Whether the Intellectual Soul Is Produced from the Semen?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced
from the semen. For it is written (Gen. 46:26): "All the souls that
came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from
the thigh of a man, except from the semen. Therefore the intellectual
soul is produced from the semen.
Obj. 2: Further, as shown above (Q. 76, A. 3), the intellectual,
sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man.
But the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen, as in
other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii,
3) that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but
first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore
also the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.
Obj. 3: Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is
directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and
the form there would not result something simply one. But the
intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced
by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is
produced by the power of the semen.
Obj. 4: Further, man begets his like in species. But the human
species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational
soul is from the begetter.
Obj. 5: Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if
the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the
sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit
intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created by God.
_On the contrary,_ It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the
rational soul is not engendered by coition."
_I answer that,_ It is impossible for an active power existing in
matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial
effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man
transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no
part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to
produce the intellectual principle.
Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter
according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making
use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever
to do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the
intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen.
Hence the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows
that the intellect alone comes from without."
Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of
the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Q. 75, A. 2): therefore
to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an
immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only
through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul
is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to
be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is
therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted
with the semen.
Reply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the
whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.
Reply Obj. 2: Some say that the vital functions observed in the
embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or
from the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are
false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth
cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said
that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the
beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.
Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which
existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and in
addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus
there would be in man three souls of which one would be in
potentiality to another. This has been disproved above (Q. 76,
A. 3).
Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely
vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power,
becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes
intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by
the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from
without. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect
comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no
substantial form is susceptible of more or less; but addition of
greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition
of unity constitutes another species of number. Now it is not
possible for the same identical form to belong to different species.
Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal
would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the
imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because
it would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not
generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in
act. For if the vegetative soul is from the beginning in the matter
of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection;
this will imply addition of further perfection without corruption of
the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of
generation properly so called. Fourthly, because either that which is
caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must
needs be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was
non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those
who held the existence of several souls in the body--or else it is
not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: and from
this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with
the body, which cannot be admitted.
There is again another explanation, according to those who held that
all men have but one intellect in common: but this has been disproved
above (Q. 76, A. 2).
We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the
corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and
in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous
form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening form contains the
perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in
this way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at
the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This
indeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated from
putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is
created by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at
the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being
corrupted.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not
ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to
one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from
reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior
agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the
generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but
the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what
has been said above (Q. 105, A. 5; Q. 110, A. 1) that the whole of
corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power,
especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders the formation of the
body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul
is from God alone.
Reply Obj. 4: Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power
the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form.
Reply Obj. 5: In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is
good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is
evil; in this God does not concur.
_______________________