I now call upon counsel for the Defendant Göring.

DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, in

yesterday’s afternoon session, you observed that application Number 2,

which I had submitted as a supplement, had not yet been discussed

orally. I was unfortunately not present at the afternoon session

yesterday. It is a question of a subsequent, formal supplement to my

applications regarding the witnesses Westhoff and Wielen. Both of these

witnesses had already been granted me in the open Tribunal session. I

submitted these names again only in order to complete my application.

As an addition I mentioned only State Secretary Stuckart, a witness who

also has already been granted me previously by a decision of the

Tribunal. I believe, therefore, that I do not need to discuss this

supplementary application, and that the Prosecution have no objection to

this action.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Nelte, General Westhoff and Wielen have already

been granted to you, and there is no need for any further application.

DR. NELTE: Is State Secretary Stuckart also granted me, Your Honor?

THE PRESIDENT: Westhoff and Wielen have already been granted to you, and

there is no need for any further application. I am afraid it is

difficult to remember these names. I think that Stuckart has been

granted to you.

DR. NELTE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am told he has.

DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Mr. President, at

yesterday’s afternoon session my name was also mentioned in the

following connection: I have hitherto submitted only written

applications, and I must now present them orally. I assume that this

refers to the written application which I handed in with my document and

witness list, in which, in a rather lengthy written application, I

requested that I might have permission to submit in evidence as

historical documents of the time, quotations from theological and

philosophical works which were considered important at the time of

Rosenberg’s public power. I beg Your Honor to inform me whether this is

the application in question.

I should like to repeat: The President told me yesterday that I should

repeat my written application orally. Therefore I should like to ask

whether this refers to the written request that I handed in with my list

of witnesses and documents.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, so far as the Tribunal knows, everything will

be covered by the written order which the Tribunal will make upon your

application. It is not convenient, really, to deal with these matters

now by way of oral requests, but everything that is in your written

application will be covered by a written order of the Tribunal. It will

be subject, of course, to the order which I have announced this morning,

in order to assure that there will be no more translation than is

absolutely necessary.

DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Mr. President and

Gentlemen of the Tribunal, before I start with my presentation I beg to

make two supplementary applications. I am aware of the fact that

supplementary requests as such should be put in writing. But since it is

a question of several requests, I should like to have your decision

whether I should submit these applications now or whether the Tribunal

desires a written request.

THE PRESIDENT: You may put your request now, verbally, but we would

prefer to have it in writing afterwards as soon as possible.

DR. STAHMER: I name first Major Bütz, who is in custody here in

Nuremberg, as a witness for the following facts: Reich Marshal Göring

repeatedly opposed in the summer of 1944 the measures which Hitler had

ordered against aviators taking part in terror attacks. Furthermore, he

knows that no order was issued either by the Luftwaffe or by the

Wehrmacht corresponding to Hitler’s orders regarding terror aviators.

Finally, he can give evidence in regard to the following: An officer of

the Luftwaffe in May 1944 in Munich protected an airman, who had bailed

out, from the lynching which the crowd wanted to carry out. Hitler, who

had knowledge of this incident, demanded of Göring the name of this

officer, and that he be punished. In spite of repeated inquiries on

Hitler’s part, Göring did not give the name of this officer, although he

knew it, and in this way protected him. This is the application

regarding the witness Bütz. Another supplementary request is concerned

with the following: In the session of 14 February 1946 the Soviet

Prosecution submitted that a German military formation, Staff 537,

Pioneer Battalion, carried out mass shootings of Polish prisoners of war

in the forests near Katyn. As the responsible leaders of this formation,

Colonel Ahrens, First Lieutenant Rex, and Second Lieutenant Hodt were

mentioned. As proof the Prosecution referred to Document USSR-64. It is

an official report of the Extraordinary State Commission of the Soviet

Union which was ordered to investigate the facts of the well-known Katyn

case. The document I have not yet received. As a result of the

publication of this speech by the Prosecution in the press, members of

the staff of the Army Group Center, to which Staff 537 was directly

subordinate and which was stationed 4 to 5 kilometers from Staff 537,

came forward. These people stated that the evidence upon which the

Prosecution have based the statement submitted was not correct.

The following witnesses are mentioned in this connection:

Colonel Ahrens, at that time commander of 537, later chief of army

armament and commander of the auxiliary army; First Lieutenant Rex,

probably taken as a prisoner of war at Stalingrad; Lieutenant Hodt,

probably taken prisoner by the Russians in or near Königsberg; Major

General of intelligence troops, Eugen Oberhauser, probably taken

prisoner of war by the Americans; First Lieutenant Graf Berg—later

ordnance officer with Field Marshal Von Kluge—a prisoner of war in

British hands in Canada. Other members of the units which are accused

are still to be mentioned. I name these witnesses to prove that the

conclusion as to the complicity of Göring drawn by the Prosecution in

the above-mentioned statement is not justified according to the

Indictment.

This morning I received another communication bearing on the same

question, which calls for the following request: Professor Naville,

professor of forensic medicine at the University of Geneva, carried out,

with an international commission at Smolensk, investigations of the

bodies at that time. He established from the state of preservation of

these corpses, from the notes found in the pockets of their clothes, and

other means of evidence, that the deed must have been committed in the

year 1940.

Those are my requests.

THE PRESIDENT: If you will put in those requests in writing, the

Tribunal will consider them.

DR. STAHMER: And now I come to the . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Just one minute. Dr. Stahmer, if you would communicate

your written application to the Prosecution, they would then be able to

make a written statement if they have any objection to it. You will do

that as soon as possible. Let us have both your written application and

the Prosecution’s answer to it.

DR. STAHMER: The Tribunal has ordered in its decision of 11 December

1945 that the Defense is entitled to one speech only. This shall take

place only after the conclusion of the hearing of the evidence. The

Tribunal decided some time later that explanatory words may be permitted

at the present stage of the proceedings in connection with the

presentation of documents by the Defense. The witnesses have already

been named by me. A decision has been made concerning their admission

except for today’s request and, with the Court’s permission, I shall

call a witness shortly. Before I do that, I wish to make the following

comments to the documents to which I shall refer during my final speech:

The Prosecution have charged the defendant repeatedly with the violation

of the Treaty of Versailles. This charge is not justified in the opinion

of the Defense. Detailed statements on this question belong to the

concluding speech of the Defense and will therefore be dealt with there.

The present part of the proceedings deals only with the production of

documents which will be used to support the contention that the Treaty

was not violated by Germany but that the German Reich was no longer

bound by it. I submit that the Fourteen Points of the American President

Wilson, which were the basis of that Treaty, are commonly known, and

therefore do not need further proof, according to Paragraph 21 of the

Charter.

The Treaty of Versailles has already been submitted to the Tribunal. It

was published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1919, Page 687. Of this Treaty

of Versailles, Article 8 and Part V are important for its

interpretation. These provisions insofar as they are of interest here,

read as follows—I quote the first four paragraphs of Article 8:

“The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of

peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest

point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by

common action of international obligations.

“The Council, taking account of the geographical situation, and

circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such

reduction for the consideration and action of the several

governments.

“Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at

least every 10 years.

“After these plans shall have been adopted by the several

governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be

exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.”

The first paragraph of Part V reads:

“In order to render possible the introduction of a general

limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes

strictly to observe the military, naval, and air clauses which

follow.”

These regulations infer, not only that Germany had to disarm, but also

that the signatories of the pact were likewise bound to disarm. Germany,

however, was committed to start disarmament first. Germany completely

fulfilled this commitment.

On 17 February 1927 Marshal Foch stated, “I can assure you that Germany

has actually disarmed.”

Therefore, the signatories of the pact had to fulfill their commitment

to disarm. As they did not disarm, Germany was no longer bound by the

pact according to general principles of law, and she was justified in

renouncing her obligations.

This interpretation agrees with the point of view which has been

expressed by French as well as by English statesmen. Therefore, I should

like to refer to the speech made by Paul Boncour on 8 April 1927, in

which Boncour stated as follows—I quote from Document Book 1, Page 28:

“It is correct that the introduction to Part V of the Treaty of

Versailles concerns the limitation of armaments which was

imposed on Germany as a prerequisite and as the forerunner of a

general limitation of armaments. This brings out very clearly

the difference between the armament restrictions of Germany and

other similar armament restrictions which in the course of

history have been imposed after the conclusion of wars. This

time these regulations—and in this lies their entire

value—have been imposed not only on one of the signatories to

the Treaty, but they are rather a duty, a moral and legal

responsibility, for the other signatories to proceed with a

general limitation of armaments.”

Further, I should like to refer to the speech by David Lloyd George on 7

November 1927, in which he particularly describes the memorandum to the

skeleton note of 16 June 1919, as—and I quote from the Document Book 1,

Page 26:

“. . . document which we handed Germany as a solemn pledge on

the part of Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and 20 other

nations to follow Germany’s example after she was disarmed.”

The Treaty of Versailles was felt not only by the German people to be a

bitter injustice—there were numerous voices even in foreign countries

that called the Treaty exceedingly unfair for Germany. I am quoting the

following from Rothermere’s _Warnings and Prophecies_, Document Book 1,

Page 30:

“Germany was justified in feeling that she had been betrayed in

Versailles. Under the pretext . . .”

MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States):

[_Interposing._] I call the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that the

documents which are now being read into the record are documents which,

as I understand it, were excluded as irrelevant by the Tribunal when

that matter was before it before. They are matters of a good deal of

public notoriety and would not be secret if they were not in evidence;

but I think the reading of them into the record is in violation of the

Tribunal’s own determination.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal has suspected that these

documents had been excluded, and they have sent for the original record

of their orders. But I must say now that the Tribunal expects the

defendants’ counsel to conform to their orders and not to read documents

which they have been ordered not to read.

[_At this point Defendant Hess was led out of the courtroom._]

DR. STAHMER: Shall I continue?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

DR. STAHMER: “Under the pretext that it was the first step to

world disarmament, Germany was forcibly disarmed. Great Britain

was, indeed, also deceived. She had actually continued to disarm

for a period of 15 years. But from the day on which the various

peace treaties were signed, France encouraged a number of small

states to powerful rearmament and the result was that 5 years

after Versailles, Germany was surrounded by a much tighter ring

of iron than 5 years before the World War. It was inevitable

that a German regime, which had renounced Versailles, would at

the first opportunity rearm heavily. It was evident that its

weapons, diplomatically, if not in the true sense of the word,

were to be directed against the powers of Versailles.”

In the same way the Locarno Pact is contested, with a breach of which

the defendant is also charged, and, as far as the Defense are concerned,

unjustifiably.

Germany renounced this pact and could do so rightfully because France

and Soviet Russia had signed a military assistance pact, although the

Locarno Pact provided a guarantee of the French eastern border. This act

by France, in the opinion of Germany, was in sharp contrast to the legal

situation created by the Locarno Pact.

In a speech of Plenipotentiary Von Ribbentrop before the League of

Nations on 19 March 1936, this opinion was expressed in the following

terms—I quote from Document Book 1, Page 32 . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I have before me now the order of the

Tribunal of 26 February 1946, and Paragraph 4 of that order is in the

following terms: “The following documents are denied as irrelevant,” and

then the heading “Göring,” and the fourth of the documents is the speech

by Paul Boncour on 8 April 1927; and the sixth is the speech by Lloyd

George on 7 November 1927, which you have not read but which you have

put into your trial brief. I would again call your attention, and the

attention of all the Defense Counsel, to the fact that they will not be

allowed to read any document which has been denied by the Tribunal. Go

on.

DR. STAHMER: This quotation is as follows:

“. . . but it is also clear that if a world power such as

France, by virtue of her sovereignty, can decide upon concluding

military alliances of such vast proportions without having

misgivings on account of existing treaties, another world power

like Germany has at least the right to safeguard the protection

of the entire Reich territory by re-establishing within her own

borders the natural rights of a sovereign power which are

granted all peoples.”

Before I take up the question of aggressive war in detail I have the

intention, if I have the permission of the Tribunal, to call on the

first witness, General of the Air Force Bodenschatz.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

[_The witness Karl Bodenschatz took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

KARL BODENSCHATZ (Witness): Karl Bodenschatz.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the

Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will

withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.

DR. STAHMER: General Bodenschatz, since when have you known Reich

Marshal Göring?

BODENSCHATZ: I have known Reich Marshal Göring since June 1918.

DR. STAHMER: In what capacity did you get to know him?

BODENSCHATZ: I came to know him when he was the commander of the

Richthofen Squadron. I was at that time the adjutant of Rittmeister

Freiherr von Richthofen who had just been killed in action.

DR. STAHMER: Were you taken into the Reichswehr at the end of the first

World War?

BODENSCHATZ: At the end of the first World War I was taken into the

Reichswehr as a regular officer and remained from the year 1919 until

April 1933.

DR. STAHMER: When, after the completion of the World War, did you resume

your connection with Göring?

BODENSCHATZ: In November 1918 I was with Göring at Aschaffenburg, at the

demobilization of the Richthofen Fighter Squadron, and later in the

spring of 1919 I was with him again for several weeks in Berlin. There

our paths separated. Then I met Göring for the first time again at his

first wedding, and I believe that was in the year 1919 or 1920. I cannot

remember exactly. Up to 1929 there was no connection between us. In the

year 1929, and until 1933, I met Hermann Göring several times here in

Nuremberg where I was a company commander in Infantry Regiment 21. My

meetings with Göring here in Nuremberg were solely for the purpose of

keeping up the old friendship.

DR. STAHMER: And then in the year 1939, you entered the Luftwaffe?

BODENSCHATZ; In 1933 I reported to Hermann Göring in Berlin. At that

time, Göring was Reich Commissioner of the Luftwaffe and I became his

military adjutant.

DR. STAHMER: How long did you retain this post as adjutant?

BODENSCHATZ: I retained this post as adjutant until the year 1938. Later

I became Chief of the Ministerial Bureau, 1938.

DR. STAHMER: And what position did you have during the war?

BODENSCHATZ: During the war, I was liaison officer between the

Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and the Führer’s headquarters.

DR. STAHMER: Were you at the headquarters, or where?

BODENSCHATZ: I was alternately at the Führer’s headquarters and at the

headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe.

DR. STAHMER: When did you leave that position?

BODENSCHATZ: I left that position on 20 July 1944, because I was

seriously wounded that day.

DR. STAHMER: And what was the cause of your being wounded?

BODENSCHATZ: The plot against Hitler.

DR. STAHMER: You were present?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: And what were your tasks at the Führer’s headquarters?

BODENSCHATZ: It was my duty in the Führer’s headquarters to report on

special events, special matters, inquiries, and desires of the Reich

Marshal if he were absent, and to transmit them. I also had to transmit

inquiries from the Führer’s headquarters direct to Hermann Göring. Then

I had to inform Hermann Göring early, that is, not through official

channels, regarding all that took place in the Führer’s headquarters

insofar as it was of interest to him in his capacity as Reich Marshal.

DR. STAHMER: Did you take part regularly in the conferences?

BODENSCHATZ: I was a listener at these conferences.

DR. STAHMER: From what time onwards did Reich Marshal Göring lose his

influence with Hitler?

BODENSCHATZ: According to my personal opinion and conviction, Hermann

Göring began to lose influence with Hitler in the spring of 1943.

DR. STAHMER: And what were the reasons?

BODENSCHATZ: That was the beginning of large-scale air attacks by night

by the R.A.F. on German towns, and from that moment there were

differences of opinion between Hitler and Göring which became more

serious as time went on. Even though Göring made tremendous efforts, he

could not recapture his influence with the Führer to the same extent as

before. The outward symptoms of this waning influence were the

following:

First, the Führer criticized Göring most severely. Secondly, the eternal

conversations between Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring became shorter,

less frequent, and finally ceased altogether. Thirdly, as far as

important conferences were concerned, the Reich Marshal was not called

in. Fourthly, during the last months and weeks the tension between Adolf

Hitler and Hermann Göring increased to such a degree that he was finally

arrested.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know anything about this arrest? What was the cause?

BODENSCHATZ: I have no exact information about it. I can only tell you

what I heard. I was at that time in Bad Reichenhall in the military

hospital. I merely heard that Reich Marshal Göring had sent a telegram

to the Führer, and in this telegram Göring requested that, since the

Führer no longer had freedom of action, he might act himself. As the

result of this telegram, which was sent by wireless to Berlin, the

arrest took place. I would like to emphasize that I only heard that. I

have no proof of any of these statements.

DR. STAHMER: And who made the arrest?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot tell you about that because I know nothing. I

heard, however, that a Kommando of the SS from Obersalzberg made the

arrest.

DR. STAHMER: Did Field Marshal Göring have any previous knowledge of the

incidents against the Jews which took place during the night of 9 to 10

November 1938?

BODENSCHATZ: Göring had no previous knowledge of these incidents. I

inferred that from his demeanor—how he acted towards me with regard to

these incidents. He acted in the following manner: When he heard of

these happenings he was dismayed and condemned them. A few days later he

went with proof to the Führer and complained about the people who had

instigated these incidents. Captain Wiedemann, the adjutant of the

Führer, can give you further particulars on the subject on oath.

Several weeks later, Hermann Göring called all the Gauleiter to Berlin,

in order to make clear his attitude regarding the incidents of the 9th

and 10th. He was violently opposed to these individual acts of

barbarism. He criticized them severely as unjust, as economically

unreasonable and harmful to our prestige in foreign countries. The

former Gauleiter, Dr. Uiberreither, who took part in this conference of

Gauleiter, has already given further particulars on oath.

DR. STAHMER: Were you present at a conference which took place in the

beginning of August 1939 at Soenke Nissen Koog near Husum?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes. I personally took part in that conference.

DR. STAHMER: Who was present there?

BODENSCHATZ: As far as I remember the following were present: Hermann

Göring; Herr Dahlerus, from Stockholm; six to eight English economic

experts, whose names I do not recall; I was present, and there was an

interpreter, Ministerialrat Dr. Böcker.

DR. STAHMER: Can you tell us about the subject of this conference?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember it word for word, but as far as I can

tell you Hermann Göring made the following statements . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, did the witness say where this conference

took place?

DR. STAHMER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you tell us where it was?

DR. STAHMER: [_To the witness._] Please repeat where this conference

took place.

BODENSCHATZ: The conference took place at the beginning of August at

Soenke Nissen Koog near Husum, Schleswig-Holstein.

DR. STAHMER: Please continue. You were going to tell us about the

subject of this conference.

BODENSCHATZ: I repeat, in substance, Göring made the following

statement: At that moment relations between England and Germany were

very tense. Under no circumstances should this tension be increased or

peace be endangered. The welfare and the trade of our two countries

could only flourish and prosper in peace. It was to the greatest

interest of Germany and Europe that the British Empire should continue

to exist. Göring emphasized that he himself would do his utmost for the

maintenance of peace. He requested the British business leaders, on

their return home, to use their influence in authoritative circles for

that purpose.

DR. STAHMER: Did Göring give you his opinion on how the foreign policy

of the Reich should be carried out? When and on what occasions did

conversations take place?

BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring often discussed these topics with me, in

1938 and 1939, especially during the period following the Munich

agreement. These conversations would take place perhaps in connection

with a report, or perhaps in his special train. Hermann Göring was

always of the opinion that the policy of the Reich must be directed in

such a way as to avoid war if possible. Hermann Göring dealt with this

topic at particularly great length in a conference with the Gauleiter in

the summer of 1938 in Karinhall. Dr. Uiberreither, whom I have

previously mentioned, has already given further sworn testimony to this

effect.

DR. STAHMER: Did Field Marshal Göring speak to you before leaving for

Munich in September 1938?

BODENSCHATZ: Before Hermann Göring left for Munich, he told me he would

do everything within his power to effect a peaceful settlement. He said,

“We cannot have war.” He exerted his influence on the Führer to this

effect, and during the negotiations in Munich, he worked decisively for

the preservation of peace. When he left the conference hall after the

conference at Munich he said to us spontaneously, “That means peace.”

DR. STAHMER: Did he often discuss with you for what reason he was

against a war, and on what occasions?

BODENSCHATZ: We talked about this topic very frequently. He always said

to me:

“In the first World War as an infantry officer and as an air

force officer I was constantly at the front. I know the horrors

of a war, and, therefore, my attitude is to preserve the German

people from these horrors if possible. My ambition is to solve

conflicts peacefully.”

In general, his opinion was that war is always a risky and unsure

business. Even if you win a war, the advantages are in no relation

whatsoever to the disadvantages and sacrifices which have to be made. If

you lose the war, then, in our position, everything is lost. Our

generation has already experienced the horrors of a great World War and

its bitter consequences. To expect the same generation to live through

another war would be unthinkable.

I would like to add that Hermann Göring, according to his inner thoughts

and character, was never in favor of war. Nothing was further from his

mind than the thought of a war.

DR. STAHMER: Did Göring converse with you about what were, according to

his wish, the aims to be accomplished by the rearmament which Germany

had undertaken? When and on what occasion?

BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring spoke with me about these matters in the

year 1935 after the Wehrfreiheit had been proclaimed. He described

Germany’s rearmament, after vain attempts to achieve general limitation

of armament, as an attempt at equality with the armament of other

countries, in order to be able to collaborate with other powers in world

politics with equal rights.

DR. STAHMER: Did conversations of this kind take place after 1935 also?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes. Now and then we resumed such conversations and he

spoke in a similar vein.

DR. STAHMER: Did you find out through Reich Marshal Göring what purpose

the Four Year Plan was to serve?

BODENSCHATZ: I happened to speak with Göring about this matter in the

year 1936, and that was after the Four Year Plan had been announced. He

explained it to me as follows: That in this plan he saw a means of

securing for Germany those raw materials which she could not import in

peacetime because of the lack of foreign exchange or whose import in an

emergency might possibly be cut off.

DR. STAHMER: When and on what occasion did Göring give you his opinion

on the Russian campaign?

BODENSCHATZ: Towards the end of 1941, after the first reverses in the

Russian campaign, Hermann Göring talked with me about the fighting in

the East. He said to me:

“Adolf Hitler foresaw a very hard battle in the East, but he did

not count on such reverses. Before the beginning of this

campaign I tried in vain to dissuade Adolf Hitler from his plan

of attacking Russia. I reminded him that he himself, in his book

_Mein Kampf_, was opposed to a war on two fronts and, in

addition, I pointed out that the main forces of the German

Luftwaffe would be occupied in the East, and England, whose air

industry was hit, would breathe again and be able to recover.”

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off for 10

minutes?

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has observed that the witness is using notes

whilst giving his evidence. The ruling which I announced this morning

was confined to the defendants and did not extend to witnesses.

Nevertheless, the Tribunal will allow the same rule to be applied to

witnesses. But the evidence must not be read, the purpose of the rule

being merely to assist recollection in giving evidence.

[_Turning to Dr. Stahmer._]

Yes, Dr. Stahmer.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether people turned to the Reich Marshal with

the request that their relatives should be freed from concentration

camps or to help them in their difficulties with the Gestapo?

BODENSCHATZ: The Chief of Staff is the person who can answer that

question. I myself only heard that such requests were made to the Reich

Marshal.

DR. STAHMER: Did you not have to deal with such requests in the military

section?

BODENSCHATZ: In the military section I had to deal with the requests

which were concerned with the Luftwaffe. But they were only requests

regarding the arrests of German citizens who stated that they had not

been given the reason for their arrest. We also received communications

regarding detention, grievances, and also regarding arrests of Jews.

Requests of this kind came to me only from Luftwaffe sources or from my

immediate circle of acquaintances.

DR. STAHMER: How were such requests treated?

BODENSCHATZ: Such requests were always treated as follows:

Most of the requests, which came from the broad masses of the people,

were submitted to the Reich Marshal through the Staff. Those requests

that came from the Luftwaffe were presented through my office, and

requests that came from the Reich Marshal’s relatives or friends, they

themselves presented. The Reich Marshal did not refuse his help in these

cases. In individual cases he asked the Führer personally for a

decision.

In all the cases that I dealt with help could be given.

DR. STAHMER: Did many Jews turn to Göring with requests for help?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, Jews, and particularly Jews of mixed blood applied to

Reich Marshal Göring.

DR. STAHMER: How were these requests handled?

BODENSCHATZ: The Reich Marshal did not deny his help and he gave

instructions whenever possible that help should be given.

DR. STAHMER: What was Göring’s general attitude to human society?

BODENSCHATZ: In his feelings, thoughts, and actions, as far as human

society was concerned, he was a benefactor to all in need. He was always

ready to help those who were in need, for instance sick people, wounded,

the relatives of those who had been killed in the war and of prisoners

of war.

Care for the working classes was particularly important to him. Here is

an example of this: The introduction of miners’ compensation. Every

miner who had completed 25 years of steady work was to receive over

20,000 marks. This is one of his most important social works.

DR. STAHMER: Did you know of the conditions in the concentration camps?

BODENSCHATZ: I had no knowledge of the conditions in the concentration

camps.

DR. STAHMER: Were the concentration camps spoken of at the Führer’s

headquarters during discussions with the Führer, or on any other

occasion?

BODENSCHATZ: In the Führer’s headquarters I never heard the Führer speak

about the concentration camps. He never discussed them in our circle.

DR. STAHMER: Was the question of the annihilation of the Jews discussed

there?

BODENSCHATZ: No, it was not; not in his discussions with me, at any

rate.

DR. STAHMER: Not even in discussions on the war situation?

BODENSCHATZ: No, I cannot remember him ever discussing the annihilation

of the Jews in my presence during discussions on the war situation.

DR. STAHMER: Did anyone else there mention anything?

BODENSCHATZ: No.

DR. STAHMER: Not Himmler?

BODENSCHATZ: He never discussed the subject with Himmler. I have only

heard since being in prison that Himmler’s reply to people who spoke to

him on this matter was, “What you have heard is not true; it is

incorrect.” I personally did not discuss this question with Himmler.

DR. STAHMER: Did you know how many concentration camps there were?

BODENSCHATZ: Everyone knew that the camps existed, but I was not aware

that so many existed. It was only after the war that I learned the names

of Mauthausen and Buchenwald from the newspaper. I only know of the camp

of Dachau because I happen to come from Bavaria.

DR. STAHMER: Did you never hear of the atrocities either?

BODENSCHATZ: No, I never heard of the atrocities. The very first time I

heard was last year, when I reported to the Reich Marshal—to be exact

it was the middle of March 1945—when I reported my departure on sick

leave. The Reich Marshal told me during lunch that very many Jews must

have perished there and that we should have to pay dearly for it. That

was the first time that I heard of crimes against the Jews.

DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions. I can now turn the witness

over to the other Defense Counsel and to the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions of

this witness?

DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and High Command of

the German Armed Forces): I have only a few questions to ask this

witness.

[_Turning to the witness._]

Witness, in your capacity as liaison officer of the Commander-in-Chief

of the Luftwaffe at the Führer’s headquarters you took part, as you have

already mentioned, in the discussions on the war situation. Did you also

take part in discussions on the war situation when front-line commanders

were making their reports to Hitler?

BODENSCHATZ: I personally did not take part in such discussions. At two

discussions, however, I was in the adjoining room, once when Field

Marshal Von Kleist was there for a conference, and the second time was

when the leader of the Crimea Army came to make a report after the

evacuation of the Crimea. I was, as I said, not actually present at

those conferences, but I heard, in the adjoining room, that there were

some differences of opinion between Hitler and the commander in question

as they were raising their voices. That is all I can say.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you hear enough to follow the trend of this

discussion?

BODENSCHATZ: No, I could not follow the trend nor the substance of these

discussions.

DR. LATERNSER: In that case I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions?

[_There was no response._]

Then does the Prosecution wish to ask any questions?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal.

[_Turning to the witness._] You are at the present time a prisoner of

war of the United States?

BODENSCHATZ: I beg your pardon. Could you please repeat the question. I

did not understand it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You are at the present time a prisoner of war of

the United States?

BODENSCHATZ: At the present time I am a prisoner of war of the United

States.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have been interrogated on a number of occasions

by representatives of the United States?

BODENSCHATZ: I was interrogated several times by representatives of the

United States.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have also had a number of consultations with

Dr. Stahmer who has just examined you?

BODENSCHATZ: I have had several discussions with Dr. Stahmer who has

just addressed questions to me.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Those questions were addressed to you some time ago

and you prepared your answers in writing?

BODENSCHATZ: Those questions were submitted to me beforehand and I was

able to prepare my answers.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Coming to the subject of the concentration camps

and the activities of your department in releasing persons from them—as

I understand, a large number of applications came to the Göring office

for release from concentration camps?

BODENSCHATZ: I stated before that the requests for release from

concentration camps did not come to my department but to the Staff

office. I received only the requests and complaints in which people

begged for help because they had been arrested, among them Jews who were

to be arrested.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And were those applications that did come to you

numerous?

BODENSCHATZ: My sector covered only the Luftwaffe. There were perhaps 10

to 20 such applications.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those applications were from persons who were

threatened with imprisonment, or had been imprisoned, or both?

BODENSCHATZ: Partly from people who were threatened with arrest and

partly from people who had already been arrested.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in each case, as I understand you, you

intervened to help them.

BODENSCHATZ: On the instructions of the Reich Marshal, I helped in all

cases that were submitted to me.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you know of any other cases that came to

the Staff in which help was not given to the imprisoned persons?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know anything about that. I only heard from Dr.

Gritzbach, Chief of Staff, that requests that came to him also were

settled in a humane way.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, were the persons that you intervened for

innocent of crime or were you helping out those who were guilty of

crime?

BODENSCHATZ: Those I helped were innocent people.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So it came to your notice that innocent people were

being put in concentration camps?

BODENSCHATZ: Could you please repeat that question.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It came to your notice that innocent people then

were being put in concentration camps?

BODENSCHATZ: Had not been put into concentration camps, but were

destined for them.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I thought you said you intervened for some who had

been arrested.

BODENSCHATZ: Yes; they were not taken to concentration camps. I will

give you a practical example. A comrade of mine, from the Richthofen

Squadron, a Jew by the name of Luther, was arrested by the Gestapo, that

is to say, he was not taken to a concentration camp, but first was

simply arrested by the Gestapo. His lawyer informed me. I informed the

Reich Marshal of this case, and the Reich Marshal instructed me to have

this man freed from his temporary custody by the Gestapo in Hamburg. He

was not yet in a concentration camp. So far as I know this case happened

in 1943.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was he charged with when he was arrested?

BODENSCHATZ: He was arrested because he was a Jew, and he had been told

that he had committed an offense against decency in that he had been

with an Aryan woman in a hotel.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you make any inquiries as to whether the

charge was true?

BODENSCHATZ: I did not have to make such inquiries because I had no

difficulty in obtaining his release. When I called up, he was released

and thereafter stayed under the protection of Hermann Göring.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whom did you call up to get his release?

BODENSCHATZ: The chief of the Gestapo office in Hamburg. I do not know

the name. I did not make the call myself but had it done by my

assistant, Ministerialrat Dr. Böttger.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that the Gestapo would release persons upon the

request of Hermann Göring?

BODENSCHATZ: Not from Hermann Göring’s office, but the Reich Marshal

gave instructions that it should be carried out, and it was carried out.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I thought you said your assistant called up. Did

Göring also call the Gestapo himself?

BODENSCHATZ: No, he did not call himself, not in this case.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that even though this man may have been guilty

of the charge, if he belonged to the Luftwaffe he was released, on the

word of the Reich Marshal?

BODENSCHATZ: He was not a member of the Luftwaffe, he was a civilian. He

had previously been one of our comrades in the Richthofen Squadron. He

was not in the Wehrmacht during the war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But your instructions were to release all persons

who were Jews or who were from the Luftwaffe? Were those your

instructions from Göring?

BODENSCHATZ: The Reich Marshal told me, again and again, that in such

cases I should act humanely, and I did so in every case.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did you find out that Jews were arrested

against whom there were no charges?

BODENSCHATZ: In one case, in the case of the two Ballin families in

Munich, these were two elderly married couples, more than 70 years old.

These two couples were to be arrested, and I was informed of this. I

told the Reich Marshal about it, and he told me that these two couples

should be taken to a foreign country. That was the case of the two

Ballin couples who, in 1923, when Hermann Göring was seriously wounded

in front of the Feldherrnhalle, and was taking refuge in a house,

received him and gave him help. These two families were to be arrested.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: For what?

BODENSCHATZ: They were to be arrested because there was a general order

that Jews should be taken to collection camps.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew of that order?

BODENSCHATZ: I did not know of the order. It was only through these

examples which were brought to my notice that it became clear to me that

this evacuation was to take place. I had never read the order myself nor

even heard of it, because I had nothing to do with it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It came to your attention that Jews were being

thrown into concentration camps merely because they were Jews?

BODENSCHATZ: In this case I am not speaking of concentration camps, but

it was ordered that people were to be brought to collection camps.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Not concentration camps, but special camps? Where

were they going from there?

BODENSCHATZ: That I do not know.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And where was this special camp that you speak of?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know where they were to be taken. I was told they

were to be taken away.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But neither you nor Göring had any suspicion that

if they were taken to concentration camps any harm would come to them,

did you?

BODENSCHATZ: I knew nothing about what took place in the concentration

camps.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now did you not hear about the concentration camps,

and was not the purpose of your saving these people from going to them,

that the people who went there were mistreated?

BODENSCHATZ: I must reiterate that I freed people from their first

arrest by the Gestapo that were not yet in the concentration camp.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What would the Gestapo take them into custody for,

if not the concentration camps?

BODENSCHATZ: What purpose the Gestapo was pursuing with these arrests I

do not know.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you intervened to save them from the Gestapo

without even finding out whether the Gestapo had cause for arresting

them?

BODENSCHATZ: If the Gestapo arrested any one, then they must have had

something against him.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you made no inquiry into that, did you?

BODENSCHATZ: I have already said it was generally known that these

people were taken to collection camps, not concentration camps. It was

known—many German people knew that they were to be taken away. They

knew that the people were taken to work camps, and in these work camps

they were put to work.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Forced labor?

BODENSCHATZ: It was just ordinary work. I knew, for instance, that in

Lodz the people worked in the textile industry.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And where were they kept while they were doing that

work?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say, for I do not know.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They were in a camp, were they not?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot tell you all that, for I do not know.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You would not know about that?

BODENSCHATZ: I have no idea.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What is the difference between a work camp and a

concentration camp? You have drawn that distinction.

BODENSCHATZ: A work camp is a camp in which people were housed without

their being in any way ill-treated.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And a concentration camp is where they are

ill-treated? Is that your testimony?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes. I can only tell you that now because in the meantime I

discovered it through the press and through my imprisonment. At that

time I did not know it. I learned it from the newspapers. I was a

prisoner of war in England for quite a while, and I read about it in the

English press.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You spoke of collection camps, that many people

knew they were being taken to collection camps to be taken away. Where

were they being taken away?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know where they went from there.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you ever inquire?

BODENSCHATZ: No, I never inquired.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were adjutant to the Number 2 man in Germany,

were you not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you never ventured to ask him about the

concentration camps?

BODENSCHATZ: No, I did not speak to him on that subject.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The only instruction you had was to get everybody

out that you could.

BODENSCHATZ: Where a request or a complaint was made, I followed those

cases down, and in those cases I assisted.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You knew that Hermann Göring was a close co-worker

with Himmler, did you not?

BODENSCHATZ: I did not know that he was a fellow worker with Himmler,

because he never worked with him directly. Himmler frequently came for

discussions with Hermann Göring, but these were private conversations

just between the two.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew that he was not only a friend, but

that he had aided Kaltenbrunner to his post when Kaltenbrunner came into

office, did you not?

BODENSCHATZ: No, that I did not know.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not know that?

BODENSCHATZ: I did not know that Reich Marshal Göring recommended

Kaltenbrunner for his office. My activity was confined simply to the

military sector. I was military adjutant to the Reich Marshal. I had

nothing to do with these matters.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you have anything to do with the procedure of

making full Aryans out of half-Jews?

BODENSCHATZ: On the question of mixed blood, requests concerning the

Luftwaffe came to me, and in fact, officers, according to the

regulations, would have to be dismissed if they were of mixed blood. In

many cases the Reich Marshal gave instructions that these officers

should not be dismissed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was done about it?

BODENSCHATZ: In these cases the chief of the personnel office was

instructed not to dismiss these officers.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in some cases some kind of an order was made,

was it not, that they were full Aryans, notwithstanding Jewish

parentage?

BODENSCHATZ: At the moment I can remember no such case.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You spoke of the requests for help from Göring

coming from broad masses of the people, and those requests were

submitted to his staff. Is that right?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was the head of that staff?

BODENSCHATZ: At the head of that staff stood the Chief of Staff, Dr.

Gritzbach.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How many assistants did he have?

BODENSCHATZ: There were three sections, a press section, with Dr. Gerner

in charge of that, and the private secretariat—there were three

sections.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And which of these sections handled the peoples’

requests for relief from arrest?

BODENSCHATZ: Dr. Gritzbach and Dr. Gerner were concerned with that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: To whom did they talk about these matters, do you

know?

BODENSCHATZ: These gentlemen, as well as myself, submitted these matters

to the Reich Marshal.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that he was kept fully informed of what you did

and of what they did?

BODENSCHATZ: Please repeat the question.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Reich Marshal was kept fully informed of these

applications to you and to the other sections?

BODENSCHATZ: He was informed by me.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, as I understand you, he never failed to give

his assistance to any one of the applications that was made to him, so

far as you know?

BODENSCHATZ: As regards requests addressed to my office or to me

personally he never refused assistance and actually help was always

given.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And never inquired into the guilt or innocence of

the person he was helping?

BODENSCHATZ: They were innocent; that was clearly established.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you were present on the 20th of July at the

bomb explosion, as I understand from your direct testimony?

BODENSCHATZ: On 20 July I was present at that meeting and stood very

near the bomb.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where was Hermann Göring on that day?

BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring was in his headquarters on that day, about

70 kilometers from the Führer’s headquarters.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Only 70 kilometers away; is that right? And at what

time were you instructed to represent him at that meeting?

BODENSCHATZ: I was not instructed to represent him at this meeting. I

took part in this conference, as in any other, as a listener. I had no

orders to represent Göring, to represent him in the Führer’s

headquarters. I was merely in the Führer’s headquarters to inform him of

what went on there.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You represented him to listen, but not to talk; is

that right?

BODENSCHATZ: I did not say very much during those years. I was simply a

listener and had to inform him as to what took place at the conference;

what would interest him in his capacity as Reich Marshal.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How far in advance of that meeting were you

instructed to attend?

BODENSCHATZ: At this meeting? On 20 July? On 19 July I was on a special

commission, sent to the Münster Camp to take part in the review of an

Italian division. On 20 July, at noon, I came by air to the Führer’s

headquarters, gave Hitler a military communication, and Hitler said to

me, “Come and discuss the situation.” I did not want to go, but I went

with him and after 15 minutes the attempted assassination took place.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who sent you with the message? Whose message was it

that you were delivering?

BODENSCHATZ: I was commissioned at that time by Reich Marshal Göring to

attend the review of the Italian division at the Münster Camp and to

tell Field Marshal Graziani that the men in that division were to be

used to command flak guns. After Field Marshal Graziani had declared

himself in disagreement with this, I was obliged to go to the Führer’s

headquarters by air. It had been proposed that I should go by

Mussolini’s special train which was in Münster, and on the night of 19

to 20 . . .

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Answer my question, Witness. Just answer the

question, please, and you will save us a great deal of time. Whose

messages were you carrying to the Führer?

BODENSCHATZ: I brought the message that Graziani was not disposed to

hand over these soldiers of the Italian division.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And before you started for the Führer’s

headquarters you communicated with Göring about it, did you not?

BODENSCHATZ: Before my departure, when I flew to Münster Camp—that was

a few days before—I spoke to him and when I returned, before reporting

to the Führer, I telephoned Hermann Göring in his headquarters and gave

him the same message.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did he instruct you to go to the Führer’s

headquarters at that time and give the message to the Führer?

BODENSCHATZ: This trip from Münster Camp I made on my own initiative

because it was important for Adolf Hitler to know of this information

before Mussolini, who was expected to arrive at the Führer’s

headquarters at 3 o’clock in the afternoon on 20 July. . . .

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As I understand you, Göring wanted a peaceful

outcome of the negotiations at Munich?

BODENSCHATZ: He said that to me several times.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he was highly pleased with the outcome that was

achieved there?

BODENSCHATZ: He was very pleased. I emphasized that before when I said

that when he came from the conference room, he said spontaneously, “That

means peace.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when you say that Göring wanted peace with

Poland, he also wanted that same kind of a peace, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Regarding peace with Poland, I did not speak to him.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he send someone or induce Hitler to take

someone to Munich in order to countercheck Ribbentrop?

BODENSCHATZ: All I know personally on this subject is this: Here, in

imprisonment, Captain Wiedemann told me that Hermann Göring had

expressed the wish that Von Neurath should be taken, and Wiedemann told

me that Hitler had granted that wish.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you were interrogated by the United States

about this subject before Wiedemann got here, were you not?

BODENSCHATZ: Before?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Before Wiedemann was brought here.

BODENSCHATZ: I was not interrogated on this subject—the Munich

Agreement and Von Neurath.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you interrogated on the 6th of November 1945,

and did you not then say that Göring used very harsh words about

Ribbentrop and asked Hitler to take Neurath to Munich with him in order

to have a representative present? Did you not say that to the

interrogators of the United States?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember at the moment. If that is in the record

then it must be so.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This meeting as to which you have—oh, by the way,

after Munich you know that Göring gave his word of honor to the Czechs

that there would be no further aggression against them, do you not?

BODENSCHATZ: Please repeat the question.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know that after Munich, when Göring was pleased

with the outcome, he gave his word of honor that there would be no

further aggression against the Czechs. Do you know that?

BODENSCHATZ: No, I did not know that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This meeting that took place in London, I mean the

meeting that took place when the Englishmen were present . . .

BODENSCHATZ: In Husum, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was the Swedish person who was present?

BODENSCHATZ: Herr Dahlerus was the Swede who was present.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who were the English who were present?

BODENSCHATZ: There were six to eight English economic experts. The names

I do not know.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And at that time—by the way, have you fixed the

time of that? What was the date?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say precisely. It was the beginning of August.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it not 7 August?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was Mr. Dahlerus there?

BODENSCHATZ: The question as to whether Dahlerus was there—I cannot

remember one hundred percent whether he was there. I know only that when

I spoke to my lawyer he said that Dahlerus was there, but I cannot swear

one hundred percent that he was there. I assumed he was, since the

Defense Counsel Dr. Stahmer told me that he was there. That was the

reason why I said previously that Hermann Göring and Dahlerus were

present at that meeting.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the subject under discussion was the Polish

relations with the German Reich?

BODENSCHATZ: Polish relations were not discussed, but relations between

England and Germany. There was no talk of relations with Poland.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Göring wanted the English gentlemen to see that

England did not attack Germany?

BODENSCHATZ: He did not express it quite that way. He said, as I have

already stated, the English gentlemen should, when they returned home,

work in the same way that he was working—for peace, and to make their

influence felt in important circles.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was that not said in connection with the

Polish negotiations that were then going on?

BODENSCHATZ: With the Polish negotiations? I cannot remember that any

mention was made of Polish negotiations.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you with Hermann Göring when the Polish war

broke out?

BODENSCHATZ: When the Polish war broke out I was in Berlin.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you still in your office under Hermann

Göring’s command?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I was at that time under Hermann Göring’s command.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did you first begin preparing for a movement

of your forces in the direction of Poland?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot make any definite statement on that subject; that

was a matter for the General Staff. I know only that during the period

before the outbreak of war the Chief of the General Staff several times

visited the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Hermann Göring, and

that such matters were discussed. I, myself, was not informed as to how

many forces were to be used in the Polish campaign.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you present at the conference in which Hermann

Göring stated that he, right after Munich, had orders to multiply the

Air Force by five?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot recall having been present at any such discussion.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know that the Air Force was greatly enlarged

after Munich?

BODENSCHATZ: No, I do not know that. The Air Force was augmented

according to plan. In this connection I can say for certain that the

German Air Force, at the beginning of the Polish campaign, as regards

leadership, planning, or material, was not equal to its task.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, would you like to adjourn now or

would you like to go on in order to finish?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This would be a convenient time. I am sure we

cannot finish before lunch hour.

THE PRESIDENT: You would like to adjourn now?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: We will have no open session tomorrow.

GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I want to say

a few words with respect to the statement of Defense Counsel Stahmer.

When speaking about the document concerning the German atrocities at

Katyn, Defense Counsel Stahmer stated that it was not in his possession.

I do not want to speak about the nature of this document. I want to

report to the Tribunal that on 13 February this document, as Exhibit

USSR-54—30 copies of it, all in the German language—was given to the

Document Room for the purposes of the Defense. We did not think that we

had to present the document to each Defense Counsel separately. We

considered that if the document were given to the Document Room, the

Defense would take the necessary steps concerning it. That is all I wish

to say on this matter.

DR. LATERNSER: There must be a misunderstanding about the number of this

document. It was submitted at that time in open session by the Russian

Prosecutor as Exhibit Number USSR-64. USSR-64 has not been distributed.

I have not received it, and upon request at Information Room of the

Defense, upon two requests, I have not been able to obtain it.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will inquire into the matter.

[_The witness Bodenschatz took the stand._]

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Previous to the spring of 1943, as I understand

you, Hermann Göring was a man of great influence in the councils of the

Reich?

BODENSCHATZ: Before the year 1943—that is, until the year 1943—Hermann

Göring always had access to the Führer, and his influence was important.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In fact, it was the most important in Germany

outside of the Führer himself, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Within the Reich he had great influence, very great

influence.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Air power was his special mission and his special

pride, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: As an old airman, he was very proud to be able to build up

and lead the Air Force.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He had more confidence in air power as a weapon of

war than most of the other men of his time, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: At any rate he was convinced that his Air Force was very

good. But I have to repeat what I said before, that at the beginning of

the war, in the year 1939, that stage had not been reached by the Air

Force. I repeat that at that time the Air Force was; as far as

leadership, training, and material were concerned, not ready for war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But ever since you first went with Hermann Göring

you had been rapidly building up the Air Force, had you not?

BODENSCHATZ: The building up of the Air Force went relatively fast.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when you first went with Göring—I have

forgotten what year you said that was.

BODENSCHATZ: I came to Hermann Göring in April 1933. At that time there

was no Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, but only a Reich

Commissariat for Aviation. But even at that time, the beginning of the

building up of the Air Force—the first beginnings—started. It was only

after 1935, however, when freedom from armament restriction was

declared, that it was speeded up.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the building up of the Air Force was very

largely in bombers, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: It was not mainly bombers; it was mixed, both fighters and

bombers.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring also had charge of the Four Year Plan?

BODENSCHATZ: He was commissioned by the Führer to carry out the Four

Year Plan.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He also held several other offices, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring, besides being Commander-in-Chief of the

Luftwaffe, was put in charge of the Four Year Plan. Before that, at the

beginning of the seizure of power, he was Minister of the Interior and

Prime Minister of Prussia, President of the Reichstag and

Reichsforstmeister.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I notice that you use here, as you have used in

your interrogations by the United States, the expression “seizure of

power.” That was the common expression used in your group, was it not,

to describe the coming to power of Adolf Hitler?

BODENSCHATZ: It cannot be used in this sense. At that time it was

completely legal because the National Socialist Party was then the

strongest party, and the strongest party nominated the Reich Chancellor,

and the strongest party had, as such, the greatest influence. It must

not be interpreted to mean that they usurped the power, but that they

had the most influential and prominent position among the parties, that

is, by the completely legal means of election.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You want to change the word “seizure”?

BODENSCHATZ: I have to change that. It is only an expression which was

common usage in the press at that time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring got along without any open break with Hitler

until 1945, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Until the year 1945 there was no open break. The arrest was

only quite at the end, as I have said before.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the arrest was the first open break that had

occurred between them, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, the first big break between the two which was apparent

to the public. But since the year 1943, as I have said before, there was

already a gradual estrangement in the attitude of the two men.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But that was kept from the public, was it not, kept

from the German people?

BODENSCHATZ: It was not so visible to the public. It was a development

which took place gradually from the spring of 1943 to 1945—first to a

small extent, and then the tension became greater and greater.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When the arrest was made it was made by the SS, was

it not?

BODENSCHATZ: I only heard that. It was said that in Obersalzberg a unit

of SS had arrived which arrested Hermann Göring in his small house and

confined him there. As to that, perhaps the witness who is going to

testify later, Colonel Brauchitsch, who was present at this arrest and

who was arrested himself, can give more details.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were not arrested by the SS?

BODENSCHATZ: At that time . . . since 20 July 1944, when I was seriously

injured, I had been in the hospital. I was close to Berchtesgaden, at

Bad Reichenhall, convalescing.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whenever there were conferences which you attended,

was it not the custom, at the conclusion of Hitler’s address to the

group, for Göring as the ranking man present, to assure the Führer on

behalf of himself and his fellow officers of their support of his plans?

BODENSCHATZ: Of course I was not present at all conferences. I only took

the part of listener. At these discussions, or shall we say conferences,

in which I took part, it happened from time to time that the Reich

Marshal made a remark at the end and gave assurance that the will of the

Führer would be carried out. But at the moment I cannot remember

specifically any such conference.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You cannot remember any conference at which he did

not do it either, can you?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes. It was not always done; on the contrary, he did not do

it as a rule. In the Reichstag Hermann Göring always made a concluding

speech, after a session had ended, expressing his confidence in Adolf

Hitler.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did he not do that at every meeting of officers

at which the Führer was present?

BODENSCHATZ: May I ask you to repeat the question? I have not quite

understood it. I beg you to excuse me, but I would like to mention that

owing to my injury I have lost 60 percent of my hearing, and therefore I

beg you to excuse me if I ask for repetitions. Please, repeat your

question.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Quite all right, Sir. Do you know of any conference

between Hitler and his High Command at which Göring did not close the

meeting, as the ranking officer present, by making assurances of support

to Hitler’s plans?

BODENSCHATZ: Some of the conferences I attended were concluded by a

declaration of that nature. There were, however, many conferences—in

fact most of the conferences—when nothing further was said at the end.

When the Führer had finished his speech, the meeting was ended.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In 1943, when Göring began to lose influence with

Hitler, it was a very embarrassing time for Göring, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring suffered from this fact. He often told me

that he would suffer very much on that account.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From the fact that the Führer was losing confidence

in him?

BODENSCHATZ: What was that?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was suffering from the fact that the Führer was

losing confidence in him? Was that what was causing his suffering?

BODENSCHATZ: That may have been part of the reason, but differences of

opinion arose about the Luftwaffe.

MR. JUSTICE. JACKSON: Now, in the spring of 1943 it was apparent to you

and apparent to him that the war was lost for Germany, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say that. The Reich Marshal did not tell me in

1943 that the war was lost, but that there were great difficulties, that

it would become very dangerous; but that the war was definitely lost—I

cannot remember that the Reich Marshal at that time, in the spring of

1943, made a statement to me of that kind, or a similar one.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Reich Marshal had given his assurance to the

German people, had he not, that it would not be possible for them to be

bombed, as Warsaw, Rotterdam, and other cities were bombed?

BODENSCHATZ: As far as I know, he did not give the assurance in those

words. Before the war, when our Air Force was growing—I mean at the

beginning of the war, when the great successes in Poland and in France

were manifest—he said to the German people that the Air Force would do

its job and do everything to spare the country from heavy air raids. At

the time that was justified. It was not clearly foreseen then that

matters would develop differently later.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then he had given his assurance to the German

people, had he not, that the Luftwaffe would be able to keep enemy

bombers away from Germany?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember that he gave an official assurance to the

German people in the form of a decree or a big speech. At times it was

said that the German Air Force, after the successes in Poland and

France, was at its peak. I do not know of any official statement whereby

it was made known to the German people.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At all events, it became apparent in the spring of

1943 that any such assurance, if it had been given, was misleading?

BODENSCHATZ: In the year 1943 the conditions were entirely different,

owing to the fact that the British and American Air Forces came into the

picture in such large and overwhelming numbers.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was also true that the air defenses of

Germany were proving entirely inadequate to cope with the situation; is

that not a fact?

BODENSCHATZ: The air defense of Germany was very difficult, as the

entire defense did not depend on the air crews alone, but it was also a

radio-technical war, and in this radio-technical war, it must be

admitted frankly, the enemy was essentially better than we were.

Therefore it was not only a war in the air, but if was also a radio war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It had become apparent that Germany could not cope

with it—is that not a fact?—by 1943.

BODENSCHATZ: In the year 1943 it was not yet a hundred percent clear.

There were fluctuations, low and high points. Efforts were made to

increase the fighter strength at the expense of the bombers. It was not

one hundred percent obvious that the enemy air force could not be

opposed successfully. That became obvious only after the middle of 1944.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Führer lost confidence in Göring as the bombing

of German cities progressed, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, indeed, from the moment the British Air Force started

with their large-scale attacks on German cities, particularly when the

first heavy British air attack on Cologne took place. From that moment

it was obvious that differences of opinion, at first not too serious,

were arising between the two men.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Hitler accused Göring, did he not, of

misleading him as to the strength of the air defenses of Germany?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know that the Führer ever accused the Reich

Marshal of any offense in this respect. Discussions between Adolf Hitler

and the Reich Marshal were, in spite of all tension, always very

moderate. The criticism is said to have become more vehement only later,

in 1944 and the beginning of 1945. But I was not present, because I had

been off duty since 20 July 1944.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you a question. I did not intend to imply

that the Führer accused him of an intentional misstatement, but he had

misled him or he had misunderstood the strength of Germany’s air

defenses. Was that not generally understood in your circle?

BODENSCHATZ: There could be no question of misleading. The reports which

the Air Force made to the Führer were always correct. The weaknesses of

the Air Force were also reported to the Führer.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What were the efforts that were made by Göring,

which you refer to as tremendous efforts, to recapture his influence

with the Führer?

BODENSCHATZ: The Reich Marshal, whenever there were conferences, asked

through me that he might participate. The Reich Marshal came more

frequently than usual to the Führer’s headquarters, and he also said to

me, “I will try everything to regain the right contact with the Führer.”

He said that personally to me.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he was particularly careful after the spring of

1944 not to do anything that would offend the Führer?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say anything more about the year 1944, because

then I was no longer active. I had no further contact.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this bombing of German cities had become very

troublesome from the point of view of the German people’s criticism of

the government, had it not, in 1944?

BODENSCHATZ: The German people suffered terribly under these bombing

attacks, and I can only say one thing—that Adolf Hitler suffered most

from them. When at night the bombing of a German city was reported, he

was really deeply moved, and likewise the Reich Marshal, because the

horror of such a bombing was indescribable. I have experienced a few

such bombings in Berlin myself, and whoever has lived through that, will

never forget it as long as he lives.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And this was all becoming very embarrassing to

Hitler and to the Reich Marshal, was it not, to explain to the German

people why this was going on?

BODENSCHATZ: That did not have to be explained, because the German

people felt it. No explanation was given. It was only said that all

possible measures would be taken to master this peril.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew at that time, and the Reich Marshal

knew, that no measures could be taken that would prevent it?

BODENSCHATZ: No, no, no. I emphasized before that it was a

radio-technical war, and there were moments when, in the defense, we

could counter the measures of the enemy while constantly discovering a

new means to hit him.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you made the announcement to the German people

that all means would be taken, you had then no means at your disposal,

that you knew of, to use, did you, to prevent the bombing of the German

cities?

BODENSCHATZ: Oh yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What were they, and why were they not used?

BODENSCHATZ: There were, for example, the following means: The most

important areas were protected by anti-aircraft guns. Then there were

radio-technical means, jamming transmitters, which would have made it

possible, and which partly did make it possible, to jam the radio sets

in the enemy aircraft.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The movement to satisfy the German people under the

bombing attacks was a matter of great concern to the Reich Marshal, was

it not?

BODENSCHATZ: The Reich Marshal was very anxious that the population

should be informed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And see that the population was satisfied, was he

not?

BODENSCHATZ: It is easy to say “satisfied.” He could only assure the

German people that he would do everything in his power to master these

attacks.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, have you seen the Reich Marshal and Hitler

when the reports came in of the bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam and of

Coventry?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember whether I was present when the reports

came.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never saw any such reactions on their part on

those bombings, I take it?

BODENSCHATZ: I only know that Warsaw was a fortress which was held by

the Polish Army in very great strength, provided with excellent pieces

of artillery, that the forts were manned, and that two or three times

Adolf Hitler announced that civilians should be evacuated from the city.

That was rejected. Only the foreign embassies were evacuated, while an

officer with a flag of truce entered. The Polish Army was in the city

defending it stubbornly in a very dense circle of forts. The outer forts

were very strongly manned, and from the inner town heavy artillery was

firing towards the outskirts. The fortress of Warsaw was therefore

attacked, and also by the Luftwaffe, but only after Hitler’s ultimatum

had been rejected.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was Coventry a fortified city?

BODENSCHATZ: Coventry was no fortress. Coventry, however, was a city

which housed the key industry of the enemy air force, in which the

aircraft engines were built, a city in which, as far as I know, many

factories were situated and many parts of these aircraft engines were

manufactured. In any case, the Luftwaffe had at that time received

orders to bomb only the industrial targets. If the city also suffered,

it is understandable, considering the means of navigation at that time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were interrogated in November of 1945, were you

not, by Colonel Williams?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I was interrogated.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Colonel Williams asked you about certain

fictitious incidents along the German-Polish border late in August of

1939, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, he asked me about that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And would you care to tell the Tribunal what you

know about the fictitious incidents along the Polish border?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know anything positive. I was asked by Colonel

Williams whether I knew in advance about the incident of the Gleiwitz

broadcasting section. I told him I knew nothing about it. It was only

that the incidents on the Polish border were very similar to those which

happened on the Czech border. It may have been presumed—that was only

my opinion—that they were perhaps deliberate. But I had no positive

proof that anything had been staged on our part.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you tell him on the 6th of November 1945, as

follows:

“I heard about it, but I personally at that time had the feeling

that all these provocations that had taken place had originated

from our side, from the German side. As I said, I had no real

proofs of that, but I always had that feeling.”

Did you not say that?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I said that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that you had talked with people about this,

from whom you got that feeling. Is that right?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember that very well now. I only know that the

reports in the press gave me that suspicion.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were asked, were you not, this question and

gave this answer:

“Question: But you are of the opinion that what appeared in the

press and these incidents that were reported were not true, but

done merely to cause an incident as an excuse for an invasion?”

And did you not make this answer:

“I had that feeling. I cannot prove it, but I definitely know I

had a feeling that the whole thing was being engineered by us.”

Did you not make that answer to that question?

BODENSCHATZ: The minutes will show it. If it is in the minutes, I said

it. At the moment I cannot remember the exact words.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not deny the fact, however?

BODENSCHATZ: I had that feeling, but it was a purely subjective opinion.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it was your opinion?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now then, I ask you whether you were not

interrogated about the Führer’s desire to make war on Poland, and

whether you did not give this answer:

“Gentlemen, this question is very hard to answer, but I can

state under my oath that the Führer actually wanted the war

against Poland. I can prove that he actually wanted a war of

aggression against Poland by the circle surrounding the Führer

and the remarks that were made. I was present during the night

when Hitler gave Henderson his conditions that he wanted Danzig,

and I concluded from all the conferences that the Führer had

with the Ambassador—I had the impression that the Führer did

not really want the Poles to accept those conditions.”

And I ask you if you made those answers to Colonel Williams?

BODENSCHATZ: I can make the following answer to that:

I was not present at the conference. If I said that, I did not express

myself correctly. I was not at the conference that the Führer had with

Henderson, but I was standing in the anterooms with the other adjutants,

and outside in the anteroom one could hear the various groups, some

saying one thing, some another. From these conversations I gather that

the conditions which Henderson received for the Poles in the evening

were such, and that the time limit for answering these questions—which

was noon of the next day—was so short, that one could conclude there

was a certain intention behind it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, that is the impression that you received from

being in the anteroom and talking with the people who were about Hitler

that night?

BODENSCHATZ: There were adjutants, the Reich Press Chief, and the

gentlemen who were waiting in the anteroom without taking part in the

conference.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask you, in order to make this very clear,

one more question about your interrogation on that subject. Were you not

asked this question:

“Then we can summarize your testimony this morning by saying

that you knew in 1938, several months before Germany attacked

Poland, that Hitler fully intended to attack Poland and wage an

aggressive war against her; is that right?”

And did you not make this answer:

“I can only say this with certainty that from the night when he

told Henderson that he wanted Danzig and the Corridor, from that

moment, I was sure Hitler intended to wage an aggressive war.”

Were you asked that question, and did you make that answer?

BODENSCHATZ: If it is in the minutes, I said it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, if it were not in the minutes, it would still

be your testimony now, would it not? It is a fact, is it not?

BODENSCHATZ: My definition is precisely this: From the handing over of

Adolf Hitler’s demands to Henderson and from the short time that

Henderson was granted, I conclude that there was a certain intention.

That is how I should like to define it precisely now.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask that you be shown Document Number L-79,

United States exhibit in evidence, Number USA-27. You have seen that

before, witness?

BODENSCHATZ: A copy of this document was shown to me by Colonel

Williams, and I told him that I myself could not remember having been

present. But if my name is on the minutes, then I was there.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But your name is on the document, is it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Then I was there. I cannot remember the subject of this

conference. I told Colonel Williams that that must have been discussed

because Colonel Schmundt, whose handwriting I know—I was shown a

copy—I told him that Colonel Schmundt was a man who was very

conscientious in making his notes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all in his handwriting?

BODENSCHATZ: That is it as I see it here.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is signed by Colonel Schmundt?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, it is signed by Colonel Schmundt—Lieutenant Colonel

Schmundt. The corrections are not in his handwriting.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the body of the document is his handwriting?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, that is his own handwriting. I know it; yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when you were asked about that by Colonel

Williams, you took time to read it, and then you said, did you not: “I

think that the thoughts are right as they are expressed here; these are

the thoughts that the Führer usually voiced to us in a small circle.”

You made that statement?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I did say that, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you said: “I cannot remember whether these

things were expressed on that day. However, it is possible that the

thoughts which are put down here are the thoughts of Adolf Hitler.” You

said that to Colonel Williams, did you not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I said that to Colonel Williams.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all I care to ask about that, Sir.

I now ask to have shown to you the original exhibit, Document Number

798-PS, Exhibit USA-29 in evidence.

BODENSCHATZ: As far as I know, a copy of this speech by the Führer was

also shown to me by Colonel Williams.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right. You said, did you not, that you did

not recall whether you were present but that the thoughts that were

expressed . . .

BODENSCHATZ: The thoughts expressed there are correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They are correct. That is all about that.

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, but I must say one more thing. I tried to speak to

Colonel Williams again and could not reach him. Probably I attended this

meeting.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we will take that statement now and excuse

you from looking for Colonel Williams.

I ask to have shown to you Document 3474-PS, United States exhibit in

evidence, Number USA-580. Is that your handwriting?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, that is my handwriting.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And signed by you?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is a note of a conference of the 2d day of

December 1936, is it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You prepared this memorandum for your files; is

that right?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know to whom I gave this.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it says the notes for the files on that

discussion; is that correct?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, that is a note for the files.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring was present at that conference; is that

correct?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes. He must have conducted it. It states here, “Present:

Generaloberst Göring.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In fact, the note says he conducted it does it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there were also present Milch, Kesselring, and

all of the others who are named in the list at the head of the note.

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you then recorded that Göring told—oh, by the

way, all of those men were men connected with the Armed Forces of

Germany, were they not?

BODENSCHATZ: Those were all men from the Air Force, the leading men at

the time. General Milch was concerned with armament; Lieutenant General

Kesselring was, I believe, Chief of Staff; they were all officers who

were in leading positions.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All concerned with the Air Force you say. And this

meeting was held on the 2d of December 1936. Are we correct about that?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then Göring opened the conference by saying: “The

press all over the world is excited about the landing of 5,000 German

volunteers in Spain. Great Britain protests officially and takes up the

matter with France.” Refreshing your recollection, that is what

occurred, is it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then Göring said, “The general situation is very

serious,” and that he took full responsibility, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes. The general situation was very serious. England was

rearming intensively, and a state of readiness was desired.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, he next said, did he not, “Silence until 1941

is desirable. However, we cannot know whether there will be implications

before. We are already in a state of war. It is only that no shot is

being fired so far.” Did he say that?

BODENSCHATZ: That is recorded in these minutes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he also said, did he not, that “beginning 1

January 1937, all factories for aircraft production shall run as if

mobilization had been ordered.”

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it is there in the text, is it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, it is contained here in the minutes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you have testified that Göring had no prior

knowledge of the action taken against the Jews on the night of November

9th and 10th of 1938.

BODENSCHATZ: I gathered that from the fact that on the next day he came

to me and was very dismayed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was informed about them the next day?

BODENSCHATZ: The next day that was in the press, in the newspapers.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You said that he complained about the people who

instigated them?

BODENSCHATZ: That I was told by Captain Wiedemann, who was here with me

in captivity. He told me that a few days later Hermann Göring came to

the Führer with proof and complained about what had occurred.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whom did he complain about?

BODENSCHATZ: He did not tell me that. Wiedemann told me that Göring

complained about Heydrich and Goebbels.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I did not get that answer.

BODENSCHATZ: Wiedemann told me—this I did not learn myself from Hermann

Göring, but Wiedemann told me he had complained about the instigators,

and that the instigators were Heydrich and Goebbels.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Heydrich and Goebbels were both officials in

Hitler’s regime, were they not?

BODENSCHATZ: Dr. Goebbels was Reich Minister of Propaganda, and Heydrich

was Chief of the Gestapo.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So, immediately following these pogroms Göring knew

and complained to Hitler that they had been incited by officials of the

Nazi regime?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know the details as to what he said there. Captain

Wiedemann knows about that and can testify to it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring was then at the height of his influence,

both with the Führer and with the country, was he not?

BODENSCHATZ: He had at that time the greatest influence.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I understand you to say that he immediately

called a meeting of Gauleiter?

BODENSCHATZ: The meeting of Gauleiter was a few weeks later. I heard

about it from the former Gauleiter of Styria, Dr. Uiberreither, who is

imprisoned here with me. This Gauleiter Uiberreither took part in that

meeting.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How long did he wait before he called the meeting?

BODENSCHATZ: Dr. Uiberreither told me that it was a few weeks

afterwards.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, did you know about his holding a meeting on

the 12th of November 1938 at his offices in the Reich Ministry for

Aviation?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you remember that he had present at that

meeting Heydrich, Goebbels, and many others? Is that the meeting to

which you refer?

BODENSCHATZ: In this case it might be necessary to ask Dr. Uiberreither

who was at that meeting. He told me that Dr. Goebbels was present as

well as the Gauleiter.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was the custom of Göring to keep minutes of

the meetings that he conducted?

BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring always had stenographers present, and these

stenographers took minutes of such meetings.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you want us to understand that Göring was

shocked and offended by what had happened to the Jews on the nights of

the 9th and the 10th of November 1938?

BODENSCHATZ: He did not agree with it because, as I mentioned

previously, he said it would be a great wrong; it would be unreasonable

economically, and it would harm our prestige abroad. I was told by Dr.

Uiberreither that Göring had spoken in these terms to the Gauleiter.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it known to you that on November the 12th, 2

days after those pogroms, Göring promulgated the order fining all of the

Jews a billion Reichsmark, confiscated their insurance, and passed a new

decree excluding them from economic life? Did you know about that?

BODENSCHATZ: I have heard of it, but I personally had nothing to do with

the idea and with this decree, as I was only the military adjutant.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: These decrees were promulgated 2 days after this

pogrom that you say he complained about, is that right?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know the connection.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the

United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, I have only one matter

which I want to make clear.

You have referred to a meeting which took place in Schleswig-Holstein in

July or August of 1939, at which Göring met a number of Englishmen, and

you described those Englishmen, the first time you mentioned them, as

members of the government, and the second time you mentioned them—I

think you mentioned them as economic specialists?

BODENSCHATZ: So far as I know now, they were English leading men in

economics, not members of the government.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am obliged to you. Would it be correct to say

that they were leading industrial and business gentlemen with no

connection with the government whatsoever?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know to what degree these gentlemen were

influential. At any rate, Hermann Göring asked at the end that the

gentlemen should exert their influence on the authorities in England in

the interests of peace.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you know that that conference between Göring

and those gentlemen took place at the instigation of Dahlerus?

BODENSCHATZ: Dahlerus is said to have brought about this meeting, but I

first learned of that in a conversation with Defense Counsel Dr.

Stahmer, who discussed the matter with me. Doctor Stahmer said he knew

that Mr. Dahlerus had asked these gentlemen to come to Germany. It is

only on the basis of this information that I assume Dahlerus asked these

gentlemen to come.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And do you know that it was the object of Mr.

Dahlerus that leading German and English personalities should meet, in

order that they should understand one another’s points of view?

BODENSCHATZ: Mr. Dahlerus later . . . he was again in Berlin after that

meeting. On that occasion I met him in Berlin, and in conversations with

him there I gained the impression that he was greatly interested in

peace being maintained between Germany and England, and that he,

assisted by Reich Marshal Göring, tried to establish this connection

with influential British circles.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: One last question to you. Do you know that, in

arranging that meeting and throughout the course of the negotiations

thereafter, Dahlerus stressed the British point of view to Göring and in

particular tried to impress Göring with the fact that the English were

losing their patience with the policy of aggression being pursued by the

German Government?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember having discussed with Dahlerus this line

of thought which you mention now.

THE PRESIDENT: Any other questions to ask?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No.

DR. STAHMER: I have only one more question.

[_Turning to the witness._] In the minutes of 2 December 1936, which

were shown to you before and which you have before you, there is one

paragraph which has not been read entirely. In my opinion it is very

important for the interpretation and for the purpose and meaning of that

meeting.

It says there:

“The general situation is very serious. Russia wants war.

England is rearming strongly. Therefore, the order is: ‘From

today on, highest degree of readiness, no consideration for

financial difficulties. Generaloberst assumes full

responsibility.’”

Was this order, “highest degree of readiness from today on,” issued

merely because Russia, as it says here, wants war and England is

rearming strongly? Was that the motive?

BODENSCHATZ: What do you mean?

DR. STAHMER: Was the gravity of the general situation the motive for the

order, “highest degree of readiness from today on”?

BODENSCHATZ: At any rate, there was no intention of attack involved, but

a measure for defense.

DR. STAHMER: If it says here “Generaloberst assumes full

responsibility,” could that be understood to refer to the words “no

consideration for financial difficulties” which would be a permissible

literal interpretation?

BODENSCHATZ: That refers to financial difficulties, because the Reich

Marshal had frequent controversies on that point with the Reich Finance

Minister because the Luftwaffe had slightly exceeded its budget.

DR. STAHMER: Thank you. I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.

[_The witness left the stand._]

DR. STAHMER: I should like to call as the next witness General Field

Marshal Milch.

[_The witness Milch took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

ERHARD MILCH (Witness): Erhard Milch.

THE PRESIDENT: Repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty

and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and

add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, did you take part in the first World War?

MILCH: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: In what position?

MILCH: First I was an artillery officer and at the end a captain in the

Air Corps.

DR. STAHMER: When did you leave the Army after the end of the first

World War?

MILCH: In the spring of 1920.

DR. STAHMER: What were your activities after you left the Army?

MILCH: I went into civil aviation.

DR. STAHMER: When did you join the Wehrmacht again?