SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 2]

Whether Adam in the State of Innocence Saw the Angels Through Their

Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw

the angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1):

"In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by

purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the

good angels."

Obj. 2: Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the

knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body

which "is a load upon the soul," as is written Wis. 9:15. Wherefore

the separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained

(Q. 89, A. 2). But the body of the first man was not a load upon his

soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to

see separate substances.

Obj. 3: Further, one separate substance knows another separate

substance, by knowing itself (De Causis xiii). But the soul of the

first man knew itself. Therefore it knew separate substances.

_On the contrary,_ The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours.

But our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore

neither could Adam's soul.

_I answer that,_ The state of the human soul may be distinguished in

two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence;

and in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished

from the state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the state of

the soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption,

the state of natural existence remaining the same: and thus the state

of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man's

soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern

the body; wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a

"living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body--namely animal

life. But he was endowed with integrity as to this life, in that the

body was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we

have said above (A. 1). Now it is clear from what has been already

said (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1; Q. 89, A. 1) that since the soul is

adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is

fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by

turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was

becoming to the soul of the first man also.

Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees

of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The first

is by the soul "passing from exterior things to concentrate its

powers on itself"; the second is by the soul ascending "so as to be

associated with the united superior powers," namely the angels; the

third is when the soul is "led on" yet further "to the supreme good,"

that is, to God.

In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to

itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the

intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external

things, as we have said above (Q. 87, A. 3): and so by the knowledge

thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act

through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself,

the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its

proper act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect

knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to

phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above

(Q. 55, A. 2); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the

soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of

an angel. Much less does the third movement lead to perfect

knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know

themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine

Substance, by reason of its surpassing excellence. Therefore the soul

of the first man could not see the angels in their essence.

Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the

angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things

within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was

on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that "he

enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits."

This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply Obj. 2: That the soul of the first man fell short of the

knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact

that the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural

object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in

our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons.

Reply Obj. 3: The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at

knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as

we have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others

in its own measure.

_______________________

Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 587 / 722 题