SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 2]

Whether the Person Proceeding Is Co-eternal with His Principle, As

the Son with the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that the person proceeding is not

co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius

gives twelve modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of

a line from a point; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. The

second is like the emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent

equality of nature. The third is like the mark or impression made by a

seal; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The

fourth is the infusion of a good will from God; wherein also

consubstantiality is wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an

accident from its subject; but the accident has no subsistence. The

sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter, as sense receives

the species from the sensible object; wherein is wanting equality of

spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the exciting of the will by

knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The eighth is

transformation, as an image is made of brass; which transformation is

material. The ninth is motion from a mover; and here again we have

effect and cause. The tenth is the taking of species from genera; but

this mode has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated of the

Son as the genus of a species. The eleventh is the realization of an

idea [ideatio], as an external coffer arises from the one in the mind.

The twelfth is birth, as a man is begotten of his father; which

implies priority and posteriority of time. Thus it is clear that

equality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one

thing is from another. So if the Son is from the Father, we must say

that He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both.

Obj. 2: Further, everything that comes from another has a principle.

But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not

eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3: Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence

everything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is

existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He

begins to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father.

Obj. 4: Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He is

always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is

begotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process

of generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in successive

things, which are always in process of becoming, as time and motion,

it follows that the Son must be always imperfect, which cannot be

admitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of

the Son, and before that moment the Son did not exist.

_On the contrary,_ Athanasius declares that "all the three persons are

co-eternal with each other."

_I answer that,_ We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the

Father. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which

proceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due

to two reasons: one on the part of the agent, and the other on the

part of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently

as regards free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account

of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the form it

gives to the effect, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 2), so it can choose

the time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however,

the same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural

power from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as,

for instance, a man is not able to generate from the very first.

Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle

cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is

successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to

act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, but in the

instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to

what has been said (Q. 41, A. 2), that the Father does not beget the

Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was

perfect from eternity; and again that the action whereby the Father

produces the Son is not successive, because thus the Son would be

successively generated, and this generation would be material, and

accompanied with movement; which is quite impossible. Therefore we

conclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus

the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is

co-eternal with both.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode

of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine

generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of

these modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied

from another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: "Let

Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal Son existed always with the

Father; let the Word announce the impassibility of His birth; let the

name Son insinuate His consubstantiality." Yet, above them all the

procession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly;

the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an

intellect passing from potentiality to act; and this cannot be said

of God.

Reply Obj. 2: Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not

the principle of origin.

Reply Obj. 3: Every corruption is a change; and so all that corrupts

begins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation, however,

is not changed, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 2). Hence the Son is ever

being begotten, and the Father is always begetting.

Reply Obj. 4: In time there is something indivisible--namely, the

instant; and there is something else which endures--namely, time. But

in eternity the indivisible "now" stands ever still, as we have said

above (Q. 10, A. 2, ad 1; A. 4, ad 2). But the generation of the Son

is not in the "now" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to

express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that

"He is ever being born," as Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as

Gregory [*Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [*Super Ps. 2:7] said, it is

better to say "ever born," so that "ever" may denote the permanence

of eternity, and "born" the perfection of the only Begotten. Thus,

therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor "was there a time when

He was not," as Arius said.

_______________________

Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 283 / 722 题