DR. STAHMER: To what extent?
MILCH: A defensive air force was built up.
DR. STAHMER: Can you give us more details about that?
MILCH: In the year 1933 Germany had left the League of Nations and
consequently also the Disarmament Conference. Hitler attempted to
discuss with the individual nations whether or not disarmament should
continue. These attempts to disarm failed, and Germany began to rearm.
It was questionable whether the other nations would approve of that.
Consequently Germany considered that it was imperative to have military
strength in the air also, and to achieve that, the Air Force was itself
to create an air power which would be sufficient for the defense of
Germany. This is shown by the fact that principally fighters and
anti-aircraft artillery were provided.
Likewise, the organization of the German Air Force was constructed for
defense. It consisted at that time of four “air districts” (Luftkreise),
which one can picture as a kind of cross over Germany. There was a
Northeast section, Southeast, Northwest, and Southwest. Moreover the
strength of the Air Force, as it was organized, was not planned for an
aggressive war or for a large-scale war. Besides fighter planes there
were also bombers, but we always called these bomber formations the
Risiko Luftwaffe (Risk Air Force), that is to say, their function was to
prevent, if possible, any of Germany’s neighbors from entering a war
against Germany.
DR. STAHMER: What were the relations of the German Air Force with the
air forces of foreign countries during the period beginning with the
year 1935?
MILCH: During the first years after 1935 Germany had no air force worth
mentioning. There were only the first units and the first larger schools
that were established. Also during these years, our industry was built
up. Before the rearmament started, our industry had been on a very small
scale. I happen to know that the number of workers in the entire German
air force industry at the time of the seizure of power by the National
Socialists was about 3,000 to 3,300 men—constructors, business men,
technicians, and workers.
The first contacts with foreign countries in the field of aviation
started in 1937. This was when, in January 1937, an English commission
led by Air Vice Marshal Courtney and three other high-ranking
officers—Courtney was the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the
British Air Force—came to Germany. I myself accompanied this commission
and acted as guide during the entire time. We complied with every
request of these gentlemen as to what they wanted to see. Those were the
first units which were established. We especially showed our training
units, in which all new forms and models were first tried out, the
industries, the schools, and anything else about which the gentlemen
wanted to know. At the end of our conference the English vice marshal
suggested that we should start a mutual German-English exchange of
plans. I asked for the approval of my commander-in-chief and it was
granted. At the time we forwarded to the British the plans of the German
Air Force for 1937, 1938, and, I believe, 1939, and, on the other hand,
we also received from the British the corresponding figures. We agreed
that in the future also, should changes in plans occur or new units be
established, an exchange of data should again take place. The visit was
animated by a spirit of comradeship and was the beginning of further
contacts.
In May of the same year, 1937, I was invited to Belgium with some other
gentlemen, as representative of my commander-in-chief, to visit the air
force there. Then in July . . .
DR. STAHMER: What happened on this visit to Belgium? Can you give me
more details about that?
MILCH: It was a very cordial reception. I made the acquaintance of the
Minister of War, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister,
and also of His Majesty the King, besides the officers of the air force,
who, of course, were of main interest to me. The discussion was friendly
on both sides, and the Belgians assured us of their personal feelings of
friendship for Germany.
DR. STAHMER: Was there also an exchange of data?
MILCH: No. Not in the same way; but later in Germany we also showed the
Belgians everything, when the Chief of the Air Force, General Duvier,
returned our visit. Then there was a big international meeting in the
summer, in July 1937, on the occasion of the aviation meeting in Zurich,
which was held every five years. At this meeting we purposely showed our
latest models of fighters, bombers, and Stukas, also our new engines
which had just been produced, and anything else that would be of
international interest. There were large French, Italian, Czech, and
Belgian delegations present, besides the German one; and a commission of
British officers also attended to see the material displayed by us, but
did not take part in the contests as representatives of Great Britain.
We showed our material to the French, the British, and to the other
nations, in a spirit of comradeship. There was, for instance, the
Messerschmitt Fighter 109 with the improvements of the time, more or
less as it was flown until the end of the war; the newest Dornier bomber
type; the newest Stuka by Junkers; also the Daimler-Benz 600 and 601
engines, and also of Junkers . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that this amount of detail is of any
interest to the Tribunal.
DR. STAHMER: Witness, please, no details; make it short.
MILCH: Yes. Then in October 1937, there was an invitation to France from
the French Government to inspect their air force also. The inspection is
said to have been made in a very friendly spirit. Shortly after that,
about one week later, a visit at the invitation of England took place in
return for Air Vice Marshal Courtney’s visit. Here, also, factories,
organizations, schools and the War Academy were shown; also, as regards
industry, the “shadow factories” were shown, that is, industries which
produce peacetime goods in time of peace, and switch over to building
aircraft and aircraft engines in time of war. There were also reciprocal
visits with Sweden. I think I can conclude with that.
DR. STAHMER: Did you take part in a discussion with the Führer on 23 May
1939?
MILCH: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: In what way did that happen?
MILCH: I was suddenly ordered to come on the morning of that day,
because the Reich Marshal was not there.
DR. STAHMER: Do you remember the course of this conversation?
MILCH: The Führer made a long speech to the three commanders-in-chief of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and their chiefs of staff. Several other
persons were also present. The gist of it was that Hitler declared he
had decided to solve in one way or another the question of a corridor
across the Corridor to East Prussia, and in connection with that he
discussed the possibility of complications which, in consequence, might
arise in the West. It was only a speech, not a discussion or a
conversation.
DR. STAHMER: Was anything else discussed or presented by him, any
further details?
MILCH: Yes, it was just the question whether the West—probably he was
thinking primarily of France—would keep quiet or whether it would
interfere.
DR. STAHMER: Was anything said of the possibility of an attack on Poland
or, as I remember, was only the solution of this Corridor problem
mentioned?
MILCH: Actually, I understood him to say that he would solve this
problem in any case, so his first thought was probably of negotiations,
but if these negotiations did not produce results, then a military
solution would probably have to be considered.
DR. STAHMER: Were there any further discussions about that?
MILCH: No, it was expressly ordered that any discussion by the
participants, even among themselves, was forbidden. I, for instance, was
forbidden to inform the Reich Marshal, who was not there. Hitler
declared that he himself would inform Göring. I remember that at that
time there was also issued the famous order which has been mentioned
previously, and which as Führer Order Number 1 had to be displayed in
every one of our offices, to the effect that nobody should tell anybody
anything he need not know; that nothing should ever be told sooner than
was necessary; and that only just as much should be told as was
necessary for the other person to know.
DR. STAHMER: Then you did not inform the Reich Marshal about this
conference?
MILCH: No; I was forbidden to do so.
DR. STAHMER: When did he find out about it?
MILCH: I do not know.
DR. STAHMER: What was the attitude of the then Field Marshal Göring
towards war?
MILCH: I was always under the impression—this already became apparent
at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland—that he was worried lest
Hitler’s policy might lead to war. In my opinion, he was against war.
DR. STAHMER: When did you find out for the first time that Hitler had
planned some operation against Russia?
MILCH: As far as I remember, that was in the spring of 1941. May I
correct myself once more? I want to look in my notebook. On 13 January
the Reich Marshal told me that Hitler expected an attack against Germany
on the part of Russia; then for some time I did not hear anything
further and the Reich Marshal did not mention either what his opinion
was. At any rate, during the weeks and months following I did not hear
any more about it. It is true, however, that at that time I was very
seldom in Berlin and not at all at headquarters, but on inspection
tours, _et cetera_. When I returned—and I do not remember whether it
was in March or April—one of my subordinates made a report to me on a
question of clothing, and he put the question to me whether winter
clothing had to be provided in case of war against Russia. I was very
surprised at this question. I had not been previously informed. I could
only tell him that if it came to war with Russia we should then need
clothing for several winters, and I told him what kind of winter
clothing I would suggest.
DR. STAHMER: Did you speak a second time to Field Marshal Göring about
this war?
MILCH: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: When was that?
MILCH: On 22 May, on one of my tours, I again came into contact with the
Commander-in-Chief for the first time after a long interval. It was in
Veldenstein where Göring was at the time. There I discussed the question
with him and I told him that, in my opinion, it would be a great
historical task for him to prevent this war since it could only end with
the annihilation of Germany. I reminded him that we should not
voluntarily burden ourselves with a two-front war, _et cetera_. The
Reich Marshal told me that he also had brought forward all these
arguments, but that it was absolutely impossible to dissuade Hitler from
this war. My offer to try to speak to Hitler once more was declared by
the Reich Marshal to be absolutely hopeless. We had to resign ourselves;
nothing could be done about it. From these words it was quite clear that
he was against this war, and that under no circumstances did he want
this war but that also for him, in his position, there was no
possibility of dissuading Hitler from this project.
DR. STAHMER: Did it also appear from what he said that he had told
Hitler of his misgivings?
MILCH: Yes, it was quite clear to me, that he had also spoken about the
question of a two-front war, and he told me that he had also laid before
Hitler the arguments I had brought forward; but he told me that it was
hopeless. I would like to say something more about the 23rd of May.
After this discussion, and owing to the fact that the German Air Force
had hardly any reserves of bombs available, I proposed that bombs should
be manufactured. Previously Hitler had considered this unnecessary and
superfluous for the time being. The shortage of iron came into the
question. After this conference, being under the impression that
complications might arise, I pointed out that the Air Force with its
bomber fleet was not ready for action. My proposal was again rejected by
Hitler after 23 May. He would let me know in time if and when we needed
bombs. When we pointed out that the manufacture of bombs would take
several weeks, even months, he declared that there would be plenty of
time for that later. From that I came to the conclusion and you know I
was not allowed to discuss it with anybody—that Hitler’s words on 23
May were not meant as seriously as they had sounded to me.
DR. STAHMER: When was this last conversation concerning the refusal to
manufacture bombs?
MILCH: That was about—I spoke once in that connection, after May when
the situation was known. But later, during the latter part of summer, I
again brought it to his attention. Again it was rejected. The order to
manufacture bombs was not given by Hitler until 12 October 1939,
although we had pointed out that deficiency before. Hitler said, if I
remember correctly, “My attempts to make peace with the West after the
campaign against Poland have failed. The war continues. Now we can and
must manufacture the bombs.”
DR. STAHMER: Did Hitler ever tell you that it was his serious desire to
live in peace with the West?
MILCH: Yes. I did not go into the details of my visits. When I came back
from France, I was with Hitler for two hours on the Obersalzberg, to
report to him about the visit to France. Likewise, after the visit in
England about two weeks later, I had to make a report to Hitler which
lasted several hours. He was very interested, and after the second
report, that is to say, after the English visit, he declared, “I wish to
carry on my policy in such and such a way, but you can all rest assured
that I will always rely on England. I shall try to co-operate with
England at all times.” This conversation took place on 2 November.
DR. STAHMER: What year?
MILCH: The year 1937, the 2d of November.
DR. STAHMER: You mentioned two conversations?
MILCH: Yes, the first was the report about the visit to France and the
second about the visit to England. Hitler, who did not know foreign
countries at all, was extremely interested to hear from a soldier
something about his reception, the country, armaments, and so forth.
DR. STAHMER: What were the relations between Reich Marshal Göring and
Himmler?
MILCH: It was not always clear to me. I had the impression that there
was always some rivalry on the part of Himmler. The mutual relationship,
however, must always have been very correct and very courteous on the
surface; how they really stood, I could not say.
DR. STAHMER: In May of 1942, there was an exchange of correspondence
between you and the SS-Obergruppenführer Wolff?
MILCH: Yes, Sir.
DR. STAHMER: In particular, about medical experiments on inmates of the
Dachau Camp. Could you tell us anything about that?
MILCH: I was interrogated about that question here in Nuremberg, and
what I no longer remembered of the matter was recalled by two letters—a
letter from Wolff, who was adjutant to Himmler at the time, and another
letter from Himmler to me and the answer which I had given, were
submitted to me. They concerned the experiments with air-pressure
chambers and chilling. These letters were addressed to me only because
Himmler did not know the official channels of the Luftwaffe. The letters
were delivered to the Medical Inspection department, which was not
subordinate to me. The Medical Inspection department also wrote the
answer and submitted it to me. I modified the answer a little and had it
mailed. I have not read a report sent by Himmler in this connection. He
also offered a film. I did not see the film. The Medical Inspector, whom
I asked what it was all about, told me that the Air Force was fully
informed about both problems, and that the experiments with air-pressure
chambers had been carried out by our young doctors who had volunteered
for that purpose. Likewise, in the question of chilling there was
nothing of interest to the Air Force. We both agreed to his suggestion
that we did not want to have anything to do with the matter. I asked him
what these experiments were made for. He told me that criminals were
subjected to these experiments. I asked him in what way. He said, in the
same way as our young doctors had subjected themselves to these
experiments. Then we wrote him a letter which was quite polite—one
could not write differently to these people—but completely repudiating
the experiments. We would have nothing to do with them. In Himmler’s
letter I had been asked to make a report to the Reich Marshal also about
that question.
I had the impression that by these experiments the SS wanted to make
themselves important in Hitler’s eyes. These were the words also used by
the chief of the medical department to me. During a long report on quite
different questions I mentioned this matter briefly to the Reich
Marshal, because I had to expect that one day he would be approached by
Himmler, and perhaps would not know anything about the whole question.
The Reich Marshal asked me, when I told him about such and such
experiments, “What does this mean?” I gave him the reply which I had
been given by the Medical Inspector. I told him that we did not want to
have anything to do with them, and that we repudiated them. He said he
was exactly of the same opinion, but I should be very careful not to
provoke the SD or treat them badly. What the experiments were about I do
not know, neither do I know what was done to the people; I do not know
it even now.
DR. STAHMER: Did the Reich Marshal know?
MILCH: No, certainly not.
DR. STAHMER: Did Dr. Rascher leave you soon after that to join the SS?
MILCH: I could not say. I do not know Dr. Rascher, and had nothing to do
with the question of transfer. Rascher was not subordinate to me any
more than was the chief of the medical department or the personnel
office.
DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether Reich Marshal Göring gave orders to the
troops under his command, saying that sabotage troops should be
annihilated, or that captured enemy terror-fliers should be turned over
to the SD without judicial procedure?
MILCH: No, I did not know anything about that.
DR. STAHMER: Did you never hear anything of that kind?
MILCH: No.
DR. STAHMER: What was the attitude of the Reich Marshal towards captured
airmen in general?
MILCH: I sometimes used to speak to the Reich Marshal about that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I wish to interpose an objection. I think we have
been very liberal. I think we have been very liberal in allowing all
kinds of statements, but it does seem to me that this passes anything
that is suitable as evidence. This witness has indicated that he has no
knowledge of the subject; he did not know the orders which are in
evidence, and he assumes to state the attitude of the Reich Marshal. I
have no objection to his making any statement of any facts from which
this Tribunal may be informed of the attitude of the Reich Marshal, but
I think that for one witness to state the state of mind of another
person without any facts whatever passes the bounds of what we can
possibly let go here into evidence. It does not help to solve the
problem and I respectfully object to the question and answer as not
constituting credible and relevant evidence on any subject before the
Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I think you should confine yourself to any
facts and observations of the Defendant Göring. As the witness had just
said that he never heard of any action against the terror-fliers at all,
I do not see how he could give evidence as to the attitude of the
Defendant Göring about it.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President; I should like to formulate my question as
follows: Did Reich Marshal Göring discuss with the witness as to how
enemy airmen who had been shot down should be treated?
MILCH: No.
DR. STAHMER: That is, I suppose, a fact, is it not?
MILCH: This was not discussed with me.
DR. STAHMER: I have one more question. Did he speak to you about the
fact that he was opposed to any cruelty in the treatment of the enemy?
MILCH: That was just what I wanted to say before. He said that to me
before the war, remembering the first World War.
DR. STAHMER: And what did he say about it?
MILCH: That once they have been shot down, they are our comrades; that
was the gist of it.
DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions to put to the witness. I place him
at the disposal of the Defense or the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of you wish to ask this witness any questions?
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, as you know, the Prosecution have grouped
together a certain circle of people consisting of the highest ranking
military leaders in order to declare this circle criminal. You probably
know this circle?
MILCH: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Was there such a grouping of equivalent offices within
the German Armed Forces?
MILCH: I did not understand the question.
DR. LATERNSER: Was there ever a grouping of offices within the German
Armed Forces like the one that has now been created in order to form
that group?
MILCH: Yes. I believe that ever since an army existed there have also
been high-ranking leaders who were grouped under their
commander-in-chief.
DR. LATERNSER: Were the holders of these offices occupied with the
elaboration of technical military problems on Hitler’s orders, or did
they work out subjects on their own initiative which were submitted to
Hitler for execution?
MILCH: No. The military leaders acted only upon the orders of their
superiors, that is, the generals of the Air Force on the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, who got his orders from the
Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht—that was Hitler, and before him,
Hindenburg.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether this alleged group of the General
Staff and the OKW, as they are now combined, ever met collectively?
MILCH: Before the attack on Poland only the Army and Navy commanders who
were assigned for action there were called together by Hitler. Likewise,
those who were to go into action in the West in the spring of 1940 were
called together by Hitler. The same thing happened again, as far as I
know, before the attack on Russia.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you sometimes present at such conferences?
MILCH: At some of them, yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Could you describe the course of any such conference?
Particularly I attach value to the point as to whether the higher
military commanders had an opportunity to make counter-suggestions
during these conferences?
MILCH: I remember the conference with Hitler which took place on the
Obersalzberg before the Polish campaign. It was on 22 August. The
commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces and the commanders of the armies
attended. Hitler stood in front, behind a large desk, and the generals
sat in chairs next to or behind each other. He made a speech giving the
reasons, the political situation, as he usually did, and his intention.
During this conference any reply or discussion on the part of the
generals was impossible. Whether there was a subsequent conference
dealing with the details I do not know. I know only of this speech of
Hitler’s. Then, before the attack on Russia, there was a different
procedure. We sat around a very large table, and the respective
commanders of the army groups and armies had to demonstrate on the map
their intentions and the methods of executing the orders which they had
received, whereupon Hitler agreed in general or, perhaps, in certain
cases, said he would prefer greater strength here and less strength
there: his objections, however, were only very slight.
DR. LATERNSER: That means these conferences were more in the nature of a
briefing?
MILCH: Definitely, briefing.
DR. LATERNSER: Can you tell me whether any member of the group “General
Staff” or of the so-called group “General Staff and OKW” ever made
suggestions to deviate from the international law then in force?
MILCH: Not that I know of.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether members of this alleged group
frequently met with politicians or high Party members?
MILCH: In my opinion, no. I mean that, of course, for the majority of
these gentlemen. It goes without saying that the commanders-in-chief of
the Armed Forces, or the Chief of the OKW, must frequently have held
conferences with politicians also. But the average commanders of the
army groups, fleet, or army had no opportunity to do so.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the members of this so-called group, those who
belonged to the Army, Navy, or Air Force, have discussions among
themselves?
MILCH: If they were assigned to collaborate in a common task, for
example, if the commander-in-chief of an army or an army group had a
naval commander-in-chief working with him, there were naturally
discussions of that kind. But with a neighboring commander-in-chief the
relationship was certainly not close, and with a more remote neighbor it
did not exist at all.
DR. LATERNSER: That means such discussions took place only with regard
to the execution of a common task?
MILCH: Yes, for that purpose.
DR. LATERNSER: Within the Air Force, is it true that this circle of
people included those officers who had held the position of Chief of
Staff of the Air Force or commander of the Air Force or of an air fleet
during a certain period? I have a list here of those generals of the Air
Force who belonged to that group, and I should like to ask you, with
regard to a few of them, what rank and position these generals had when
the war started. What was the rank of General Korten at the outbreak of
war?
MILCH: I believe either colonel or lieutenant colonel, but I am not
quite sure.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know what position he held?
MILCH: I believe he was Chief of Staff of the Munich Air Fleet.
DR. LATERNSER: Then, from August to October 1944 General Kreipe was
Chief of Staff of the Air Force. What was this officer when the war
started?
MILCH: I presume major or lieutenant colonel.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. Do you know what position he had?
MILCH: No, at the moment I could not say exactly. It may be that he was
chief of staff of an air corps.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. And what rank did he have at the time as Chief of
Staff of an air corps?
MILCH: From major to colonel; that depends.
DR. LATERNSER: General Koller also was Chief of Staff of the Air Force
for a short time. What was this officer when the war started?
MILCH: I believe lieutenant colonel.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I have only a few more names. Do you know what rank
and position Dessloch had at the outbreak of war?
MILCH: I do not remember exactly; perhaps major general or colonel. I do
not know exactly.
DR. LATERNSER: And General Pflugbeil?
MILCH: The same.
DR. LATERNSER: General Seidel?
MILCH: Seidel, I believe, was already Major General at the outbreak of
war.
DR. LATERNSER: And what position did he have at that time?
MILCH: He was Quartermaster General in the General Staff.
DR. LATERNSER: What rank did that position have compared with commander,
commander-in-chief, divisional commander. . . ?
MILCH: Corps commander is about the same as a quartermaster general.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I have a few more questions concerning the Air Force
itself and the highest military leaders. From your testimony it is to be
concluded that in 1939 the Air Force was not fully prepared for war. As
to this point, could you state the reasons for this unpreparedness of
the Air Force for war?
MILCH: During the few years between 1935 and 1939—I gave the figures
for industry before—it would have been impossible for any soldier in
any country to build an air force equal to the tasks with which we were
faced from 1939 on. That is impossible. It is not possible to create the
units nor to establish the schools and furnish them with adequate
teaching staffs; nor is it possible to develop the planes which are
necessary, and then to build them by mass production. Nor is it possible
in that short period to train or produce air crews sufficiently
qualified to meet the high technical standards necessarily demanded for
modern aircraft. Likewise, it is impossible in such a short time to
produce ground crews which are technically highly qualified and to put
them at the disposal of the Air Force and also of the aviation industry.
At the same time also. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: He said that it is impossible. It should not be necessary
to go into this detail on this subject.
DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more specific questions.
[_Turning to the witness._] Did the Air Force expect resistance against
the invasion of Austria?
MILCH: No. We knew definitely that there would be no resistance. We did
not take any arms with us.
DR. LATERNSER: How was the reception there?
MILCH: So friendly that it could not be more so in our own country.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you, as Field Marshal, informed in advance that war
was to be declared against the United States?
MILCH: No.
DR. LATERNSER: In this Trial there are serious accusations against
German soldiers and their leaders on account of cruelties committed. Was
not every soldier sufficiently informed and instructed about the
regulations of international law?
MILCH: Yes. Each soldier had a pay book. On the first page of the pay
book were pasted ten commandments for the soldier. They included all
these questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Can you give me examples of points contained in this
memorandum?
MILCH: Yes. For instance, that no soldier—no prisoner, should be shot;
that looting was not permitted. By the way, I have my pay book here.
Treatment of prisoners of war; Red Cross; civilian population
inviolable; attitude of soldier when himself prisoner of war and, in
conclusion, the threat of punishment for offenses.
DR. LATERNSER: If it became known that soldiers had committed offenses
or outrages against the civilian population, did the commanders
concerned, so far as you know, interfere with the severity necessary?
MILCH: I know of some cases, I knew of some cases, where that was
definitely the case, even the death penalty being imposed.
DR. LATERNSER: So the commanders always strove under all circumstances
to maintain the discipline of the troops?
MILCH: Yes. I can give a notable example. A general of the Air Force had
appropriated jewelry which belonged to a foreign lady. He was sentenced
to death and executed. I think it was in 1943 or 1944.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in particular during the critical days of 1939
you were in close official contact with Defendant Göring. Did you ever
hear through him about a large-scale plan for waging an extensive war?
MILCH: No.
DR. LATERNSER: In your opinion, did the other high military leaders hear
or would they have heard more about it?
MILCH: No. All measures taken by Hitler—beginning with the occupation
of the Rhineland—came very suddenly, as a rule after only a few hours’
preparation. That applies to Austria; that also applies to
Czechoslovakia and to Prague. The only time that we were told anything
beforehand was the affair with Poland, which I mentioned before, where
we had a conference on 23 May.
DR. LATERNSER: In all other cases, therefore, it was rather a surprise
to the high military leaders?
MILCH: Yes, a complete surprise.
DR. LATERNSER: Now I have one more question: What was the possibility of
resignation for high military leaders during the war?
MILCH: That has been told several times. I have also experienced it
myself—one was not permitted to hand in one’s resignation. It was said
if there was a reason for anyone to leave, he would be informed by his
superiors. In an authoritarian state the subordinate, the citizen has no
right to resign on his own initiative, whether he be a soldier or a
civilian.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until Monday morning.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]
SEVENTY-EIGHTH DAY
Monday, 11 March 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, had you finished your examination?
DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions to ask the witness.
[_The witness Milch resumed the stand._]
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like to refer again, very briefly, to
the extent of the unpreparedness of the Luftwaffe for war in 1939. While
on this subject I should like to ask whether the collaboration of the
Luftwaffe with the OKW, the Army, and the Navy had been secured in 1939?
MILCH: In my opinion, the Luftwaffe was not prepared for a major war in
1939. No mutual agreements of any kind existed with the other branches
of the Armed Forces. At any rate, I knew of no such agreements.
DR. LATERNSER: Had such agreements with other branches of the Armed
Forces existed, would you have known about them?
MILCH: I imagine so, since at that time I certainly would have been
involved in these matters.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the co-ordination like between the more
important departments of the Luftwaffe?
MILCH: From 1937, it was rather loose. The General Staff, the technical
branch and the personnel office were detached; they worked independently
and more or less on their own.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you have just mentioned the General Staff. What
do you understand by the German “General Staff of the Luftwaffe”?
MILCH: General Staff means in German leaders’ assistants; in other
words, junior officers who had been given specialized training, and who
acted as assistants to troop commanders, from divisional commanders
upwards.
DR. LATERNSER: Of whom did the General Staff of the Luftwaffe consist?
MILCH: It consisted of the officers in the administrative sections of
the General Staff, from the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe
himself downwards, and also of officers who had been assigned as staff
officers to divisions and corps in the field and to air fleets.
DR. LATERNSER: What time limits were set for the formation of new units
of the Luftwaffe?
MILCH: The formation of larger units had not yet been ordered, although
they had been discussed quite a long time before the outbreak of war. It
was intended to create a larger Air Force later, but, as far as I can
remember, the plans envisaged were scheduled for completion in 6 or 8
years.
DR. LATERNSER: In what year would the plans have been completed?
MILCH: I should think about 1944-1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Not only is there some technical fault—we are getting
two translations at once—but both the witness and the defense counsel
are going too fast.
DR. LATERNSER: Did an organization exist already in 1939 for day- and
night-fighter planes?
MILCH: No, it did not exist at that time.
DR. LATERNSER: Did an organization exist for bomb warfare?
MILCH: Not to the extent necessary for a war of aggression.
DR. LATERNSER: What progress had been made at that time in the building
of airfields?
MILCH: Airfields had been built with runways up to 1,000 meters, but
these were only suitable for fighter planes and not for loaded heavier
bombers.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the position of the Luftwaffe Signal Corps
network?
MILCH: The operational network, that is, the cable network for
operations, did not exist at that time; it had to be improvised and
built up later on during the war.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the position of the Aircraft Observer Corps?
MILCH: This also had not yet been organized. Reverting to the question
of bombers, the most I can add is that originally, in the early years,
models of 4-engine bombers, which would also have been suitable for
night use, were put into production. Although technically perfect, these
bombers were abandoned—I believe in 1937. It was thought that the big
expense entailed by such heavy bombers should be avoided, since, at that
time, nobody was thinking of war. This was at the time when Field
Marshal Kesselring was Chief of the General Staff, and the question was
submitted for decision to the Reich Marshal, who agreed to the
discontinuance of these large bombers.
DR. LATERNSER: When was that?
MILCH: One moment, I will just look it up. On 29 April 1937 the Reich
Marshal, acting on the recommendations of the Chief of the General
Staff, stopped the production of these long-distance bombers. Therefore,
in 1939, there were no night bombers which could in any way compare with
English machines of the Lancaster type, _et cetera_.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the position of the Luftwaffe crews?
MILCH: We had just sufficient personnel replacements for a comparatively
small Luftwaffe at that time. The lack of personnel replacement was the
greatest handicap of all in building up the Luftwaffe. The whole
question of time limits, and so on, depended on the training of
personnel. It was the personnel question which regulated the pace. It
was possible to build planes more rapidly, but it was not possible to
expedite the training of the crews. And, as I said on Friday, this was
the main consideration when dealing with the question of time limits.
Pilots and technical personnel are of no use unless thoroughly trained.
It is much worse to have half-trained personnel than no personnel at
all.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, I do not want to interrupt your
cross-examination but we have been sitting here for nearly 20 minutes
now, and all I have got from it is that the Luftwaffe was not ready for
war in 1939. It seems to me too much is being taken up with detail.
DR. LATERNSER: I have one more question on this matter. Were there any
reserves of aluminum, magnesium, and rubber; and did any means exist for
producing these materials?
MILCH: Not in sufficient quantities.
DR. LATERNSER: And now—one last question. Witness, during your
testimony on Friday, you mentioned “Basic Order Number 1.” You also gave
us the contents of this order. In this connection I would like to ask:
Was this order strictly observed, or not?
MILCH: Yes, very strictly.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions to ask the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defendants’ counsel want to ask the
witness any questions?
DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer): I request permission
to ask the witness a few questions.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, do you remember when Hitler
demanded the construction of bomb-proof aircraft factories in caves or
concrete shelters?
MILCH: As far as I remember it was when the British started the heavy
raids in 1943.
DR. FLÄCHSNER; Do you remember a conference on the Obersalzberg at the
beginning of April 1944, and what you told Hitler at the time about the
difficulties in the building industry, and the orders issued by Hitler
on that occasion?
MILCH: Yes. On that occasion Hitler ordered very solid structures to be
built. I believe he demanded six large bomb-proof factories, each with
600,000 square meters floor space. Later on, Speer, who had been absent
from the April meeting through illness, raised objections to these
orders. He considered this construction work to be on far too large a
scale and that it was too late to undertake it. Later he obtained
permission for all factories which by June 1944 were not in a
sufficiently advanced stage of construction—that is, which could not
start working by the beginning of 1945—to be discontinued immediately.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I am above all interested in the question of labor. At
this discussion on the Obersalzberg, did the Führer allocate the
requisite labor for the construction of the factories demanded by him?
MILCH: Yes. I think I remember rightly that, in answer to the objection
raised by one of the gentlemen present, he said that he himself would
see that the labor was made available.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, you said that Herr Speer was opposed to these
constructions. What happened then? Speer was not present at that
meeting?
MILCH: No, he was ill at the time.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Can you tell us briefly what happened?
MILCH: During Speer’s illness, requests reached the Führer from other
quarters that Speer should be relieved of construction work.
Difficulties arose owing to the fact that whereas in theory Speer still
remained in charge of building, in practice the work was nearly all
taken out of his hands. He was no longer able to have any say in
construction work, since it had been decided that the construction
department of the Todt Organization should receive orders direct from
Hitler. Thus, Speer was excluded more and more from this sphere of
activity. A great deal was said at that time about large-scale
constructions, but very little work was actually done on them.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did Hitler give a written order to Herr Dorsch, and did
he have it shown to Speer? Do you know anything about it?
MILCH: As far as I can remember, such a written order was given and it
was also sent to Speer. I have a vague recollection that Speer once
showed me such an order.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: One last question on this matter. In this way, Dorsch,
who had been directly commissioned by the Führer, took over the
responsibility for these buildings and the necessary manpower?
MILCH: Yes.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, you were a member of the Central Planning Board.
Can you tell me if the Central Planning Board was authorized to make
decisions on the use of foreign or German labor and its allocation?
MILCH: No.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did the Central Planning Board ever make decisions of
this kind?
MILCH: The Central Planning Board had been set up for the distribution
of raw materials only; but a certain control over transportation
devolved upon it. However, the matter of transportation was independent
of any activity concerning allocation of raw material. It had no say in
the allocation of labor. If the Central Planning Board attempted to
obtain some influence as to the allocation of workers, it was because it
was at the same time responsible for armaments, and therefore best able
to judge the existing requirements. But here, too, considerable
difficulties were encountered, and this branch of the Central Planning
Board’s work had to be dropped.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: So no decision was ever reached? We have records before
us which show that labor problems were sometimes discussed by the
Central Planning Board.
MILCH: Yes, very frequently, as the armament offices which were
represented on the Central Planning Board were greatly concerned with
labor problems; but these discussions mostly concerned food supplies and
extra rations for the workers.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: And now—one last question on the subject. Did the
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in any way look upon
the Central Planning Board as authoritative, that is, as the final
arbiter in the total plan for the utilization of manpower?
MILCH: No, he could not do that, as he himself represented that
authority.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were there any reserves of German workers in 1943 or
1944, and did Speer request the utilization of this German manpower
instead of foreign labor?
MILCH: Yes, again and again Speer made strong representations that any
German labor still available, even if difficult to mobilize, should be
brought in and put to work. This reserve consisted mostly of female
labor, women of professional circles and social stations who in wartime
had nothing to do apart from domestic work.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, you have already told us that the Defendant
Speer was a sick man in 1944. Could you tell us approximately when his
illness began and when it ended?
MILCH: His illness started in February, and I think it lasted until
about June.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you. Do you know anything about this long illness
being exploited in order to undermine severely his influence and
authority? Can you tell me who was primarily interested in doing that?
MILCH: His influence was undermined in the above-mentioned building
projects. It is very difficult for me to name here the individuals who
probably hoped to succeed him.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did matters improve, or did they become worse after 20
July?
MILCH: Actually, as time went on they became worse. Speer’s position
became more difficult than ever, as the whole of Speer’s views differed
more and more from Hitler’s official opinion.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you. Now, may I remind you of something else? In
February 1945, by a Hitler order, the Defendant Speer was entrusted with
the distribution of motor vehicles; and you, if I am correctly informed,
were appointed as his representative. Can you tell me what the transport
situation was like at that time, and to what extent the armaments output
depended on the transport situation?
MILCH: In those days, the transport situation was so deplorable, owing
to the American daylight raids, that the transport system was no longer
able to carry even the most essential commodities and armament
materials. Our great forge, the Ruhr district, was particularly hard
hit, as well as the transport system carrying products from the Ruhr to
the finishing industries in Central Germany, Berlin, and Saxony. If very
stringent measures had not been taken and extraordinary powers granted,
total collapse, due solely to transport difficulties, would have become
only a matter of hours. That was the situation at that time.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Could Speer, in his position, be expected to give
preferential treatment to armaments when available transport was
allocated? What did he actually do?
MILCH: No; Speer, like myself, saw quite clearly that the whole armament
question could no longer influence the situation at that stage.
Therefore, acting on his own initiative, he gave priority to the
movement of food supplies for the population. The most urgent job was to
remove the foodstuffs from the German territory in danger of being lost
to the enemy.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were these measures only taken to safeguard the current
food supply, or were they long-term measures?
MILCH: The intention was to move all available and transportable food to
a place of safety.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, motor transport was a particularly difficult
problem at the time. Was the number of trucks and the quantity of fuel
to drive them cut down when transport was allocated to the armaments
industry; and what orders regarding trucks did Speer issue in
mid-February? Do you know?
MILCH: I know that trucks were always in such short supply in the
armament industry that not even essential orders could be filled. All
kinds of alternative transport had to be found, such as electric trains,
a great number of horse carts, and other vehicles. But, as far as my
knowledge goes, here too, Speer used this means of transport for the
benefit of the German population in order to maintain some sort of food
distributing organization.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Fuel was, at that time, one of the most serious
bottlenecks, was it not?
MILCH: It was, in fact, the most serious bottleneck of all.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, do you happen to know that after February 1945
Speer granted priority to repair work on nitrogen factories producing
fertilizers for agriculture, which meant that repairs to fuel producing
plants had to take second place?
MILCH: Yes, I do know, because Speer discussed with me in great detail
the emergency measures to be taken, now that we were faced with imminent
and inevitable collapse. He was of the opinion that first and foremost
everything that was still possible should be done to help the German
people to get through the very hard times which would follow the
collapse. These first measures dealt with food supplies, salvage of food
supplies, and transport for distribution.
Secondly, he sought to avoid the destruction of the German factories
still in our possession, which was in direct opposition to Hitler’s
“scorched earth” tactics.
Thirdly, he discussed the switch-over from war to peacetime production
of such factories as might still be standing. First of all, he had in
mind agricultural machinery and spare parts, and banked upon the
assumption that, if once the orders were placed, they would be carried
out in spite of the upheaval—for instance, even if some German
factories passed into enemy hands, or when, the fighting having ceased,
the government armament contracts would automatically fizzle out.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, we have now connected up an entire series of
questions and I am most grateful to you. I should, however, like to ask
you one more question: Could you give us any further details about the
prevention of destruction?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, will you explain to me why this evidence
that you are calling now is relevant and to what charge it is relevant?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, the Defendant Speer is charged with
participating in the conspiracy and in the common plan for waging
aggressive warfare until 7 May 1945. If I can now prove that his
activities, at least for some time before that date, were incompatible
with such common plan, then this item of evidence would be relevant to
the question whether this charge of the Indictment is justified or not.
THE PRESIDENT: All the evidence that you have been giving for the last
15 minutes was related to 1943 and 1944, and was related to conferences
with reference to the erection of factories for the production of
bombers and the fact that—as far as I have understood it—the fact that
Speer was engaged more on attempting to feed the German people than on
building armament factories. What that has to do with it, I have not any
idea.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The first point referred to Document 1584-PS, which the
Prosecution submitted as incriminating my client. The document says
that, at a conference on the Obersalzberg, the construction of certain
factories was ordered, and that 100,000 Hungarian Jews were employed on
this construction. The purpose of the interrogation of this witness was
to establish that the Defendant Speer could not be held responsible for
this construction, since Hitler had given the order for this work
directly to somebody else, and to eliminate this particular point
submitted by the Prosecution in support of their charge. That was the
purpose of the first question. The purpose of the second question,
concerning the avoidance of destruction and the safeguarding of
agricultural produce and the food supply of the German people, is
connected with the accusation of participating in a conspiracy for the
execution of a common plan; whereas all the activities, just confirmed
by the witness, were to serve an entirely different aim and had just the
opposite effect to the common plan alleged by the Prosecution. They did
not serve the war effort but were directed towards peacetime economy.
THE PRESIDENT: There is no charge against Speer on the ground that he
attempted to feed the German people during the war. The Prosecution have
not laid that against him as a charge.
DE. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I never said that the Prosecution had
raised this charge against him. There must have been a mistake in the
transmission.
[_Turning to the witness._] One last question, Witness. Can you tell us
to what extent Speer informed the Führer at a later date of the results
of the heavy air raids on Hamburg and on other cities?
MILCH: He gave the Führer the fullest information and repeatedly drew
his attention to the difficulties.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you.
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, did the
Central Planning Board also concern itself with labor problems?
MILCH: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were the manpower requirements established?
MILCH: They were established by the industries and reported through the
labor exchanges. We also submitted figures on the shortages of manpower
in the armament industry.
DR. SERVATIUS: May I interrupt you? What did you do, once the
requirements were established? And what was the purpose of establishing
them?
MILCH: They showed the shortages in manpower caused by the continual
calling up of the workers for war service.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was this not done in order to bring in more workers?
MILCH: The request for more workers came from the factories. We
supported the factories in their negotiations with Sauckel by telling
him that such and such an industry had applied for so and so many
workers. We also told him which of their figures were too high according
to our calculations.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the figures represent the total sum of the workers
needed?
MILCH: No. It was a general figure according to the statistics supplied
by Sauckel’s labor exchanges.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who fixed the requirements, Sauckel or the applicants for
labor?
MILCH: The factories did.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the Central Planning Board’s task in connection
with labor problems?
MILCH: The Central Planning Board dealt with the distribution of raw
materials. It also had to see that raw materials were made available
. . .
DR. SERVATIUS: My question concerns the workers and not raw materials.
MILCH: Please wait until I have finished what I want to say. You will
then understand what I mean. The raw materials had to be produced and
their production called for workers. For instance, in the mining
industry and the aluminum factories . . .
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, may I interrupt you? It is clear that workers
are essential for production; but what I want to know is who made the
request for labor, and who finally decided as to the numbers of workers
required?
MILCH: The factories made the request and Sauckel decided on the
figures. He placed at their disposal as many workers as he could get,
but the numbers were always below the figure requested.
DR. SERVATIUS: In this connection did he have a free hand, or did the
Führer make the decisions?
MILCH: As far as I know, the Führer intervened very frequently and
Sauckel was often summoned to confer with Hitler.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were there not discussions at the Führer’s headquarters
on all essential programs, especially those involving manpower?
MILCH: No, not all programs; but occasionally these matters were
discussed. However, the discussions with the Führer about labor problems
were mostly very brief. He did not wish to discuss the wider issues of
this matter.
DR. SERVATIUS: What had the Four Year Plan to do with the matter?
MILCH: The Four Year Plan, as far as I know, also dealt with these
problems. But I rather think that in this respect it served as an
auxiliary organization for Hitler, who did not wish to discuss these
matters in detail.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know that according to decrees Sauckel had to
subordinate himself to the Four Year Plan, that is, to Göring, and that
he had to receive orders from him?
MILCH: I do not exactly know how matters stood.
DR. SERVATIUS: One more question. How did the workers, the foreign
workers, behave? Were they willing and hard working?
MILCH: The majority were excellent workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: How do you account for that?
MILCH: In the first years these workers were pleased to be able to get
work and food. We treated them well, as far as I can judge, and their
rations were larger than those of the German population. They received
extra rations on the same scale as the German workers for heavy and very
heavy physical work, also for overtime. The French and Russian workers
worked exceptionally well. I occasionally heard complaints about the
Dutch workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: Are you familiar with Sauckel’s regulations concerning
the welfare of the foreign workers?
MILCH: I remember that on one occasion Sauckel spoke to us on this
subject at the headquarters of the Central Planning Board.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did he show a humane or a severe attitude?
MILCH: His intentions were entirely humane. Sauckel had been set a very
difficult task by Hitler. As far as I know, he had been a workingman
himself and, as a seaman, had worked very hard in his time;
consequently, he was kindly disposed towards workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to ask the witness.
PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Witness,
did you take part in the 1937 Wehrmacht maneuvers?
MILCH: In Mecklenburg, I believe.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, that is so. Do you remember if any foreign officers
were present as guests?
MILCH: Yes. I know that a large British military mission was present and
a general, who later was appointed Governor of Gibraltar.
DR. JAHRREISS: General Ironside?
MILCH: Yes, Ironside. I spoke to him personally and also welcomed some
of the gentlemen of his staff. There were also Italian officers and
officers from many other countries; at the moment I cannot say exactly
what countries—I have forgotten.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was there by any chance a French military mission as
well?
MILCH: I think, so, but I cannot say for certain—I cannot remember so
far back. But I did speak to General Ironside.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know if at that time these foreign
officers were also shown the most up-to-date German armament equipment?
MILCH: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was all the equipment demonstrated in action?
MILCH: Everything was demonstrated in action, with the exception of a
new plane not yet in use; but even this was shown.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know if we, that is, Germany, also allowed foreign
powers to inspect our air raid precautions equipment?
MILCH: Yes, on many occasions. A Mr. Fraser came to see me from England,
together with Lord Trenchard. Mr. Fraser was interested in air raid
precautions equipment, and was immediately shown the latest
developments.
DR. JAHRREISS: When was that, please?
MILCH: I think it was in 1937 or 1938, but I will see if I can find the
date. [_Referring to his notes._] It was on 1 July 1937.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you remember if anybody else came from England at a
later date?
MILCH: It was later followed by a personal interchange between our
services and the British. I myself, having brought them together, took
no further part in the matter.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. One more question. Do you remember the
conflict which arose over the reoccupation of the Rhineland?
MILCH: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: You also know how great was the excitement it caused.
MILCH: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did the Luftwaffe also take part in the reoccupation of
the Rhineland—to be precise, on the left bank of the Rhine?
MILCH: I cannot, at the moment, answer this question. The reoccupation
of the Rhineland was so sudden that I was taken unawares while on leave.
When I returned, the occupation was well under way. I know that
Düsseldorf had been occupied and that the Luftwaffe had taken part. I
myself went there a few days later.
DR. JAHRREISS: But that is on the right bank of the Rhine?
MILCH: That is on the right bank.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then you know nothing about the left bank of the Rhine?
MILCH: No, I cannot say anything about it at the moment. I do not
believe there was an airfield there; anyhow, I cannot remember exactly.
DR. JAHRREISS: You say that the reoccupation of the Rhineland was very
sudden. But had nothing been arranged beforehand by the Luftwaffe to
provide for such an event?
MILCH: The decision was made when I was on leave and everything we had
was naturally used for this purpose, but we did not have very much.
DR. JAHRREISS: Quite so, but let us get it quite clear. Was the
Luftwaffe told to be ready for the first time while you were on leave?
MILCH: Yes, definitely; otherwise I would not have gone on leave.
DR. JAHRREISS: What was the earliest date on which the Luftwaffe was
given the alert before the reoccupation?
MILCH: It might have been a matter of 14, 15, or 16 days. That would be
the maximum.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, on Friday you made a statement about the part
played by the Luftwaffe in the military operations for the completion of
the Anschluss policy in March 1938. On what day did the preparations
begin?
MILCH: The preparations began less than 48 hours beforehand. That I know
exactly.
DR. JAHRREISS: And when did you first learn that military preparations
were to be made for the solution of this problem?
MILCH: About 36 hours before the march into Austria.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you.
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Witness, am I
right in assuming that you were never in a position to issue orders to,
that is, never had anything to do officially with either the Gestapo or
with the concentration camps?
MILCH: No, I never had anything to do with them.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When did you first hear of the establishment of these
camps?
MILCH: Through the general announcements in 1933 that concentration
camps, or rather that one concentration camp had been established.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you, during the years which followed, receive more
detailed information concerning further establishments of this kind?
MILCH: Until the war ended I had heard of Dachau and Oranienburg only. I
knew nothing at all about any other concentration camps. At my own
request and in the company of some high-ranking officers of the
Luftwaffe, I inspected Dachau in 1935. I saw no other concentration
camps, nor did I know anything about what happened in them.
DR. KAUFFMANN: During your inspection, what impression did you get of
the establishment itself and the treatment of the internees, _et
cetera_?
MILCH: At that time there was so much talk about these camps, also in
Germany in our officers’ circles, that I decided to judge for myself.
Himmler gave his immediate consent to my request. At that time, I
believe, Dachau was the only concentration camp in existence. There I
found a very mixed assortment of inmates. One group consisted of major
criminals, all habitual offenders; other groups consisted of people who
repeatedly committed the same offense which were not crimes, but only
offenses. There was another group of persons who had participated in the
Röhm Putsch. One of the men I recognized as having seen before. He had
been a high-ranking SA leader and was now an internee. The camp, run on
military lines, was clean and properly organized. They had their own
slaughterhouse and their own bakery. We insisted on having the food of
the internees served to us. The food was good and one of the camp
leaders explained that they fed the inmates very well as they were
engaged on heavy work. All the inmates whom we approached explained the
reason for their internment. For instance, one man told us that he had
committed forgery 20 times; another, that he had committed assault and
other offenses 18 times. There were many cases of this kind. I cannot,
of course, say if we were shown everything in this large establishment.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You have just mentioned that the question had been
discussed in military circles, among the officers. Later, when you
returned, did you convey your impressions of Dachau to anyone?
MILCH: I scarcely mentioned them to anybody, only if my more intimate
comrades broached the subject. As I have said before, I did not go
alone; there were several other gentlemen with me and, no doubt, they
too must have had occasion to discuss this subject in smaller circles.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Unheard of acts of cruelty were perpetrated in the
concentration camps. Did you come to hear of them and, if so, when did
you first hear of them?
MILCH: On the day on which I was captured it was revealed to me for the
first time when internees from an auxiliary camp in the vicinity were
led past the place where I was captured. This was the first time I saw
it for myself. The rest I learned in captivity from the various
documents which we were shown.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then it was completely unknown to you that more than 200
concentration camps existed in Germany and in the occupied territories.
MILCH: It was completely unknown to me. I have already mentioned the two
camps whose existence was known to me.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It could be held against you that it must have been
impossible not to know of these facts. Can you explain to us why it was
not possible for you to obtain better information regarding existing
conditions?
MILCH: Because the people who knew about these conditions did not talk
about them, and presumably were not allowed to talk about them. I
understand this to be so from a document in the Indictment against the
General Staff, in which Himmler—also erroneously considered as one of
the high-ranking military leaders—had issued an order to this effect.
This document dealt with some conference or other of high-ranking police
leaders under Himmler, in 1943, I believe.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Am I right in saying that any attempt to disclose
conditions prevalent in the concentration camps was impossible unless
the person in question was ready to risk his life?
MILCH: In the first place the large number of concentration camps was
unknown to everybody, as it was unknown to me. Secondly, nobody knew
what went on there. This knowledge was apparently confined to a very
small circle of people who were in [on] the secret. Further, the SD was
very much feared by the entire population, not only by the lower
classes. If anybody tried to gain access to these secrets he did so at
the peril of his life. And again, how could the Germans know anything
about these things, since they never saw them or heard about them?
Nothing was said about them in the German press, no announcements were
made on the German radio, and those who listened to foreign broadcasts
exposed themselves to the heaviest penalties, generally it meant death.
You could never be alone. You could depend upon it that if you yourself
contravened that law, others would overhear and then denounce you. I
know that in Germany a large number of people were condemned to death
for listening to foreign broadcasts.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did it ever come to your knowledge that there had been
mass deportations of Jews to the Eastern territories? When did you first
hear about it?
MILCH: I cannot give the exact date. Once, in some way or other, I can
no longer remember how, the information did reach me that Jews had been
settled in special ghetto towns in the East. I think it must have been
in 1944 or thereabout, but I cannot guarantee that this date is exact.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You have just mentioned ghettos. Did you know that these
mass deportations were, in effect, a preliminary step to mass
extermination?
MILCH: No, we were never told.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I ask you further if, in this connection, you had any
idea about the existence of the Auschwitz extermination camp?
MILCH: No. I first heard of the name much later. I read it in the press
after I was captured.
DR. KAUFFMANN: So-called Einsatzkommandos were employed in the East,
where they carried out large-scale exterminations, also of Jews. Did you
know that these Einsatzkommandos had been created by order of Adolf
Hitler?
MILCH: No. The first I heard of these Einsatzkommandos was here in
prison in Nuremberg.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you know that a special campaign was launched for the
extermination of Jewish citizens in the southeastern provinces of the
Reich, which, according to the statement of the leader concerned, named
Eichmann, caused the death of from 4 to 5 million Jews?
MILCH: No, I know nothing at all about it. This is the first time I have
heard the name Eichmann mentioned.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Am I correct in stating that in Germany, under the regime
of an absolute leader, any opposition to a supreme order would most
probably have meant death?
MILCH: That has been proved in many hundreds of cases.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Am I also correct in stating that the peril would have
been equally deadly even if the order had been opposed on legal and
moral grounds?
MILCH: I believe that here, too, one would have had to be prepared to
pay the penalty, and not only one’s own, but the family’s as well.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you. I have no more questions to ask.
DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Witness, I have only
a short question to ask you. You told us, on Saturday or on Friday, that
in 1937 you had discussions with an English mission. This mission was
headed by Air Vice Marshal Courtney. I should like to know from you if,
in the course of these discussions, it was agreed that the competent
German and British authorities should exchange information concerning
the establishment plans for their respective Air Forces?
MILCH: Your surmise is correct.