SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 7]

Whether the Soul Is United to the Animal Body by Means of a Body?

Objection 1: It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by

means of a body. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 19), that "the

soul administers the body by light," that is, by fire, "and by air,

which is most akin to a spirit." But fire and air are bodies.

Therefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body.

Obj. 2: Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing

the removal of which involves the cessation of their union. But when

breathing ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the

breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of union between soul

and body.

Obj. 3: Further, things which are very distant from one another, are

not united except by something between them. But the intellectual

soul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal,

and because it is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to be united to

the body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some

heavenly light, which would harmonize the elements, and unite them

together.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1): "We need

not ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and

its shape are one." But the shape is united to the wax without a body

intervening. Therefore also the soul is thus united to the body.

_I answer that,_ If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united

to the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some

other bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any

animal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it

by means of something nearer.

If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have

said (A. 1), it is impossible for it to be united by means of

another body. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as

it is a being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be

actual since it is itself essentially an act; nor does it give

existence by means of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing

composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by

reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there

any other cause of union except the agent, which causes matter to be

in act, as the Philosopher says, _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 6).

From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who

maintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the soul and

body of man. Of these certain Platonists said that the intellectual

soul has an incorruptible body naturally united to it, from which it

is never separated, and by means of which it is united to the

corruptible body of man. Others said that the soul is united to the

body by means of a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the

body by means of light, which, they say, is a body and of the nature

of the fifth essence; so that the vegetative soul would be united to

the body by means of the light of the sidereal heaven; the sensible

soul, by means of the light of the crystal heaven; and the

intellectual soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now

all this is fictitious and ridiculous: for light is not a body; and

the fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a

mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but only virtually: and lastly,

because the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to

matter.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the

body; whence he uses the word "administration." It is true that it

moves the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. And

the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the

Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x).

Reply Obj. 2: The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of

breath, not because this is the means of union, but because of the

removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such

a union. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first

instrument of motion.

Reply Obj. 3: The soul is indeed very distant from the body, if we

consider the condition of each separately: so that if each had a

separate existence, many means of connection would have to intervene.

But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an

existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own

existence is united to the body immediately. This is the case with

every form which, if considered as an act, is very distant from

matter, which is a being only in potentiality.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 470 / 722 题