Whether It Is an Article of Faith That the World Began?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a
demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that
is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved
demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed
this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can
be demonstratively proved that the world began.
Obj. 2: Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by
God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from something.
But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world
would have preceded the world; against which are the arguments of
Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated.
Therefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing; and
thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have begun.
Obj. 3: Further, everything which works by intellect works from some
principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts by
intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore,
which is His effect, did not always exist.
Obj. 4: Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have
developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some
fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been
always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist.
Obj. 5: Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But
if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration.
Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.
Obj. 6: Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that
infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass
through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at
this present day; which is manifestly false.
Obj. 7: Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was
eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite
series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii,
text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite
series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5).
Obj. 8: Further, if the world and generation always were, there have
been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal: therefore
an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is
impossible. Therefore it can be known with certainty that the world
began, and not only is it known by faith.
_On the contrary,_ The articles of faith cannot be proved
demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" (Heb.
11:1). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world
began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in one God,"
etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses
prophesied of the past, saying, "In the beginning God created heaven
and earth": in which words the newness of the world is stated.
Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and
therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.
_I answer that,_ By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration
can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said
above of the mystery of the Trinity (Q. 32, A. 1). The reason of this
is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part
of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the
essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is
abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence it is said that universals
are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man,
or heaven, or a stone were not always. Likewise neither can it be
demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will.
For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as
regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He
wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above (Q. 19,
A. 3). But the divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which
faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of
faith, but not of demonstration or science. And it is useful to
consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of
faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to
give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds
we believe things that are of faith.
Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of
philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For
some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is
an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are
cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made
by God. For they hold that the world has a beginning, not of time,
but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible way it was
always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei
x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in the dust from eternity,
there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by
him who trod on it, so also the world always was, because its Maker
always existed." To understand this we must consider that the
efficient cause, which acts by motion, of necessity precedes its
effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action,
and every agent must be the principle of action. But if the action is
instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker
to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of
illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily if
God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the
world in duration; because creation, by which He produced the world,
is not a successive change, as was said above (Q. 45, A. 2).
Reply Obj. 2: Those who would say that the world was eternal, would
say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made
after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation,
but that it was not made from anything; and so also some of them do
not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix,
text 4).
Reply Obj. 3: This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys.
viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion,
except as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out
what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human
intellect, but not the divine intellect (Q. 14, AA. 7, 12).
Reply Obj. 4: Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that
some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being
uninhabitable to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise
they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and
accidents, were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay.
Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such
particular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole
world.
Reply Obj. 5: Even supposing that the world always was, it would not
be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6);
because the divine Being is all being simultaneously without
succession; but with the world it is otherwise.
Reply Obj. 6: Passage is always understood as being from term to
term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there
is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection
is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite
number of mean terms.
Reply Obj. 7: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to
infinity _per se_--thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes
that are _per se_ required for a certain effect; for instance, that a
stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to
infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity
_accidentally_ as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the
causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one
cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by
means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may
be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer
acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to
this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for
he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men
generating hold one grade in efficient causes--viz. the grade of a
particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be
generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible
if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an
elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.
Reply Obj. 8: Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this
reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to
be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of
Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But
this was disproved above (Q. 7, A. 4). Some say that the soul is
corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will
remain. But others, as Augustine says [*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4, 5; De
Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a
circuit of souls--viz. that souls separated from their bodies return
again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which
matters will be given later (Q. 75, A. 2; Q. 118, A. 6). But be it
noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one
might say that the world was eternal, or at least some creature, as
an angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in
general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.
_______________________