FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Will in God?

Objection 1: It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of

will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end.

Therefore there is not will in God.

Obj. 2: Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it

is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which

cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.

Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54),

the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement,

and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there

is not will in God.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 12:2): "That you may prove

what is the will of God."

_I answer that,_ There is will in God, as there is intellect: since

will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual

existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by

its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its

natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when

it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural

perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things

without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also

intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its

intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not

possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will.

Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every

sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in

God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own

existence, so is His will.

Reply Obj. 1: Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He

Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this

by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (Q. 6,

A. 3): for the end has the aspect of good.

Reply Obj. 2: Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which,

although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking

what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in

what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as

having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is

not distinct from His essence.

Reply Obj. 3: A will of which the principal object is a good outside

itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will

is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God

is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself

alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be

movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover

moves itself.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 152 / 722 题