Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible
appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are
parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore
it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii,
12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not
obey reason.
Obj. 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But
the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according to
the Apostle (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members fighting
against the law of my mind." Therefore the irascible and
concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.
Obj. 3: Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational
part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive
part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear nor see
just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers
of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupiscible, obey
reason.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the
part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided
into concupiscence and anger."
_I answer that,_ In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers
obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the
will; first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the
reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive
appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance,
a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the
estimative power, as we have said above (Q. 78, A. 4), is replaced
by the cogitative power, which is called by some "the particular
reason," because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man
the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason.
But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved
according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters
particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions.
Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive
appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this
appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from
universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but
of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are
said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone
can experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal
considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.
To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution,
which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals
movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites:
for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it
has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not
moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible
appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the
superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of
motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first:
wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement,
unless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher
says (De Anima iii, 11), that "the higher appetite moves the lower
appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower." In this way,
therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason.
Reply Obj. 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is
proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and
concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the
part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said.
Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): "We observe in
an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates
the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the
appetite by a politic and royal power." For a power is called
despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to
resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since
they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and
royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject
to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their
own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who
commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic
power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the
sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and
whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved
at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible
and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite
has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the
commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved,
not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the
cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the
imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the
irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we
sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or
unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the
irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not
conclude that they do not obey.
Reply Obj. 3: The exterior senses require for action exterior
sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which
is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and
apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore they are
subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify
the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the
phantasms of the imagination.
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