FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 4]

Whether All Things Are Life in God?

Objection 1: It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is

said (Acts 17:28), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all

things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.

Obj. 2: Further, all things are in God as their first model. But

things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all

things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life

in God.

Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living

substance is better than a substance that does not live. If,

therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God,

it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this

appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in

God potentially.

Obj. 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time are

known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but

that never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God,

inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things

that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this

appears inadmissible.

_On the contrary,_ (John 1:3, 4), it is said, "What was made, in Him

was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things

are life in God.

_I answer that,_ In God to live is to understand, as before stated

(A. 3). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of

understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as

understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since

all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood,

it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.

Reply Obj. 1: Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In

one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the

divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in

us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in

their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the

Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our

being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another

sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in

which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God

are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in

God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and

not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner

are not movement, but life.

Reply Obj. 2: The thing modelled must be like the model according to

the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of

another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing

modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect

immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists

outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of

things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine

mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.

Reply Obj. 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural

things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in

the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which

reason, in fact, Plato held that the _separate_ man was the true man;

and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation.

But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say

that those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly

than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated

being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular

being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its

own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human

nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is

not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in

matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the

one which exists in the mind; since the former is actual, the latter

only potential.

Reply Obj. 4: Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being

comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by

Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are

known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be

said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in

time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding

only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so far

as life implies a principle of operation.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 150 / 722 题