FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 1]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Immortal?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not

immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. But

if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined.

Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal.

Obj. 2: Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically

distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there

can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first

man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present

state.

Obj. 3: Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence,

this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature,

for since nature does not change within the same species, he would

also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to

grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to

Wis. 10:2: "He brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have

regained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore

man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

Obj. 4: Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward,

according to Apoc. 21:4: "Death shall be no more." But man was not

created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward.

Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:12): "By sin death came into

the world." Therefore man was immortal before sin.

_I answer that,_ A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First,

on the part of matter--that is to say, either because it possesses

no matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in

potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things

as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is

incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible,

yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from

corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as

Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): "God made man's soul of such a

powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds

to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption."

Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient

cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state

of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19

[*Work of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of St.

Augustine): "God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that

he might achieve for himself life or death." For man's body was

indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but

by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby

it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it

remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for

since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter,

as above explained (Q. 76, A. 1), it was most properly endowed at

the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner

surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter.

Reply Obj. 1 and 2: These objections are founded on natural

incorruptibility and immortality.

Reply Obj. 3: This power of preserving the body was not natural to

the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace

as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not

recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this

was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature

was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further

on (III, Q. 14, A. 4, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 4: The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs

from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of

innocence.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 601 / 722 题