SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 2]

Whether God Preserves Every Creature Immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that God preserves every creature

immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action,

as above stated (A. 1, ad 4). But God created all things immediately.

Therefore He preserves all things immediately.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it

cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore

can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God

preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them.

Obj. 3: Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of

its _becoming,_ but also of its being. But all created causes do not

seem to cause their effects except in their _becoming,_ for they

cause only by moving, as above stated (Q. 45, A. 3). Therefore they

do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.

_On the contrary,_ A thing is kept in being by that which gives it

being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes.

Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a thing keeps another in

being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or

hindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and

_per se,_ by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as

the being of the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a

created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in

corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of

corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just

as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many

other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as

to its being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one

another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first

and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way

on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal

cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the

middle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle

cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.

For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and

continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the

Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the

diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated;

whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of

diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner

astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those

things which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps

certain things in being, by means of certain causes.

Reply Obj. 1: God created all things immediately, but in the

creation itself He established an order among things, so that some

depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He

remains the principal cause of their preservation.

Reply Obj. 2: Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause

on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can

only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the

power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving

another.

Reply Obj. 3: No created nature can be the cause of another,

as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by

virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something

presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect,

without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form

or disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow

some change to have taken place, while the preservation of the light

is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the

source of light.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 633 / 722 题