Whether God Can Move the Created Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For
whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be
forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot
be moved by God.
Obj. 2: Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at
the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be
voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another.
Therefore God cannot move the will.
Obj. 3: Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to
the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but
to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that
voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But
this is false. Therefore God does not move the will.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God who worketh
in us [Vulgate--'you'] both to will and to accomplish."
_I answer that,_ As the intellect is moved by the object and by the
Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above (A. 3), so is the
will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the
power of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object,
but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move
a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover
surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable.
Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for
its object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect
is the universal being. But every created good is some particular
good; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the
capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In
like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will
is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which
is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs
to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just
as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs
the directing of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both
ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second
way by an interior inclination of the will.
Reply Obj. 1: A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its
natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the
proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is
made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not
forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it,
because He gives the will its own natural inclination.
Reply Obj. 2: To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within,
that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be
caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is
not repugnant to being moved by another.
Reply Obj. 3: If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be
moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed
for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not
prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2),
it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
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