Whether the Image of God Is to Be Found in Irrational Creatures?
Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is to be found in
irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are
contingent images of their causes." But God is the cause not only of
rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of
God is to be found in irrational creatures.
Obj. 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it
approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine
goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of God.
Obj. 3: Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more
it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness
than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things
together are called "very good" (Gen. 1:31). Therefore the whole
universe is to the image of God, and not only man.
Obj. 4: Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding the
world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore the
whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational
creature.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "Man's
excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by
giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of
the field." Therefore things without intellect are not made to God's
image.
_I answer that,_ Not every likeness, not even what is copied from
something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be
only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does
not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a
worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image,
merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white
like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing;
for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature
of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king
exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and
chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper.
Whence Hilary says pointedly that "an image is of the same species."
Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate
difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly
because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because
they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83,
qu. 51) "approach so near to God in likeness, that among all
creatures nothing comes nearer to Him." It is clear, therefore, that
intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's
image.
Reply Obj. 1: Everything imperfect is a participation of what is
perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image,
so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in
some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects
are "contingent images of their causes"; that is, as much as they
happen (_contingit_) to be so, but not absolutely.
Reply Obj. 2: Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as
regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is
involved in the idea of an image.
Reply Obj. 3: The universe is more perfect in goodness than the
intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but
intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is
found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for
the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly
divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore,
when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of
God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's
image, but that the other parts are excluded.
Reply Obj. 4: Boethius here uses the word "image" to express the
likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species
in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the
exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using
the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in
nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the
First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent,
like to the Supreme Wisdom.
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