Whether There Is Equality in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that equality is not becoming to the
divine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one
in quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the
divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic
quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity,
which we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of
discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore
equality is not becoming to the divine persons.
Obj. 2: Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have
said (Q. 39, A. 2). Now essence is signified by way of form. But
agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal.
Therefore, we may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not
of equality.
Obj. 3: Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are
equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine
persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine
says (De Trin. vi, 10): "If an image answers perfectly to that
whereof it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that
which it represents cannot be said to be equal to the image." But the
Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the
Son. Therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons.
Obj. 4: Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common to
the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of the
relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.
_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says that "the three persons are
co-eternal and co-equal to one another."
_I answer that,_ We must needs admit equality among the divine persons.
For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15, 16, 17),
equality signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot
admit anything greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius
says (De Trin. i): "They must needs admit a difference [namely, of
Godhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do,
who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus
involving a plurality." Now the reason of this is that unequal things
cannot have the same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else
than His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any
inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the same
essence; and thus the three persons would not be one God; which is
impossible. We must therefore admit equality among the divine persons.
Reply Obj. 1: Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of "bulk" or
dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things,
and has, therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of
"virtue," which is measured according to the perfection of some
nature or form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of
something as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is more or
less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly
by its source--that is, by the perfection of that form or nature:
such is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of great
heat on account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine
says (De Trin. vi, 18) that "in things which are great, but not in
bulk, to be greater is to be better," for the more perfect a thing is
the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity is measured by the
effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is being, for
everything has being by reason of its form. The second effect is
operation, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently
virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and in regard to
action: in regard to being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect
nature are of longer duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as
things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so as
Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says: "We understand
equality to be in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one
of them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or
surpasses in power."
Reply Obj. 2: Where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity,
equality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes
excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to be
alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as
the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said
to be equal if one participates in the form more perfectly than
another. And because not only is the same nature in both Father and
Son, but also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not
only that the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the
error of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude
the error of Arius.
Reply Obj. 3: Equality and likeness in God may be designated in two
ways--namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns,
equality in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the
Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is because
the divine essence is not more the Father's than the Son's.
Wherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, and is
therefore equal to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the
Son, and is therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to
creatures, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "Equality and likeness are
not mutual." For effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch
as they have the form of their causes; but not conversely, for the
form is principally in the cause, and secondarily in the effect.
But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not
in God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore, the Son
receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the
Father, and not conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is
equalled to the Father, but not conversely.
Reply Obj. 4: In the divine persons there is nothing for us to
consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations
in which they are distinct. Now equality implies both--namely,
distinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to
itself; and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons
equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness and
essence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is
not a real relation. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another
by a further relation: for when we say that paternity is opposed to
filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity
and filiation. For in both these cases relation would be multiplied
indefinitely. Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons
is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: but in
its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the
persons, and the unity of essence. For this reason the Master says
(Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in these "it is only the terms that are
relative."
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