POLITICAL REFLECTIONS.
In the foregoing chapters I have endeavoured to describe the present
condition of Cyprus, exhibiting the actual resources of the island,
together with the numerous disadvantages resulting from a peculiarity of
climate, and the total neglect of all public works during the Ottoman
rule of three centuries. It will be remarked that nothing of value
exists beyond the agricultural productions, which are now precarious
through the uncertainty of seasons; the metallic wealth has either been
exhausted by the ancient miners, or it remains to be developed; the
forests have been destroyed; the harbours have been clogged by silt; the
communications are confined to pack animals in the general absence of
roads and bridges. Yet, notwithstanding this neglected condition of
the island, the revenue has yielded an average of about 200,000 pounds
annually, or as nearly as possible one pound sterling per head of the
entire population.
An increase of revenue can only result from a corresponding advance in
material prosperity, which must depend upon an influx of capital that
will develop the agricultural resources upon which Cyprus will mainly
depend. There are some few collateral profits that may perhaps increase,
such as the sponge fisheries, and a probable discovery of red coral by
the employment of the helmet-diving apparatus. At present the condition
of the sea-bottom is little known; the sponges, of an inferior-quality,
are collected by dredging, and the boats pay a fixed sum for a licence
according to the size and construction of the dredging apparatus,
varying from 5 to 20 pounds per annum; this yields a small annual
revenue of about 1600 pounds, which embraces the entire coast of Cyprus.
By careful management the salt might exhibit an increase, but on the
other hand, the wine, if relieved from the present extreme taxation,
would for the first two or three years ensure a considerable reduction.
No increase of imports can be expected until the general advance of
internal prosperity shall enable the population to extend their demand
for foreign manufactures. We have seen that the peasantry are contented
with the home-made cotton stuffs which they produce without an
expenditure of money; and the habits of the agricultural classes are
simple, and independent of external aid. It will require many years
before the customs of the Cypriotes shall be changed by the intercourse
with strangers, and the increase of their wealth, commencing from the
zero of poverty, must be the base of future expectations. We generally
remark in the advancing desires of communities that women exert a
powerful influence in the development of manufactures. The wholesome,
and to a certain extent civilising, attention to personal appearance,
creates a demand for articles of dress and other little vanities which
encourage trade, and by degrees the improvement in every household
expands into a new birth of external relations with foreign countries,
which induces an increase of imports. The women of Cyprus are completely
subjugated to their husbands, and although exempt from the cruelty
unfortunately so prevalent among a similar class in England, they are
seldom indulged in the love of finery which in our own country is
carried to an excess. The baggy trousers and the high hob-nailed boots
of the Cyprian Venus will hardly excite the ambition of British
manufacturers, and for many years the females will remain in their
present position. There are already soap manufactories in the island,
and the first groundwork for improvements in personal habits will be
ensured by their extension, before the exterior fineries of more
civilised communities shall be introduced. We may therefore omit the
Cyprian female from the class that would benefit the island
commercially, but she will perform her duty in a sensible and simple
manner as a good housewife, and thereby assist in the prosperity of her
husband the agriculturist. The more pains that we may bestow upon an
examination of the resources of Cyprus, the more certain becomes the
conclusion that the present and the future depend entirely upon
agricultural development.
This fact is patent to all who can pretend to a knowledge of the island,
and the question will naturally intrude, "Was Cyprus occupied for
agricultural purposes?" Of course we know it was not: but on the other
hand, if we acknowledge the truth, "that it was accepted as a
strategical military point," it is highly desirable that the country
should be self-supporting, instead of, like Malta and Gibraltar, mainly
dependent upon external supplies.
If Cyprus belonged to England or any other Power, it would be a valuable
acquisition. We have seen that under the Turkish administration it was a
small mine of wealth, and remains in the same position to its recent
masters.
We pay 96,000 pounds sterling per annum to the Turks, out of an assumed
revenue of 170,000 pounds. Therefore, without any trouble or risk, the
Turk is receiving 3.25 per cent. interest upon three millions. This
establishes an unfortunate precedent in the valuation of the island
should England eventually become a purchaser.
If Cyprus can, without undue taxation, afford a revenue of 170,000
pounds, it is palpable that a large margin would be available for those
absolutely necessary public works--irrigation, the control of the Pedias
river, road-making, harbour-works, bridges, extension of forests and
guardians, and a host of minor improvements, such as district schools
for the teaching of English, &c. &c. In fact, if we held Cyprus without
purchase as a conquered country, such as Ceylon, Mauritius, or other of
our colonies, it would occupy the extraordinary position of a colony
that could advance and pay its way entirely by its own surplus revenue,
without a public loan! This is a fact of great importance--that, in
spite of the usual Turkish mal-administration, the island has no debt,
but that England has acknowledged the success of the Turkish rule by
paying 96,000 pounds per annum as the accepted surplus revenue of this
misgoverned island!--which holds upon these data a better financial
condition than any of our own colonies.
If the total gross revenue is 170,000 pounds a year, and we can afford
to pay 96,000 pounds to the Porte, and at the same time allow the home
government to boast in the House of Commons of "a surplus," Cyprus is
one of the most lucrative positions, and the Turks can fairly claim a
success instead of admitting the blame of mal-administration.
If the Turks by mismanagement can obtain a nett revenue of 96,000 pounds
a year, how much should England obtain by good management?
The fact is that, as usual, the English government has been hoodwinked
in their hasty bargain. The island can pay its way, and, if free from
Turkey, would become most prosperous; but we have inherited an estate so
heavily mortgaged by our foolish Convention, that the revenue is all
absorbed in interest, which leaves nothing for the necessities of
development. The commissioners of districts are over-worked and
ill-paid, their allowance of interpreters is quite insufficient to
secure the necessary check; and their position is incompatible with the
importance of their official status. There is no money for any
improvements, and the boasted surplus will just suffice for the payment
of salaries and the absolutely necessary items of carrying on a
government more in accordance with the position of Greece or Denmark
than with the historical reputation of Great Britain.
This financial embarrassment has disappointed the expectations of the
inhabitants, who naturally had anticipated brilliant advantages from the
reform between Turkish and English administrations. My own opinion may
be valueless, but it is shared by many; Cyprus should belong absolutely
to England, or we should have nothing to do with it. I repeat the dictum
expressed in the introduction; if England is the ally of Turkey and she
can depend upon the integrity of that defensive alliance against Russia,
there is no need for any station that incurs the obligations of Cyprus;
all the Turkish ports would be open to our ships. The occupation of
Cyprus would therefore suggest that a far-seeing government had doubted
the integrity of Turkey, and had therefore determined to secure a
pied-a-terre in a strategical position that would command the east of
the Mediterranean. Upon this point opinions will again differ, and I
quote the words of one of the most experienced statesmen and an
ex-minister of the Upper House, who writes:--
"The objections to Cyprus as a military and naval station are shortly
these. It will oblige us to establish a garrison, and therefore to
increase and divide our forces in the Mediterranean. There must be
barracks, hospitals, store-houses, &c. After all this expenditure Cyprus
will weaken rather than strengthen our power.
"Famagousta may be made a good harbour; but how can it be defended? The
ships will not be, as in Malta, defended by batteries projecting far
beyond the anchorage; Famagousta will require ships of war to defend it,
or batteries constructed on the breakwater--a most costly undertaking.
As a coaling-station it is not wanted, because colliers accompanying the
fleet are much more convenient. If, in short, we are supreme at sea,
Cyprus is not wanted; if we are not supreme, Cyprus will be an
incumbrance."
I acknowledge the force of a portion of the argument, and no one can
more highly respect the distinguished authority I have quoted, who, as
an ex-First Lord of the Admiralty of practical experience, must carry
the great weight of his ability and position; but I would suggest that
Famagousta is underrated. I have already described that powerful
fortress, and in its present condition, if mounted with forty-ton guns
upon the sea-face, I doubt the possibility of an attack from seaward.
The natural reefs which form the sea-wall afford the greatest facilities
for batteries a-fleur-d'eau, as their solid foundations require the
simple levelling of cement, and a facing of steel plates would complete
an impregnable line of casemates that would render the approach by sea
impossible.
The advantages of attendant colliers is great as a continuous
coal-supply to a fleet, especially during the blockade of an enemy's
port; but for a cruising fleet, or for independent vessels, the speed of
the colliers would be insufficient, and a line of coaling-stations, at
intervals of five days' steaming is in my opinion highly important, in
addition to the necessity of docks where ironclad vessels could obtain
the necessary repairs after a naval engagement. It is a serious result
of modern improvements that the cumbrous and complicated ironclads
cannot be repaired in a few days after an action with the enemy by their
own carpenters and crews, like the wooden vessels of old, but that docks
must be within reach, and all the appliances of the engineers' yards and
an arsenal. Without this advantage, Famagousta would be a useless
acquisition, and Cyprus would be worthless as a strategical position.
In my opinion the entire question hangs upon the integrity of Turkey as
an ally. England has done but little for her, and we may expect too
much. The Turks are thoroughly aware that an Anglo-Turkish defensive
alliance, and the "Protectorate of Asia Minor by Great Britain," are
political arrangements based upon self-interest, for which they owe us
no personal gratitude; in the hour of their distress we declined
material assistance, but seized the opportunity for occupying one of
their important positions--Cyprus; their only satisfaction remained in
the knowledge that they had "done us" in the bargain. We have quickly
discovered the painful fact, and one party to the alliance already feels
aggrieved, and seeks for an alteration in the terms of the Convention.
I cannot conceive any more dangerous risk to friendships than an
interference in the private affairs of individuals, or in the public
administration of governments. We have assumed the enormous
responsibility of the Protectorate of Asia Minor under conditions which
we must know will never be fulfilled; Turkey promises to reform the
abuses of her internal administration, &c. &c.! Anybody who knows Turkey
must be aware that such a reform is impossible: the honest
administrative material does not exist in the Ottoman Empire, and the
promises of the Porte have been tolerably exemplified since the Crimean
war. Under these circumstances the Anglo-Turkish alliance is in a
questionable position. We have assumed the Protectorate of Asia Minor
conditionally; we occupy Cyprus conditionally; and should Turkey fail to
perform her promises in the government of her Asiatic provinces, we have
a back-door for an escape from our onerous engagement. Unfortunately
English diplomacy is celebrated for back-doors. In the Berlin Treaty we
entered Cyprus through a back-door, and we may possibly retire by the
same exit; but there is little doubt that the Turk does not believe in
our professed determination to defend him by force of arms in the event
of a future conflict between Russia and the Sultan in Asia Minor.
Notwithstanding our professed sincerity, the Turk has become an
unbeliever in the faith of treaties and political engagements; he
believes most thoroughly that should "British interests" require the
sacrifice of honour, England will somehow or other manage to slip
through the Ottoman fingers, and escape from her alliance when called
upon to meet Russia in the field. Of course the ignorant Turk is wrong,
and his suspicions are unfounded.
With a mutual want of confidence in the integrity of an alliance, it
would hardly be surprising should the Sultan attach more importance to
the practical force of Russia than to the moral rectitude and high
political principles of England. The power of Russia has been felt, and
the position of European Turkey is that of a dislocated and dismembered
Empire, which upon the next explosion will reduce the Sultan to the
small extremity on the Bosphorus between Constantinople and the lines of
Tchataldja. Turkey will cease to be a European Power, and upon the
outbreak of the next Russian war she will be discovered as represented
by Asia Minor, in which the claws of the Eagle are already fixed in the
vital points--Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan. A Russian advance from those
positions will, according to the terms of the alliance, compel Great
Britain to exhibit herself as the champion of Turkish rights in armed
defence of Asia Minor.
When we reflect upon the prodigious responsibility of such an alliance
with a crippled Power that has been completely subdued, the victorious
army of the Czar retired from the gates of the capital, the nation
bankrupt beyond all hopes of liquidation, the various states in chronic
discontent both in Europe and in Asia, and the claims of Greece
threatening to explode the combustible materials, we may well appreciate
the back-door that has so frequently afforded a retreat from an
untenable position.
If it is necessary for England to form a defensive alliance with Turkey
as a crippled Power, with Russia actually established in Asia Minor, why
should we have waited until Turkey was mortally stricken, when by an
earlier alliance we could have at least saved Asia Minor in its
integrity? We have let the lion into the house with a boast that we will
turn him out in the event of further roaring, instead of having
prevented his entry in the first instance.
Under all the circumstances of the risk and responsibility assumed by
England in a defensive alliance with Turkey under the title of a
Protectorate of Asia Minor, the Cyprus Convention is highly unfavourable
in its conditions. The island should have been simply conveyed from
Turkey and transferred as a free gift to England, as a position
necessary for her occupation under the probable contingencies of the
Anglo-Turkish alliance, and it should have at once become a portion of
the British Empire. Had this course been pursued a mutual confidence
would have been established; on the other hand, all back-doors would
have been sealed, as we should have been bound by all the laws of honour
to defend Turkey to the last extremity in Asia Minor.
Russia, in Kars, occupies a position which affords an unbounded horizon
for political intrigue. The various Turkish Pachas and other district
authorities throughout Asia Minor have witnessed the irresistible
advance of Russia, while England stood afar off, and only assisted
Turkey with her good counsel. The same authorities now see Russia in
possession, while England, who has not assisted during the bloody
struggle, appears upon the scene as a political Paul Pry, and intrudes
upon the mysteries that surround Pachas, Governors, and various
functionaries, who, from the highest to the lowest official, mainly
exist upon extortion.
It is hardly necessary to explain that British assistance in such a form
will be most unwelcome, and will increase our reputation for
intermeddling while in the hour of extremity we withhold the required
aid. Any interference on our part with the administration of Asia Minor
will cause an extreme jealousy and suspicion throughout all classes of
Turkish officials, who will be rendered the more amenable to the guiles
of Russian intrigues from Kars and Ardahan. A very slight knowledge of
Turkish character would induce the natural conclusion. The English would
be suspected of coveting Asia Minor, as they had already obtained
Cyprus, and Russia would have gained her end in destroying all
confidence that might possibly have existed, and thus endanger the
defensive alliance.
There are serious risks that might enforce the advance of Russian troops
beyond the defined frontier. Already there are reports of general
discontent and threatened disturbances. In the event of a mutiny of
Turkish troops on the Russian border, the Russians might be invited to
assist by the Pacha in command. Sometimes such revolts are factitious,
for political purposes. In all cases the position of Russia in Asia
Minor is one of extreme danger to Turkey, and it is far from improbable
that activity on her side, and passiveness upon ours, may terminate in a
friendship between the Russians and the Turks to the detriment of
British interests, and to the confusion of the assumed Protectorate.
This document distinctly states:--If "Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of
them shall be retained by Russia, and if any further attempt shall be
made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further
territories of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia as fixed by the
definitive treaty of peace, England engages to join his Imperial Majesty
the Sultan in defending them by force of arms."
In a despatch from Lord Salisbury to Sir A. H. Layard, dated 30th May,
1878, these ominous words are contained:--
"Even if it be certain that Batoum and Ardahan
and Kars will not become the base from which
emissaries of intrigue will issue forth, to be in due
time followed by invading armies, the mere retention
of them by Russia will exercise a powerful influence
in disintegrating the Asiatic dominion of the Porte."
In the same lengthy despatch the conditions are described which Turkey
must fulfil in reforming the abuses of the present administration, &c.
&c., and there can be no doubt that the British government contemplated
the necessity of supplanting a considerable number of the peculant
Turkish officials by experienced English officers, whose supervision
would ensure the necessary reforms. If such a course should have been
accepted by the Porte there could be no question of the salutary effect,
as the presence of British officials in actual authority throughout the
provinces of Asia Minor would have proved to the various races our
positive determination to uphold their rights, and to defend them from
the oppression and extortion to which they had been subjected. Such a
position would have given England the control that is absolutely
necessary to effect the reforms in the administration of Asia Minor,
without which the result will be anarchy and revolution within a few
years, fostered by Russia precisely in accordance with the policy that
has terminated in the disruption of Turkey in Europe.
In the same despatch of 30th May, 1878, Lord Salisbury continues:--
"Her Majesty's Government intimated to the Porte on the
occasion of the Conference at Constantinople that they
were not prepared to sanction misgovernment and
oppression, and it will be requisite before they can
enter into any agreement for the defence of the Asiatic
territories of the Porte in certain eventualities, that
they should be formally assured of the intention of the
Porte to introduce the necessary reforms into the
government of the Christian and other subjects of the
Porte in those regions. IT IS NOT DESIRABLE TO REQUIRE
MORE THAN AN ENGAGEMENT IN GENERAL TERMS, FOR THE
SPECIFIC MEASURES TO BE TAKEN COULD ONLY BE DEFINED
AFTER A MORE CAREFUL INQUIRY AND DELIBERATION THAN
COULD BE SECURED AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE."
The italics are my own, for the weak point of the Convention is
exhibited by this sentence.
No "general terms" should ever be mentioned in a communication with
Orientals, and no convention should have been concluded with the Porte,
unless every detail had been previously considered and specially agreed
upon between the contracting parties. When this Convention was made
public, I concluded that the British government contemplated the
official employment of a certain number of their own officers to carry
out the spirit of the agreement, without which the Convention would be a
farce; at the same time I was convinced that the suspicions of the
Turkish government and the stubborn pride of the race would resist any
such direct interference upon the part of England. Under these
conditions Asia Minor would remain exactly where it was. A grand scheme
which would have had immense political results, had the Turks accepted
our interference in the honourable spirit of our intentions, has been
frustrated by their want of confidence, and the Convention remains,
containing an agreement of stupendous importance, by which England is
committed to a military undertaking of the first magnitude, while Turkey
risks nothing except her "PROMISES OF REFORM in the administration of
her Asiatic provinces."
"British interests" in this transaction are represented by Cyprus, which
we occupy as tenants--paying 96,000 pounds a year for the ruined house,
and leaving ourselves no balance from the revenue for the necessary
repairs.
There is no more difficult political associate than the Turk; his
defensive weapon is delay, and in moments of the greatest emergency his
peculiar apathy or patience never forsakes him. Proud and haughty to a
superlative degree, in his heart he detests all extraneous counsel and
interference, and would rather glide onward to destruction than grasp
the hand stretched out to save him. Turkey has expected much from
England, and has made a poor return for our sacrifice of blood and
treasure during the Crimean war. She obtained an ephemeral financial
reputation through the aid of France and England in becoming guarantees
for a public loan; upon this false position she traded until the
inevitable bankruptcy plunged her into ruin, and opened the gate for the
entrance of her enemies, at the same time that dishonesty entailed the
severance of friends. England has from mutual interests endeavoured to
preserve her from absolute dissolution, and the Protectorate of Asia
Minor was a step of political audacity in her favour that surprised the
world. This extraordinary offer of material aid has been met by the same
want of confidence that has marked the decline of the Turkish Empire;
the only extra interference in Asia Minor has been the appointment of a
few additional British consuls. These gentlemen will report long lists
of abuses, and the general mal-administration of the Turkish officials;
they will be hated accordingly, and being absolutely powerless for good,
they will simply keep the Foreign Office informed of what was thoroughly
well known before. Remonstrances upon our part will be made to the
Porte, who will deny the accuracy of the consular reports, and
ultimately a special commission will be sent out, which will prove their
correctness; the Porte will again promise amendment, but will not
sanction the appointment of British officials. In this old-fashioned
course, so thoroughly understood by all who have any knowledge of
Turkey, the affairs of Asia Minor will be conducted, until revolution
shall bring Russia upon the scene at the most favourable opportunity;
and England, who has been thwarted by the Power she has endeavoured to
save, will, by the terms of the Convention, be compelled to appear in
arms as the defender of the remnant of the Turkish Empire.
Common sense would suggest the absolute necessity of special and clearly
defined conditions in concluding an alliance with Turkey which may at
any moment demand our military interference. If we are bound to assist
by force of arms in the defence of Asia Minor, it is equally necessary
that Turkey should be bound to qualify herself for resistance to an
attack from Russia. It should have been distinctly agreed that Turkey
should raise a territorial army of an estimated strength for the
protection of Asia Minor, and that a certain number of British officers
should hold important commands, to ensure the regular payment of the
troops and to maintain the necessary discipline. Had such conditions
been defined, and the civil courts been placed under the supervision of
British officials, the Protectorate of Asia Minor would have become a
practical combination that would have been an effectual check to Russian
encroachments; but as the affair now stands, the alliance is fraught
with extreme danger to ourselves. I cannot conceive the possibility of a
credulity that would induce experienced statesmen to believe in the
assurances given either by Turkey or by Russia. The history of the past
is sufficient to prove the utter fallacy of assertions, promises, and
treaties; Turkey will persist in mal-administration; Russia, who is now
marching upon Merv in spite of former assurances, as she advanced on
Khiva under similar pretexts, will at the moment of her own selection
assuredly break through her boundaries in Asia Minor. The position of
England will be contemptible. We have thrown down the gauntlet to Russia
by an ostentatious alliance with Turkey, but we hesitate to insist upon
the overwhelming necessity of British official and military officers
to organise the civil administration and an army of defence; thus, when
the sudden emergency shall arise, Turkey will be totally unprepared; the
various races that comprise her Asiatic dominions will already have been
poisoned by intrigue, and the only defence that can be offered to a
Russian advance will be afforded by Turkish neglect, which has left the
country devoid of roads.
Under these inevitable circumstances, England will probably accuse
Turkey of neglecting to fulfil the conditions of the defensive alliance,
and the "back-door" will offer a convenient exit from the difficulty;
in which case, Turkey will be compelled to make terms with Russia that
will probably terminate in a Russo-Turkish alliance AGAINST England, who
will be accused of having treacherously deserted her after breaking a
solemn engagement--and obtaining Cyprus.
This may be a gloomy prospect, but it is not one shade darker than the
reality of the position, unless the Porte will sanction the assistance
of a British administration that would entirely change the political
aspect. A reform of administration in Asia Minor to be effective, should
be based upon the judicial system pursued by the English in the courts
of Cyprus--where the Turkish laws remain undisturbed, but they are
administered under the supervision of specially appointed officers. For
the most part Turkish laws are based upon pure equity, and leave little
to be desired beyond their faithful execution. The oppression and
extortion prevalent throughout the Turkish dominions are directly
contrary to the laws, and are the result of personal tyranny on the part
of the authorities.
In the event of a rupture with our ally that would result in a
Russo-Turkish combination, Cyprus would exhibit its importance as a
strategical position that would entirely command the coasts of Syria and
the approach to Egypt. As I have already stated, the value of the island
is conditional upon the permanence of the Turkish alliance; should
Turkey and England remain friends and allies, Cyprus is quite
unnecessary as a British military station; but our possession will
probably ENTAIL THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF TURKISH GOOD FAITH, as the
restored arsenal and harbour of Famagousta would complete a position
that would dominate the whole of the Turkish shores upon the
Mediterranean, and in conjunction with Greece, which would assure the
refuge of Corfu to our fleets, the naval power of Great Britain would be
absolute to the east of Gibraltar.