Whether the Knowledge of God Is of Future Contingent Things?
Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future
contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary
effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said
above (A. 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He
knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of
contingent things.
Obj. 2: Further, every conditional proposition of which the
antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary
consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are
to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary
conclusion can follow, as is proved in _Poster._ i. But this is a true
conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will
be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the
antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is
eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent
is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is
necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.
Obj. 3: Further, everything known by God must necessarily be,
because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of
course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no
future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent
future thing is known by God.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 32:15), "He Who hath made the
hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e.
of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free
will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.
_I answer that,_ Since as was shown above (A. 9), God knows all
things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and
creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it
follows that God knows future contingent things.
In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be
considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in
act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as
present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference)
to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this
it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to
the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its
cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a
contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent
cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent
thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a
contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural
knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they
are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in
itself. And although contingent things become actual successively,
nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they
are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is
because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being;
and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said
above (Q. 10, A. 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to
God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things
present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried
from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality.
Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by
God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their
presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to
their own causes.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may
be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as
the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate
contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first
cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent
on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God,
which is the first cause, is necessary.
Reply Obj. 2: Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this
contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because,
although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This
however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had
relation to the future, must have had it, although the future
sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this
antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and
contingent; as this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man."
But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this
contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter
of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its
contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or
contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it
may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said
Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and
contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely
necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is
absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of
the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause.
But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were
its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a
contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the
grass will grow."
Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains
anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be
taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the
existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a
thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul
understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is
immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself.
Likewise if I say, "If God knew anything, it will be," the consequent
must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as
it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the
antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily
be," as the Philosopher says in _Peri Herm._ i.
Reply Obj. 3: Things reduced to act in time, as known by us
successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is
above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know
future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God
alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who
goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas
he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling
by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it
is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be
known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according
to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as
already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes.
Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must
necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the
thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and
false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary."
If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense
is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."
Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good
with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I
said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as
applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing
which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, "a white thing
is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from
the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said,
"A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to
be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by
God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these
words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the
subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be
attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be
known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under
actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in
itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.
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