Whether the Intellectual Soul Is United to the Body Through the Medium
of Accidental Dispositions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the
body through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form
exists in its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are
accidents. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter
before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the
soul is a substantial form.
Obj. 2: Further, various forms of one species require various parts
of matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without
division in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose
dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are many
belonging to one species.
Obj. 3: Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is
corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its
power. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by
means of a power, which is an accident.
_On the contrary,_ Accident is posterior to substance, both in the
order of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says,
_Metaph._ vii (Did. vi, 1). Therefore it is unintelligible that any
accidental form exist in matter before the soul, which is the
substantial form.
_I answer that,_ If the soul were united to the body, merely as a
motor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain
dispositions mediating between the soul and the body; on the
contrary, they would be necessary, for on the part of the soul would
be required the power to move the body; and on the part of the body,
a certain aptitude to be moved by the soul.
If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the
substantial form, as we have already said above (A. 1), it is
impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body
and the soul, or between any substantial form whatever and its
matter. The reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all
manner of acts in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the
acts must be understood as being first in matter. Now the first among
all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be
apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before it is actual. But
matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it
to exist absolutely, as we have said above (A. 4). Wherefore it is
impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter
before the substantial form, and consequently before the soul.
Reply Obj. 1: As appears from what has been already said (A. 4), the
more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior
forms; therefore while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter
according to the various degrees of perfection. For the same
essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an
animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to every genus follow its own
proper accidents. Therefore as matter is apprehended as perfected in
its existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so
those accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist
before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter
before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards the
subsequent effect.
Reply Obj. 2: Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the
corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter, once
understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct
in its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according
to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially
the same form which gives matter the various degrees of perfection,
as we have said (ad 1), yet it is considered as different when
brought under the observation of reason.
Reply Obj. 3: A spiritual substance which is united to a body as
its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the
intellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a
form; and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue.
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