poachers,
distinguishing between those having a passion for hunting and those who
only want to steal. I made a distinction also with regard to smugglers,
between those who take personal risks showing a certain passion for
their activity, and those who do it in a dishonorable way.
Both these main paragraphs plainly show that I did not wish to use
criminals of any type, and that is why I explicitly denied having said
what is stated in the last paragraphs. It is not a question of the
minutes but of the notes taken by an official with whom I discussed
these things. He should be able to testify where and if he heard these
words uttered by me. But they contradict my ideas so much, and I
particularly emphasize this, and in particular, as I have clearly said,
as regards rape, which I always punished with death even if committed
against citizens of enemy states, that I rejected that statement; and I
again pointed out that the main paragraphs are in utmost contradiction
to the last remark, because if it had been a matter of indifference to
me, I could have selected criminals.
Thirdly, I expressly stated above, that their main task behind the lines
was to create confusion, to disrupt communications, to destroy railways,
and the like. Fourthly and lastly, the whole thing never took place.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You objected to the word “ravish” which had been
translated the first time “rape”, and that is the only objection you
made to this document when it was presented to you. Is that not correct?
GÖRING: No, it is not correct that way. I say this because it is a most
significant concept which has always particularly contradicted my sense
of justice, for shortly after the seizure of power I instigated a
sharpening of this phase of German penal laws. And I wanted to show by
this word and this concept, that this entire latter part could not have
been uttered by me, and I deny having said it. I will absolutely and
gladly take responsibility for even the most serious things which I have
done, but I deny this statement, as being in complete contradiction to
my opinions.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who is the signer of this document?
GÖRING: Dr. Joel.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes—you knew him?
GÖRING: I knew him slightly. I saw him at this conference.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was present at the conference?
GÖRING: I instructed him to come to tell him that I wished that type of
people.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you dealt in economic matters with the various
occupied countries through Reichskommissars?
GÖRING: I testified the other day that all sorts of authorities,
including the Reichskommissars had to follow my economic directives and
orders.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And were to report to you on economic matters?
GÖRING: Not about all of them, only insofar as they concerned my
directives.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was your Reichskommissar in Poland?
GÖRING: There was no Reichskommissar in Poland. There was a Governor
General in Poland, that was Dr. Frank.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was the Reichskommissar in the Netherlands?
GÖRING: Dr. Seyss-Inquart was Reichskommissar for Holland.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was the Reichskommissar for Norway?
GÖRING: In Norway the Gauleiter Terboven was Reichskommissar.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Terboven—he was also a Gauleiter you say?
GÖRING: He was Gauleiter at Essen.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You appointed him to Norway or attained his
appointment?
GÖRING: I neither appointed him for Norway—because that was beyond my
jurisdiction—nor did I have him appointed. I did not oppose his
appointment in any way as I considered he would make a very competent
Reichskommissar.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he was there from 1940 until 1945?
GÖRING: I believe that is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I will ask to have you shown Document R-134, a
communication from Terboven to you.
[_Document R-134 was submitted to the witness._]
That is a communication of the 1st of May 1942, is it not?
GÖRING: I note the date; yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that reports to you as follows, does it not—it
is addressed to you as Reich Marshal, “My esteemed Reich Marshal”, is
that right?
GÖRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Omitting the first paragraph, unless you are to
give it.
“Several days ago on an island west of Bergen we captured a
Norwegian sabotage unit, trained by the Secret Service, and
found extensive stores of sabotage instruments, some of them of
a new kind, including probably poison and bacteria. Those which
appeared unfamiliar were forwarded to the Reich Security Main
Office for closer examination.
“Besides other tasks, this sabotage unit was to begin its
sabotage work, on Sola and Herdla using the explosive of which a
sample is enclosed herewith. This appears from written
directives found. Since it must be assumed that similar actions
are under way on airfields on the rest of the European coast,
and assuming that a means of sabotage actually unknown until now
is involved, I am communicating with you by the fastest possible
means, in order to give you an opportunity to issue an
appropriate warning.
“Unfortunately, two especially reliable officers of the Security
Police were killed in the fight against the sabotage unit. We
buried them this morning at 1000 hours in the Heroes’ Cemetery
in Bergen.
“On the same day and at the same hour 18 Norwegians were shot on
my order. These had been captured some time previously in the
attempt to go to England illegally.
“On the same day, the entire village which had harbored the
sabotage unit was burned down and the population deported. All
the males were taken to a German concentration camp without any
notification being sent to their families. The women were sent
to a female forced labor camp in Norway, and those children who
were not capable of working went to a children’s camp. Heil
Hitler! Yours obediently, Terboven.”
Is that correct?
GÖRING: It says so in the letter, a copy of which is before me.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Terboven remained after that report until 1945,
didn’t he?
GÖRING: That’s correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, later in the same year, 1942, you adopted very
similar means to those reported by Terboven to you, did you not?
GÖRING: I did not understand the question.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you adopted later in the same year the same
means as Terboven, didn’t you?
GÖRING: I? Where?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I will ask that you be shown Document
1742-PS.
[_Document 1742-PS was submitted to the witness._]
Now, this is a decree of 26 October 1942, by Göring. I ask you to follow
me:
“Simultaneously with the intensified combating of guerrilla
activity ordered by the Führer, and the cleaning up of the land
behind the lines, in particular that behind the Army Group
Center, I request that the following points be taken into
consideration, and the conclusions drawn therefrom be put into
practice:
“1. Simultaneously with the combating of the underground forces
and the combing out of the areas contaminated by them, all
available livestock must be driven off to safe areas. Similarly,
food supplies are to be removed and brought into safety, so that
they will no longer be available to the guerrillas.
“2. All male and female labor suitable for any kind of
employment must be forcibly recruited and allocated to the
Plenipotentiary General for Labor, who will then employ them in
safe areas behind the lines or in the Reich. Separate camps must
be organized behind the lines for the children.”
Is that right?
GÖRING: Absolutely. It concerns areas overrun by guerrillas, and no one
could expect me to leave cattle and foodstuffs at their disposal.
Furthermore, people who were repeatedly being incited to guerrilla
activities and revolts against us had to be brought back to safe areas
and put to work. I would like to emphasize that this was absolutely
vital for the security of the troops. But I may emphasize again that you
said I gave the same orders which you read from Terboven’s letter. I did
not order villages to be burned, and did not order the shooting of
hostages. This was something basically different.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You simply seized all the men, women and children
and moved them out. That is what I referred to.
By May of 1944 your problem in the loss of fighter aircraft and fighter
personnel was becoming serious?
GÖRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: On the 19th of May, 1944, you had a conference in
your office, on the subject of fighter aircraft and the losses of
fighter personnel, did you not?
GÖRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you have been shown the minutes of that meeting
and authenticated them in your interrogations?
GÖRING: It is not the minutes of that conference. It is a short and
brief summary by an officer of a meeting which, as far as I know, lasted
2 days.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask to have you shown Document L-166. It is
entitled, “Most Secret Document,” isn’t it?
GÖRING: That is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is also entitled, “Minutes of conference on
fighter aircraft with the Reich Marshal on 15 and 16 May 1944.” That is
correct, too, is it not?
GÖRING: No, it says, “Notices of a conference on fighter aircraft at the
Reich Marshal’s on 15 and 16 May 1944.”
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Notices,” you translate it “notices”?
GÖRING: It says “memorandum” here and that is the original.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Notes of Conference on Fighter Aircraft.”
GÖRING: Lasting 2 days.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. And at first General Galland described in
detail the situation regarding fighter personnel. That took place,
didn’t it, and he reviewed the losses?
GÖRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And reviewed the losses?
GÖRING: That is right.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then he reviewed at some length under Item 2,
“Remedial Measures,” is that right?
GÖRING: According to the memorandum, yes, but whether that actually took
place I cannot say.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This conference took place, didn’t it?
GÖRING: Absolutely, 2 days.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And under Item 3 General Galland made certain
proposals, did he not?
GÖRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then after considerable discussion General
Schmidt made certain proposals, Items 12 and 13, is that right?
GÖRING: It must have been so. At any rate it says so according to the
memorandum.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You recommended a conference between the chief of
the General Staff and the chief of artillery, as soon as possible, did
you not? Item 13?
GÖRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And General Schmidt’s recommendations and requests
appear in Items 14 and 15 and 16 and 17 and 18?
GÖRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you decided:
“The Reich Marshal has decided that only the III-groups of
fighter squadrons are to remain in the Reich, and that all the
fighters fit for operations are to be pressed into service.”
That occurred, did it not?
GÖRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then:
“The Reich Marshal desires that when low-level attack on
airfields are made, causing considerable loss in personnel and
material, the measures taken for defense and dispersal are to be
re-examined by the Luftwaffenführungsstab.”
Number 19. That occurred, did it not?
GÖRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Item 20 reads:
“The Reich Marshal wishes to propose to the Führer that American
and English crews who shoot indiscriminately over towns, at
moving civilian trains, or at soldiers hanging to parachutes
should be shot immediately on the spot.”
Have I correctly read that?
GÖRING: It says so here. And I objected at once at that time that this
was not correct. This passage has no connection at all with the context
of these notes, 19-21. Besides the expression “soldiers hanging to
parachutes” is entirely misleading and not commonly used. I thought for
a long time about how this could have got into the notes, which I never
saw and which were drawn up over a period of 2 days, and can only find
the explanation that I pointed out—as can be gathered from the other
evidence—that around that time the Führer gave a directive in that
connection, and that in any event there must be a mistake; that is, it
should not be that the Reich Marshal wants to propose, _et cetera_, to
the Führer, but that I might have suggested that the Führer had some
such intention. But about this the author of these notes would have to
be consulted. No other item in all these notes refers to this. Even the
next item is entirely different. Whereas everything else stands in
relationship, this one point is extraneous.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In all the notes of the 2 days, this is the one
thing that you say is mistaken.
Now I ask to have you shown Document 731-PS.
[_Document 731-PS was submitted to the witness._]
Now, the conference, the notes of which I have just read you, was
followed within a week by the order, 731-PS, was it not, the memorandum,
731-PS, which reads:
“The Führer has reached the following decision in regard to
measures to be taken against Anglo-American air crews in special
instances:
“Enemy airmen who have been brought down are to be shot without
court martial proceedings in the following instances . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, shouldn’t you refer to a passage
four lines above that, after “Report of the Reich Marshal”?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I did not, but perhaps for the record it ought to
be in full.
“Chief of the Command Staff of the Armed Forces, Chief WFSt.
Please direct drafting of order. W (Warlimont). K (Keitel),
Deputy Chief of Command Staff of the Armed Forces. Must go to
Reichsführer SS. According to the report of the Reich Marshal,
General Korten made the following statement: ‘Memorandum’”—I
think the next line is not in the original—
“‘The Führer has given the following ruling in regard to
measures to be taken against Anglo-American air crews in special
instances:
“‘Enemy airmen whose machines have been shot down are to be shot
without trial by court martial in the following cases:
“‘(1) In the event of the shooting of our own German air crews
while they are parachuting to earth.
“‘(2) In the event of aerial attacks upon German planes which
have made emergency landings and whose crews are in the
immediate vicinity.
“‘(3) In the event of attacks upon railway trains engaged in
public transport.
“‘(4) In the event of low-level aerial attacks upon individual
civilians, farmers, workers, single vehicles, and so forth.’”
Now, there is a note: “In the event of low-level aerial attacks on
individual civilians, single civilian vehicles, and so forth,” is there
not?
GÖRING: On my copy, “In the event of low-level aerial attacks—on
single”—“single” is crossed out here and there are two words written
above which I cannot read. Before the expression, “single vehicles,” is
the word “civilian” and referring to Point 2, it says:
“I consider it doubtful, because the destruction of a plane
which has made an emergency landing cannot be designated as
gangster methods but rather as a measure in keeping with the
strictest standards of civilized warfare.”
We are concerned with the entire series of questions discussed in these
days and weeks and to which Von Brauchitsch also testified recently.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That note about that emergency landing is signed by
“J,” isn’t it, which, stands for “Jodl”?
GÖRING: Certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that is all I care to ask.
There are a number of documents which should be introduced in this
connection, and I think it will be best perhaps if we tabulate them and
get them ready over the evening and present them in the morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Mr. Justice Jackson, you can put them all in
then.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to ask you first some questions about the
matter of the British Air Force officers who escaped from Stalag Luft
III. Do you remember that you said in giving your evidence that you knew
this incident very completely and very minutely? Do you remember saying
that?
GÖRING: No—that I had received accurate knowledge; not that I had
accurate knowledge—but that I received it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me quote your own words, as they were taken
down, “I know this incident very completely, very minutely, but it came
to my attention, unfortunately, at a later period of time.” That is what
you said the other day, is that right?
GÖRING: Yes, that is what I meant; that I know about the incident
exactly, but only heard of it 2 days later.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told the Tribunal that you were on leave at
this time, in the last period of March 1944, is that right?
GÖRING: Yes, as far as I remember I was on leave in March until a few
days before Easter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you said, “As I can prove.” I want you to
tell the Tribunal the dates of your leave.
GÖRING: I say again, that this refers to the whole of March—I remember
it well—and for proof I would like to mention the people who were with
me on this leave.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to know is, where you were on leave.
GÖRING: Here, in the vicinity of Nuremberg.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you were within easy reach of the telephone
from the Air Ministry or, indeed, from Breslau, if you were wanted?
GÖRING: I would have been easily accessible by phone if someone wanted
to communicate with me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to help me with regard to one or two
other dates of which you have spoken. You say: “I heard 1 or 2 days
later about this escape.” Do you understand, Witness, that it is about
the escape I am asking you, not about the shooting, for the moment; I
want to make it quite clear.
GÖRING: It is clear to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you mean by that, that you heard about the
actual escape 1 or 2 days after it happened?
GÖRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you hear about it from the office of your
adjutant or from your director of operations?
GÖRING: I always heard these things through my adjutant. Several other
escapes had preceded this one.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that’s right. There had been a number of
escapes from this camp.
GÖRING: I cannot tell you exactly whether they were from this camp.
Shortly before several big escapes had taken place, which I always heard
of through the office of my adjutant.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to tell the Tribunal another date:
You say that on your return from leave your chief of staff made a
communication to you. Who was your chief of staff?
GÖRING: General Korten was chief of staff at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you tell us the date at which he made this
communication to you?
GÖRING: No, I cannot tell you that exactly. I believe I discussed this
incident with my chief of staff later, telling him what I had already
heard about it from other sources.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who was the first to tell you about it? Was it
your chief of staff who told you about the shootings? Do you mean that
some one else had told you about the shooting?
GÖRING: I cannot say exactly now whether I heard about the shooting from
the chief of staff, or from other sources. But in any event I discussed
this with the chief of staff.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the date that you talked about it with
your chief of staff?
GÖRING: I cannot tell you the date exactly from memory, but it must have
been around Easter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That would be just about the end of March,
wouldn’t it?
GÖRING: No. It might have been at the beginning of April, the first half
of April.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then you had an interview with Himmler, you
have told us?
GÖRING: Yes, I talked with Himmler about this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you fix that?
GÖRING: Of course I cannot establish this date with certainty. I saw
Himmler, and, at the first opportunity after I had heard about this
incident, spoke to him about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that you can’t fix the date in relation to
your coming back from leave, or the interview with your chief of staff,
or any other date, or Easter?
GÖRING: Without any documents it is, as I said, impossible for me today
to fix the date. I can only mention the approximate period of time; and
that I have done.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said the other day that you could prove when
you were on leave. Am I to take it that you haven’t taken the trouble to
look up what your leave dates were?
GÖRING: I have already said that I was on leave during March. Whether I
returned on the 26th or the 28th or the 29th of March I cannot tell you.
For proof of that you would have to ask the people who accompanied me,
who perhaps can fix this date more definitely. I know only that I was
there in March.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, will it be perfectly fair to you if I
take the latest of your dates, the 29th of March, to work on?
GÖRING: It would be more expedient if you would tell me when Easter was
that year, because I do not recall it. Then it will be easier for me to
specify the dates, because I know that a few days before Easter I
returned to Berchtesgaden in order to pass these holidays with my
family.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A few days before Easter you went back to
Berchtesgaden?
GÖRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you had come back on leave some day before
that. Before you went to Berchtesgaden you had come back from your March
leave?
GÖRING: Berchtesgaden was then at the same time the headquarters of the
Führer. I returned from my leave to Berchtesgaden, and with my return my
leave ended, because I returned to duty. The return to Berchtesgaden was
identical with the termination of my leave.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I can’t give you Easter offhand, but I
happen to remember Whitsuntide was the 28th of May, so that Easter would
be early, somewhere about the 5th of April. So that your leave would
finish somewhere about the end of March, maybe the 26th or the 29th;
that is right, isn’t it?
Now, these shootings of these officers went on from the 25th of March to
the 13th of April; do you know that?
GÖRING: I do not know that exactly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You may take that from me, because there is an
official report of the shooting, and I want to be quite fair with you.
Only 49 of these officers were shot on the 6th of April, as far as we
can be sure, and one was shot either on the 13th of April or later. But
the critical period is the end of March, and we may take it that you
were back from leave by about the 29th of March.
I just want you to tell the Tribunal this was a matter of great
importance, wasn’t it? Considered a matter of great importance?
GÖRING: It was a very important matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Milch—I beg pardon—Field Marshal Milch
has said that it was a matter which would require the highest authority,
and I think you have said that you know it was Hitler’s decision that
these officers should be shot; is that so?
GÖRING: The question did not come through clearly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was Hitler’s decision that these officers
should be shot?
GÖRING: That is correct; and I was later notified that it was Hitler’s
decree.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you just to remember one other thing,
that immediately it was published, the British Foreign Secretary, Mr.
Eden, at once said that Great Britain would demand justice of the
perpetrators of these murders; do you remember that?
GÖRING: I cannot remember the speech to the House of Commons given by
Eden. I myself do not know the substance of this speech even today. I
just heard that he spoke in Parliament about this incident.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to tell the Tribunal just who the
persons in your ministry involved were. I will tell you; I think it
would be shorter in the end. If you disagree you can correct me.
The commandant of Stalag Luft III was Oberst Von Lindeiner of your
service, was he not?
GÖRING: That is quite possible. I did not know the names of all these
commandants. There was a court martial against him and that was because
the escape was possible. He was not connected with the shootings.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, but he was commandant of the camp, and I
suppose you had to review and confirm the proceedings of the
Zentralluftwaffengericht which convicted him and sentenced him to a
year’s imprisonment for neglect of duty. That would come to you,
wouldn’t it? Wouldn’t that come to you for review?
GÖRING: No, only if larger penalties were involved. One year
imprisonment would not come to my attention. But I know, and I would
like to certify, that court proceedings were taken against him for
neglect of duty at the time of the escape.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In May of 1943, Inspectorate Number 17 had been
interposed between the Luftwaffe and the Prisoners of War Organization
of the OKW, the Kriegsgefangenenwesen; do you remember that?
GÖRING: I do not know the details about inspection nor how closely it
concerned the Prisoners of War Organization of the OKW, or how it was
otherwise.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to remind you of who your own officers
were. You understand, Witness, that your own officers are involved in
this matter. I want to remind you who they were. Was the head of
Inspectorate 17 Major General Grosch of the Luftwaffe?
GÖRING: Major General Grosch is of the Luftwaffe.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told the Tribunal the other day—I am
quoting your own words—that you knew from information, you knew this
incident very completely and very minutely. You are now telling the
Tribunal you don’t know whether Major General Grosch was head of
Inspectorate Number 17 of the Luftwaffe.
GÖRING: That is irrelevant. I told the High Tribunal that I heard an
accurate account of the incident of the shooting of these airmen, but
that has no connection with General Grosch and his inspectorate, for he
did not participate in the shooting.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will show you that connection in one minute if
you will just answer my questions. Was Grosch’s second in command Oberst
Welder; do you remember that?
GÖRING: I do not know the particulars of the organization for inspection
of prisoner-of-war camps, nor the leaders, nor what positions they held.
At least not by heart. I would like to emphasize again, so that there
will be no confusion, that when I said I knew about this matter, I mean
that I knew how the order was issued and that the people were shot, that
I came to know all about this; but not as far as this was related to
inspections, possibilities of flight, _et cetera_.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did General Grosch, as head of Inspectorate
17, have to report to General Fōrster, your director of operations at
the Luftwaffe Ministerium?
GÖRING: That I cannot tell you without having the diagram of the
subordinate posts before me. General Fōrster was, I believe at that
time, head of the Luftwehr, or a similar designation, in the ministry. I
concerned myself less with these matters, because they were not directly
of a tactical, strategic, or of an armament nature. But it is quite
possible and certain that he belonged to this department.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it to you quite shortly, and if you don’t
know I will leave it for the moment. Did you know Major General Von
Graevenitz was head of the Defendant Keitel’s department, the
Kriegsgefangenenwesen, that dealt with prisoners of war?
GÖRING: I first heard about General Graevenitz here, for this department
did not directly concern me. I could not know all of these military
subordinate commanders in their hundreds and thousands of departments.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So I take it that you did not know Colonel, now
General Westhoff, of the department under Von Graevenitz?
GÖRING: Westhoff I never saw at all, and he did not belong to the
Luftwaffe.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not suggesting that Von Graevenitz and
Westhoff belonged to the Luftwaffe. I wanted to make it clear that I was
suggesting they belonged to General Keitel’s organization.
GÖRING: I did not know either; and I did not know what posts they
occupied.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Up to that time you still had a considerable
influence in the Reich, didn’t you?
GÖRING: At this time no longer. This no longer concerns 1944.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you were still head of the Luftwaffe and
head of the Air Ministry, weren’t you?
GÖRING: Yes, I was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you had, as head of the Luftwaffe and head
of the Air Ministry, been responsible for six prisoner-of-war camps for
the whole of the war up to that time, hadn’t you?
GÖRING: How many prisoner-of-war camps I do not know. But of course I
bear the responsibility for those which belonged to my ministry.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To the Air Force?
GÖRING: Yes, those which were subordinate to the Air Force.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew about the general plan for treatment of
prisoners of war, which we have had in evidence as the “Aktion Kugel”
plan, didn’t you?
GÖRING: No. I knew nothing of this action. I was not advised of it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were never advised of Aktion Kugel?
GÖRING: I first heard of Aktion Kugel here; saw the document and heard
the expression for the first time. Moreover no officer of the Luftwaffe
ever informed me of such a thing; and I do not believe that a single
officer was ever taken away from the Luftwaffe camps. A report to this
effect was never presented to me, in any case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know what Aktion Kugel was: That escaped
officers and noncommissioned officers, other than British and American,
were to be handed over to the police and taken to Mauthausen, where they
were shot by the device of having a gun concealed in the measuring
equipment when they thought they were getting their prison clothes. You
know what Aktion Kugel is, don’t you?
GÖRING: I heard of it here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not
know that escaped prisoners of war who were picked up by the police were
retained by the police and taken to Mauthausen?
GÖRING: No, I did not know that. On the contrary, various prisoners who
escaped from my camps were caught again by the police; and they were all
brought back to the camps; this was the first case where this to some
extent did not take place.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But didn’t you know that Colonel Welder, as
second in command of your ministry’s inspectorate, issued a written
order a month before this, in February 1944, that prisoners of war
picked up by the Luftwaffe should be delivered back to their camp, and
prisoners of war picked up by the police should be held by them and no
longer counted as being under the protection of the Luftwaffe; didn’t
you know that?
GÖRING: No. Please summon this colonel to testify if he ever made a
report of that nature to me, or addressed such a letter to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, of course I cannot tell whether your
ministry was well run or not. But he certainly issued the order, because
he says so himself.
GÖRING: Then he must say from whom he received this order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, he says that he issued this order,
and you know as well as I do that prisoners of war is a thing that you
have got to be careful about, because you have got a protecting power
that investigates any complaint; and you never denounced the Convention
and you had the protecting power in these matters all through the war,
had you not? That is right, isn’t it?
GÖRING: That is correct, but I take the liberty to ask who gave him this
order, whether he received this order from me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, he would not get it direct from you. I do
not think you had ever met him, had you? He would get it from Lieutenant
General Grosch, wouldn’t he?
GÖRING: Then Grosch should say whether he received such an order from
me. I never gave such an order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. So you say that you had never heard—this
was 3½ years after the beginning of the war—and you had never heard
that any escaped prisoners of war were to be handed over to the police.
Is that what you ask the Tribunal to believe?
GÖRING: To the extent that escaped prisoners of war committed any
offenses or crimes, they were of course turned over to the police, I
believe. But I wish to testify before the Court that I never gave any
order that they should be handed over to the police or sent to
concentration camps merely because they had attempted to break out or
escape, nor did I ever know that such measures were taken.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is my last question: I want to make it
quite clear, Witness, that I am referring to those who had escaped, who
had got away from the confines of the camp and were recaptured by the
police. Didn’t you know that they were handed over to the police?
GÖRING: No. Only if they had committed crimes while fleeing, such as
murder and so on. Such things occurred.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 21 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]
EIGHTY-SEVENTH DAY
Thursday, 21 March 1946
_Morning Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, do you remember telling me last night
that the only prisoners of war handed over to the police were those
guilty of crimes or misdemeanors?
GÖRING: I did not express myself that way. I said if the police
apprehended prisoners of war, those who had committed a crime during the
escape, as far as I know, were detained by the police and were not
returned to the camp. To what extent the police kept prisoners of war,
without returning them to a camp, I was able to gather from
interrogations and explanations here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Document D-569? Would you look
first at the top left-hand corner, which shows that it is a document
published by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht?
GÖRING: The document which I have before me has the following heading at
the top left-hand corner: “The Reichsführer SS,” and the subheading:
“Inspector of Concentration Camps.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is a document dated the 22d of November 1941.
Have you got it?
GÖRING: Yes, I have it now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at the left-hand bottom corner, as to
distribution. The second person to whom it is distributed is the Air
Ministry and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force on 22 November 1941.
That would be you.
GÖRING: That’s correct. I would like to make the following statement in
connection with this . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just for a moment. I would like you to
appreciate the document and then make your statement upon it. I shall
not stop you. I want you to look at the third sentence in Paragraph 1.
This deals with Soviet prisoners of war, you understand. The third
sentence says:
“If escaped Soviet prisoners of war are returned to the camp in
accordance with this order, they have to be handed over to the
nearest post of the Secret State Police, in any case.”
And then Paragraph 2 deals with the special position—if they commit
crimes, owing to the fact that:
“. . . at present these misdemeanors on the part of Soviet
prisoners of war are particularly frequent, due most likely to
living conditions still being somewhat unsettled, the following
temporary regulations come into force. They may be amended
later. If a Soviet prisoner of war commits any other punishable
offense then the commandant of the camp must hand the guilty man
over to the head of the Security Police.”
Do I understand this document to say that a man who escapes will be
handed over to the Security Police? You understand this document says a
man who escapes will be handed over to the Secret Police, a man who
commits a crime, as you mentioned, will be handed over to the Security
Police. Wasn’t that the condition that obtained from 1941 up to the date
we are dealing with in March 1944?
GÖRING: I would like to read the few preceding paragraphs so that no
sentences are separated from their context.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, while the witness is reading the
document, might I go over the technical matter of the arrangement of
exhibits? When I cross-examined Field Marshal Kesselring I put in three
documents, UK-66, which becomes Exhibit GB-274; D-39, which becomes
GB-275; TC-91, which becomes GB-276; so this document will become
GB-277.
[_Turning to the witness._] Have you had an opportunity of reading it,
Witness?
GÖRING: Yes, I have.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I am right, am I not, that the Soviet
prisoners of war who escaped were to be, after their return to the camp,
handed over to the Secret State Police. If they committed a crime, they
were to be handed over to the Security Police, isn’t that right?
GÖRING: Not exactly correct. I would like to point to the third sentence
in the first paragraph. There it says, “If a prisoner-of-war camp is in
the vicinity, then the man who is recaptured is to be transported
there.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But read the next sentence, “If a Soviet
prisoner of war is returned to the camp”—that is in accordance with
this order which you have just read—“he has to be handed to the nearest
service station of the Secret State Police.” Your own sentence.
GÖRING: Yes, but the second paragraph which follows gives an explanation
of frequent criminal acts of Soviet prisoners of war, _et cetera_,
committed at that time. You read that yourself; that is also connected
with this Paragraph Number 1. But this order was given by itself and it
was distributed to the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. And I would
like to give the explanation of its distribution. In this war there were
not only hundreds, but thousands of current orders which were issued by
superiors to subordinate officers and were transmitted to various
departments. That does not mean that each of these thousands of orders
was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief; only the most decisive and most
important were shown to him. The others went from department to
department. Thus it is that this order from the Chief of the High
Command was signed by a subordinate department, and not by the Chief of
the High Command himself.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This order would be dealt with by your
prisoner-of-war department in your ministry, wouldn’t it?
GÖRING: This department, according to the procedure adopted for these
orders, received the order, but no other department received it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think the answer to my question must be “yes.”
It would be dealt with by the prisoner-of-war department—your ministry.
Isn’t that so?
GÖRING: I would say yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quicker, you see, if you say “yes” in the
beginning; do you understand?
GÖRING: No; it depends upon whether I personally have read the order or
not, and I will then determine as to my responsibility.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the escape . . .
THE PRESIDENT: You were not asked about responsibility; you were asked
whether it would be dealt with by your prisoner-of-war department.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the escape about which I am asking you took
place on the night of the 24th to the 25th of March. I want you to have
that date in mind. The decision to murder these young officers must have
been taken very quickly, because the first murder which actually took
place was on the 26th of March. Do you agree with that? It must have
been taken quickly?
GÖRING: I assume that this order, as I was informed later, was given
immediately, but it had no connection with this document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no; we are finished with that document; we
are going into the murder of these young men. The Grossfahndung—a
general hue and cry, I think, would be the British translation—was also
issued at once in order that these men should be arrested; isn’t that
so?
GÖRING: That is correct. Whenever there was an escape, and such a large
number of prisoners escaped, automatically in the whole Reich, a hue and
cry was raised, that is, all authorities had to be on the lookout to
recapture the prisoners.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that in order to give this order to murder
these men, and for the Grossfahndung, there must have been a meeting of
Hitler, at any rate with Himmler or Kaltenbrunner, in order that that
order would be put into effect; isn’t that so?
GÖRING: That is correct. According to what I heard, Himmler was the
first to report this escape to the Führer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, General Westhoff, who was in Defendant
Keitel’s Kriegsgefangenenwesen, in his prisoner-of-war set-up, says
this, that
“On a date, which I think was the 26th, Keitel said to him,
‘This morning Göring reproached me in the presence of Himmler
for having let some more prisoners of war escape. It was unheard
of.’”
Do you say that General Westhoff is wrong?
GÖRING: Yes. This is not in accordance with the facts. General Westhoff
is referring to a statement of Field Marshal Keitel. This utterance in
itself is illogical, for I could not accuse Keitel because he would not
draw my attention to it, as the guarding was his responsibility and not
mine.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: One of the Defendant Keitel’s officers dealing
with this matter was a general inspector, General Röttich. I do not know
if you know him.
GÖRING: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, General Westhoff, as one could understand,
is very anxious to assure everyone that his senior officer had nothing
to do with it, and he goes on to say this about General Röttich:
“He was completely excluded from it by the fact that these
matters were taken out of his hands. Apparently at that
conference with the Führer in the morning, that is to say, the
conference between Himmler, Field Marshal Keitel, and Göring,
which took place in the Führer’s presence, the Führer himself
always took a hand in these affairs when officers escaped.”
You say that is wrong? You were at no such conference?
GÖRING: I was not present at this conference, neither was General
Westhoff; he is giving a purely subjective view, not the facts of the
case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that we find that—you think that—Westhoff
is wrong? You see, Westhoff, he was a colonel at this time, I think, and
now he finishes as a major general, and he asks that the senior officers
be asked about it; he says this: “It should be possible to find out that
Himmler made the suggestion to the Führer—to find that out from Göring
who was present at the conference.” Again and again Westhoff, who after
all is a comparatively junior officer, is saying that the truth about
this matter can be discovered from his seniors. You say that it cannot.
GÖRING: I would not say that. I would like just to say that General
Westhoff was never present for even a moment, therefore he cannot say, I
know or I saw that Reich Marshal Göring was present. He is assuming it
is so, or he may have heard it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What he says is, you know, that Keitel blamed
him, as I have read to you; that Keitel went on to say to him at General
Von Graevenitz’, “Gentlemen, the escapes must stop. We must set an
example. We shall take very severe measures. I am only telling you that,
that the men who have escaped will be shot; probably the majority of
them are dead already.” You never heard anything of that?
GÖRING: I was neither present at the Keitel-Westhoff-Graevenitz
conversation nor at the Führer-Himmler conversation. As far as I know
General Westhoff will be testifying here. Moreover, Field Marshal Keitel
will be able to say whether I was there or not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well then, I am bound to put this to you. I come
on to your own ministry. I suppose in general you take responsibility
for the actions of the officers of your ministry from the rank of field
officer and above—colonels and major generals and lieutenant generals?
GÖRING: If they acted according to my directives and my instructions,
yes; if they acted against my directives and instructions, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let us see what happened in your
own ministry. You know that—do you know, that Colonel Walde made a
personal investigation of this matter at the camp? Did you know that?
GÖRING: The particulars about this investigation, as I explained
yesterday, are unknown to me; I know only that investigations did take
place.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, on the 27th of March, that was a Monday,
did you know that there was a meeting in Berlin about this matter? Just
let me tell you who were there before you apply your mind to it, so you
will know. Your ministry was represented by Colonel Walde, because
Lieutenant General Grosch had another meeting, so he ordered his deputy
to attend; the Defendant Keitel’s organization was represented by
Colonel Von Reurmont; the Gestapo was represented by Gruppenführer
Müller; the Kripo was represented by Gruppenführer Nebe. Now, all these
officers were of course not on the policy level, but they were high
executive officers who had to deal with the actual facts that were
carried out, were they not?
GÖRING: They were not executive officers, insofar as it has not been
definitely established that executive powers are within an officer’s
province. To the first question, whether I knew about this meeting, I
would say no. Colonel Walde I do not even know personally.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean to say, you are telling the Tribunal,
that you were never told about this meeting at any time?
GÖRING: Yes, I am saying that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to look at—let him have Walde’s
statement—I want you to look at the statement of one of the officers of
your own ministry on this point. This is a statement made by Colonel
Ernst Walde, and—I am sorry I have not another German copy, but I will
get one in due course—and in my copy, Witness, it is at the foot of
Page 2, the beginning of the paragraph which I want you to look at, is:
“As recaptured prisoners were not to be taken back to their camp,
according to an order issued several weeks previously . . .”—can you
find it?
GÖRING: Where is it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, in the English version it is at the middle
of the second page, and I want to ask you about the—the middle of that
paragraph; I do not know if you see a name—it stands out in my
copy—Major Dr. Hühnemörder; do you see that?
GÖRING: Yes, I have found it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, it is the sentence after the name Major
Dr. Hühnemörder appears: “On this Monday”—have you got this?
GÖRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.
“On this Monday a conference took place at the Reich Security
Main Office at Berlin, Albrechtstrasse. As far as I remember
this conference had been called by the Chief of the
Prisoner-of-War Organization OKW, and I attended as
representative of Luftwaffe Inspektion 17, since General Grosch
was unable to attend in person, for reasons which I cannot
remember; the Chief of the Prisoner-of-War Organization, as far
as I know, was represented by Colonel Von Reurmont, while the
Security Office was represented by Gruppenführer Müller and
Gruppenführer Nebe, the Chief of the Criminal Police at that
time. I find it impossible to give a verbatim account of the
conversation or to state what was said by every single person.
But I remember this much: That we were informed about a
conference which had taken place on the previous day, that is
Sunday, at the Führer’s headquarters in connection with the mass
escape from Sagan, in the course of which heated discussions had
taken place between the participants. In this connection the
names of Himmler, Göring, and Keitel were mentioned. Whether
Ribbentrop’s name was also mentioned I do not remember. The
Führer was not mentioned. At this conference appropriate
measures were said to have been discussed, or taken, to check
any such mass escapes in the future. The nature of these
measures was not disclosed. Later, and more or less in
conclusion, Gruppenführer Müller declared that requisite orders
had already been given and put into effect the previous morning.
Regarding the search for escaped prisoners, he could or would
not make any statement; he merely declared that according to
reports so far received, shootings had taken place at some
points for attempted escapes. I think he said that the number
was 10 or 15.
“After these remarks by Gruppenführer Müller, which unmistakably
caused a shattering effect, it became clear to me that a
decision had been made by the highest authority, and that
therefore any intervention by subordinate departments was
impossible and pointless.”
Now, this was announced at a meeting of persons that I would call
executives, that the shooting had already begun. Are you telling this
Tribunal that this matter was made clear to these executives, including
one of your own officers, and was never told to you? Are you still
saying that?
GÖRING: I am still saying that. Firstly, that I have never heard
anything about this conference. Secondly, that the officer in question
is only surmising when he mentions the names, he makes no assertion. And
thirdly, I would like to ask you also to mention the beginning of this
statement, which begins as follows:
“In this matter of the mass escape of British Air Force officers
from Prisoner-of-War Camp Number III, at Sagan on 24 or 25 March
1944, I make the following statement:
“I have to point out that in view of the absence of any
documents, I am forced to reconstruct completely from memory
events which happened almost a year and 9 months ago; I
therefore ask that this fact and the possibility thus arising of
my making a mistake be taken into consideration, and that due
allowances be made.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is a perfectly fair point, and the answer
to it is that I will show you what this officer reported at the time to
his general.
Give the witness General Grosch’s statement.
[_The document was submitted to the witness._] We are getting reasonably
high up. This officer, General Grosch, signs it as a Lieutenant General.
Now, would you like, if you can, to help me again—you were most helpful
last time—to try to find the place? This is a statement by Lieutenant
General Grosch.
GÖRING: I request to have permission to read this document first, to see
whether similar modifications apply here also.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you read the first sentence? I do not want
to take up time to read an account of the general matter. It says:
“During my interrogation on 7 December 1945 I was told to write down all
I knew about the Sagan case.” And then he wrote it down. But I would
like you to look at Number 1, the first page. Do you see at the foot of
the page an account of the pyramid in your ministry of administration?
Do you see that at the foot of Page 1?
[_There was no response._]
SIR DAVID. MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, do you see at the foot of Page 1 the
pyramid?
GÖRING: I see it but—I am now at the place.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It comes in about the fourth paragraph.
GÖRING: I can see it, but I should like to read the other first.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, if you will look about four small
paragraphs on, it begins: “A few days after the day of the escape—I
cannot remember the date any more—Colonel Walde informed me that OKW
had called a conference in Berlin.”
Do you see that?
I do not mind you running through it quickly, but you may take it that
the first two pages are what I said were there, the pyramid of your
ministry.
GÖRING: Yes, I have found it. Which paragraph, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Part C, the fourth paragraph, the Sagan
case. “A few days after the escape. . . .” Do you find that?
GÖRING: Yes, I have the place.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.
“A few days after the day of the escape—I cannot remember the
date any more—Colonel Walde informed me that the OKW had called
a conference in Berlin—I believe on the premises of a high SS
and police authority, and that the Inspectorate Number 17 was to
send representatives. I should have liked to have gone myself,
but had to attend another conference in Berlin, and asked
Colonel Walde to attend as representative. After his return
Colonel Walde informed me that the spokesman of the OKW had
informed them that there was a decision by the Führer to the
effect that, on recapture, the escaped British airmen were not
to be handed back to the Luftwaffe but were to be shot.”
Then missing a paragraph and taking the last line of the next paragraph:
“It is, however, certain that the danger of their being shot was
even then clearly recognizable. I asked Colonel Walde whether
such a far-reaching decision would be notified in writing to the
High Command of the Luftwaffe or the Reich Air Ministry or
whether he had been given anything in writing. Colonel Walde
gave me to understand that the assembly were told by the
spokesman of the OKW, that they would receive nothing in
writing, nor was there to be any correspondence on this subject.
The circle of those in the know was to be kept as small as
possible. I asked Colonel Walde whether the spokesman of the OKW
had said anything to the effect that the Reich Marshal or the
High Command of the Luftwaffe had been informed about the
matter. Colonel Walde assured me that the OKW spokesman had told
them that the Reich Marshal was informed.”
I will not ask you about that for the moment. I want you to look at what
your general did. It says:
“Up to the time of Colonel Walde’s report I had not received
even so much as a hint anywhere that escaped prisoners of war
should be treated in any other way than according to the
provisions of the Geneva Convention.
“The same afternoon I rang up my superior officer, the Chief of
Air Defense, to ask time for an interview with General der
Flieger Förster. This was fixed for the next morning.
“When I came there to report I found General Förster together
with his chief of staff. I asked General Förster for permission
to speak to him alone and put the facts before him. In
conclusion, I expressed the opinion that if the British airmen
were to be shot, (a) there would be a breach of the Geneva
Convention, (b) reprisal measures endangering the lives of
German airmen held by the British as prisoners of war would have
to be expected. I asked General Förster to bring the matter to
the notice of the Reich Marshal even at this very late stage,
and to stress those two points.
“General Förster was immediately prepared to do this. When it
came to the choice of the way in which the matter could be
brought to the attention of the Reich Marshal, it was decided to
report to State Secretary Field Marshal Milch.
“In my presence General Förster rang up the office of the state
secretary and obtained the interview at once. General Förster
left the room, and while doing so he instructed me to wait for
his return in his study. After some time General Förster came
back and told me that he had reported the matter to the state
secretary and that Field Marshal Milch had made the necessary
notes.”
Look at the last paragraph:
“I gave Colonel Walde the order, despite the ban by the OKW, to
incorporate a detailed written statement about the conference in
our records. So far as I know, this was done.”
DR. STAHMER: Counsel Stahmer on behalf of the Defendant Göring.
We have had submitted here a series of affidavits given by witnesses who
are in Nuremberg and who, in my opinion, could be brought as witnesses
in person. Because of the importance of this matter, not only for Göring
but for other defendants, I object to this procedure, on the assumption
that the same rules apply for cross-examination as examination in chief.
By that I mean that we should not be satisfied with an affidavit and
depend on an affidavit, if the Prosecution can, without difficulty,
summon the witness in order to have him testify before the Tribunal, so
that the Defense may be in position to cross-examine these witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, what you have said is entirely inaccurate.
The rules with reference to cross-examination are not the same as rules
with reference to examination in chief, and what is being done at the
present moment is that the Defendant Göring is being cross-examined as
to his credit. He has said that he knew nothing about this matter, and
he has been cross-examined to prove that he has lied when he said that.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, according to my opinion the procedure should
be that the witness be brought here in person. The fact remains that, in
our estimation, a reference to an affidavit is a less desirable means
than the personal testimony of a witness, which affords the Defense the
possibility of adducing evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, as I have already pointed out to you, you
are quite in error in thinking that the rules for cross-examination are
the same as for examination in chief. The witness at the present moment
is being cross-examined and is being cross-examined as to credit; that
is to say, to prove whether or not he is telling the truth.
As to the calling of this witness—I think his name is Grosch—you can
apply to call him if you want to do so. That is an entirely different
matter.
DR. STAHMER: Yes. I quite understand, Mr. President; but I had to have
the possibility of calling the people who are mentioned in this
affidavit, in case I consider it necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can apply to do that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: [_Turning to the witness._] You understand, what
I am suggesting to you is that here was a matter which was not only
known in the OKW, not only known in the Gestapo and the Kripo, but was
known to your own director of operations, General Förster, who told
General Grosch that he had informed Field Marshal Milch. I am suggesting
to you, that it is absolutely impossible and untrue that in these
circumstances you knew nothing about it.
GÖRING: I would like first to establish an entirely different point. In
the German interpretation regarding the first objection by Dr. Stahmer,
the following came through:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Tribunal does not want you to discuss legal
objections.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you please answer the question that is put to you?
You have already been told that you must answer a question directly and
make any explanation afterwards, and shorten it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you still say, in view of that evidence, in
view of these statements from the officers of your own ministry, that
you knew nothing about this?
GÖRING: Precisely these statements confirm this, and I would like to
make a short explanation. You determined a date. You said it was the
27th. But in this statement by Grosch this date is not determined. It
says: “A few days after the escape, I do not recall the date, Colonel
Walde informed me.”
Secondly, it says here that General Förster, who was not chief of my
operational branch but chief of another branch of the ministry,
mentioned this matter to State Secretary Field Marshal Milch, without
referring to the date. General Field Marshal Milch was here as a
witness, but unfortunately, he was never questioned as to whether he
gave me this report, and at what time, and whether to me direct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh yes, he was, and General Field Marshal Milch
took the same line as you, that he knew nothing about it, that Förster
had never spoken to him. It was asked by my friend, Mr. Roberts, “Didn’t
General Förster speak to you about it?”.
What I am suggesting is that both you and Field Marshal Milch are saying
you knew nothing about it, when you did, and are leaving the
responsibility on the shoulders of your junior officers. That is what I
am suggesting and I want you to understand it.
GÖRING: No, I do not wish to push responsibility on to the shoulders of
my subordinates, and I want to make it clear—that is the only thing
that is important to me—that Field Marshal Milch did not say that he
reported this matter to me. And, secondly, that the date when Förster
told Milch about this is not established. It could have been quite
possible that on the date when this actually happened, the Chief of the
General Staff of the Luftwaffe might already have conferred with me
about it. The important factor is—and I want to maintain it—that I was
not present at the time when the command was given by the Führer. When I
heard about it, I vehemently opposed it. But at the time I heard of it,
it was already too late. That a few were shot later, was not yet known
at the time, neither was the exact time of the event. Most of them had
been shot already.
Thirdly, those who escaped, and were captured in the direct vicinity of
the camp by our guards were returned to the camp and were not handed
over. Those prisoners who were captured by the police and the
Grossfahndung, and returned to the camp before the Führer had issued the
decree, were likewise not handed over and shot.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that, according to Wielen, who is going
to give evidence, the selection of the officers to be shot—a list as
regards the selection of officers to be shot—a list had been prepared
by the camp authorities at the request of Department 5, that is of the
RSHA Kripo Department, in which those officers were regarded as
disturbing elements—plotters and escape leaders, having been
specifically mentioned. The names were selected either by the commandant
or by one of these officers. Thereupon, the shooting of the officers
mentioned by name was accordingly ordered by Department 4 of the RSHA
and corresponding instructions sent to the Staatspolizei.
Are you telling the Tribunal you did not know that your own officers
were selecting the men to be shot on the ground that they were plotters
and escape leaders? In any other service in the world, attempt to escape
is regarded as a duty of an officer, isn’t it, when he is a prisoner of
war? Isn’t that so?
GÖRING: That is correct, and I have emphasized that. To your first
question, I would like to put on record very definitely that we are
dealing with the utterances of a man who will be testifying as a
witness. As to whether he actually asked for a list and saw a list, his
utterance is illogical. There was no selection made for shooting. Those
who were captured by the police were shot without exception, and those
who had not been returned to the camp. No officers were selected as
representing disturbing elements, but those who had returned to the camp
were not shot. Those who were recaptured by the police outside the camp
were shot without exception, on the orders of the Führer. Therefore, the
utterance is entirely illogical and not in accordance with the facts.
I know nothing about such a list being asked for, nor about the carrying
out of such a wish. I personally pointed out to the Führer repeatedly
that it is the duty of these officers to escape, and that on their
return after the war, they would have to give an account of such
attempts, which as far as I can remember should be repeated three times,
according to English rules.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that the Government of Germany sent
an official note about this matter, saying that they had been shot while
resisting arrest while trying to escape? Do you remember that?
GÖRING: I heard for the first time that there had been a note to this
effect when the reply to it was sent. I had no part in the drawing up of
the note. I know of its contents only through the reply, for I happened
to be there when the reply came in.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not at the moment on the point that
everyone now admits that the note was a complete and utter lie. I am on
the point of the seriousness of this matter. Do you know that General
Westhoff says in his statement: “Then, when we read this note to England
in the newspaper, we were all absolutely taken aback. We all clutched
our heads, mad.” According to Mr. Wielen, who will be here, it was a
contributory cause for General Nebe of the Kripo, for nights on end, not
going to bed but passing the night on his office settee. You will agree,
won’t you, Witness, that this was a serious and difficult matter? All
these officers that had to deal with it found it a serious and difficult
matter, isn’t that so?
GÖRING: Not only these officers found this matter serious and difficult,
but I myself considered it the most serious incident of the whole war
and expressed myself unequivocally and clearly on this point, and later,
when I learned the contents of the note, I knew that this note was not
in accordance with the truth. I gave expression to my indignation,
inasmuch as I immediately told my Quartermaster General to direct a
letter to the OKW to the effect that we wished to give up the camps for
prisoners of war, because under these circumstances, we no longer wished
to have anything to do with them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And according to your evidence in chief, what
you did was to turn to Himmler, asking him if he had received the order,
and then you said,
“I told him what excitement would result in my branch, because
we could not understand such measures; and if he had received
such orders, he would please inform me before carrying them
through so that I would have the possibility to prevent such
orders from being carried out, if possible”—and then you said
that you—“talked to the Führer and that he confirmed that he
had given the order and told me why.”
You, according to that evidence, still had enough influence in Germany,
in your opinion, to stop even Himmler issuing such orders or carrying—I
am sorry, I said “issuing”—carrying out such orders.
GÖRING: You are giving my statement a completely wrong meaning. I told
Himmler plainly that it was his duty to telephone me before the
execution of this matter, to give me the possibility, even at this
period of my much diminished influence, to prevent the Führer from
carrying out this decree. I did not mean to say that I would have been
completely successful, but it was a matter of course that I, as Chief of
the Luftwaffe, should make it clear to Himmler that it was his duty to
telephone me first of all, because it was I who was most concerned with
this matter. I told the Führer in very clear terms just how I felt, and
I saw from his answers that, even if I had known of it before, I could
not have prevented this decree, and we must keep in mind that two
different methods of procedure are in question. The order was not given
to the Luftwaffe, that these people were to be shot by the Luftwaffe
personnel, but to the police. If the Führer had said to me, “I will
persist in this decree which I gave the police,” I would not have been
able to order the police not to carry through the Führer’s decree. Only
if this decree had had to be carried out by my men, would it have been
possible for me perhaps to circumvent the decree, and I would like to
emphasize this point strongly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that may be your view that you could not
have got anywhere with the Führer; but I suggested to you that when all
these officers that I mentioned knew about it, you knew about it, and
that you did nothing to prevent these men from being shot, but
co-operated in this foul series of murders.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, are you passing from that now?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You are putting in evidence these two documents?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am putting them in. I put them to the witness.
D-731 will be GB-278, and D-730 will be GB-279.
THE PRESIDENT: And should you not refer perhaps to the second paragraph
in 731?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It shows that apparently, in the early hours of the 25th
of March the matter was communicated to the office of the adjutant of
the Reich Marshal—the second paragraph beginning with “the escape.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
“The escape of about 30 to 40 prisoners, the exact number having
to be ascertained by roll call, was reported by telephone from
the Sagan Camp to the inspectorate in the early hours of the
25th of March, Saturday morning, and duly passed on in the same
way by this office to the higher authorities which were to be
informed in case of mass escapes. These were: 1.) the Office of
the Adjutant of the Reich Marshal; 2.) the OKW, for directors of
these prisoners of war; 3.) the Inspector General of Prisoners
of War; and 4.) Director of Operations, Air Ministry.”
I am much obliged. You must remember that the witness did not admit
yesterday afternoon that the news of the escape had been given to the
office of his adjutant.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am much obliged to you.
GÖRING: The escape was communicated to us every time relatively quickly.
I should now like to give my view of the statement made by you before
that—it concerns assertions made by you—but I still maintain that I
did not hear about this incident until after it had occurred.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have put my questions on the incident. I pass
to another point. I want to ask you two or three questions about the
evidence that you gave 2 days ago, dealing with the evidence of your own
witness, Herr Dahlerus, who made his first visit to London on the 25th
of August 1939, after an interview and a telephone conversation with you
on the 24th. I just want you to fix the date because it is sometimes
difficult to remember what these dates are. At that time, you were
anxious that he should persuade the British Government to arrange a
meeting of plenipotentiaries who would deal with the questions of Danzig
and the Corridor. Is that right?
GÖRING: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew perfectly well, did you not, that as
far as the Führer was concerned, Danzig and the Corridor was not the
real matter that was operating in his mind at all. Will you let me
remind you what he said on the 23rd of May:
“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all; it is a
question of expanding our living space in the East, of securing
our food supplies, and of the settlement of the Baltic problem.”
You knew that, didn’t you?
GÖRING: I knew that he had said these things at that time, but I have
already pointed out repeatedly that such discussions can only be
assessed, if considered in conjunction with the whole political
situation. At the moment of these negotiations with England, we were
solely concerned with Danzig and the Corridor.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you say that despite what Hitler said on
the 23rd of May, that at that moment Hitler was only concerned with
Danzig and the Corridor? Do you say that seriously?
GÖRING: I maintain in all seriousness that, in the situation as it was
at that time, this was really the case. Otherwise it would be impossible
to understand any of Hitler’s acts. You might just as well take his book
_Mein Kampf_ as a basis and explain all his acts by it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am interested in the last week of August at
the moment. I want you now just to remember two points on what you said,
with regard to Dahlerus, during the morning of the 25th. Do you
remember, you had a telephone conversation with him at 11:30 on the
24th? On the 25th, were you sufficiently in Hitler’s confidence to know
that he was going to proffer the _note verbale_ to Sir Nevile Henderson,
the British Ambassador, on the 25th? Did you know that?
GÖRING: Yes, of course.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At that time, when you were sending Dahlerus,
and the _note verbale_ was being given to the British Ambassador, the
arrangement and order was that you were going to attack Poland on the
morning of the 26th, wasn’t it?
GÖRING: There seems to be a disturbance on the line.
THE PRESIDENT: I think there is some mechanical difficulty. Perhaps it
would be a good thing to adjourn for a few minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told me, Witness, that the arrangements to
attack Poland on the morning of the 26th were changed on the evening of
the 25th. Before I come to that, I will ask you one or two questions
about that.
GÖRING: No, I did not say that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wait a minute. I am sorry, but that is what I
understood you to say.
GÖRING: No. I said explicitly that already on the 25th the attack for
the morning of the 26th was cancelled. It is a technical and military
impossibility to cancel a large-scale attack of a whole army the evening
before an attack. The shortest time required would be from 24 hours to
48 hours.