FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 81, Art. 1]

Whether Sensuality Is Only Appetitive?

Objection 1: It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive,

but also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "the

sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses

is common to us and beasts." But the bodily senses belong to the

apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.

Obj. 2: Further, things which come under one division seem to be

of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality

against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge.

Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive.

Obj. 3: Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place

of the "serpent." But in the temptation of our first parents, the

serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing

sin, which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a

cognitive power.

_On the contrary,_ Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things

belonging to the body."

_I answer that,_ The name sensuality seems to be taken from the

sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13),

just as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance,

sight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following

sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not

so properly called a movement as the act of the appetite: since the

operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact

that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the

operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he

who desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the

operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas the

operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement.

Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the

appetitive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive

appetite.

Reply Obj. 1: By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is

directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to

understand that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but

rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to

the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended

through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain to

sensuality as a preamble.

Reply Obj. 2: Sensuality is divided against higher and lower

reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the

apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason,

is a motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.

Reply Obj. 3: The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but

also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is

signified by the serpent.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 504 / 722 题