FOURTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 14]

Whether God Knows Enunciable Things?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to

know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and

divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition.

Therefore God does not know enunciable things.

Obj. 2: Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some

likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since

He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable

things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men"

(Ps. 93:11). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of

men. Therefore God knows enunciable things.

_I answer that,_ Since it is in the power of our intellect to form

enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in

that of creatures, as said above (A. 9), it follows of necessity

that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.

Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite

things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the

manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were

composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by

simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if

we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand

all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in

our intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch

as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not

to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not

forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we

understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this

account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one

by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the

species of the divine intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to

represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows

the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to

them.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection would avail if God knew enunciable

things after the manner of enunciable things.

Reply Obj. 2: Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a

thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the

similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 125 / 722 题