Whether Free-Will Is a Power?
Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not a power. For
free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an
act, not a power. Therefore free-will is not a power.
Obj. 2: Further, free-will is defined as "the faculty of the will and
reason." But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to
a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De
Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is "the soul's habit of
disposing of itself." Therefore it is not a power.
Obj. 3: Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But
free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that "man, by
abusing free-will, loses both it and himself." Therefore free-will is
not a power.
_On the contrary,_ Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of
a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which
it chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.
_I answer that,_ Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium--i.e. free
judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of
speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by
which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both
power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge
and by the intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a
power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit
nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways.
First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit;
for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not
natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under
free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we
have natural habits--for instance, to assent to first principles:
while those things to which we are naturally inclined are not subject
to free-will, as we have said of the desire of happiness (Q. 82, AA.
1, 2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it
should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit
is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.
Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that "by reason
of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and
passions" (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as
regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by
knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we
know the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free-will
is indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible
for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act.
And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power
which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will
denominated an act, it would not always remain in man.
Reply Obj. 2: Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for
operation, and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of
free-will. But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but
as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of
relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit:
for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by
the habit he is apt to act well or ill.
Reply Obj. 3: Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin,
not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as
regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat
later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this work
(I-II, Q. 85, seqq.; Q. 109).
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