SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 2]

Whether God Can Create Anything?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot create anything, because,

according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient

philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing

is made from nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the

contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make

the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation and negation

are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything

from nothing, or create.

Obj. 2: Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to

be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore

creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as

appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of

what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to

be made out of nothing by God.

Obj. 3: Further, what has been made must have at some time been

becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same

time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what

is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it

would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time.

Therefore when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having

been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which

the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything

should be made from nothing.

Obj. 4: Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite

distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not

happen that something is made from nothing.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God

created heaven and earth."

_I answer that,_ Not only is it [not] impossible that anything should

be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were

created by God, as appears from what has been said (Q. 44, A. 1). For

when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from

which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by

his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or

brass, which are caused not by the action of art, but by the action

of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards

their form, but presupposes matter. If therefore God did only act

from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing

presupposed would not be caused by Him. Now it has been shown above

(Q. 44, AA. 1, 2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is

the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that

God brings things into being from nothing.

Reply Obj. 1: Ancient philosophers, as is said above (Q. 44, A. 2),

considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular

causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their action;

whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from nothing."

But this has no place in the first emanation from the universal

principle of things.

Reply Obj. 2: Creation is not change, except according to a mode of

understanding. For change means that the same something should be

different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the

same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in

motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is

the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the

subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole

substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as

different now and before only according to our way of understanding,

so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and

afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the

substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations

(Phys. iii, text 20, 21), it must follow that when motion is

withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the

creature. But because the mode of signification follows the mode of

understanding as was said above (Q. 13, A. 1), creation is signified

by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is

to make something from nothing. And yet "to make" and "to be made"

are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be

changed," because "to make" and "to be made" import a relation of

cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change

only as a consequence.

Reply Obj. 3: In things which are made without movement, to become

and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the

term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated

and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the term of

movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the

same time. In these things what is being made, is; but when we speak

of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was not

previously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is

being created and is already created at the same time.

Reply Obj. 4: This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if

there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is

plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken

to signify a change existing between two forms.

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