SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 7]

Whether the Essential Names Should Be Appropriated to the Persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be

appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in

faith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as

Jerome says, "careless words involve risk of heresy" [*In substance

Ep. lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are

common to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may

be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they

are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than

to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be

appropriated to the persons.

Obj. 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract

signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another;

since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is

the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially when

expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons.

Obj. 3: Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property

is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential

attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as

what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential

attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons.

_On the contrary,_ the Apostle says: "Christ the power of God and the

wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24).

_I answer that,_ For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting

that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons.

For although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by

demonstration, as was above expounded (Q. 32, A. 1), nevertheless it

is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us.

Now the essential attributes of God are more clear to us from the

standpoint of reason than the personal properties; because we can

derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures

which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain

regarding the personal properties, as was above explained (Q. 32, A.

1). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of the trace or image

found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons, so

also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes.

And such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the

essential attributes is called "appropriation."

The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the

essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things

which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who

proceeds by way of intellect, as Word. In another way by

dissimilitude; as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine

says, because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble;

lest anything of the kind be imagined of God.

Reply Obj. 1: The essential attributes are not appropriated to the

persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to make

the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above

explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation

of the truth.

Reply Obj. 2: If the essential attributes were appropriated to the

persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would

follow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which

Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the

Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son

were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be

called wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is

called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father

Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both

together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom

begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His own essence.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the essential attribute is in its proper

concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding;

nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to

prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is

appropriated. Thus color is posterior to body considered as body,

but is naturally prior to "white body," considered as white.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 267 / 722 题