Whether There Are Notions in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are no notions. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say anything of God
but what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture." But Holy Scripture
does not say anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in
God.
Obj. 2: Further, all that exists in God concerns the unity of the
essence or the trinity of the persons. But the notions do not concern
the unity of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; for neither
can what belongs to the essence be predicated of the notions: for
instance, we do not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can
what belongs to the persons be so predicated; for example, we do not
say that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten. Therefore
there do not exist notions in God.
Obj. 3: Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions
as principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition: for
they are known of themselves. But the divine persons are supremely
simple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notions in God.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 5): "We
recognize difference of hypostases [i.e. of persons], in the three
properties; i.e. in the paternal, the filial, and the processional."
Therefore we must admit properties and notions in God.
_I answer that,_ Prepositivus, considering the simplicity of the
persons, said that in God there were no properties or notions, and
wherever there were mentioned, he propounded the abstract for the
concrete. For as we are accustomed to say, "I beseech your
kindness"--i.e. you who are kind--so when we speak of paternity in
God, we mean God the Father.
But, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 3, ad 1), the use of concrete and
abstract names in God is not in any way repugnant to the divine
simplicity; forasmuch as we always name a thing as we understand it.
Now, our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the
divine essence, considered in itself, and therefore, our human
intellect apprehends and names divine things, according to its own
mode, that is in so far as they are found in sensible objects, whence
its knowledge is derived. In these things we use abstract terms to
signify simple forms; and to signify subsistent things we use concrete
terms. Hence also we signify divine things, as above stated, by
abstract names, to express their simplicity; whereas, to express their
subsistence and completeness, we use concrete names.
But not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in
the concrete, as when we say Deity and God; or wisdom and wise; but
the same applies to the personal names, so that we may say paternity
and Father.
Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises from the
obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Ghost to be one God and three persons, to those who ask:
"Whereby are They one God? and whereby are They three persons?" as we
answer that They are one in essence or deity; so there must also be
some abstract terms whereby we may answer that the persons are
distinguished; and these are the properties or notions signified by an
abstract term, as paternity and filiation. Therefore the divine
essence is signified as "What"; and the person as "Who"; and the
property as "Whereby."
The second motive is because one person in God is related to two
persons--namely, the person of the Father to the person of the Son
and the person of the Holy Ghost. This is not, however, by one
relation; otherwise it would follow that the Son also and the Holy
Ghost would be related to the Father by one and the same relation.
Thus, since relation alone multiplies the Trinity, it would follow
that the Son and the Holy Ghost would not be two persons. Nor can it
be said with Prepositivus that as God is related in one way to
creatures, while creatures are related to Him in divers ways, so the
Father is related by one relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost;
whereas these two persons are related to the Father by two relations.
For, since the very specific idea of a relation is that it refers to
another, it must be said that two relations are not specifically
different if but one opposite relation corresponds to them. For the
relation of lord and father must differ according to the difference of
filiation and servitude. Now, all creatures are related to God as His
creatures by one specific relation. But the Son and the Holy Ghost are
not related to the Father by one and the same kind of relation. Hence
there is no parity.
Further, in God there is no need to admit any real relation to the
creature (Q. 28, A. 1, 3); while there is no reason against our
admitting in God, many logical relations. But in the Father there
must be a real relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence,
corresponding to the two relations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,
whereby they are related to the Father, we must understand two
relations in the Father, whereby He is related to the Son and to the
Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is only one Person of the Father, it is
necessary that the relations should be separately signified in the
abstract; and these are what we mean by properties and notions.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the notions are not mentioned in Holy
Scripture, yet the persons are mentioned, comprising the idea of
notions, as the abstract is contained in the concrete.
Reply Obj. 2: In God the notions have their significance not after
the manner of realities, but by way of certain ideas whereby the
persons are known; although in God these notions or relations are
real, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 1). Therefore whatever has order to
any essential or personal act, cannot be applied to the notions;
forasmuch as this is against their mode of signification. Hence we
cannot say that paternity begets, or creates, or is wise, or is
intelligent. The essentials, however, which are not ordered to any
act, but simply remove created conditions from God, can be predicated
of the notions; for we can say that paternity is eternal, or immense,
or such like. So also on account of the real identity, substantive
terms, whether personal or essential, can be predicated of the
notions; for we can say that paternity is God, and that paternity is
the Father.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the persons are simple, still without
prejudice to their simplicity, the proper ideas of the persons can be
abstractedly signified, as above explained.
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